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Abstract 
 
This thesis presents a critical analysis of the political relations between Rome on 
the one hand and Near Eastern kingdoms and principalities on the other hand 
during the age of civil war from 44 until 31 BC. In contrast to previous studies of 
Rome’s foreign affairs in the eastern Mediterranean glancing over this era as a 
result of their focus on longer periods of time during the Republic or Principate, 
this work yields a unique insight into the workings of Rome’s interstate dealings 
during a time of internal upheaval.  
 
By looking at each bilateral relationship separately both from the perspective of 
Rome and the kingdom or principality, it shows first and foremost the wide 
variety in political dealings between representatives of Roman power and Near 
Eastern rulers. Yet, in spite of this diversity, issues such as the political 
dependency of Near Eastern kings and other dynasts on Rome show that there are 
also some common characteristics about the relations. Ever since Pompey 
reorganised the eastern Mediterranean, Rome interfered on a regular basis in the 
internal administration and the foreign affairs of the kingdoms and principalities 
in the Near East. A notable exception in this case formed Parthia, the only realm 
that could measure up to Rome.  
 
The thesis also investigates to what extent the conduct of Rome and Near Eastern 
kingdoms and principalities towards one another in the period from 44 until 31 
was typical for this period. Drawing upon examples from earlier eras, it shows 
that to a large degree the behaviour of Rome and Near Eastern realms in our age 
of civil war was not typical and manifests continuity with earlier periods. It thus 
presents a prima facie case for the re-examination of prevailing views on the 
specificities of Rome and the civil war in relation to international relations of the 
period. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Twenty years have passed since the publication of The Roman Near East 31 BC – 
AD 337, Fergus Millar’s ground-breaking work on the social and political history 
of the Levant and its hinterland during the Principate and the successive period of 
the tetrarchs up until the death of Constantine. 1  As prophesied by Michał 
Gawlikowski in a review at that time,2  the book still stands as the best analysis of 
Near Eastern society during the Roman imperial era, not only in that it exposes the 
variety in civilisation and culture across the entire region in question, but also in 
that it demonstrates how changes in political circumstances – more specifically 
Rome’s eastward expansion and the interplay with the Parthians and (later) the 
Sassanians – influenced social life within the area. Pioneering as this monograph 
thus is, Millar deliberately chose to begin his study at the Battle of Actium, thereby 
leaving out the period of civil war that began in 44 following Caesar’s 
assassination and ended with Octavian’s victory in 31 and formed a transitory 
period from Republic to Principate. 3  The aim of this thesis is to redress this 
imbalance by providing a critical analysis of the political relations maintained by 
Rome on the one hand and Near Eastern kingdoms and principalities on the other 
hand during the era of civil conflict from 44 until 31. This period was characterised 
by institutional novelties, deviant administrative practices – especially with regard 
to the provinces – and by an almost continuous movement of armies and military 
personnel.4 It is in the light of these developments vital to examine whether the 
                                                          
1 Millar (1993). 
2 Gawlikowski (1994) 244. 
3 Millar (1993) xii. The difficulties are further explained in Millar (1987) = (2006) 3-31. 
4 For a critical analysis of the commanders under which Roman legions served, as well as the 
location of these troops in the period from 44 until 31, see Brunt (1971) 480-508. For a brief 
summary of the changes with regard to the administration of Rome’s provinces, see Millar (1973) 
50-61 = (2002) 242-259; Bleicken (1990). 
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relations between Rome and royal powers in the Near East – the area that more 
than once would function as the main stage of the civil war – also underwent any 
changes. No publication has specifically focused on Rome’s interstate transactions 
with the Near East during the thirteen years that marked the transition from 
Republic to Principate. Although the French historian Maurice Sartre deals in his 
opus magnum with the political and socio-cultural history of the Levant from the 
era of Alexander the Great until the demise of the Palmyrene Empire in AD 273, 
his study is limited in geographical terms to the Levant. 5  Michael Sommer’s 
monograph from 2005, on the other hand, is a cultural history of the Near East and 
as such does not deal specifically with interstate relations in our period of civil 
war.6 Yet even Adrian Sherwin-White and Richard Sullivan, who both do focus on 
bilateral interaction, have dealt mainly with Pompey’s activities in the eastern 
Mediterranean in the 60s BC, and less so with the period of Roman civil war from 
44 until 31. 7 This disparity is odd given the fact that the evidence for Rome’s 
affairs with foreign powers in the Near East during this era of civil strife is not 
necessarily inferior to the source material for Pompey’s reorganisation of Asia 
Minor and the Levant. Even studies that do concentrate on the age of internal 
strife have neglected Rome’s foreign affairs in the Near East.8  
 
1 The Near East 
 
As with all studies that are limited to a specific geographical region, it is also in 
this case vital first to draw the boundaries of research – a task that is not as 
                                                          
5 Sartre (2001) 464-468 deals with the history of the province of Syria during our period of civil war. 
6 Sommer (2005). 
7 Sherwin-White (1984); Sullivan (1990).  
8 Biographies of Augustus, Mark Antony, Brutus and Lepidus focus with regard to the period from 
44 until 31 predominantly on the internal political conflicts that raged throughout Rome’s empire 
in those years: Gardthausen (1891); Bengtson (1977); Huzar (1978); Clarke (1981); Weigel (1992); 
Kienast (1999). The great Ronald Syme concentrates in his Roman Revolution (1939) regarding our 
period of civil war mainly on internal politics and changes in the ruling class. Rice Holmes (1928) is 
descriptive. Bleicken (1990) focuses on the Triumvirate as an administrative institution. 
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straightforward as it appears to be.9 The Near East as toponym is alien to the 
ancient world, having only found its origin in nineteenth-century European 
diplomacy, in which context it was used initially to refer roughly to the lands that 
belonged to the erstwhile Ottoman Empire, and in the course of the twentieth 
century with the disintegration of that realm more strictly to Anatolia, the areas on 
the eastern shores of the Mediterranean between modern Turkey and Egypt (often 
identified as the Levant) and lands in the Euphrates and Tigris basin. Soon after 
the term had crept into the language of western diplomacy, it was introduced into 
the fields of archaeology and (art) history.10 Since then, scholars of antiquity have 
identified the Near East with a variety of regions in Asia, depending on the period 
of study and the topic under consideration. Publications that focus on the earliest 
history of the Near East from about the fourth millennium until the onset of the 
Hellenistic Age in the last third of the first millennium BC, for example, have 
tended to regard the Near East to encompass a vast area stretching from the Ionian 
coast in western Anatolia to the eastern boundaries of Iran, from the Caucasus in 
the north to the Red Sea in the south.11 In contrast, scholars dealing with the 
Roman era have commonly disregarded western Anatolia, placing the western 
boundary of the Near East more to the east in the Taurus mountain chains and 
Mount Amanus.12  
The present thesis largely adopts the definition of the latter group, and 
holds the Near East to be limited in the northwest by Mount Amanus and the 
Taurus as far as the banks of the upper Euphrates near Melitene. The northern 
boundary is formed by the Caucasus. From there, the Near East stretches to the 
southeast into the Euphrates and Tigris basin. In the west, it covers the Levant and 
Egypt. My definition of the Near East, thus, corresponds for the most part to the 
                                                          
9 See also maps 1-5 for clarification. 
10 For a brief historical overview of the usage of the toponym Near East by archaeologists and 
ancient (art) historians, see Butcher (2003) 9-11; Van De Mieroop (2007) 1-2. 
11 See e.g. Bienkowski / Millard (2000); Van De Mieroop (2007); Snell (2007). 
12 See e.g. Millar (1993); Butcher (2003). 
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one put forward by Millar in his Roman Near East, and encompasses to a large 
degree the region that is known as the Fertile Crescent.13 
Besides practical, there are geopolitical reasons for demarcating the Near 
East as such and not to include – let us say – kingdoms and principalities in Asia 
Minor into the analysis. Rome had already established herself in Anatolia in the 
second century BC with the installation of the province of Asia in the years after 
the death in 133 of the Pergamene king Attalus III.14 The birth of the first Roman 
province in the Near East as delineated above followed upon the dissolution of the 
last Seleucid possessions in Syria in 64. 15  At approximately that time, Rome 
established her third province in Asia Minor in Bithynia and Pontus; a second one 
had already been founded around the year 80 in Cilicia. Although changes in the 
geographical extent of all these provinces had occurred since their establishment, 
they were all still in existence by the time of Actium. New provinces would not be 
installed until sometime after this event. Thus, with direct Roman rule more 
profoundly present in Asia Minor than in the Near East, the relations maintained 
by Rome and Anatolian powers towards one another were of a different nature 
than the interstate dealings between Rome and Near Eastern kingdoms and 
principalities. 
The less extensive manifestation of Rome in the regions to the east and 
south of the Amanus and the Taurus, however, is not the only ground for 
excluding Asia Minor from our discussion. Another reason why the Near East as 
defined above stands out from other regions is Parthia, the only power that could 
measure up to Rome in the period of civil war. In case of a potential clash between 
these two superpowers, Near Eastern kingdoms and principalities were, based on 
                                                          
13 Millar (1993) xi. The main difference between my and Millar’s definition of the Near East is the 
latter’s decision to leave out Egypt. For my reasons to include Egypt in my study, see below in the 
same section. 
14 For more details on the installation of the province of Asia, see among others Sherwin-White 
(1984) 80-92. 
15 On the dissolution of the Seleucid Kingdom and the installation of the province of Syria, see 
chapter 1.5. 
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their geographical location, more likely to become directly involved than their 
western Anatolian counterparts. 16  Although the Asiatic realms could also be 
overrun by Parthian armies (as we shall see further below) the brunt of the attack 
would be borne by Armenia and Commagene, both kingdoms in the Near East.17 
This circumstance had wide implications for the relations of the other Near 
Eastern realms and Rome towards one another. Since the defeat of the Pontic king 
Mithridates VI in 63, Asia Minor did not have a power left that could pose a 
serious threat to Rome. Geopolitical circumstances will thus have played less of a 
role in the relations that Rome had with western Anatolian kings. The proximity 
to Parthia and the potential Parthian political influence thus set apart the 
kingdoms and principalities to the south and east of the Taurus and east of the 
upper section of the Euphrates from the realms in Anatolia. 
 Most scholars focusing on the Near East in their publications have not 
covered Egypt.18 Studies that deal with the social and religious aspects of society 
in particular have made this decision,19 because Egypt is clearly distinct from the 
Levant and lands further to the east in this respect. Politically, however, Egypt 
forms an intricate part of the Near East. As it will become clear, the Ptolemaic 
dynasty did not only maintain relations with kings and princes of the Levant, it 
also became involved in the territorial distributions of the Near East as organised 
by Antony in the mid-30s BC. In the context of the political relations between 
Rome and Near Eastern kingdoms and principalities, Egypt simply cannot be 
excluded at the time of the internal strife.   
 
                                                          
16 See map I. 
17 See chapter 8.1. 
18 A notable exception in this respect is the grand study of the political relations between Rome and 
the Hellenistic kingdoms and principalities by Gruen (1984), who does include the Ptolemaic 
Kingdom in his analysis. His study, however, does not deal with the first century BC despite the 
fact that the two greatest Hellenistic realms emerging from Alexander’s disintegrating empire (the 
Seleucid and Ptolemaic Kingdoms) survived well into the first century BC until 64 and 30 
respectively, on which see chapters 1.5 and 9.4. 
19 See e.g. Millar (1993). 
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2 The Civil War, 44-31 BC 
 
The period of civil war that forms the chronological framework of this thesis set 
off with Caesar’s assassination on the Ides of March 44 at the hands of a group of 
senators headed by the praetors M. Iunius Brutus and C. Cassius Longinus, and 
came to an end with Octavian’s victory over Mark Antony and the Ptolemaic 
queen Cleopatra VII in the Battle of Actium. The era of thirteen years was 
characterised by a constant series of disputes between different factions within the 
Roman state, and occasional armed clashes. The aim of this section is to give a 
brief historical overview of the conflict in order to facilitate a better understanding 
of the political relations under examination in this thesis.20  
 In the first year of the war, the centre of gravity of Rome’s internal political 
disputes was situated in Italy and the province of Cisalpine Gaul. The war against 
the tyrannicides Brutus and Cassius, who in the course of 44 escaped Italy, and 
fled to the eastern Mediterranean, would not become a priority until sometime 
later in 43. The attention was in first instance focused on Antony, the consul of 44 
who had managed in June by means of a plebiscite to exchange the province of 
Macedonia, which had been allotted to him in April, for Cisalpine Gaul and Gallia 
Comata, and towards the end of the year, when he tried to acquire it, he came into 
conflict with D. Iunius Brutus, who had been appointed by Caesar earlier in the 
year as proconsul to that province.  Both men took to their weapons, and Antony 
eventually managed to lay siege on his opponent at Mutina. The eruption of war 
provoked the Senate to dispatch the consuls of 43, C. Vibius Pansa and A. Hirtius, 
to the hotbed to support D. Brutus against Antony. Octavian was also sent to the 
war, and, for this occasion, was awarded propraetorian imperium – his first official 
position. In April it came to two serious clashes, one at Forum Gallorum and one 
                                                          
20 This outline in no way claims to be comprehensive. For more detailed historical overviews and 
analyses and sources, see Rice Holmes (1928) 1-164; Rawson (1992); Christ (1993) 424-463; Pelling 
(1996). 
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at Mutina. Although Hirtius died during the last battle and Pansa briefly 
afterwards, both military confrontations were won by the consular faction. 
 In the meantime, the two leading conspirators, Cassius and Brutus, had 
managed to obtain a position of power in the eastern Mediterranean. The two 
tyrannicides had left Italy at some point late in the summer, and instead of going 
to the two provinces allocated them (Cyrenaica and Crete) made their way to Syria 
and Macedonia respectively, where they arrived around the beginning of 43. In 
the course of the new year, Brutus succeeded on extending his hegemony to 
include Greece and Asia Minor, whereas Cassius consolidated his position in 
Syria. Both men were ultimately confirmed in their position by the Senate. 
 After the military clashes at Forum Gallorum and Mutina in April 43, 
Antony fled the battlefield and moved westwards where he eventually found 
allies among C. Asinius Pollio, proconsul of Farther Spain, M. Aemilius Lepidus, 
proconsul of Nearer Spain and Narbonese Gaul, and L. Munatius Plancus, 
proconsul of Transalpine Gaul. After his position over Cisalpine Gaul was 
confirmed by the passing of a law in early summer, Antony returned to his 
province and in October held a meeting with Lepidus and Octavian, the latter of 
whom in the intervening time had managed to be elected to one of the two 
consulships that had become vacant with the death of Hirtius and Pansa. Antony 
and Octavian now reconciled and along with Lepidus formed an alliance which in 
November by means of the lex Titia was given legal status making them tresviri or 
triumviri rei publicae constituendae (three men for setting the res publica in order). 
Their new positions gave Antony, Octavian and Lepidus consular powers for five 
years and the right to appoint the city magistrates for the same duration. The three 
men also divided the provinces in the West, whereby Antony retained Gallia 
Comata and Cisalpine Gaul, Lepidus Narbonese Gaul and Nearer Spain, and 
Octavian was  
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given Africa, Sicily and Sardinia. The first priority of the triumvirs was to wipe out 
the Republican power base that Brutus and Cassius had acquired in the eastern 
Mediterranean over the year. Before Antony and Octavian left for the East, 
though, they had to ensure that their enemies would not undermine their 
positions while they were in the East. Accordingly, the decision was made to leave 
Lepidus behind, and to render their foes harmless by placing them on a list of 
outlaws (the proscriptions). Antony and Octavian went to the East and eventually 
engaged in two battles with Brutus and Cassius at Philippi in Greece in 42. The 
encounter ended in a victory for the two triumvirs. 
 With the Republicans defeated, Antony and Octavian implemented a new 
division of the empire. The former was to move eastwards and settle affairs in 
Asia Minor and the Levant, whereas Octavian was to return to Italy and deal with 
the settlement of the veterans who fought at Philippi. The settlement of the 
veterans was a precarious matter with insufficient public land available in Italy. 
Accordingly, Octavian sought recourse to annex territories and give them to the 
troops. This policy unsurprisingly led to frustration among the dispossessed 
inhabitants of Italy. The unsatisfied people found in L. Antonius, brother of the 
triumvir and consul of 41, someone who gave a voice to their grievances and was 
willing to make a stand for them and take recourse to military force. It came to a 
clash at Perusia, and Octavian eventually managed to defeat L. Antonius in the 
beginning of 40.  
Octavian’s success alarmed Antony and prompted him to return from the 
East. An encounter between the troops of the two triumvirs was imminent, but did 
eventually not occur when the troops refused to fight. Antony and Octavian 
reconciled and decided on a redivision of the territories under their control (the 
so-called Pact of Brundisium). Octavian was given authority over the western 
provinces, Antony over the eastern ones, and Lepidus over Africa. The Pact solved 
some of the tension between the Octavian and Antony but did not bring the 
internal conflicts to an end. Sextus Pompeius, a son of Pompey the Great, 
19 
controlled the seas with his fleet and threatened the grain supply to Rome. The 
possibility of a shortage forced Octavian to conclude a treaty with Sextus at 
Misenum in 39. It was decided to give Sardinia, Corsica, Sicily and the 
Peloponnese to Sextus, and to promise him the consulship of 35. The agreement 
prompted Sextus to lift the blockade of Italy.  
 Two years later, in September 37, Antony, Octavian and Lepidus met at 
Tarentum to renew the Triumvirate for another five years after it had expired at 
the end of 38. In the meantime, the conflict with Sextus Pompeius had resumed, 
and Octavian was bound to remove the naval commander. The naval battles at 
Mylae and Naulochus in 36 were devastating for Sextus who fled to the East and 
was assassinated by Antony’s men in 35. A year earlier, Lepidus had been 
removed from his command. In 33, the relations between the two remaining 
triumvirs escalated, and in 31 the two men made preparations for an armed clash 
which eventually occurred at Actium, and ended in a victory for Octavian. Antony 
and his consort Cleopatra had managed to flee the scene, but were finally defeated 
at Alexandria in 30. The downfall of Antony left Octavian as sole ruler over Rome. 
 
3 Structure of the thesis 
 
With the geographical extent of the Near East determined, and a brief outline of 
the civil war provided, it is time to explain exactly which kingdoms and 
principalities will be included in our study.21 For practical reasons, it has been 
decided to focus only on Rome’s relations with those administrative entities that 
were headed by a monarch – whether a king, queen or a dynast carrying lesser 
titles such as ἐθνάρχης and φύλαρχος. Free cities, such as Tyre and Sidon, will 
thus not be taken into account. 22  Equally omitted from the discussion are, 
                                                          
21 See maps 1-5 for clarification. 
22 That these two cities were regarded as free during the time of the civil war, is illustrated by a 
passage in Josephus, AJ 15.95, which clarifies that Antony granted all coastal cities between the 
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obviously, those kingdoms and principalities for which no or very little evidence 
of political contact with Rome exists. Most notable in this respect were Osrhoene 
and Adiabene. The former of these two was located on the left bank of the 
Euphrates opposite Samosata, the latter south of Armenia to the east of the river 
Tigris.23 Both realms had maintained a hostile stance towards the Romans at some 
point before the outbreak of the civil war. Adiabene rendered assistance in 69 to 
the Armenian king Tigranes II against L. Licinius Lucullus, the proconsul who had 
invaded Armenia in pursuit of the Pontic king Mithridates VI,24 whereas Osrhoene 
actively supported the Parthians during the Roman campaign of 53 led by the 
proconsul M. Licinius Crassus. 25  Interesting as it would have been from this 
perspective to uncover how the relations between these two powers and Rome 
had developed in the age of civil war, a lack of evidence prevents us from 
undertaking such an analysis. Similar problems are in play with regard to Rome’s 
political dealings with the Iberians, Albanians and the Rhambaeans, three peoples 
of which the former two inhabited different regions of the Caucasus and the latter 
an unknown area west of the Euphrates. Although political contact between the 
kings of these three communities and Rome for our period of civil war has not 
entirely eluded the source material, the interaction for each of these peoples is 
limited to a single or to two occasions. The Iberians and Albanians came in contact 
with Rome when a certain P. Canidius Crassus undertook a campaign into the 
Caucasus towards the end of 37, whereas the Rhambaeans were involved in an 
internal conflict between Pompeians and Caesareans that occurred in the province 
                                                                                                                                                                                
river Eleutherus and Egypt to the Ptolemaic queen Cleopatra VII in the mid-30s BC with the 
exception of Tyre and Sidon, because both places had enjoyed freedom “from the time of their 
ancestors” (“ἐκ προγόνων”). Cf. BJ 1.361, which mentions the allotment of Tyre and Sidon to 
Cleopatra, but does not refer to the long period of freedom that the two cities had experienced. For 
further references to the history of Tyre, Sidon and other Near Eastern free cities in our period of 
Roman civil war, see among others Eiselen (1907) 76-77; Jones (1971) 259-260.  
23 For more details on the location and on the history of Osrhoene and Adiabene in the first century 
BC, see among others Sullivan (1990) 106-108; Luther (1999); Sommer (2005) 225-234. Cf. Duval 
(1892) 30-73, whose king list is now to be rejected because of errors in the chronology.  
24 Plutarch, Luc. 26-27. 
25 Dio, 40.20.1-21.1. 
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of Syria from 46 until 43. The Iberians also sent a contingent of auxiliary forces to 
support Cassius and Brutus at Philippi in 42. The dealings of these three peoples 
with Rome will, obviously, not be left out. Yet, as no more interaction is known to 
have taken place between them, the occasions for which we do have evidence will 
be dealt with in those chapters where they fit best.26 
Despite the exclusion of free cities, two kingdoms and several associations 
of people from our examination, the relations maintained by the majority of Near 
Eastern powers with Rome will still be analysed. The kingdoms and principalities 
in question are the following: Parthia, the Ptolemaic Kingdom, Judaea, the 
Princedom of Chalcis, the Emisenoi, Nabataea, Armenia, Media Atropatene and 
Commagene. Most of them share a common history concerning their origin. With 
the exception of the Ptolemaic Kingdom, Nabataea and Parthia, they all emerged 
from the Seleucid Kingdom at some point after the beginning of the second 
century BC. Although diplomatic relations with some of these powers by Rome 
were established soon afterwards, it was only with the arrival of Pompey the 
Great in the Near East around the middle of the 60s BC that the relations became 
more intense. It is well known that Pompey dismissed the Seleucid claims to Syria 
in 64 and established a Roman province in that region instead. He also reorganised 
the entire region, by replacing existing rulers and altering the territorial extent of 
several kingdoms and principalities. Almost all Near Eastern powers were 
affected quite drastically in this way. But other significant changes implemented 
by Rome do not seem to have occurred until sometime during the period of civil 
war, with the exception of some alterations in the internal government of Judaea,27 
and Pompey’s measures thus had an enormous impact on how the political map 
of the Near East appeared on the eve of the civil strife in 44. This circumstance 
makes it vital to have a look at the reorganisation of the Near East as it took shape 
                                                          
26  For Canidius’ expedition into the Caucasus, see chapter 14.1. For the involvement of the 
Rhambaeans in the war between the Pompeians and Caesareans in Syria in the middle of the 40s 
BC, see chapter 5.1. 
27 See the introduction to chapter 4. 
22 
in the mid-60s BC before analysing the relations between Rome and Near Eastern 
kingdoms and principalities in the period from 44 until 31. Part I focuses therefore 
on the administrative changes that Pompey carried through in the Near East. As 
will become clear, one of his actions was the conclusion of amicitia (friendship) 
between some of the Near Eastern rulers and Rome. What it meant for the 
participating parties to be united by friendship is another issue on which Part I 
concentrates. 
Part II is devoted to an inquiry into the political relations maintained by 
Rome on the one hand and the nine Near Eastern kingdoms and principalities 
identified above on the other hand in the period of civil war from 44 until 31. The 
approach is chronological. Part II.A deals with the interstate dealings for the 
period from the eruption of civil strife in 44 until the defeat of Brutus and Cassius 
at Philippi in 42; part II.B follows on from there and focuses on the time until 
Octavian’s victory at Actium in 31. Within the two subparts, a critical analysis of 
the political interaction between Rome and Near Eastern realms is provided for 
each interstate relation separately. As some instances of political interaction 
involved more than one kingdom and/or principality, there will be an unavoidable 
overlap between certain chapters. In those cases, though, the exchanges are 
analysed each time from a different perspective. Since Nabataea, Armenia and 
Commagene are not attested to have had contact with Rome in the period from 44 
until 42, these kingdoms do not appear in part II.A. The reason for dealing with 
the bilateral connections between 44 and 42 independently from the subsequent 
eleven years is related to the nature of the civil war. As we saw above, the internal 
strife did not revolve around one particular feud, but was characterised by various 
political power conflicts between members of the aristocracy, some of which 
culminated in an armed clash.28 The two major conflicts during the internal strife 
turned out to be the clash between the tyrannicides and the triumvirs, resulting in 
                                                          
28 See the outline of the civil war in section 2.  
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a victory for the latter at Philippi in 42, and the struggle between Octavian and 
Antony, ending in success for the former at Actium in 31. Since in the period prior 
to each of these clashes, the Near East was in hands of one of the leading 
participants of these with regard to both disputes, one of the contestants had 
acquired a position of power in the Near East – Cassius in 43 and 42, Antony from 
41 until 31 – and since political contacts by rulers in that region with Rome were 
predominantly maintained with governors in the vicinity, it has been decided to 
focus in the first place on the period up till Philippi and subsequently the 
remainder of the civil war, in the expectation that differences in the relations can 
be detected between these two periods. 
Following on from the analysis of the political relations between Rome and 
Near Eastern kingdoms and principalities, Part III will be dedicated to the 
question to what degree those interstate dealings were typical of our period of 
civil war. The purpose of this analysis is to identify what impact the civil war had 
on the relations between Rome and Near Eastern powers. In order to illuminate 
these issues a comparison is made with the conduct of Rome and Near Eastern 
political entities towards one another prior to 44. 
 
4 Sources 
 
Since the focus of this thesis is on interstate conduct and interaction, the source 
material consists predominantly of Greek and Latin literary texts. Epigraphic texts 
and coins do not offer a detailed narrative of political events and are thus of lesser 
help. Nevertheless, coinage and inscriptions are not ignored, as in some instances 
they can serve to strengthen the argument and provide us with useful insight into 
the foreign relations (especially with regard to the representation of interstate 
events).  
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The main literary sources of interest for our purpose are Plutarch’s 
biographies of Brutus and Antony, Appian’s Civil Wars, Cassius Dio’s Roman 
History, Strabo’s Geography and Flavius Josephus’ Jewish War and Jewish 
Antiquities.29 Vital as these texts are for our analysis, it is important to realise that 
none of them are particularly concerned with Rome’s foreign relations and only 
deal with it if necessary for the main theme of their work. This makes it very likely 
that the literary sources only allow us to catch glimpses of the actual interaction 
that occurred between Rome and Near Eastern kingdoms and principalities. 
Another factor that needs to be borne in mind when using these works is the fact 
that almost all the works are written from the perspective of the Rome. Only 
Josephus has composed a historical work that focuses on one of the principalities 
with which this thesis deals: Judaea. For this reason, we are much better informed 
about the relations of Judaea with Rome than about the interstate dealings of other 
Near Eastern powers with Rome. It is further important that he himself was a 
native of the kingdom of which he wrote a history. He knew Judaea’s society and 
as such provides us with valuable insights that can help to explain the conduct of 
Judaea’s leaders towards Rome in the period of civil war. Regarding all the other 
kingdoms and principalities with which the present study deals, this native 
perspective is unfortunately missing. 
 
5 Client kings 
 
Before moving on to the discussion of Pompey’s reorganisation of the Near East, it 
is important to elaborate on an important issue of terminology. For it may strike 
the reader as odd that none of the kings, queens and other dynasts mentioned 
throughout this work are characterised as “client kings” or “client rulers” of 
                                                          
29 Unless indicated otherwise, all the texts and translations into English are taken from the relevant 
titles mentioned in the list of used editions and the list of used translations at the end. 
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Rome, despite the fact that several of them, with the exception of Parthia’s 
sovereigns, have frequently been styled as such, predominantly in more general 
works on the political and social history of the Near East or of a particular 
kingdom in that region.30 The absence of these terms is not a coincidence but the 
consequence of a deliberate choice. The belief that the language of patrocinium 
(patronage) and clientela misrepresents the relationship between Rome and the 
rulers on the fringe of her empire who were to some extent dependent on her 
underlies this decision. Certainly, even though the paucity of the language of 
clientela does not speak in favour of designating all monarchs whose positions 
were in some way dependent upon Rome as clients, the limited number of 
attestations for the patron-client terminology in the context of Rome’s interstate 
affairs is in itself not a valid justification for abstaining from its use.31 It would thus 
theoretically still be possible for the summarily available evidence to vindicate the 
extensive application of the patron-client model to Rome’s relations with rulers in 
the periphery, as realised by Ernst Badian and, to a lesser degree, by Percy Sands.32 
A closer look at the relevant source material, however, should demonstrate that 
this view is to be rejected. 
 As it happens, in most known instances the patron-client terminology is 
used in a metaphorical sense as a means to illustrate to the reader, with concepts 
familiar to them, what type of relationship Rome de facto (not formally) had with 
rulers and communities.33 When Cicero thus sketches a romanticised picture of 
Rome’s conduct vis-à-vis kings, princes and communities during the bygone days 
of the Republic before Sulla, and concludes that her attitude “could be called more 
truly a patrocinium of the world than a dominion”, he does not profess that Rome 
                                                          
30 See e.g. Ball (2000) 30, who refers to “client king” and “client kingdoms”; Sartre (2001) 449, who 
explains which parts of Syria came under provincial rule in 64, and then proposes that “tout le 
reste resta confié à des princes clients”. 
31 Also acknowledged by Kaizer / Facella (2010b) 18. 
32 Sands (1908); Badian (1958). 
33 That the language of clientela was used in a metaphorical sense by our ancient authors to describe 
Rome’s foreign relations is now generally accepted. See among others Braund (1984) 23. 
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formally was patron of all people in her empire and beyond. 34  Cicero merely 
asserts that the behaviour of Rome towards the people inside and outside her 
domain in an idealised past bears resemblance to the conduct of a patron 
regarding his client. With the expression patrocinium employed as a metaphor, it is 
clear that the passage in question cannot serve as evidence for the existence of 
interstate clientela.35  
 The language of patrocinium and clientela is likewise to be understood 
figuratively when Livy points to Rome’s commitment to ensure the “patrocinium of 
Greek liberty” in a speech attributed to the Roman official T. Quinctius Flamininus 
in the context of the negotiations with ambassadors of the Seleucid king Antiochus 
III in 193 concerning the sovereignty over the Greek cities in Asia and in Greece. 
Clearly, Livy does not mean that Rome had the intention to guarantee her 
“patronage over Greek liberty” – whatever that would mean. Instead, he refers to 
Rome’s assurance to warrant “the protection of Greek freedom”.36 In this instance, 
the term patrocinium is thus not indicative of the existence of an interstate patron-
client relationship.37 
 An allegorical use of the patron-client terminology is also encountered in a 
section of a letter by the first century AD Roman jurist Proculus, transmitted in 
Justinian’s Digesta. The term clientes appears in a discussion on the conditions for 
the exercise of postliminium, the restoration of a person’s free status upon return 
from captivity in the hands of an enemy.38 Having stipulated the provisions for 
claiming these rights, Proculus offers an exposé of a free people: 
 
                                                          
34 Cicero, Off. 2.27: “… patrocinium orbis terrae verius quam imperium poterat nominari” (LCL transl. 
adapted). 
35 For similar views and concomitant line of reasoning, see among others Gruen (1984) 160; Ferrary 
(1997) 114; Eilers (2002) 187; Kaizer / Facella (2010b) 21. 
36 Livy, 34.58.11: “Patrocinium libertatis Graecorum”. 
37 Similar conclusions in Eilers (2002) 187 n.24; Kaizer / Facella (2010b) 21. 
38 For more details on postliminium, see among others Levy (1943); Imbert (1944); Sherwin-White 
(1973) 292-293; Coşkun (2009) 82-107. 
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“A free people is one which is not subject to the control of any other people; a civitas 
foederata, one which has either entered into friendship under an equal treaty or under 
a treaty [which] includes the provision that this people should with good will 
preserve the maiestas of another people. It has to be added that that other people is to 
be understood to be superior, not that [the federated] people is not free; and insofar as 
we understand our clients to be free, even if they are not our equals in authority, 
dignity or power, so also those who are bound to preserve our maiestas with good will 
are to be understood to be free”.39 
 
The text makes clear that a people bound by an unequal treaty to uphold the 
maiestas of another people – the Romans for example – enjoyed freedom in the 
same way as communities that had an equal compact. To illustrate that the inferior 
partner in an unequal treaty retained his free status, Proculus draws a parallel 
with clients who likewise rejoiced in freedom despite being in a position of 
subordination. The term clientes is in this context thus manifestly used as part of a 
comparison. The passage does not support in any way the view that the 
subservient partner of an unequal treaty was a client. Proculus merely provides an 
analogy using the language of clientela to clarify the status of communities bound 
by an unequal treaty. 40  The reference to clientes can accordingly not serve as 
evidence for Rome’s application of the patron-client model to its relations with 
kings, dynasts and associations of people.  
 The same conclusion is to be drawn with regard to an occurrence of the 
patron-client terminology in Suetonius’ biography of Augustus. The passage in 
                                                          
39 Dig. 49.15.7.1: “Liber autem populus est is, qui nullius alterius populi potestati est subiectus: siue is 
foederatus est item, siue aequo foedere in amicitiam uenit siue foedere comprehensum est, ut is populus 
alterius populi maiestatem comiter conseruaret. hoc enim adicitur, ut intellegatur alterum populum 
superiorem esse, non ut intellegatur alterum non esse liberum: et quemadmodum clientes nostros 
intellegimus liberos esse, etiamsi neque auctoritate neque dignitate neque uiri boni nobis praesunt, sic eos, 
qui maiestatem nostrum comiter conseruare debent, liberos esse intellegendum est” (Watson transl. 
adapted). 
40 For similar conclusions, see among others Rich (1989) 124-125; Eilers (2002) 12-13, 188; Kaizer / 
Facella (2010b) 17. 
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question describes the honours that were bestowed upon Augustus by certain 
allied kings:  
 
“[Augustus’, ed.] friends and allies among the kings each in their own realm founded 
a city called Caesarea, and all joined in the plan to contribute the funds for finishing 
the temple of Jupiter Olympius, which was begun at Athens in ancient days, and to 
dedicate it to his Genius; and they often left their kingdoms and presented themselves 
not only at Rome, but also when travelling through the provinces, showing him the 
daily attentions clad in toga and without the regal insignia in the manner of clients”.41 
 
The text evidently does not assert that Augustus’ royal friends and allies actually 
were clients. Suetonius just draws an analogy between the homage paid by allied 
and friendly kings to the emperor and the daily attentions (cotidiana officia) that 
clients were due to their patron. This excerpt thus does not prove that Rome 
applied the patron-client model to her foreign relations.42 It merely demonstrates 
that Suetonius thought it suitable to use the language of clientela in a metaphorical 
sense to explain how the relations of Augustus with his royal friends and allies are 
to be understood. As we have seen, Suetonius was not the first one who believed it 
appropriate to draw parallels with the patron-client terminology to clarify the 
relationship between Rome and foreign communities and rulers; Proculus, Livy 
and Cicero, respectively writing a century and two centuries earlier, preceded 
him. Apparently, all four authors expected the language of patronage, with which 
their audience was familiar, to facilitate a better understanding of Rome’s 
interstate relations.43 The four texts, however, do not equate these foreign relations 
with the patron-client association. None of them can thus serve to support the 
                                                          
41 Suetonius, Aug. 60: “Reges amici atque socii et singuli in suo quisque regno Caesareas urbes condiderunt 
et cuncti simul aedem Iovis Olympii Athenis antiquitus incohatam perficere communi sumptu destinaverunt 
Genioque eius dedicare; ac saepe regnis relictis non Romae modo sed et provincias peragranti cotidiana officia 
togati ac sine regio insigni more clientium praestiterunt” (LCL transl. adapted). 
42 But it may, as Millar (1996) 162 = (2004) 233 points out, “have been largely responsible for the 
invention of the misleading modern term ‘client kings’”. 
43 See for similar view with regard to the passage in Suetonius Kaizer / Facella (2010b) 16. 
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view according to which Rome considered kings, other rulers and communities on 
the fringe of her empire as clients in the technical sense of the word.  
 The language of patrocinium and clientela in the context of Rome’s foreign 
affairs is not only employed in a metaphorical sense. When Cicero refers in his 
Republic to the people from the city of Massilia as “our clients”, this is not to be 
understood figuratively.44 The reference can nevertheless not be used as evidence 
for Rome viewing foreign communities as clients, since it forms part of a longer 
quotation that Cicero ascribes to the statesman P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus 
Africanus, famous for his capture of Carthage in 146. With the source of this 
quotation unknown, the mention of clientes does not prove that Rome applied the 
patron-client model upon foreign states.45 
  On slightly different grounds, we can disregard the occurrence of the 
patron-client vocabulary in Livy’s version of a speech that a Rhodian ambassador 
would have delivered before the Senate in 189 as evidence for the existence of 
interstate patronage. The envoy had come to ask Rome for protection against the 
imperialistic aspirations of the Pergamene king Eumenes II. He is said to have put 
his request into the following words: 
 
“You have undertaken to defend against the slavery to a king the liberty of a most 
ancient people, most famed either from the renown of its achievements or from 
universal praise of its culture and learning; this patrocinium of a whole people taken in 
your fides and clientela it befits you to guarantee forever”.46 
 
                                                          
44 Cicero, Rep. 1.43: “nostri clientes”. 
45 Cf. Rich (1989) 125, who seems to regard it as a possibility that the text refers to a “personal 
patronage of Scipio over Massilia”, even though he admits that there is no evidence to support this 
view, which has been taken by Gelzer (1969) 87-88 among others. 
46 Livy, 37.54.17: “Gentis vetustissimae nobilissimaeque vel fama rerum gestarum vel omni commendatione 
humanitatis doctrinarumque tuendam ab servitio regio libertatem suscepistis; hoc patrocinium receptae in 
fidem et clientelam vestram universae gentis perpetuum vos praestare decet” (LCL transl. adapted). 
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The passage seems at first sight to prove that Rome applied the patron-client 
model to her relations with foreign communities and rulers. 47  Yet, nothing is 
further from the truth. Livy’s version of the speech is clearly based on the 
rendition of this address by the Greek historian Polybius, who does not point in 
any way to a patronage exerted by Rome over Rhodes. 48  The reference to 
patrocinium and clientela thus seems to be an invention by Livy. It is very likely that 
he used the language of patronage for rhetorical purposes, as it blends nicely into 
the remainder of the speech in which Rome is placed on a pedestal. The passage 
accordingly does not prove that Rome formally regarded foreign peoples as her 
clients.49 
 The same conclusion can be drawn concerning a reference in Florus’ 
epitome of Livy to the kingdom of Numidia being in the fides and clientela of the 
Senate and Roman people at some point before the reign of Jugurtha.50 With 
Sallust, the author of the best known account of the Jugurthine War, not 
mentioning anything about Numidia being Rome’s client, it is very likely that 
Florus’ reference is not based on the actual existence of a patron-client 
relationship, but is merely used in a figurative way to stress the dependency of the 
Numidian kingdom upon Rome.51 The passage in Florus can thus not prove that 
Rome exerted patronage over certain foreign rulers. 
 
With all references to the language of patrocinium and clientela in the context of 
Rome’s interstate affairs discussed,52 it becomes apparent that none of them can 
                                                          
47 Rich (1989) 125-126 argues that the passage attributes “to the Romans a patronage over the 
Greeks”. 
48 Polybius, 21.22.5-21.23.12. 
49 Same conclusion and similar argumentation in Gruen (1984) 176; Ferrary (1997) 114; Eilers (2002) 
186-187; Kaizer / Facella (2010b) 17-18. 
50 Florus, 1.36.3. 
51 So also Gruen (1984) 159-160; Kaizer / Facella (2010b) 21. Cf. Rich (1989) 126, who uses the 
reference in Florus as evidence for the existence of interstate clientela.  
52 The references to the interstate clientela in Ammianus, 17.12.15 and 18.2.16 can hardly be used as 
evidence of Rome applying the patron-client model to her relations with foreign kings and 
communities in our period, because it concerns references to practices in the fourth century AD.  
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prove that Rome applied the patron-client model to her relations with foreign 
rulers and communities.53 As pointed out above, this does not inevitably mean 
that Rome abstained from the creation of interstate relations based on clientela. In 
an attempt to explain this lack of evidence, scholars have argued that the Romans 
refrained from describing kings and other foreign rulers as clients out of gallantry 
to prevent the subordinate position of certain rulers from being made explicit.54 
Burton and Kaizer / Facella have most recently convincingly argued, however, 
that ancient authors did not display any hesitation in describing kings in terms 
that expresses their inferiority with regard to Rome.55 Tacitus, for instance, does 
not appear to have any difficulties with styling the Commagenian king Antiochus 
IV “the richest of the subject kings”. 56  A deliberate attempt to suppress the 
language of clientela where patron-client relations actually existed out of politeness 
can thus not clarify the lack of evidence.57 It is much more likely that the reason for 
the scarce number of attestations to the vocabulary of patrocinium and clientela in 
the context of Rome’s foreign affairs in our sources needs to be sought in Rome’s 
reluctance to apply the patron-client model to her relations with foreign rulers and 
communities.  
                                                          
53 In contrast, patronage of individual Roman aristocrats over foreign communities did exist. For 
more details and references to this type of patronage, see among others Ferrary (1997) 105-113; 
Eilers (2002) 109-144. 
54 See e.g. Mommsen (1864) 355 n.2; Badian (1958) 7; Hellegouarc’h (1963) 55; Brunt (1988) 394-395; 
Deniaux (1993) 4-5. Cf. Rich (1989) 124, who claims that “politeness often led Romans to use words 
like amicus… rather than patronus and cliens of what were in fact patronage relationships between 
individuals”. However, on p. 126 he seems to reject this explanation for the infrequent attestation 
of the patron-client terminology with regard to Rome’s foreign affairs. 
55 Burton (2003) 341-342; Kaizer / Facella (2010b) 18-19. 
56 Tacitus, Hist. 2.81: ”inservientium regum ditissimus”. This case is also mentioned by Kaizer / Facella 
(2010b) 19. 
57 Equally unconvincing is the suggestion made by Rich (1989) 127 according to which the clientela-
terminology “was only felt appropriate in a world where there could be a multiplicity of patrons”, 
such as within the Roman state. Since in the case of the relations maintained by foreign rulers with 
Rome, there could only be one patron (namely Rome), the language of patronage would be 
inappropriate. However, Rich does not explain with the use of clear reference to our sources why it 
would be inappropriate to use the language of patronage in the case of a sole patron. His 
suggestion that the near absence of the clientela-terminology in our extant sources with regard to 
Rome’s foreign relations is due to the unsuitability of employing the language of patronage in the 
case of only one patron, remains accordingly speculative. 
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The lack of evidence is not the only reason for me to refrain from applying 
the language of clientela to kings, queens or other rulers mentioned in this thesis. 
Describing the unequal relations that most of these dynasts de facto had with Rome 
in terms of clientela would also be a misrepresentation of those connections.58 
Within Roman society, a relationship based on clientela morally bound the two 
individuals to the exercise of certain duties, which generally pertained to the 
provision of support by the client in exchange for protection from the patron. In 
the realm of interstate relations, however, Rome did not feel morally obliged to 
render protection to certain rulers, as will hopefully become clear throughout this 
thesis. To style kings and dynasts as client kings would thus be a 
mischaracterisation of the relationship that these rulers had with Rome. 59 
Employing the language of patrocinium and clientela to describe the connections 
between Near Eastern kings, queens and dynasts on the one hand and Rome on 
the other hand is thus best avoided. All those, though, who would still argue that 
the absence of the clientela-terminology in our sources with regard to Rome’s 
interstate affairs should not dissuade us from applying it in a modern sense to all 
those relations with foreign rulers that were based on an exchange of rewards and 
aid,60 need to be reminded of the following words once uttered by Fergus Millar:61 
 
“It can even be claimed that we are entitled to apply to ancient societies the now 
established common-language (or sociological) use of terms like ‘clientage’ and 
‘patronage’ without regard to the presence, or precise use, of equivalent terms in the 
society in question. But to say that is to say that curiosity about the exact nuances of 
ancient social and political relationship is superfluous”. 
                                                          
58 Bleicken (1964) 181; Kaizer / Facella (2010) 19-20. 
59 See also Kaizer / Facella (2010) 19. 
60 See e.g. Saller (1982); Wallace-Hadrill (1989). 
61 Millar (1984) 17 = (2002) 137, as quoted by Kaizer / Facella (2010) 20. 
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PART I 
PRELUDE 
34 
1 POMPEY’S REORGANISATION OF THE NEAR 
EAST, 66-63 BC 
 
 
When in the beginning of 66 the tribune of the plebs C. Manilius managed to have 
the bill passed that conferred upon Pompey the command in the war against king 
Mithridates VI of Pontus and king Tigranes of Armenia, no-one could foresee that 
within three years almost the entire Near East would have undergone a grand-
scale administrative reorganisation. 1  Although a political and territorial 
transformation of Pontus and Armenia might have been expected, the installation 
of a new Roman province in Syria at the cost of the last Seleucid possessions as 
well as the territorial reduction of Judaea were probably not envisaged. It was 
only after Mithridates’ flight from Pontus across the Caucasus into the Bosporus 
and Tigranes’ submission in 66 that the future of the Seleucid Kingdom and the 
succession crisis within Judaea became important issues with which Pompey had 
to deal. It should thus not come as a surprise that none of our sources for the lex 
Manilia mention plans pertaining to the expansion of Rome’s empire or to regime 
change in Judaea.2 That does not, however, automatically mean that Pompey’s 
military and diplomatic activities in Syria and the southern Levant were illegal. 
On the contrary, a statement made by Appian, according to which this law gave 
Pompey permission “to make war and peace as he liked, and to make friends or 
enemies in line with his own judgement”, would suggest that Pompey was free to 
                                                          
1 See map 1 for clarification. 
2 The original text of the lex Manilia is missing. For the potential terms of the command granted to 
Pompey, we rely entirely on the following literary sources: Asconius, 65; Plutarch, Luc. 35.7; Pomp. 
30.1-5; Appian, Mith. 97; Velleius, 2.33.1-2; Livy, Per. 100; Dio, 36.42.4-36.43.2; Eutropius, 6.12.2. The 
famous speech that Cicero as praetor delivered before the People in support of Manilius’ bill does, 
unfortunately, not provide us with any details concerning the terms of the command that was 
submitted to the assembly for approval. Sherwin-White (1984) 189 argues on the basis of the 
arguments that Cicero uses to garner support for the bill that the speech as it has been transmitted 
to us is “a masterpiece of misrepresentation”. Kallet-Marx (1995) 321-323 focuses, in contrast, on 
contemporary attitudes to the eastern empire which, according to him, can be extracted from the 
speech.  
35 
make war upon any king or dynast in the Near East and to intervene in the 
internal affairs of their realms.3 Unfortunately, the accuracy of this testimonial is 
debatable, given the fact that Appian in the same context also makes an 
indisputable overstatement by claiming that Pompey was given command “of all 
the forces beyond the border of Italy”. 4  It thus remains opaque whether the 
Manilian law actually endowed Pompey with a carte blanche to take any decision 
he deemed appropriate regarding the political future of the Near Eastern lands.5 
Nevertheless, despite Appian’s embroidered portrayal of at least some of the 
powers that arose from the lex Manilia, it seems to be difficult to imagine that 
Pompey was prohibited from dealing with the political situation in the Near East at 
all. It was impossible that a conflict could occur with another Roman 
promagistrate, as the lands in this region had yet to be placed under provincial 
administration. Moreover, Pompey’s acta would only be subject to ratification by 
                                                          
3 Appian, Mith. 97: “ὅπῃ θέλοι, συντίθεσθαί τε καὶ πολεμεῖν, καὶ φίλους ἢ πολεμίους οὓς 
δοκιμάσειε ποιεῖσθαι”. 
4 Appian, Mith. 97: “ὅση πέραν ἐστὶ τῆς Ἰταλίας”. Cf. Plutarch, Pomp. 30.1, who can also be 
accused of misrepresenting the powers with which Pompey had been endowed when claiming that 
the Roman supremacy was placed into the hands of one man. 
5 Cf. Gelzer (1949) 273 n.17, who claims on the basis of Dio, 37.7.1 that Appian’s statement, 
according to which Pompey had the freedom to declare war and to make peace as he liked, is an 
exaggeration. The passage in Dio informs us that Pompey refrained from undertaking a military 
campaign against the Parthian king Phraates III in 64 despite requests made by the Armenian king 
Tigranes to do so. The Roman commander would have put forward as a reason for his decision 
that he would not have been assigned such an expedition. However, Dio presents this professed 
reason as a pretext (πρόφασιν ποιησάμενος). Dio can, therefore, not be used as evidence to regard 
Appian’s aforementioned statement as an exaggeration. Sherwin-White (1984) 190 seems to utter 
doubts similar to the ones brought forward by Gelzer concerning the accuracy of Appian’s 
statement. Although he does believe that Pompey had been granted the authority to make war and 
peace and to conclude alliances, he proposes that “these powers were limited to the context of the 
Anatolian provinces and the war with” Mithridates and Tigranes. Yet, despite the evidence for the 
transfer of the provinces of Bithynia and Cilicia to Pompey (Dio, 36.42.4; Plutarch, Pomp. 30.1), it 
would go too far to argue on the basis of references to this assignment in the literary sources that 
the right to decide about peace and war, and the prerogative to form friendships, was restricted to 
these provinces and to the context of the war against Mithridates and Tigranes. Even though it 
cannot be excluded that the lex Manilia set a boundary on the territorial extent of Pompey’s powers, 
it is evident that none of our sources make any mention that Pompey breached the terms of the law 
when in 63 he waged war in Judaea and allegedly even planned to inspect the Nabataeans – areas 
clearly situated beyond the confines of the Anatolian provinces as well as the erstwhile empires of 
Mithridates and Tigranes. On the territorial extent of Tigranes’ empire, see below. 
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the Senate and People of Rome upon his return to Italy.6 The distance stretching 
between Rome and the eastern Mediterranean in conjunction with the rapidly 
changing political circumstances in Asia Minor and the Near East would have 
made it problematic for Pompey to react adequately to events if he had to ask for 
endorsement any time he intended to wage war or wished to conclude peace and 
friendship.7 The diplomatic and military activities undertaken by Pompey and his 
lieutenants in the Levant were thus not necessarily illegal. Yet, whatever the 
precise privileges were with which he was invested, it is at least clear that the 
Roman commander realised a wide-ranging and deeply penetrating 
administrative rearrangement of almost the entire Near East within a period of 
three years.8 It needs to be analysed in what way the kingdoms and principalities 
that are attested to have maintained political relations with Rome in the period of 
civil war from 44 until 31 were affected by this reorganisation. The discussion will 
in this respect not merely focus on the details of the administrative changes, but 
also on the circumstances under which Pompey implemented alterations. Some of 
the kings and princes whose realms were affected by the reforms also concluded 
friendship (amicitia or φιλία) with Rome. The exact implications of such an 
association for the Near Eastern rulers in question will be examined as well. 
 
1.1 The end of the Great Armenian Empire 
 
The earliest of Pompey’s territorial and administrative reorganisations of 
kingdoms and principalities in the Near East to which our sources bear witness 
                                                          
6 Pompey wished to have his acta ratified upon his return from the East. Although he initially faced 
senatorial opposition, with the support of Caesar he eventually managed to have his acta approved 
in 59 (Cicero, Att. 1.14.2, 6; 2.16.2; 1.18.6; 1.18.3; 1.18.5; 1.19.4; 1.20.5; Velleius, 2.44.2; Plutarch, Luc. 
42.6; Cat. min. 31.1-2; Pomp. 48.3 Appian, BCiv. 2.9; Suetonius, Iul. 19.2; Dio, 37.49.2-50.1; 38.7.5). See 
also: Williams / Williams (1988) passim; Seager (2002) 81-85, 88. 
7 So also Sherwin-White (1984) 188; Seager (2002) 52. 
8 The imperium with which the lex Manilia invested Pompey has been subject to much debate. For 
the latest analysis with bibliography, see Koehn (2010). 
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was carried out at some point in 66 following Mithridates’ expulsion from Pontus 
and subsequent escape to Colchis. Although Pompey was initially anxious to hunt 
down the Pontic king, he decided, after his enemy had reached the river Phasis in 
the western Caucasus, to suspend the pursuit and instead to proceed eastwards to 
launch an invasion into Armenia. 9  The ruler of this kingdom, Tigranes, had 
collaborated with his father-in-law Mithridates, and was now to pay the price for 
his behaviour.10 Already in 71 or 70, the Armenian king had infuriated the Romans 
by his reluctance to extradite the Pontic monarch who had sought refuge with him 
in order to avoid falling into the hands of the proconsul L. Licinius Lucullus.11 Yet, 
more recently, those ill feelings towards Tigranes seem to have been aggravated 
when Rome became aware of the provision of an army in 68 by the Armenian 
ruler to Mithridates. With these forces, the Pontic king managed to inflict a 
devastating defeat upon Lucullus’ legate C. Valerius Triarius at Zela in 67, and to 
                                                          
9 On the hostilities between Pompey and Mithridates in 66 and the expulsion of the Pontic king 
from the heartland of his realm into Colchis, see among others Magie (1950) 354-356; Van 
Ooteghem (1954) 207-214; Sherwin-White (1984) 191-193. 
10 This view is based on Appian, Mith. 104, who claims that “Pompey marched against Armenia, 
making it a cause of war against Tigranes that he had assisted Mithridates” (“ὁ Πομπήιος 
ἐστράτευσεν ἐς Ἀρμενίαν, ἔγκλημα ἐς Τιγράνη τιθέμενος ὅτι συνεμάχει Μιθριδάτῃ”). 
11 Lucullus had sent Ap. Claudius Pulcher as envoy to the Armenian king with demands for the 
extradition of Mithridates (Plutarch, Luc. 19.1, 21.6; Memnon, BNJ 434, F1 31.2; cf. Appian, Mith. 83 
who mentions the demands, but not the embassy consisting of Ap. Claudius). Tigranes’ subsequent 
refusal to give up his father-in-law has been mentioned by Plutarch, Luc. 21.7, 23.6; Appian, Mith. 
84 and Memnon, BNJ 434, F1 31.2. None of these three authors provide us, unfortunately, with any 
clear indication concerning the year in which Tigranes rejected Rome’s order to deliver up 
Mithridates. The meeting between the Armenian king and Claudius Pulcher can, at any rate, not 
have taken place before Mithridates made his way to Armenia (Cicero, leg. Man. 21-22 with 23; 
Plutarch, Luc. 19.1, 22.1; Appian, Mith. 82; Syr. 49; Memnon, BNJ 434, F1 30.1 with 31.1, 35.3, 38.1). 
The earliest possible year in which this event can be dated is 72. The evidence for this early date is 
discussed by Broughton (1952) 106-109, 118. Cf. Magie (1950) 336; Sherwin-White (1984) 172-173; 
McGing (1984) 17; McGing (1986) 151 and Keaveney (1992) 91, who are all of the belief that 
Mithridates sought refuge in Armenia in 71. It is, however, more likely that Tigranes’ rebuff 
occurred nearer to the Roman invasion of Armenia in 69, as it was the rejection of the demands 
announced by Ap. Claudius that seems to have triggered the offensive against the Armenian 
monarch (Plutarch, Luc. 23-24; Appian, Mith. 84). For Ap. Claudius to have brought forward 
Rome’s ultimatum at some point in 71 or 70 is therefore most likely. Broughton (1952) 107 with 125 
seems to opt for these two years as well. On the invasion of Armenia undertaken by Lucullus in 69 
and 68, see among others Sherwin-White (1984) 176-185; Keaveney (1992) 99-128. 
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pave the way for the recovery of his kingdom.12 It can thus not engender any 
surprise that Rome was eager to see Pompey undertaking disciplinary measures 
against Tigranes for his alliance with the Pontic king. The fact that earlier in 66 
Tigranes had refused to grant Mithridates’ request for shelter when he was on the 
run from his Roman opponents, proved to be of no avail in averting the invasion.13 
Rome held the Armenian king at least partly responsible for its reverses in 67, and 
was fervent to settle the old score. 
 The attack on Armenia was initiated sometime in 66 following the 
expulsion of Mithridates from Pontus and the foundation of a colony called 
Nicopolis in the conquered land for the benefit of the Roman soldiers. 14  As 
Pompey drew near to the river Araxes, he was approached by a homonymous son 
of Tigranes, who offered him his services as a guide.15 The prince had already been 
involved in a severe conflict with his father for a while and had just been defeated 
in battle. 16  He would have escaped to king Mithridates, had the Roman 
advancement earlier in the year not forced the Pontic ruler to fall back on one of 
the last remaining provinces of his realm.17 Learning of the fate that Mithridates 
had overcome, Tigranes the Younger thus decided – possibly with the consent of 
the Parthian king Phraates III – to seek refuge with Pompey in the hope to be 
                                                          
12 The provision of troops to Mithridates: Appian, Mith. 88. The defeat inflicted upon Triarius and 
recovery of Pontus: Cicero, leg. Man. 25-26; Plutarch, Luc. 35.1; Appian, Mith. 88-89; Dio, 36.12-13. 
13 Plutarch, Pomp. 32.9; Dio, 36.50.1. 
14 Dio, 36.50.3 gives the reference to the colonisation of Nicopolis.  
15  Velleius, 2.37.3; Dio, 36.51.3; Appian, Mith. 104. Cf. Plutarch, Pomp. 33.1, who claims that 
“Pompey invaded Armenia on the invitation of the young Tigranes” (“Πομπήιος δὲ εἰς Ἀρμενίαν 
ἐνέβαλε τοῦ νέου Τιγράνου καλοῦντος αὐτόν”). This statement does not, however, necessarily 
denote that Pompey had not already himself decided to attack Armenia. We have already seen that 
Tigranes’ collaboration with Mithridates formed one of the main driving forces behind the military 
campaign against Armenia. Cf. Heftner (1995) 234, who even points out that Pompey did not need 
to receive a request from Tigranes the Younger to invade Armenia, as the lex Manilia would 
already have conferred the war against king Tigranes upon the Roman commander. 
16 Dio, 36.51.2 mentions the king’s triumph over his son. For more details on the revolt of Tigranes 
the Younger against his father, see among others Manandian (1963) 156-158, 169-170; Chaumont 
(2001-2002) 225-230. 
17 Dio, 36.51.3. 
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treated leniently.18 The Roman commander proved willing to employ the young 
prince as an advisor, and together they marched into the direction of the capital 
Artaxata. As the two men made their way to Armenia’s administrative centre, they 
received the submission of several cities along the route.19 Tigranes the Elder must 
soon have realised that he did not hold the winning cards and that a potential 
military confrontation could be fatal for him. With the swift progress of the Roman 
armies, any hope of a successful outcome in the case of an armed clash vanished 
                                                          
18 Dio, 36.51.2-3 and Appian, Mith. 104 both claim that Tigranes the Younger sought refuge with 
Pompey. The two authors differ in opinion, however, on the circumstances under which the 
Armenian prince fled to the Roman commander. Whereas Dio claims that the escape to Pompey 
took place after Tigranes the Elder had overcome his son in battle, Appian makes clear that 
Tigranes the Younger was with the Parthian king Phraates III when Pompey came and secured the 
Arsacid king’s approval before embarking on his mission to seek asylum with the Roman 
commander. Nothing is said in Appian’s account about a defeat in battle that would have 
prompted Tigranes the Younger to make an escape to Pompey. On the contrary, the author 
explains that the rebellious prince fled to Phraates after his father had overwhelmed him in battle. 
That defeat refers, however, in all likelihood not to the loss that Tigranes the Younger had suffered 
in 66 at the hands of the Armenian king (mentioned by Dio, 36.51.2), but to an earlier military 
confrontation. Although such an earlier clash has not explicitly been reported in any other source, 
Dio does refer to the revolt of the Armenian prince (36.50.1) against his father prior to the escape to 
Phraates. This means that there is at least some ground to believe that the confrontation between 
the Armenian king and his son to which Appian refers is not identical to the clash in 66 mentioned 
by Dio (36.51.2). That leaves us with two contradictory accounts of the events leading up to the 
escape of Tigranes the Younger to Pompey, none of which can be categorically dismissed. Similar 
to Seager (2002) 55, I have tried to combine the two sources by stating that Tigranes the Younger 
might have received Phraates’ consent to seek refuge with Pompey. A different attempt to 
harmonise these two versions has been made by Sullivan (1990) 285, who surmises two meetings 
between Tigranes the Younger and Pompey: one would have taken place after the confrontation 
between the Armenian king and his son in 66, as mentioned by Dio (36.51.2), and the other one 
prior to this event. Although the possibility of such an early meeting cannot be excluded, the 
source material does certainly not support it. Even Appian’s account cannot serve as evidence for 
such an early meeting. Appian maintains that Tigranes the Younger “took refuge with Pompey as a 
suppliant” (“κατέφυγεν ὁ παῖς ἱκέτης ἐς τὸν Πομπήιον”). Yet, it is difficult – if not impossible – 
to imagine why the Armenian prince would have fled to Pompey as a suppliant before the clash 
with his father. It seems therefore better to reject Sullivan’s hypothesis of two meetings and to 
negate the existence of an early encounter between Tigranes the Younger and Pompey until 
conclusive proof can be provided. 
19 Dio, 36.51.3; Plutarch, Pomp. 33.2. On Pompey’s potential route to Artaxata, see Manandian (1963) 
170-172. 
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into thin air. The king therefore decided to avoid the battlefield and to offer his 
surrender to the victorious Roman commander.20  
With the capitulation of Tigranes secured, Pompey turned his attention to 
the reorganisation of Armenia and the territories over which his adversary had 
extended Armenia’s hegemony since the beginning of his reign in the mid-90s 
BC. 21  The decision was made to reinstate Tigranes as king over his paternal 
kingdom, but to impose the payment of 6,000 talents upon him as an indemnity 
for the war. The Armenian king was also to relinquish his claims on domains that 
he had conquered earlier during his reign,22 most notably the areas situated west 
of the Euphrates. The Armenian ruler had penetrated those lands around the 
middle of the 80s BC, and soon managed to oust the Seleucids and take over their 
possessions in Syria. In the following decade, Tigranes gradually extended his 
power base northwards into Cilicia Pedias and southwards into Phoenicia.23 The 
king was forced to abandon most of those annexed territories when Lucullus 
invaded Armenia in 69. Yet, he still laid claim to all those lands, and it was those 
claims that Pompey declared void in 66.24 The Roman commander also removed 
from Armenian rule portions of Cappadocia that Tigranes had annexed in 67.25 
East of the Euphrates, Iberia, Albania and Media Atropatene were freed from the 
Armenian yoke, and given their independence.26 The Armenian possessions in 
Adiabene and Mesopotamia, which Tigranes had taken away from the Parthians 
in the first ten years of his reign, returned to their former owners and were to 
                                                          
20 Dio, 36.52.1-3; Plutarch, Pomp. 33.2-3; Comp. Cim. Luc. 3.4; Appian, Mith. 104; Velleius, 2.37.4; 
Cicero, Sest. 27.58; Valerius Maximus, 5.1.9; Livy, Per. 101; Eutropius, 6.13; Florus, 1.40.27. On the 
circumstances that prompted king Tigranes to submit to Pompey, see Manandian (1963) 171-172. 
21 In order to facilitate a better understanding of the reorganisation of Armenia, see also maps 1, 2, 
4, 5. 
22 Appian, Mith. 105; Plutarch, Pomp. 33.4; Dio, 36.53.2-5; Strabo, 11.14.10; Velleius, 2.37.5; Cicero, 
Sest. 27.58; Valerius Maximus, 5.1.9; Livy, Per. 101; Florus, 1.40.27; Eutropius, 6.13. 
23 On the annexation of lands in Syria, Phoenicia and Cilicia Pedias, see among others Manandian 
(1963) 43-46; Hewsen (1985) 68-69; Sullivan (1990) 102-105. 
24 On the territories that Tigranes abandoned during Lucullus’ offensive into Armenia, see among 
others Manandian (1963) 123-124; Sullivan (1990) 280-281. 
25 On the conquest of Cappadocia, see Sullivan (1990) 281.  
26 Sullivan (1990) 292; 295-296. 
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some extent placed under local rule, as far as these territorial changes had not yet 
occurred when Lucullus launched a campaign into northern Mesopotamia in 68.27 
Sophene, one of Tigranes’ earliest acquisitions after his accession to the throne, 
was given to Tigranes the Younger.28 It remains unclear whether along with this 
latter region Gordyene, an area located to the south of Armenia proper, was also 
awarded to Tigranes the Younger, as Appian suggests.29 The possibility can at any 
rate not be ruled out, despite the fact that the author erroneously places both 
Sophene and Gordyene in Armenia Minor – a district located west of the 
Euphrates, whereas Sophene and Gordyene were situated east of the river.30 Yet, 
whatever territories were exactly allocated to Tigranes the Younger, it is certain 
that he soon ended up imprisoned as a result of a conflict with Pompey, and saw 
                                                          
27 Although none of the authors who elaborate on Pompey’s reorganisation of Armenia explicitly 
refer to lands in Mesopotamia or Adiabene that Tigranes would have been obliged to abandon, the 
termination of Armenian rule within these two districts can still be surmised. Velleius, 2.37.5 
clearly explains that the “sovereignty of the king was limited to Armenia” (“finis imperii regii 
terminatus Armenia”) as a result of the territorial redistribution of Tigranes’ former empire, and a 
statement made by Dio, 36.53.2, according to which the Armenian ruler was restored to “all his 
hereditary domain” (“τὴν πατρῴαν πᾶσαν ἀρχήν”), but lost “what had been acquired by him” 
(“προσκτηθέντα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ”) later during his reign, seems to point into the same direction. 
Similarly Appian, Mith. 105 clarifies that Tigranes was to surrender “the realm that he had newly 
acquired” (“τὴν δὲ ἐπίκτητον αὐτὸν ἀρχὴν ἐκέλευεν ἤδη μεθεῖναι”). The fact that the latter two 
authors do name the territories west of the Euphrates, but refrain from any explicit reference to the 
removal of possessions in Mesopotamia and Adiabene, does not necessarily render their 
statements inaccurate. Sherwin-White (1984) 194 has convincingly shown on the basis of a passage 
in Plutarch, Pomp. 33.4 which explains that Tigranes had to give up his claims on territories already 
taken from him by Lucullus in 69 and 68, that the Armenian areas in northern Mesopotamia were 
officially removed from the king’s realm by Pompey. The city of Nisibis (Dio, 36.6.2-7.3; Plutarch, 
Luc. 32.4-5; cf. Eutropius, 6.9) was located in this district and had definitely been captured by 
Lucullus in 68 in spite of the fact that Plutarch fails to mention it. Cf. Asdourian (1911) 46, who 
claims that Pompey was allowed to retain his Parthian conquests. On the transfer of the Armenian 
possessions in Mesopotamia and Adiabene to more local control, see among others Sullivan (1990). 
28 Plutarch, Pomp. 33.4; Dio, 36.53.2. 
29 Appian, Mith. 105. Asdourian (1911) 46; Will (1967) 422 and Wirth (1983) 18 prefer Appian’s 
interpretation, but do not provide any arguments to support this opinion. 
30 Similar: Manandian (1963) 175; Sullivan (1990) 285; Heftner (1995) 239. Cf. Chaumont (2001-2002) 
231, who rejects Appian’s version according to which both Sophene and Gordyene were allotted to 
Tigranes the Younger; Chaumont favours the accounts by Plutarch and Dio, but fails to provide 
compelling grounds.  Appian’s geographical error cannot justify the view that only Sophene had 
been awarded to the Armenian prince. The majority of scholarship on this issue uncritically follow 
the tradition transmitted by Plutarch and Dio: Grousset (1947) 98; Gelzer (1949) 94; Magie (1950) 
357-358; Van Ooteghem (1954) 216; Chahin (1987) 236; Seager (2002) 56. 
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himself deprived of his newly awarded realm.31 Appian informs us that Sophene 
and Gordyene were subsequently given to king Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia.32 
The evidence pointed out by Thérèse Frankfort seems to illustrate, however, that 
Sophene was reverted to the control of the Armenian king.33 The same can be said 
for the status of Gordyene after the deposition and incarceration of Tigranes the 
Younger.34 If this district had been assigned in the first place to the king’s son, it 
would now have been placed under the rule of Tigranes the Elder as a dispute 
with the Parthian king Phraates III in 65 concerning the control over this district 
demonstrates. After the Parthians had invaded Gordyene in that same year, 
Pompey had his legate L. Afranius successfully driving out his enemies from the 
area and transferring it back to Tigranes.35 Although it cannot be excluded that in 
the year preceding this event Gordyene was placed under the rule of 
Ariobarzanes, it is much more likely, as Plutarch implies, that the area had already 
been back into the hands of the Armenian king before the Parthian ruler 
attempted to seize it.36 The so-called “Seventy Valleys”, which formed a part of the 
realm of Tigranes’ predecessor Artavasdes I, were in all likelihood located in this 
district.37 When this predecessor passed away (whether by natural causes or not), 
Tigranes, who had been a hostage at the Parthian court, was released and acceded 
                                                          
31 Dio, 36.53.3-4 claims that Tigranes the Younger was taken captive on account of his refusal to 
deliver up the Armenian treasuries that were kept in his dominion. Cf. Appian, Mith. 105 who 
believes that the incarceration of the prince was related to a plot devised against Tigranes the 
Elder. Plutarch, Pomp. 33.5 proposes on the other hand that displeasure with the territorial 
distributions eventually prompted the prince to offend Pompey, who then had him imprisoned. It 
is logical that Tigranes the Younger was dissatisfied with Pompey’s measures given the fact that he 
had helped him against Tigranes the Elder. Whatever the circumstances under which Pompey 
threw the king’s son into chains, it is clear that the prisoner was eventually staged in his triumph in 
61. What subsequently happened to Tigranes the Younger is not entirely clear. Cf. Chaumont 
(2001-2002) 237-245, who analyses the different versions concerning the prince’s fate.  
32 So also Will (1967) 422. 
33 Frankfort (1963) 186-187. So also Sherwin-White (1984) 195; Chahin (1987) 236; Seager (2002) 56; 
Cf. Sullivan (1990) 175, 282, who believes that Sophene reverted to Cappadocian rule.  
34 Frankfort (1963) 186.  
35 Plutarch, Pomp. 36.2; Dio, 37.5.3-4. On the dispute between Tigranes and Phraates in 65 and 64 
concerning the sovereignty over Gordyene, see among others Sherwin-White (1984) 222-224. 
36 See previous note. 
37 Strabo, 11.14.15; Sherwin-White (1984) 223; Syme (1995) 55. 
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to the Armenian throne. For his release he paid as a ransom the “Seventy Valleys”. 
Tigranes’ later re-acquisition of this district formed thus merely a restoration of his 
paternal kingdom. As such, the restoration of lands in Gordyene to Tigranes by 
Pompey does not contradict the statement by Dio that Tigranes was restored to his 
hereditary domain. 
 
The reorganisation of Armenia carried out by Pompey thus changed the political 
landscape of the Near East entirely. Almost all the kingdoms and principalities 
that had been under Tigranes’ control regained their independence, whereas 
dynasts that had only lost parts of their possessions to the Armenian ruler saw 
them returned. Tigranes himself was restricted to his hereditary kingdom – 
probably enlarged with Sophene after the arrest of his rebellious son. Extensive as 
the territorial losses were for Tigranes, the changes that Pompey implemented 
could have worked out much worse for him taking into account his previous 
opposition against the Roman cause. The king had accordingly no reason for 
complaint. On the contrary, as far as Dio is concerned, Pompey did not merely 
restore Tigranes to his paternal realm, he “shortly afterwards” also “enrolled him 
among the friends and allies of the Roman people”.38 What this measure precisely 
meant for the relations between the king and Rome has not been clarified by the 
historian. The conferment of the title does at least show that Pompey regarded the 
Armenian sovereign to be a reliable ruler now that he had become more 
dependent upon Rome for the future of his position.39  
 
 
 
                                                          
38 Dio, 36.53.6: “ἐκεῖνον ἔς τε τοὺς φίλους καὶ ἐς τοὺς συμμάχους οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον ἐσέγραψε”. 
39  Potential further political implications of the formation of friendship and alliance will be 
discussed below (see 1.4). 
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1.2 War in the Caucasus and the relations with the Parthians 
 
With the restoration of Tigranes to the kingship secured and the territorial 
rearrangement of the former Armenian empire implemented towards the end of 
66, Pompey moved northwards into the Caucasus and came into conflict with 
some of the peoples there – most notably the Albanians who were ruled by a 
certain king (βασιλεύς) Oroeses and inhabited the eastern regions towards the 
Caspian Sea, and the Iberians who were led by king (βασιλεύς) Artoces and lived 
to the west of them occupying the ridges that formed the link between the 
mountainous regions of Armenia and the Caucasian highlands.40 The hostilities 
were allegedly initiated by the Albanians out of fear for an attack by Pompey who 
was approaching their districts during the winter.41 The ‘preventive’ assault is said 
to have surprised the Romans, but Pompey eventually managed to gain the upper 
hand, and made peace with his opponents.42 In 65, the Roman general launched an 
attack against the Iberians, defeated them and succeeded in concluding an alliance 
with their king, the exact terms of which remain unclear.43 Pompey thereupon 
marched westwards into Colchis, from where he is said to have planned to move 
northwards to Bosporus – the region where the Pontic king Mithridates had 
sought refuge a year earlier. The hostile attitude of the tribes living in the areas 
north of the Caucasus as well as the lack of harbours for the fleet to secure 
sufficient supplies, however, forced Pompey to return to Pontus via the Caucasus. 
The decision was made to put up a sea blockade in the hope that this measure 
                                                          
40 Plutarch, Pomp. 34-35 and Dio, 36.54.1-37.5.2 form our main sources for Pompey’s wars in the 
Caucasus against the Albanians and Iberians. See also Strabo, 11.1.6, 11.3.5, 11.4.5; Velleius, 2.40.1; 
Livy, Per. 101; Orosius, 6.4.8; Eutropius, 6.14.1. Cf. Appian, Mith. 103, who places the war against 
the Albanians and Iberians before the submission of Tigranes to Pompey. See also maps 1 and 2. 
41 Dio, 36.54.1. 
42 Plutarch, Pomp. 34.2-4; Dio, 36.54.2-5; Eutropius, 6.14.1; Orosius, 6.4.8. 
43 Dio, 37.1.1-2.7 says that Artoces made an alliance (συνηλλάγη) with Pompey. Cf. Plutarch, Pomp. 
34.4-5; Eutropius, 6.14.1 and Orosius, 6.4.8 who do not mention the conclusion of an alliance. 
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would force Mithridates to surrender. 44  In the meantime, Pompey advanced 
against the Albanians who had revolted once more. Yet again, the Roman 
commander proved victorious and made peace with them. Subsequent truces with 
some other tribes marked the ultimate end of the Caucasian campaigns.45 
 A clear and unambiguous explanation for Pompey’s wars in the Caucasus 
cannot be given. Some of our ancient authors have us believe that the hostilities 
against the Albanians and the Iberians and neighbouring groups were purely 
accidental. Livy’s Periochae explain, for example, that the decision to take up the 
armshad been induced by the refusal to let the Roman armies pass the Caucasus,46 
and Plutarch’s statement according to which Pompey aimed to proceed against 
Mithridates, and merely “out of necessity passed through the peoples dwelling 
about the Caucasus Mountains” has the same implication. 47  Despite these 
attestations, though, the duration of the wars against the Albanians and Iberians 
as well as the course followed by the Roman troops demonstrate that Pompey did 
not merely intend to neutralise the armed resistance that he encountered in the 
Caucasus on the way to the Bosporus and on the return journey. Part of his 
purpose lay in the Caucasus. If Pompey had gone to Colchis with the intention to 
chase Mithridates, he would have travelled from Artaxata northwards across the 
Cyrus River and via Iberia.48 Instead, he moved eastwards at the Cyrus River and 
camped his army for winter near Albanian territory.49 This diversion from the 
route can only be made understandable if Pompey had some business to transact 
in the Caucasus. That a military expedition against the Albanians and Iberians was 
planned – or at least anticipated – is thus very likely. What the exact rationale of 
                                                          
44 Dio, 37.3.1-3; Plutarch, Pomp. 35.1; Velleius, 2.40.1. See also Appian, Mith. 103 who refers to 
Pompey’s pursuit of Mithridates into Colchis, but places the war against the Albanians and 
Iberians before the submission of Tigranes to Pompey, unlike the other authors. 
45 Dio, 37.3.3-5.2; Plutarch, Pomp. 35.1-3. 
46 Livy, Per. 101. 
47  Plutarch, Pomp. 34.1: “αὐτὸς ἐβάδιζε διὰ τῶν περιοικούντων τὸν Καύκασον ἐθνῶν 
ἀναγκαίως”. 
48 Sherwin-White (1984) 196-197 with references to literature and sources. 
49 Strabo, 11.3.4-5; Dio, 36.53.5-54.1. 
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the wars waged upon the peoples in this region was, however, is subject to 
scholarly debate. It has been argued that Pompey’s personal ambition clarifies the 
Roman demonstration of power.50 Although ambition will definitely have been a 
factor behind the decision to wage war, it is most likely that other factors were in 
play as well. Sherwin-White has made the suggestion that the Roman commander 
intended to “assert control over the rulers” in the Caucasus – a plausible idea, 
given the fact that these peoples were once part of Tigranes’ Armenian empire and 
had as such granted military support to their overlord at Tigranocerta in 69 
against Lucullus.51 By demonstrating his military supremacy, Pompey probably 
intended to bring them into Rome’s sphere of influence. Sherwin-White explains 
that Roman (indirect) control over the region would prevent a Parthian take-over 
of Tigranes’ former possessions.52 However, since there is no evidence whatsoever 
to conclude that the Parthians were set on extending their hegemony beyond the 
Caucasus, this suggestion remains speculative.  
 
Following the conclusion of peace with some of the tribes in the Caucasus in 65, 
Pompey moved southwards into Pontus and allegedly received an embassy from 
the Parthian ruler Phraates “requesting to renew the treaty with him”. 53  Dio 
informs us that the king was startled at Pompey’s success and the subjugation of 
Armenia and parts of Pontus. The advance “across the Euphrates as far as the 
Tigris” by A. Gabinius, one of Pompey’s legates who was to become proconsul of 
Syria in 57, would have upset him as well.54 What treaty Phraates wished to have 
renewed exactly is not clarified by Dio, but the historian is most likely to have 
referred to a foedus that Pompey himself would have concluded with the Parthians 
at some earlier point. This may seem odd, but we will see that in the light of 
                                                          
50 Magie (1950) 359. 
51 Plutarch, Luc. 26.4. 
52 Sherwin-White (1984) 195. 
53 Dio, 37.5.2: “ἀνανεώσασθαι τὰς συνθήκας ἐθέλων”. 
54 Dio, 37.5.2: “ὑπὲρ τὸν Εὐφράτην μέχρι τοῦ Τίγριδος”. 
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changed circumstances the request for this renewal is actually understandable. 
Although our only two sources for that earlier treaty, Florus and Orosius, do not 
provide us with any indications regarding the date of this earlier agreement, it is 
not implausible to surmise that the pact was settled in 66 prior to the attack upon 
Mithridates. Dio dates the creation of friendship between Pompey and Phraates to 
this moment.55 It is very well possible that the realisation of these friendly relations 
was the result of the conclusion of that earlier treaty. Unfortunately, only marginal 
details about this pact are given by Florus and Orosius. Both authors place their 
reference to this pact in the context of Crassus’ launch of his Parthian expedition in 
54. Florus describes how Crassus crossed the Euphrates at Zeugma and was 
approached by ambassadors from king Orodes II at Nicephorium, who had 
brought the message “bidding him to remember the treaties made with Pompey 
and Sulla”.56 Orosius recounts a similar episode, claiming that a certain legate 
dispatched by the king came near to Crassus and accused him of having violated 
the treaty of Lucullus and Pompey by traversing the Euphrates.57 Some scholars 
have concluded on the basis of these sources that the treaty struck by Pompey 
with the Parthians arranged for the Euphrates as boundary between the Roman 
and Parthian spheres of influence. 58  However, Sherwin-White has accurately 
pointed out that the question of the Euphrates as frontier can only have arisen 
after Tigranes had been forced to give up his claims on the territories in Sophene 
and Mesopotamia. This only happened later in 66, whereas the treaty that 
Phraates requested to be renewed in 65 may already have been struck in the 
beginning of 66 prior to the outbreak of hostilities between Pompey and 
                                                          
55 Dio, 36.45.3. Cf. Livy, Per. 100, who even says that Pompey renewed the amicitia with Phraates. 
Both passages do not necessarily refer to two different events. On the contrary, it is very likely that 
Dio drew upon Livy’s account at this point. If Livy’s epitomiser is to be believed, book 100 dealt 
among other things with the transfer of the command in the Third Mithridatic war upon Pompey 
and the conflict between Tigranes the Younger and his father. Since both events can be safely dated 
to 66, the renewal of friendship with Phraates probably occurred in the same year. 
56 Florus, 1.46.4: “… percussorum cum Pompeio foederum Sullaque meminisset”. 
57 Orosius, 6.13.2. 
58 Dobiáš (1931) 235; Ziegler (1964) 28. 
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Mithridates. Sherwin-White believes that the original agreement with Phraates 
had arranged for the redistribution of Tigranes’ possessions in Mesopotamia and 
Adiabene to Parthia.59 When Gabinius had made his march as far as the Tigris (i.e. 
through Mesopotamia), probably at some point in 65, Phraates was surprised and 
thus sent a deputation to Pompey after his return from the Caucasus to confirm 
the agreement that was made earlier on.60 Pompey did not reply to the king’s 
request and instead sent his legate Afranius to take away Gordyene from him and 
give it to Tigranes – a move that successfully played Phraates and Tigranes against 
each other. The legate succeeded in his mission at some point later in 65 and then 
returned through Mesopotamia to Syria where he arrived in 64.61 It was only after 
this event that Phraates can logically have demanded the Euphrates to be 
recognised as frontier between Rome and Parthia. 
 
1.3 Amisus and the friendship with Antiochus of Commagene 
 
The request made by king Phraates in 65 to have the earlier treaty made by 
Pompey renewed was thus rejected. During the remainder of the year and the 
following winter, the Roman commander stayed in Pontus. What business he 
precisely transacted in Mithridates’ former kingdom and in other areas during the 
following year and a half until the armed conflict in Judaea in 63 remains 
unfortunately unclear as a result of the absence of a continuous narrative in our 
sources for this period.62 It is nevertheless beyond doubt that he spent the winter 
and most of 64 suppressing the last vestiges of resistance in Pontus that were 
centred in certain strongholds.63 With the kingdom pacified, Pompey moved to the 
                                                          
59 Sherwin-White (1984) 221-223. 
60 Dio, 37.5.2. 
61 Dio, 37.5.3-5; Plutarch, Pomp. 36.2. See map 1 for clarification. 
62 As pointed out by Sherwin-White (1984) 206. 
63 Plutarch, Pomp. 36.6-37.3; Dio, 37.7.5; Strabo, 12.3.38; Appian, Mith. 107. See also Sherwin-White 
(1984) 206-208, who provides a critical analysis of the Pompey’s activities in 64. 
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city of Amisus on the Black Sea coast, and engaged in regulating Rome’s 
provinces. Plutarch informs us that he also distributed gifts and received many 
kings, dynasts and other leaders.64 Details about the decisions that he made there 
have unfortunately not been transmitted to us; nor is it clear what the identities of 
those rulers were and what had motivated them to come and see Pompey. 
Possibly, they anticipated to obtain some benefits from him with the war in Pontus 
and – earlier on already – in Armenia having come to a conclusion. Mithridates 
and Tigranes had expanded their respective kingdoms substantially prior to the 
struggle with Lucullus in the 70s BC at the cost of other rulers. Now that Pompey’s 
successes had undone most of those gains in the course of 64, a suitable moment 
had arisen for those dynasts or their successors to meet Pompey and demand the 
return of territories of which they had been deprived on earlier occasions. 
Whether the kings and dynasts to which Plutarch refers had actually come to meet 
Pompey with those intentions can obviously not be said on the basis of our source 
material. 
 Yet, whatever the exact nature of the exchanges at Amisus was, Pompey 
eventually left Pontus with his army and advanced southwards to Commagene.65 
Appian explains in his Mithridatic Wars that at arrival there he launched a war 
against the Commagenian king Antiochus I. Specifics about this alleged encounter 
are not provided. The hostilities are said to have ended when the king concluded 
friendship with Pompey.66 Positive as Appian is about this armed aggression, 
                                                          
64 Plutarch, Pomp. 38.1-2; Livy, Per. 102. Cf. Dio, 37.7a, who does not explicitly mention a meeting at 
Amisus, but does refer to Pompey dealing with the business of those kings and dynasts who had 
come to see him. 
65 See maps 1 and 5 for clarification. 
66 Appian, Mith. 106. Inscriptions from Commagene in which Antiochus is styled φιλορώμαιος 
(OGIS 383-397, 401-402, 404) cannot be seen as evidence for the official recognition of the king as 
friend of the Roman people (amicus populi Romani). Facella (2010) 186-187 has pointed to a stele 
discovered at Sofraz Köy – and published by Wagner / Petzl (1976) – which on the front consists of 
a relief depicting the king and Apollo, and on the back features an inscription referring to 
Antiochus as φιλορώμαιος. The text has fairly convincingly been dated to the early years of 
Antiochus’ reign (r.69-38) before Pompey’s intervention in 64 on the grounds that in the first place 
the epithet μέγας – so prolific in inscriptions after 64 – is absent and in the second place Antiochus 
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though, scholars rightly cast doubt on the occurrence of the military clash.67 Not 
only is Antiochus not known to have served as a supporter of Mithridates or 
Tigranes in the recent wars with Rome, Appian informs us a bit further in his 
account that Pompey granted the city of Seleucia on the Euphrates (also known as 
Zeugma) and some unidentified land in Mesopotamia to the Commagenian king – 
a claim that has been corroborated by Strabo.68 Zeugma was located by a bridge 
over the river which gave access to the Parthian kingdom and was as such 
strategically highly important. That Pompey added this city to the Commagenian 
realm thus demonstrates how much trust he had in the king. Had Antiochus 
offered resistance, then Pompey would probably not have retained him in his 
position and conferred upon him such a vital piece of territory. A war against the 
Commagenian king did thus in all likelihood not take place. As Sherwin-White 
suggests, Appian may have been deceived by the alleged appearance of 
Antiochus’ name on a plaque that was carried in the triumphal parade of 61 and 
contained, among other things, the names of rulers reputedly conquered by 
Pompey.69  Although the accuracy of the preserved version of the text on the 
plaque is uncertain in view of the fact that only Appian himself has transmitted a 
copy to us, the presence of Antiochus’ name on the tablet does by itself not prove 
                                                                                                                                                                                
is styled “the first adopting the tiara” (“πρῶτος ἀναλαβών τὴν κίταριν”), by which is probably 
meant the Armenian tiara of king Tigranes II as visualised by reliefs, statues and the imageries on 
coinage (for references see Facella l.c.). Since the mid-80s BC, Commagene had belonged to the 
Armenian sphere of influence. Lucullus’ invasion of Armenia in 69 ended this dependency. The 
reference to the Armenian tiara probably appeared soon afterwards as a means to portray 
Antiochus as the legitimate successor of the Armenian king in Commagene. The epigraphic 
evidence to Antiochus as πρῶτος ἀναλαβών τὴν κίταριν is limited to the inscription under 
discussion here. Later texts do not make this connection any more; obviously after Antiochus had 
been recognised as king by Rome, it was no longer essential to make an association with the 
Armenian past. The inscription at Sofraz Köy can thus fairly safely be dated before Pompey’s 
intervention in 64. This means that Antiochus was already called “a friend of Rome” 
(φιλορώμαιος) before being officially given that title by the Senate in 59 when Pompey’s acta were 
ratified. As argued by Facella l.c., the appearance of the term φιλορώμαιος in inscriptions does not 
necessarily reflect the conferment of the official title amicus populi Romani by Rome. 
67 Sullivan (1977c) 764; Sherwin-White (1984) 208; Facella (2006) 230-231. 
68 Appian, Mith. 114; Strabo, 16.2.3. 
69 Sherwin-White (1984) 208. The text of the supposed inscription carrying Antiochus’ name is 
given by Appian, Mith. 117. 
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that a military victory over Commagene had in fact occurred.70 As Facella points 
out, nothing would have withheld Pompey from listing the Commagenian king 
among the rulers that he had conquered (ἐνικήθησαν) just to give the impression 
that Antiochus was defeated in battle. 71  That Pompey deliberately strove to 
represent his dealings with Antiochus as a military victory is illustrated by the 
alleged inclusion of Commagenian hostages in the triumphal procession among 
distinguished hostages from Iberia and Albania, and eminent prisoners from other 
nations.72 The audience will not have been able to regard the Commagenians 
                                                          
70 Cf. Östenberg (2009) 165, who calls the accuracy of Appian’s version of the text on the tablet 
carried in the procession into doubt based on the inclusion of Antiochus’ name on the one hand 
and the absence of Commagene in any “official list of the eastern nations over which Pompey held 
his triumph” on the other hand. None of these so-called official lists to which Östenberg refers 
(Plutarch, Pomp. 45.2; Pliny, HN 7.26.98; Diodorus, 40.4), though, make it necessary to reject 
Appian’s version of the tablet. Neither Pliny the Elder nor Diodorus claim to give the text on the 
plaques carried in the triumphal procession. The former merely claims that he provides the official 
announcement (praefatio) of the parade, whereas the latter purports to have given the text of a 
dedicatory inscription mentioning Pompey’s achievements. Only Plutarch informs us of the 
content of the plaques taken along in the procession, and asserts that they contained the names of 
the names of the nations which Pompey led in a triumph. That Commagene is not mentioned in 
the list that Plutarch provide, however, does not mean that Antiochus was not included in the 
inscription to which Appian refers. There is no reason to assume that the inscriptions carried in the 
triumphal procession all contained the same text. 
71 Facella (2006) 231. 
72 Plutarch, Pomp. 45.4 informs us of the participation of the Commagenian, Iberian and Albanian 
hostages, as well as the prominent prisoners in the procession. That the hostages and prisoners 
would have been led in the parade alongside one another is explained by Appian, Mith. 117, who 
himself reveals that three Iberian and two Albanian chiefs participated in the procession, but does 
not make any mention of Commagenian hostages. Florus, 1.40.28 and Dio, 37.2.5-7 clarify that the 
Iberian king Artoces had placed his children as hostages at Pompey’s disposal. The nature of the 
Albanian and Commagenian hostages staged in the procession is unknown to us. It is not 
unthinkable, though, that they equally consisted of members of the ruling elite. Yet, from whatever 
group within the society these hostages were recruited, it is important to realise that hostages were 
not only demanded of Rome in the event of the capitulation (deditio) of a foreign people, such as in 
the case of the Iberians and the Albanians. There is ample evidence, compiled and analysed by 
Elbern (1990) 98-103, 137-140, revealing that hostages were also given to Rome in the case of the 
conclusion of treaties or other interstate arrangements (such as truces). The hostages served as a 
bail to force the foreign party to adhere to the agreement. Accordingly, the presence of hostages 
from Commagene does not show that Commagene had been defeated militarily by Pompey. It may 
very well be that Pompey had demanded hostages of Antiochus to secure his loyalty and maintain 
the friendship. The conclusion of Elbern (1990) 140 – followed by Östenberg (2009) 165 – believes 
that the Commagenian hostages were given in the case of the conclusion of a foedus iniqua (an 
unequal treaty). There is, however, no evidence for a treaty by Pompey with the Commagenians. 
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carried along in the parade as others than prisoners. 73  The mentioning of 
Antiochus’ name on the plaque of conquered rulers, thus, does not corroborate 
that the Commagenian ruler was defeated by Pompey in battle. As we saw, armed 
hostilities have in all likelihood not taken place. With the bestowal of strategically 
vital pieces of land to Antiochus, Pompey could save Roman manpower that 
would have been necessary in the case of adding this territory to a Roman 
province (which at that moment did not yet exist in the Near East).74  
King Antiochus was not the only ruler recognised as a friend of Rome. We 
have already seen that Pompey had established friendship with the Parthian king 
Phraates in 66 and that in the same year the Armenian ruler Tigranes was enrolled 
“among the friend and allies of Rome”.75 The practice to create these types of 
connections with kings, princes, notables and indeed communities in the eastern 
Mediterranean became part of Rome’s diplomatic dealings as early as late in the 
third century. At first, the creation of such relationships occurred sporadically, but 
from 200 onwards, Rome embraced this activity on a more frequent basis.76 Some 
of the rulers who are attested to have maintained political dealings with Rome in 
the period of civil war from 44 until 31 appear to have upheld such associations at 
some point during their reign. With the formation of friendships being so 
widespread, the question arises what the consequences were of these kinds of 
compacts for the bilateral transactions between Rome and each of the parties 
involved. Did the conclusion of a mere friendship impose certain obligations on 
either or both of the partners? Or were such obligations only in place in the case of 
a concomitantly concluded alliance? For the benefit of a comprehensive analysis of 
                                                          
73 Östenberg (2009) 166-167. Cf. Beard (2007), who does not deal with the hostages staged in a 
procession in her book on the Roman triumph. 
74 Facella (2006) 234-236. 
75 See above. 
76  Gruen (1984) 68-69; 76; 84; 88; 95. Friendship was for example expressed with Perseus of 
Macedonia in 179 (Polybius, 25.3.1; Diodorus, 29.30) and with Ariarathes V of Cappadocia in 163 
(Polybius, 31.3.1; 31.8.8). 
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the political relations between Rome and the Near Eastern kingdoms and 
principalities during our civil war, a brief elaboration on these issues is important. 
 
1.4 Amicitia and Societas 
 
Despite the abundant amount of evidence for relationships of friendship between 
Rome and foreign rulers, a clear vision on the juridical status of such interstate 
amicitia-connections cannot be extracted from the source material. It is therefore 
peculiar that until recently scholarly debate on this issue was settled ever since 
Alfred Heuss had claimed in 1933 that relationships of amicitia between Rome and 
foreign powers were made independently from the enactment of a formal treaty, 
“durch jede Art friedlichen, zwischenstaatlichen Verkehrs...”.77 He rejected the 
view – mainly adhered to by Mommsen and Täubler – according to which 
relationships of amicitia between Rome and foreign powers were founded on 
formal enduring treaties of friendship.78 A majority of scholars embraced Heuss’ 
views and proposed that amicitia between Rome and a foreign king, dynast or 
other ruler “represented an informal and extra-legal relationship not requiring a 
treaty, a pact, or any official engagements”.79 Yet, lately, the German historian 
Andreas Zack published a study in which he challenges this view, claiming that 
there is no evidence to prove that informal amicitia-relationships were a regular 
feature of Rome’s foreign policy from the third century BC onwards. In addition, 
he asserts that those instances of interstate amicitia of which the foundation act has 
                                                          
77 Heuss (1933) 46. 
78 Heuss (1933) 12-25, 53-59; cf. Mommsen (1887) 590-591; Täubler (1913) 1-3; 47-58: Mommsen and 
Täubler assert that a so-called enduring ‘Freundschaftsvertrag’ between Rome and a foreign 
people created “ein dauerndes internationales Rechtsverhältniss” (Mommsen, o.c. 591) for both 
scholars claimed that natural hostility existed between Rome and a foreign people in a situation 
where no treaties between the two parties had been concluded.  
79 Gruen (1984) 55 (quotation). Similar views by Ziegler (1972) 83; Coşkun (2008c) and Kaizer / 
Facella (2010b) 22. 
54 
been attested in the extant source material, can be traced back to a foedus (treaty).80 
Several examples of amicitia-connections, which found their origin in a treaty, have 
been provided by Zack. For practical reasons, only one of his cases will be briefly 
discussed in this section: Rome’s friendship with Syphax,81 a tribal leader of the 
Numidian Masaesylii during the Second Punic War.  
 The two Roman military commanders, P. and Cn. Cornelius Scipio, sent an 
embassy to Syphax in 213, in order to conclude friendship and an alliance 
(“amicitiam societatemque”) with him and to make a promise that Rome would 
repay Syphax, if he were to continue his resistance against Carthage.82 Rome left 
one of the three ambassadors in Numidia to train the troops and prepare them for 
infantry battles, in which they were inexperienced, according to Livy. 83  In 
exchange for this support, Syphax sent three Numidian legates to Spain, 
instructing them to persuade Numidian troops there to desert the auxiliary forces 
of Carthage.84 The military instructor as well as the legates sent to Spain succeeded 
in their tasks, since the army of Syphax defeated the Carthaginians in a battle, 
whereas many Numidians began to desert the Carthaginian cause in Spain.85  
Livy informs us that these diplomatic dealings marked the beginning of 
amicitia between Rome and Syphax.86 Obviously, the basis of those diplomatic and 
political interactions was laid by the agreement which the three Roman 
ambassadors and Syphax made in 213. In a different passage, Livy clearly refers to 
this agreement as a foedus.87 Yet, the existence of such a treaty has been rejected by 
Heuss, who argues that a foedus could only be sanctioned by the Senate and the 
people in Rome and not merely by a magistrate. Since such an authorisation is not 
                                                          
80 Zack (2001) 240 (conclusion), 167-242. 
81 Livy, 24.48.1-24.49.6; Zack (2001) 185-187. 
82 Livy, 24.48.1-3. 
83 Livy, 24.48.5-12. 
84 Livy, 24.48.9-10. 
85 Livy, 24.48.12-13. 
86  Livy, 24.48.13: “Thus began the friendship of the Romans with Syphax” (“Ita cum Syphace 
Romanis coepta amicitia est”). 
87 Livy, 24.49.3. 
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attested in the sources, he concludes that a foedus could not have been established 
between Rome and Syphax 213.88 Zack argues convincingly against this view, 
asserting that a Roman magistrate was capable of making treaties with a foreign 
king or people himself. The treaty could become valid by the regular ratification of 
a promagistrate’s actions by the Senate. 89  It is therefore plausible that the 
agreement between the three ambassadors of P. and Cn. Cornelius and Syphax 
had the status of an official foedus. Provided that Livy’s terminology is accurate, 
we may propose, alongside Zack, that the amicitia between Rome and Syphax was 
the result of this foedus.90  
The conclusion that the origin of the amicitia-connection between Rome and 
Syphax can be traced back to a treaty between these two powers, is used by Zack, 
along with several similar instances, to demonstrate that amicitia-relationships, 
which did not find their origin in a treaty, were no regular feature of Rome’s 
foreign policy.91 Although the example of the amicitia between Rome and Syphax 
does show that relationships of friendship were able to originate in a foedus, there 
is no proof that other events or circumstances could not also initiate such 
connections. Several scholars, who regard interstate amicitia as an informal 
relationship, asserted that any kind of diplomatic intercourse, a friendly exchange, 
a military alliance with or without a treaty or a peace agreement could lay the 
foundation for a relationship of amicitia.92 The peace treaty between Rome and 
Antiochus III in 188 can, for example, be used as evidence for the informal nature 
of amicitia-connections. Both the Greek and the Latin versions of the treaty 
illustrate that φιλία (amicitia) and συμμαχία (societas) were established between 
                                                          
88 Zack (2001) 185-187; cf. Heuss (1933) 29-30; Dahlheim (1968) 229-230 only mentions the making of 
amicitia. 
89 Zack (2001) 190-214. 
90 Zack (2001) 187. 
91  Zack (2001) 184-189. The only examples mentioned by Zack (2001) of possible amicitia-
relationships, which did not find their origin in a treaty, were Rome’s friendship with Rhodes until 
167 BC (Zack o.c. 214-222) and the amicitia with five Sicilian cities (Zack o.c. 222-231). However, he 
adds to this that the evidence for these informal amicitia-relationships is problematic.  
92 Dahlheim (1968) 137; Ziegler (1972) 87; Gruen (1984) 55; 68. 
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these two parties on the conditions mentioned in the treaty.93 This could suggest 
that not the treaty itself, but the terms mentioned in the treaty enacted amicitia 
between both parties. In other words, not the form of enactment (foedus), but the 
content of the stipulations seems to have established the relationship of amicitia 
between Antiochus III and Rome.94 Whether a similar explanation can be applied 
to other instances of interstate amicitia is uncertain, since the foundation acts of 
most interstate amicitiae have not been preserved in the sources. Other factors that 
might have played a role, according to some scholars, in the establishment of 
amicitia, such as mere friendly exchanges or any kind of diplomatic intercourse, 
have not been attested in the sources.95  
Therefore, it is not possible to conclude that all relationships of interstate 
amicitia were made in an informal way, independent of the establishment of a 
formal treaty.96 Nor can we state that amicitia by its nature denoted a relationship, 
of which the foundation was laid by the acceptance of a formal treaty. Although 
the evidence has shown that those instances of interstate amicitia of which the 
foundation act has been preserved in the sources can be traced back to a treaty, the 
two versions of the peace treaty between Rome and Antiochus III have shown, 
however, that tracing back the origin of an amicitia-connection to a foedus does not 
necessarily mean that such a treaty established this relationship. It is equally likely 
that the specific terms, included into the clauses of the treaty, resulted in interstate 
amicitia. Yet, whether a similar explanation can be applied to other instances of 
                                                          
93 Polybius, 21.42; Livy, 38.38.1-18.  
94 On this argument, see also Dahlheim (1968) 147. 
95 These factors have been mentioned by Dahlheim (1968) 137; Ziegler (1972) 87; Gruen (1984) 55; 
68. 
96 See also Pomponius’ explanation of circumstances under which the ius Postliminii was applied in 
peace time (Dig. 49.15.5.2): “Postliminium is also granted in peace time; for if we have neither 
friendship nor hospitium with a particular people, nor a treaty made for the purpose of friendship, 
they are not precisely enemies…” (transl. Watson) (“in pace quoque postliminium datum est: nam si 
cum gente aliqua neque amicitiam neque hospitium neque foedus amicitiae causa factum habemus, hi hostes 
quidem non sunt”). Heuss (1933) 12-13 has argued on the basis of this passage that the existence of 
amicitia did not necessarily depend on the conclusion of a treaty. Cimma (1976) has proposed with 
regards to this same passage that a so-called friendship-treaty did exist and that this passage 
cannot be used to show that amicitia was not necessarily dependent on the existence of a treaty. 
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amicitia is uncertain, since the foundation acts of most relationships of amicitia 
have not been preserved in the sources. It is therefore not possible to state if the 
existence of interstate amicitia-connections depended on the establishment of a 
formal treaty, or if other factors played a role in the foundation of these 
relationships. Perhaps, both formally enacted foedera and informally constructed 
relationships of friendship between Rome and foreign kings or peoples did occur.   
Since the juridical status of interstate amicitia-relationships is not clear, a 
definite answer to the question whether amicitia was a relationship which imposed 
mutual obligations on the two parties, cannot be given. Not only do the extant 
literary accounts and epigraphic documents fail to reveal whether amicitia entailed 
any obligations. These sources also use the expressions amicitia (φιλία), societas 
(συμμαχία) and amicitia et societas alternately.97 Dahlheim argues that these terms 
are often used as synonyms. 98  We should agree with Dahlheim that this 
inconsistent use does not necessarily reflect a lack of knowledge on the part of the 
two main authorities for Republican history, Polybius and Livy. In the time when 
amicitia was introduced as a diplomatic tool of Rome in the fourth century (not 
necessarily with regard to kingdoms, principalities and city-states in the eastern 
Mediterranean), many of its amici were also military allies (socii). In this way, the 
two terms became gradually assimilated.99 That Tigranes was enrolled among the 
friends and allies of Rome by Pompey does thus not necessarily mean that a treaty 
had been concluded with the Armenian king and that he was bound to support 
Rome in war. Nor does the application of any of these terms to any of the Near 
Eastern kings mean that certain obligations had been imposed upon them by 
Rome. 
 
                                                          
97 Dahlheim (1968) 163-166; Ziegler (1972) 88; Zack (2001) 171, 181. See also Sands (1907) 12-40 on 
the terminology of the sources for referring to friendship, alliances and treaties. 
98 E.g. Livy, 42.6.6-12; Dahlheim (1968) 164. 
99 Dahlheim (1968) 169, 265-269; Coşkun (2008b) 12. 
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1.5 The war against Darius the Mede and the dissolution of the Seleucid Kingdom 
 
It must have been sometime in the autumn of 64 when Pompey intervened in 
Commagene. Around the same time, the Roman commander is said by Appian to 
have fought a war against a certain Darius the Mede (who is probably to be 
identified as the ruler of Media Atropatene) on the grounds that he had either 
supported king Antiochus or Tigranes.100  Median assistance for the Armenian 
ruler in 69 during the war against Lucullus is confirmed by Plutarch.101 That this 
alliance with Rome’s enemy would have prompted Pompey to undertake a 
punitive expedition against Darius is not unthinkable. Velleius also refers to an 
invasion of Media, and Appian has Darius’ name mentioned in his version of 
Pompey’s triumphal inscription that gives a list of rulers whom he had conquered 
and was carried in the procession.102 Unlike Appian, though, Velleius associates 
the aggression against Media Atropatene with the wars in the Caucasus and does 
not place it after Pompey’s dealings with Commagene. That the encounter 
occurred in 65 following the Caucasian campaign is much more plausible than for 
the struggle against Darius to have taken place – as Appian suggests – in 64 when 
Pompey was on his way to Syria. Media Atropatene was located just south of the 
Caucasus, and it would be most logical for Pompey to have initiated his armed 
confrontation when he was engaged in that region, all the more so since Plutarch 
refers to some diplomatic exchanges between Pompey and Media Atropatene 
when the wars against the Albanians and Iberians were in progress.103  
 Yet, whenever the war against Darius the Mede was fought, and whatever 
the outcome of the struggle, Pompey arrived in Syria towards the end of 64 and 
dealt with the request of the Seleucid prince Antiochus XIII Philadelphus (also 
                                                          
100 Appian, Mith. 106. For the location of Media Atropatene, see map 1 and 2. 
101 Plutarch, Luc. 26.4. 
102 Velleius, 2.40.1; Appian, Mith. 117. 
103 Plutarch, Pomp. 36.2. Similar view by Sherwin-White (1984) 209. 
59 
known as “Asiaticus”),104 a son of Antiochus X Eusebes (r. c.95-92?/88?), to be 
reinstalled as king over Syria and Cilicia.105 Already in 69, Antiochus had ascended 
to the throne by establishing himself as king in Antioch following the Armenian 
evacuation of Syria,106 thereby ending a hiatus in Seleucid rule of almost fifteen 
years.107 The monarch received approval for this move from the Antiochenes and 
soon afterwards also secured recognition for his acquisition of the kingship over 
Syria from Lucullus.108 With this moral backing, Antiochus was able to maintain a 
position of authority over Antioch and the surrounding region for about a year 
and a half. Eventually, a defeat on the battlefield in 67 at the hands of opponents 
whose identities have not been revealed to us marked the beginning of his 
downfall.109 In the aftermath of this military setback Antiochus faced a revolt 
                                                          
104  Appian, Syr. 70 explains that the epithet “Asiaticus” derived from Antiochus’ place of 
upbringing being Asia. On his own silver tetrardrachms struck at Antioch, he is styled “βασιλέως 
Ἀντίοχον φιλάδελφον” – on which see Newell, SMA 126-127 nos.460-461; Houghton / Lorber / 
Hoover (2008) 619 no.2487. Cf. Babelon (1890) 201-202 no.1538, who attributed the coin to 
Antiochus XI Philadelphus (r. c.94/93). On stylistic and material grounds, Newell l.c. has assigned 
these coins to Antiochus XIII. 
105 Appian, Mith. 106; Justin, Epit. 40.2.3; Malalas, 212; Dio, 37.7a. 
106 Appian, Syr. 49. 
107 The Seleucid rule came to an end in 83 when Philip I Philadelphus, son of Antiochus VIII 
Grypus, was expelled from Antioch by Tigranes (cf. Appian, Syr. 48 and Mith. 105, who 
erroneously believes that it was Antiochus Pius (X) who was ejected). In the preceding twelve 
years the offspring of Antiochus VIII and his cousin Antiochus IX Cyzicenus, who died in 96 and 
95 respectively, had been engaged in almost incessant warfare against one another. The internal 
feuds weakened the Seleucid kingdom enormously and made it vulnerable for external attacks. 
The coup de grâce came 84/83 when Antiochus XII Dionysus perished in a battle against the 
Nabataeans near Cana (Josephus, AJ 13.387-392). For Philip I it was difficult to maintain his 
position in the north of Syria, and Tigranes’ advancement eventually forced him to seek refuge in 
the sanctuary of Zeus at Olba in Cilicia. For more details about these conflicts in the Seleucid 
Kingdom from 95 until 83, see now Ehling (2008) 231-250 with references. Although contradictory 
indications provided by literary sources and numismatic evidence render it impossible to establish 
the exact course of all the events with certainty, newly discovered coins seem to resolve some 
dating issues – for which see Houghton / Lorber / Hoover (2008) 551-612 – and thus render the 
older studies with regard to the period 95-83 by Bevan (1902) 259-263; Bellinger (1949) 72-80 and 
Will (1967) 382-385 partly obsolete. 
108 Justin, Epit. 40.2.2. Cf. Appian, Syr. 49, who merely says that Lucullus did not bear a grudge 
(ἐφθόνησεν) against Antiochus’ rule over his ancestral kingdom. 
109 Diodorus, 40.1a. Ehling (2008) 261 argues that Antiochus was defeated by the Arabs whom 
Tigranes II would have placed in the Amanus mountain range at some point during the heyday of 
his reign, which was before Lucullus’ invasion of Armenia (Plutarch, Luc. 21.4). The possibility of 
this suggestion cannot be excluded because of the vicinity of the Amanus to Antioch. Moreover, in 
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among Antioch’s population whose agitators aimed for his expulsion. Although 
the king managed to quell the uprising, the leaders of the rebellion escaped to 
Cilicia and persuaded a homonymous son of the former king Philip I (r. c.95/94-83) 
to come to Syria and win the Seleucid throne for himself. The pretender thereupon 
secured the support of a so-called “Arab” leader named Azizus, and had a diadem 
placed on his head by him. The provenance of this Azizus, as well as the exact area 
of his rule, remains uncertain. Yet, wherever this Arab leader originated from, 
Antiochus XIII did not stand by and watch his realm slipping through his fingers. 
He was determined to maintain his position, and appealed to the Emisene ruler 
Sampsigeramus for assistance. Sampsigeramus, however, did not grant the aid for 
which the king had hoped. Diodorus informs us that the Emisene chief, in 
accordance with an arrangement made with Azizus to get rid of the two kings and 
to split the remnants of the Seleucid realm between them, had Antiochus arrested. 
Philip II managed to evade detention and eventually found himself on the throne 
at Antioch.110 For how long the new king retained his position in Syria remains 
unknown, but it is not unthinkable that the king lost his position in 65 as a result 
of an uprising at Antioch.111 Who subsequently exerted control at Antioch and the 
wider area of the Tetrapolis remains unclear. It has been suggested that Antiochus 
XIII immediately returned to the throne before Pompey’s arrival in Syria, but there 
is no evidence to support that view. In the end, though, Pompey rejected the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
65 Pompey had dispatched to Syria one of his legates, L. Afranius, who is said (Plutarch, Pomp. 
39.2) to have subjugated Arabs dwelling in the Amanus mountains. Surely, a campaign against this 
people would not have been necessary if they did not pose a potential threat to the security of the 
region. Yet, there is no certainty that these were the Arabs responsible for the defeat upon 
Antiochus. We shall see that a little later the so-called “Arab” leader Azizus and the Emisene ruler 
Sampsigeramus would make an attempt to eliminate the Seleucid claimants to the throne and to 
divide the remains of the Seleucid realm among themselves. It is not unthinkable that one of them 
had been responsible for a military victory over Antiochus, but had failed to expel him. Obviously, 
without any evidence, it remains to conjecture who defeated Antiochus. 
110 Diodorus, 40.1a-b. 
111 Dio, 36.17.3. 
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requests of Antiochus XIII and turned Syria into a Roman province, the first one in 
the Near East.112 
 Several different explanations can be given for Pompey’s decision to reject 
the claims of Antiochus and to establish the provincia Syria. The choice seems at 
first a deviation from the practice to retain native rulers.113 The most plausible 
explanation is given by Justin. This author claims that Pompey refused to reinstall 
Antiochus XIII as ruler because he had already lost the throne to Tigranes in the 
past and because Rome was victorious over the Armenian king. Justin implies that 
Pompey did not believe that Antiochus was able to defend his kingdom against 
the Judaeans and Arabs.114 That this fear was justified is shown by Antiochus’ 
defeat in the war in 67 and by the observation that certain Arabs were ravaging 
the region. 115  Pompey did not trust Antiochus to bring the stability that was 
needed. Probably for that reason, he refuted the claims by Antiochus and 
established a Roman province in Syria. 
 
1.6 Pompey’s dealings with the Emisenoi and his reorganisation of the Princedom of 
Chalcis 
 
Having spent the entire winter in Antioch, Pompey moved in the spring of 63 
southwards to Damascus. Along the way, he first seems to have dealt with the 
Emisenian φύλαρχος Sampsigeramus who had participated in the deposition of 
the Seleucid king Antiochus XIII in 67. Not much is known of his measures with 
regard to this ruler whose main base appears to have been the city of Arethusa 
situated in the north of Syria on the river Orontes. 116  A coin from Arethusa 
                                                          
112 Appian, Syr. 49; Mith. 106; Justin, Epit. 40.2.5; Plutarch, Pomp. 39.2; Dio, 37.7a; Malalas, 212. 
113 Appian, Syr. 49; Plutarch, Pomp. 39.2; Dio, 37.7a. 
114 Justin, Epit. 40.2.2-5. 
115 Dio, 37.7a.  
116 Strabo, 16.2.10. As Millar (1993) 302 has pointed out, there is no evidence for the city of Emesa to 
have existed at that point already. 
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mentioning the Roman emperor Diadumenian, who ruled briefly in AD 217-218, 
carries the date 280, meaning that the city adopted a new era in 64 or 63.117 
Although the sources do not provide us with any indication for the event that 
prompted the adoption of this new era, the implementation of this new dating 
formula is in all likelihood related to benefits granted by Pompey at that time as 
part of his grand-scale reorganisation of the Near East. Yet, whatever the nature of 
such remunerations may have been, Sullivan has claimed that Pompey did not 
only confirm Sampsigeramus’ rule, but also imposed taxation on the Emisenoi.118 
The evidence on which he bases the existence of a tax is a letter by Cicero from the 
year 59 addressed to Atticus in which he criticises Pompey for supporting Caesar’s 
proposal for the distribution of land in Campania.119 The move would have ended 
the levy of the vectigal (a tax on public land) in that region, and thus have led to a 
loss of revenue.120 The possibility of this happening prompted Cicero to address 
Pompey directly – as if he were communicating with him rather than with Atticus 
– and to refer to him as Sampsigeramus in a metonymic manner: 121 
 
“Very well, my good Sampsigeramus, but what are you going to say now? That you 
have arranged a vectigal for us in the Anti-Lebanon Mountains, and taken away our 
vectigal in Campania? How are you going to make that sound convincing?” 
 
The reference to Pompey as Sampsigeramus has induced Sullivan to believe that 
Pompey had imposed a vectigal on the realm ruled by the φύλαρχος of the 
Emisenoi. Although the possibility is not to be excluded – all the more since 
Sampsigeramus’ dominion may have stretched as far south as the Anti-Lebanon 
                                                          
117 Seyrig (1950) 21. 
118 Sullivan (1977a) 201-202. 
119 For more details and references, see Shackleton Bailey (1965) 381. 
120 For more details on the vectigal, see among others Nicolet (1976) 79-86. 
121 Cicero, Att. 2.16.2: “Nunc, vero, Sampsicerame, quid dices? Vectigal te nobis in monte Antilibano 
constituisse, agri Campani abstulisse?Quid? Hoc quem ad modum obtinebis?” (Shackleton Bailey transl. 
adapted). 
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Mountains – in view of its sarcastic undertone, the passage cannot serve as 
evidence for the imposition of a Roman tax on the Emisenoi.122 
 The route to Damascus led Pompey through the Beqāʽ valley and the 
principality ruled by a certain Ptolemy based at the (unidentifiable) city of Chalcis. 
Josephus informs us that he “devastated the territory of Ptolemy, the son of 
Mennaeus”.123 What tracts of land were shattered exactly cannot be gleaned from 
our sources. On the eve of Rome’s intervention, though, Ptolemy’s realm appears 
to have consisted of the Beqāʽ and the adjoining Lebanon mountain range. Some 
unknown fortresses on the Phoenician coast between Tripolis and Byblos, which 
Strabo claims robbers (κακοῦργοι) of Ituraean and Arabian descent occupied, may 
also have constituted a part of Ptolemy’s dominion.124 However, in 63 Pompey 
appears to have decided on the demolition of those maritime strongholds, 
possibly to make an end to the pillaging activities which stood as a potential threat 
to the newly installed province of Syria.125 Pompey may have been dissatisfied 
with Ptolemy’s efforts to suppress these marauding operations. He may even have 
accused Ptolemy of involvement in these raids and for that reason have resolved 
to prosecute him. Unfortunately, the precise details of the arraignments which 
Pompey purportedly intended to bring up against Ptolemy, have eluded us. Yet, 
whatever “the sins” (τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων) were for which Pompey allegedly 
intended to sentence Ptolemy, Josephus explains that Ptolemy paid one thousand 
talents to escape a penalty, which might have entailed dethronement or perhaps 
even execution.126 Whether Pompey also imposed taxation on the Princedom of 
Chalcis, as Aliquot has claimed, is uncertain because of the lack of any indication 
                                                          
122 Moreover, Cicero also refers in other letters sarcastically to Pompey as Sampsigeramus: Att. 
2.14.1, 2.17.1. 
123 Josephus, AJ 14.39: “τὴν Πτολεμαίου τοῦ Μενναίου χώραν κατεπόνησεν”. 
124 Strabo, 16.2.18. 
125 Strabo, 16.2.18.  
126  Josephus, AJ 14.39 says that Ptolemy’s relative, Dionysius of Tripolis, was beheaded on 
Pompey’s instigation. It is not unlikely that Ptolemy had to face a similar fate if he had not offered 
a bribe.  
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for this in the sources.127 At any rate, Ptolemy managed to be confirmed in his 
position, and Pompey allowed him to carry the titles of τετράρχης and ἀρχιερεύς 
(High Priest), as the appearance of these ranks on the coinage of this prince 
illustrates.128 The near experience of a possible dethronement or perhaps even an 
execution must have made Ptolemy aware that the future of his position was at 
least to a certain degree dependent upon Rome or its representative in the Near 
East. A good illustration of this new relationship is the use of a Pompeian era on 
some of Ptolemy’s coin issues.  
 
1.7 The reorganisation of Judaea 
 
With business in the Princedom of Chalcis concluded, Pompey moved further 
southwards and eventually arrived at Damascus, where he dealt with the 
succession crisis that had erupted in Judaea following the death of queen 
Alexandra in 67 between her sons Hyrcanus II and Aristobulus II.129 The seeds of 
this conflict, however, had already been sown in 76 when Alexander Jannaeus, the 
father of the two brothers, passed away.130 Just like his predecessor Aristobulus I 
(r. 104-103), this Alexander did not only serve as High Priest, but also carried the 
title of king.131 With his death, the royal title came to his widow Alexandra, who as 
a woman was not eligible for the High Priesthood. After her elevation to the 
kingship she appointed her elder son Hyrcanus as High Priest.132 The younger 
sibling Aristobulus did not agree with this choice and after their mother died in 
                                                          
127 Aliquot (1999-2003) 214. 
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coins that can be attributed to Ptolemy feature both titles. 
129 See stemma 1 in the appendix for clarification. 
130 Josephus, AJ 13.398; BJ 1.106. 
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67, he immediately took up arms against his elder brother, who had inherited the 
royal title and carried it in addition to the High Priesthood that he had already 
possessed for nine years. Aristobulus was victorious and forced Hyrcanus to hand 
over his two positions to him.133 With Hyrcanus willing to submit to Aristobulus, 
peace would have returned to Judaea, had not Antipater, the son of a 
homonymous στρατηγός of the Judaean district of Idumaea under Alexander 
Jannaeus,134 persuaded his friend (φίλος) Hyrcanus to rebel against his brother. 
Having secured the support of the Nabataean king Aretas III in exchange for the 
return of twelve cities in the Moab that Alexander Jannaeus had taken from the 
Nabataeans, the war with Aristobulus resumed. The pressure of the Nabataean 
armies forced Aristobulus to retreat to Jerusalem. 135 At that moment, the general 
M. Aemilius Scaurus arrived in Judaea – where he had been sent by Pompey – and 
was approached by envoys of the two brothers who both tried to win Scaurus’ 
support. Scaurus decided in the end in favour of Aristobulus and ordered Aretas 
to cease the siege and return to his kingdom.136 The matter was reopened, though, 
when Pompey arrived in the spring of 63 at Damascus, the city which his legates 
L. Lollius and Q. Caecilius Metellus Nepos had captured in 65 or 64 and which 
would henceforth remain under Roman rule.137 The Roman commander received 
Aristobulus, Hyrcanus and a delegation of Judaeans who aimed for the abolition 
of royal power and wished to revert to the rule of a High Priest.138 Pompey at first 
decided to defer a verdict until he would come back from his inspection to the 
Nabataeans, but eventually decided against this idea when Aristobulus began a 
rebellion. 139 Pompey returned to Judaea and eventually captured the enemy and 
                                                          
133 Josephus, AJ 14.1, 4-7; BJ 1.119-122. 
134 For the location of Idumaea, see map 3. 
135 Josephus, AJ 14.8-21; BJ 1.123-127. 
136 Josephus, AJ 14.29-33; BJ 1.127-130. 
137 Josephus, AJ 14.29; BJ 1.127. On Lollius and Metellus, and their capture of Damascus in 65 or 64, 
see Broughton (1952) 148, 160, 164, 165 n.7. 
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occupied Jerusalem.140 He then implemented a rigorous reorganisation of Judaea, 
whereby he strongly reduced the kingdom in size.141 Most of the territories that 
had been attached to Judaea under the reigns of Hyrcanus I and Alexander 
Jannaeus were taken away from it. All the coastal cities from Dora in the north to 
Raphia in the south were removed from Judaean rule. The same applied to the 
western part of Idumaea, the city of Samaria and the cities east of the Jordan, the 
latter of which came to be known collectively as the Decapolis, and would adopt 
an era going back to this event (64/63).142 All these areas were now placed under 
direct Roman rule and attached to the province of Syria. Pompey may also have 
taken the Plain of Esdraelon from Judaea.143 Hyrcanus was reinstalled as High 
Priest in Jerusalem, 144 and he was granted “the leadership of the nation”, but 
without the royal title.145 The realm granted to him consisted now only of the 
districts of Judaea proper, Samaria, Galilee and eastern Idumaea. In addition, 
Judaea was forced to pay tribute, the exact details of which elude us.146 
 The reasons for this harsh treatment inflicted on Judaea have not been 
transmitted to us. Yet, it is very much thinkable that Pompey was induced by the 
internal friction that had disturbed Judaea ever since the death of Alexandra in 67. 
In order to ensure stability, he had Hyrcanus reinstalled as High Priest and taken 
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141 See map 3 for clarification. 
142 For more details on the geographical extent and status of the Decapolis after its annexation by 
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from Hyrcanus (“διάδημα δὲ φορεῖν ἐκώλυσεν”). Smallwood (1976) 27 claims that aside from 
being appointed as High Priest, Hyrcanus was made ἐθνάρχης. Although Josephus’ reference to 
the προστασία over the Judaean nation would suggest that Hyrcanus was given the title of 
ἐθνάρχης (which literally means “leader of a nation”), there is no firm evidence at all that this title 
was actually conferred upon him at this point. It remains thus unclear whether Pompey installed 
Hyrcanus as ἐθνάρχης in Judaea. 
146 Josephus, AJ 14.75-76; BJ 1.155-156. See also Smallwood (1976) 27-29. 
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his brother Aristobulus as prisoner to Rome. The territorial deprivations and the 
withdrawal of the royal title may have been measures designed to increase 
Hyrcanus’ loyalty to Rome. In the hope to see these territories and the royal title 
restored, Hyrcanus would have shown allegiance to Rome.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Having implemented his reorganisation of Judaea, Pompey left M. Aemilius 
Scaurus proquaestore propraetore behind as the first governor of Syria, and returned 
himself to Asia Minor and eventually to Rome where he celebrated his triumph in 
61.147 In 59, his reorganisation of the Near East was confirmed by the Senate.148 
Pompey’s actions in the East after the passing of the lex Manilia began as a war 
against Mithridates and his allies, but ended in a complete rearrangement of the 
political map of the Near East. The rationale behind the enterprise is difficult to 
gauge, but it seems as if Pompey was motivated to bring stabilisation to a region 
that had been torn apart by political turmoil with the steady disintegration of the 
Seleucid Kingdom from the turn of the century onwards. In order to implement a 
balance of power in the Near East, Pompey confirmed most rulers in their 
position. In some cases, though (such as with regard to Judaea), internal problems 
forced him to take more rigorous measures and apply regime change and 
territorial reductions. There does not seem to have been any incentive to place the 
Levant entirely under direct Roman rule. Only in Syria was a Roman province 
installed, because the Seleucid claimant to the throne had proven to be weak and 
unsuitable to rule. Yet, this abstention from installing Roman provinces did not 
mean that Rome had no control over the Near East. On the contrary, the relations 
                                                          
147 Velleius, 2.40.3; Pliny, HN 7.26.98, 37.5.11-7.18; Josephus, AJ 14.79; BJ 1.157; Plutarch, Pomp. 42.1-
45.5; Appian, Syr. 51; Mith. 116-117; BCiv. 5.10; Dio, 37.20.6-21.2; Eutropius, 6.16; Degrassi (1947) 84-
85 = (1954) 108; Broughton (1952) 168-170, 176, 181. 
148 Velleius, 2.44.2; Plutarch, Pomp. 48.3; Dio, 38.7.5. 
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that Pompey had established with most rulers in the Levant increased Rome’s grip 
on the region.  
 
  
69 
PART II.A 
44-42 BC 
 
70 
2 PARTHIA 
 
 
Caesar’s assassination on the Ides of March 44 will have been welcomed by none 
of the kingdoms and principalities in the Near East as much as by Parthia. Caesar 
was about to set off on a campaign against Parthia, but his death led to the 
cancellation of the expedition against the only other power that could measure up 
to Rome in size and power.1 Unlike most other realms in the Levant and in the 
areas of the Upper Euphrates basin, Parthia was largely excluded from the 
administrative reorganisation that Pompey implemented in the eastern 
Mediterranean.2 The only tangible measures seem to have been the restoration of 
portions of Mesopotamia and Adiabene to Parthian rule. No territorial 
annexations or personnel changes are known to have occurred. Parthia thus came 
off much better than many other kingdoms and principalities in the Near East, 
such as Judaea and Armenia. The positive outcome nevertheless failed to 
guarantee peaceful relations between Parthia and Rome. King Phraates III was 
dissatisfied with the territories granted to him and sought to get hold of Gordyene 
as well, defying the decisions made by Pompey according to whom this district 
belonged to Armenia. The Parthian ruler thus resorted to military means in order 
to attain his aim, provoking people around Pompey to persuade him to begin a 
campaign against Parthia. Pompey decided against the idea. A military campaign 
was, however, about to begin in 56 or 55. In that year, Mithridates III, a son of 
Phraates III, had come to see the proconsul of Syria, A. Gabinius, to ask him for his 
support in the succession crisis in which he had been involved with his brother 
Orodes II since the death of their father. Gabinius was about to begin his invasion 
                                                          
1 Appian, BCiv. 2.10; Plut. Caes. 58.6-7; Suetonius, Iul. 44.3; Dio, 43.51.1-9; Nicolaus of Damascus, 
BNJ 90 F130 (26). For more details on Caesar’s intended campaign, see Townend (1983); Malitz 
(1984). 
2 On the political dealings between Pompey and Parthia in the mid-60s BC, see chapter 1.2. 
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when Ptolemy XII Auletes came to see him with a similar request. Apparently, 
since Ptolemy offered more, Gabinius decided to support the Egyptian king in his 
reinstatement. 3  The status quo was only broken in 54when the proconsul M. 
Licinius Crassus, the proconsul of Syria and associate of Pompey and Caesar, 
invaded Parthian-held territories east of the Euphrates – a move that eventually 
led to his downfall in 53, the demise of allegedly 20,000 soldiers, the capture of 
another 10,000, and the seizure of the standards.4 Two years later, the Parthians 
took the initiative by making a brief incursion into Roman territory in Syria, 
leading Cicero to worry about a full-scale invasion.5 With the onset of civil war in 
49, the relations between Rome and Parthia took a different shape, as the Parthians 
became involved in Rome’s internal political strife. Although they supported the 
Pompeian cause, the Parthians appear not to have been present at Pharsalus.  How 
the relations between Rome and Parthia developed from the renewed outbreak of 
civil war in 44 will now be considered.  
 
2.1 Parthian support for Cassius 
 
Early in September 44, Cassius, one of the two leading tyrannicides, left Italy and 
headed by way of Asia to Syria, ignoring the province of Cyrenaica which had 
been assigned to him in August. Devoid of senatorial approval, Cassius entered 
Syria at the beginning of 43 and succeeded to enlist the favour of all armies and 
                                                          
3 Dio, 39.55-58; Strabo, 17.1.1. For more details on Gabinius’ intended Parthian expedition, see 
among others Debevoise (1938) 75-78; Keaveney (1982) 412-417; Sherwin-White (1984) 272-273; 
Arnaud (1998); Lerouge (2007) 63-67. 
4 For more details on Crassus’ campaign against Parthia in 54 and 53, see among others Günther 
(1922) 14-38; Debevoise (1938) 78-95; Keaveney (1982) 417-426; Sherwin-White (1984) 279-290; 
Wolski (1993) 128-134; Lerouge (2007) 67-75. 
5 Cicero, Fam. 5.14.1, 15.1.2-6; Att. 5.16.4; 5.20.6. 
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their commanders by the beginning of March.6 At that time, Cassius had still not 
gained senatorial authorisation for his position in Syria, despite a motion 
proposed to that effect by Cicero.7 Only in late April did the Senate take the 
decision to ratify his governorship of Syria. The same resolution also granted him 
the supreme command of the war against P. Cornelius Dolabella, consul of the 
year 44 who had begun a rebellion in Asia Minor.8 In the re-allotments of the 
consular provinces in April 44, Dolabella had received Syria. However, instead of 
proceeding to his allocated province, he went to Asia and executed the governor 
C. Trebonius early in the year 43.9 As a result of the assassination, Dolabella was 
declared a public enemy by the Senate and saw his command for the province of 
Syria rescinded. In spite of this measure, he ventured to move into Syria, but could 
not pose a serious threat to Cassius’ position. Soon after his arrival, Dolabella had 
to take refuge to the city of Laodicea, where he was besieged by Cassius and 
ultimately committed suicide, probably late in July.10  
 In his struggle against Dolabella, Cassius did not only make use of regular 
Roman troops. In a letter to Cicero, a certain Cassius Parmensis informs us that in 
addition to ten Roman legions, his namesake was in command of twenty auxiliary 
                                                          
6 Livy, Per. 121; Velleius, 2.62.3; Appian, BCiv. 3.63; Dio, 46.40.3-4, 47.28.5. On Cassius’ journey to 
the East and the initial allotment of Cyrenaica to him, see among others Magie (1950) 419; 
Broughton (1952) 320, 327, 343-344 with references.  
7 Cicero, Phil. 11.30 proposes in a meeting of the Senate towards the end of February to assign the 
province of Syria and the command in the war against Dolabella to Cassius, and to grant him an 
imperium maius for the prosecution of this struggle. However, Cicero makes clear in a letter written 
in March and addressed to Cassius (Fam. 12.7) that his proposal has been rejected. 
8 Cicero, Phil. 11.30; Cicero, Fam. 12.7.1. On the senatorial decision to bestow Syria upon Cassius 
and grant him the command over the war against Dolabella, see among others Broughton (1952) 
343 with references. 
9  Cicero, Phil. 11.4-5, 16, 28; Fam. 12.12.1, 12.14.5, 12.15.2, 5; ad Brut. 2.3.1, 5; Velleius, 2.69.1; Livy, 
Per. 119, 121; Appian, BCiv. 3.7-8, 12, 24-27, 61, 64, 4.57-58, 60; Dio, 47.28.5-29.3; Orosius, 6.18.6. For 
the source material on the allotment of Syria to Dolabella in April 44, and on Dolabella’s decision 
to travel to Asia and execute Trebonius, see among others Magie (1950) 419-420; Broughton (1952) 
317, 349-350; Rohr Vio (2006). 
10 Cicero, Fam. 12.13.4, 12.14.4, 12.15.7; Velleius, 2.69.2; Strabo, 16.2.9; Livy, Per. 121; Appian, BCiv. 
4.60-62, 5.4; Dio, 47.30.1-5; Orosius, 6.18.13. For more details on the siege of Laodicea by Cassius, 
see among others Magie (1950) 421; Broughton (1952) 344; Clarke (1981) 61. 
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cohorts and a cavalry force of 4000.11 From what kingdoms, principalities and 
other communities these auxiliary units and horsemen originated, is not clarified 
by Cassius Parmensis. Fortunately, Dio is of some help in this respect, elucidating 
that Parthians (Πάρθοι) participated in the war against Dolabella.12 Although the 
historian does not specify in what way the Parthians would have assisted Cassius, 
it is plausible that at least a fraction of them served as equestrian bowmen. Appian 
informs us that Cassius was joined by Parthian mounted archers at some point 
after his arrival in Syria early in 43.13 These mounted bowmen were only sent back 
to the Parthian king Orodes II later in the year when news of Octavian’s and 
Antony’s journey to the East had reached him.14 From that perspective, it is thus 
very well possible that at least a section of the Parthian forces participating on the 
side of Cassius in the war consisted of equestrian archers.  
Well-attested as the presence of Parthians in the war against Dolabella thus 
is, the question that immediately comes up is what prompted them to render aid 
to Cassius. Being the only power in the Near East that could measure up to Rome, 
Parthia could not easily be pressurised by Rome. That Parthia supported Cassius 
militarily thus demonstrates a willingness to get actively involved in an internal 
Roman conflict.  This requires an explanation. With regard to the Parthian 
mounted archers who joined the tyrannicide in 43 and who may have participated 
in the war against Dolabella, Appian explains that they were attracted to Cassius 
                                                          
11 Cicero, Fam. 12.13.4. 
12 Dio, 47.30.3. 
13 Appian, BCiv. 4.59. Debevoise (1938) 107 and Timpe (1962) 116 have argued that these Parthian 
auxiliary forces constituted a part of the armies that Cassius took over from Q. Caecilius Bassus, a 
former equestrian officer of Pompey, who functioned as the leader of a revolt among Roman troops 
in Syria from 46 until 43 (on which see chapter 4.1). In 45, a Parthian military force under Pacorus 
came to the assistance of Caecilius Bassus (Cicero, Att. 14.9.3; Dio, 47.27.2-5). This force, however, 
appears not to have remained with him for a long time. Dio, 47.27.5 makes clear that in view of the 
winter the Parthian auxiliaries left Syria. The Parthian mounted archers to which Appian refers 
thus cannot be identified with those troops that had come to assist Caecilius Bassus in 45. What is 
more, Appian’s text does not indicate in any way that the equestrian bowmen joining Cassius in 43 
had participated previously in Caecilius Bassus’ rebellion. On the contrary, as explained further 
below, the passage seems to imply that the Parthian mounted archers had come especially to ally 
themselves with Cassius. 
14 Appian, BCiv. 4.63. 
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because of the reputation (δόξα) he had earned among them when he served as 
quaestor to Crassus in the expedition against Parthia in 53. 15  Cassius was 
responsible for the retreat of the Roman troops from Parthian territory after 
Crassus had fallen in battle.16 That on account of this role he thus enjoyed a rather 
good reputation is not necessarily disputable.17 It can even be imagined that his 
δόξα was one of the motivations behind the dispatch of the mounted archers to 
Syria in 43. Yet, it would go too far to regard Cassius’ status as the main driving 
force behind the support granted in the war against Dolabella. An explanation for 
this assistance needs to be sought elsewhere. 
Unfortunately, apart from the reference in Appian’s Civil Wars, none of our 
extant literary works can provide us with any useful indications in this respect. 
For that reason it is difficult – if not impossible – to come up with a plausible 
explanation for Parthia’s assistance to Cassius. Two scholars have nevertheless 
made attempts into this direction, but both of them fail to convince. Timpe argues 
that the Parthians had a natural disposition to support Rome’s “Republicans” who 
were involved in domestic conflicts throughout the 40s BC. 18  That there is, 
however, no reason to imagine why the Parthians would favour the Republican 
political outlook (whatever this exactly means) above the viewpoints of Caesar’s 
supporters and political heirs, does not seem to have occurred to him. 19 Less 
speculative, but not necessarily more forceful is the idea brought forward by 
Dabrowa. On the assumption that Orodes was determined to incorporate Syria 
and Asia Minor into his empire, he claims that the Parthian ruler rendered 
assistance to Cassius (as well as to Pompey’s adherents earlier on), “parce qu’aussi 
bien les partisans de Pompée que les meurtriers de César étaient maîtres des 
                                                          
15 Appian, BCiv. 4.59. 
16 Dio, 40.25.4; Velleius, 2.46.4; Eutropius, 6.18.2. 
17  Cf. Timpe (1962) 116, who regards Cassius’ friendly relations towards the Parthians as 
“erstaunlich”. 
18 Timpe (1962) 114.  
19 Similar criticism in Dabrowa (1986) 123. 
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territoires de l’empire romain qui constituaient l’objet de ses efforts”.20 Dabrowa 
seems to imply that the grant of military assistance was exploited by Orodes as a 
means to negotiate the transfer of Syrian territory from Roman to Parthian 
hegemony. The existence of such a plan is according to Dabrowa corroborated by 
a passage in Dio’s account which claims that Orodes had refused to give military 
assistance to Pompey in 48 in his conflict against Caesar, because Pompey was 
unwilling to confer Syria upon the king.21 Using Rome’s withdrawal from Syria as 
a prerequisite for the provision of armed support to Pompey in 48, however, does 
not mean that in 43 the same condition was stipulated for the grant of auxiliaries 
to Cassius. With the earlier attempt to receive Syria having ended in failure, it is 
problematic to imagine how Orodes could sincerely have expected to find Cassius 
willing to hand over the only Roman province in the Near East to him. Different 
considerations are thus likely to have prompted Orodes to place Parthian troops at 
Cassius’ disposal. Possibly, the Parthian ruler had become less ambitious, merely 
hoping that with the presence of Parthian troops in Syria he would be able to 
increase Parthian political influence west of the Euphrates among Cassius’ other 
allies.Obviously, in the light of our evidence, certainty cannot be provided. 
 
2.2 The embassy of Labienus and the Battle of Philippi 
 
The Parthian mounted archers who had come into the possession of Cassius in 43 
are said not have stayed with him continuously until the battles at Philippi in 42. 
When Cassius was about to undertake a punitive expedition against Cleopatra at 
the beginning of 42 for the support that she intended to give to Octavian and 
Antony, he received a message from Brutus, saying that Octavian and Antony 
were crossing the Adriatic.22 As a result of these events, he gave up his campaign 
                                                          
20 Dabrowa (1986) 123. 
21 Dio, 41.55.4.  
22 Appian, BCiv. 4.63.  
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into Egypt and allegedly sent back his mounted archers (ἱπποτοξόται) with gifts 
and with a certain Q. Labienus as envoy to the Parthian king Orodes to ask for 
more troops.23 At that time, Cassius could not have known that the dispatch of 
Labienus as part of an embassy to Parthia would have disastrous consequences for 
the eastern Mediterranean. The envoy did not return to Brutus and Cassius with 
Parthian military assistance. He remained in Parthia, became loyal to its king and, 
along with the king’s son Pacorus, invaded Roman territories in Asia Minor and 
Syria in 40.24 Whether before his defection he succeeded in persuading Orodes to 
send troops to assist Brutus and Cassius in the war against Octavian and Antony 
remains unclear. Although Appian has proposed that the forces for which 
Labienus’ delegation asked did not arrive in Syria until after Philippi,25 in a later 
passage he does reckon Parthian equestrian bowmen and other types of horsemen 
(ἱππεῖς) among the forces commanded by Cassius and Brutus on the eve of the 
clash.26 The cavalry (ἱππεῖς) to which Appian refers may already have been with 
the tyrannicides from the moment that they had established their power base in 
the East. Yet, the alleged presence of mounted archers at Philippi is in flagrant 
contradiction with earlier statements made by Appian – an incongruity that most 
scholars seem to have ignored.27 Only Sherwin-White has noted it, but his attempt 
at offering a ‘solution’ is unconvincing. Rejecting the presence of Parthian 
mounted archers at Philippi, he purports that the bowmen to which Appian refers 
did not consist of Parthians, Arabs and Medes, but were more likely recruited 
                                                          
23 Dio, 48.24.5; Florus, 2.19.4. Cf. Appian, BCiv. 4.63, who merely refers to ambassadors (πρέσβεις) 
sent by Cassius to Parthian. Although the name of Labienus is not mentioned explicitly, it is clear 
that the embassy of which he was a member is meant. If we have to believe Appian, this embassy 
was dispatched sometime at the beginning of 42 after Cassius had received a message from Brutus 
informing him about Octavian’s and Antony’s crossing of the Adriatic. The inclusion of this 
announcement among events that indisputably occurred in the year 43 does not refute that date.  
24 On which, see chapter 8.1. 
25 Appian, BCiv. 4.63. 
26 Appian, BCiv. 4.88; 4.99. 
27 Günther (1922) 41; Debevoise (1938) 107-108; Timpe (1962) 116; Frye (1984) 234; Sullivan (1990) 
311; Wolski (1993) 136; Lerouge (2007) 87. Even Magnino (1998) 215-216, 235-236, 242 has failed to 
show awareness of this contradiction in his commentary of book IV of Appian’s Civil Wars.  
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among the Commagenians and among a people led by a certain Alchaudonius28 – 
a rather problematic idea since none of our ancient sources provide us with any 
indication that suggests the presence of troops enlisted among those two peoples. 
Sherwin-White’s proposal is thus better dismissed. How the contradiction in 
Appian’s Civil Wars is to be ‘solved’ then remains uncertain. Both statements can 
be correct and there are no grounds for giving preference to one over the other, 
even though it appears to me somewhat peculiar that Cassius decided to return all 
the mounted archers in the beginning of 42, if his aim was to obtain a larger force 
of auxiliaries.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has revealed that for the period from 44 until 42 only three instances 
of interaction between Rome and Parthia can be identified with some degree of 
certainty: firstly, Parthian military support for Cassius in the confrontation against 
Dolabella; secondly, the dispatch by Cassius of an embassy to the Parthian king 
with requests for military assistance; and thirdly, the assistance provided by 
Parthian cavalry to the tyrannicides at Philippi. Parthian participation in the 
struggle against Dolabella testifies at any rate to their willingness to get involved 
into Rome’s internal struggles. Possibly, the Parthians anticipated seeing their 
influence increased west of the Euphrates. Obviously, Cassius and Brutus will 
have dreaded a greater Parthian sway over the Levant, but both were apparently 
so desperate to increase the number of forces under their wings that they were 
prepared to ask for Parthian support and to take the risk of losing influence to 
                                                          
28 Sherwin-White (1984) 302. Not much is known of this Alchaudonius. Dio, 40.20.1-2 refers to a 
certain Arab called Alchaudonius (ὁ Ἀλχαυδόνιος  ὁ Ἀράβιος) who along with Abgar of Osrhoene 
supported the Parthians in 53 against the Roman invaders led by Crassus. Sherwin-White (1984) 
282, 301-302 identifies this Alchaudonius with a certain Alchaedamnus, king of the Rhambaeans, 
who is mentioned by Strabo (16.2.10) among the allies of Q. Caecilius Bassus in the mid-40s BC. 
There seems, however, not to be any evidence to support this identification. On the revolt of Q. 
Caecilius Bassus, see chapter 4.1. 
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Parthia in the Near East. With Cassius and Brutus in control of the eastern 
Mediterranean, the relations between Rome and Parthia thus developed into a 
different direction than expected prior to Caesar’s assassination, when an 
expedition into Parthia was about to be launched.29 Whether in the years after 
Philippi Rome (and more specifically Antony as her representative in the East) 
used the Parthians as a potential source of military assistance, and to what extent 
Caesar’s idea of a campaign into Parthia was revived, will be examined in Part 
II.B.  
                                                          
29 See the introduction to this chapter. 
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3 PTOLEMAIC KINGDOM 
 
 
Of all the kingdoms and principalities whose political relations with Rome form 
the subject of this study, the Ptolemaic Kingdom was the only one not involved in 
Pompey’s reorganisation of the East. Despite requests made by king Ptolemy XII 
Auletes for assistance in dealing with some internal problems, Pompey refrained 
from taking any action. It was only after a revolt in Egypt had forced Auletes to 
flee his kingdom in 58 that Rome became entangled in the internal affairs of the 
Ptolemies. Although politicians in Rome could not come to an agreement with 
regard to the necessary course of action, the proconsul of Syria, A. Gabinius, 
attracted by a bribe, restored the exiled king to the throne in 55 – an event not 
unique in the history of the Ptolemies’ relations.1 Already in the second century 
BC, members of the ruling dynasty repeatedly appealed to Rome for recognition 
or requested to be reinstalled.2 Seven years after Gabinius’ reinstatement of the 
king, Rome was once more drawn into an internal political conflict. This time it 
was Caesar who succeeded in bringing about a reconciliation between Cleopatra 
VII and her younger brother Ptolemy XIII, both of whom had been in almost 
continuous conflict with one another ever since their accession as joint rulers in 51 
following the death of their father Auletes. The reunion proved to be short-lived. 
The relations between the two siblings degenerated rapidly and culminated into 
open warfare. During this conflict – known to us as the Alexandrian War – Caesar 
revealed himself as a staunch supporter of Cleopatra. The conflict ended in 47 into 
a victory for the queen and left Ptolemy XIII dead. 3  In the aftermath of the 
                                                          
1 For more details on Auletes’ expulsion in 58 and his restoration to the throne in 55, see among 
others Broughton (1952) 218, with references; Sullivan (1990) 237-244; Huß (2001) 684-697; Hölbl 
(2001) 226-229. 
2 On which see among others chapter 17.1. 
3 On Cleopatra’s ejection, her reinstallation and the Alexandrian War, see among others Sullivan 
(1990) 255-259; Huß (2001) 705-722; Hölbl (2001) 235-237. 
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hostilities, at Caesar’s initiative a joint reign and marriage were realised between 
Cleopatra and another of her younger brothers, Ptolemy XIV.4 The two siblings 
were summoned to Rome in 46, where Caesar “enrolled them among the friends 
and allies of the Roman people”.5 To what extent these new associations imposed 
any legal obligations on the parties involved is not clear in the light of our limited 
evidence. Yet, whatever its exact meaning, the royal couple stayed for at least 
another two years in the capital. Soon after Caesar’s assassination, Cleopatra 
returned to Egypt.6 How the relations between Rome and the Ptolemaic Kingdom 
developed from that moment onwards needs to be examined at present. 
 
3.1 Supporting Dolabella  
 
As we have seen above, early in September 44, Cassius left Italy and travelled by 
way of Asia Minor to Syria where he arrived around the beginning of 43. That he 
disregarded the province of Cyrenaica, which had been assigned to him, did not 
prove to be problematic. By the onset of March, Cassius had managed to secure 
the support of all the armies and their commanders, and about a month later, his 
control over the province of Syria was given approval by the Senate. At the same 
time he was also given command over the war against P. Cornelius Dolabella, the 
consul of 44 who had initially been allocated Syria, but who had seized Asia 
instead and arranged for the assassination of the proconsul C. Trebonius there – 
an act that had prompted the Senate to declare him an enemy. Dolabella 
thereupon raised infantry troops and a navy, and made his way to Syria, where as 
a result of the supremacy of Cassius’ armies he was eventually surrounded and 
                                                          
4 Sullivan (1990) 259-260; Huß (2001) 720-721; Hölbl (2001) 237. 
5 Dio, 43.27.3: “ἐς τοὺς φίλους σφᾶς τούς τε συμμάχους τοὺς τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐσέγραψε”. Cf. 
Suetonius, Iul. 52.1, who mentions Cleopatra’s coming to Rome, but does not mention Ptolemy XIV 
or the enrolment among Rome’s friends and allies; Hölbl (2001) 238; Bingen (2007) 47. 
6 Cicero, Att. 14.8; Will (1967) 452; Sullivan (1990) 264; Hölbl (2001) 239. 
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besieged at Laodicea.7 Dio explains that Dolabella only managed for a while to 
maintain a position on the sea through the naval force (νῆες) that the Ptolemaic 
queen Cleopatra had placed at his disposal.8 Cleopatra is also said to have given 
him money (χρήματα). Appian explains that the queen rendered support to 
Dolabella because of her close relationship with the murdered Caesar – a 
conceivable suggestion, given that Dolabella fought on Caesar’s side against 
Pompeians in the 40s BC.9 Plausible as this suggestion is, though, all this aid 
turned out to be nothing more than a temporary reprieve. Cassius and his troops 
could not be defeated, and Dolabella, realising that he was in a desperate 
situation, eventually committed suicide.10 
 
3.2 Recognition for Ptolemy XV Caesarion 
   
Cleopatra’s support for Dolabella does not seem to have remained 
unremunerated. Dio informs us that because of the support that she had rendered 
to Dolabella, she was given the right to have her son Ptolemy XV (better known as 
Caesarion) called king (βασιλεύς) of Egypt. 11  As her brother and co-regent, 
Ptolemy XIV, had already been dead since the summer of 44, the elevation of 
Ptolemy XV did in no way mark the deposition of that co-ruler.12 The son who 
                                                          
7 For sources and references, see chapter 2.1. 
8 Dio, 47.30.4; Appian, BCiv. 4.61. 
9 Appian, BCiv. 4.61; 2.41, 47; Cicero, Fam. 9.9; Phil. 2.75; Suetonius, Iul. 36; Florus, 2.13.31; Dio, 
41.40.1-2; Orosius, 6.15.8. 
10 Strabo, 16.2.9; Velleius, 2.69.2; Livy, Per. 121; Appian, BCiv. 4.62; Dio, 47.30.5; Orosius, 6.18.13. 
11 Dio, 47.31.5. 
12 The time of Ptolemy XIV’s death can only roughly be determined. There is proof of him still 
being co-regent in July of 44 since his regnal years were used to date a document in Egypt at that 
time. A statement made by Porphyry, BNJ 260 F2 (17) (transmitted by Eusebius in his 
Chronographia) demonstrates that Ptolemy passed away in his fourth regnal year, which 
corresponds to Cleopatra’s eighth year in office. Skeat (1969) 18, 42 has revealed that Cleopatra’s 
regnal years ran from the beginning of September until the following September. This means that 
Ptolemy XIV must have passed away by the beginning of September 44 – a conclusion shared by 
Samuel (1962) 158-159 and Sullivan (1990) 264-265 among others. Both Porphyry l.c.; Josephus, Ap. 
2.57-58 and AJ 15.89 inform us that the young king was assassinated – an act for which they hold 
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received recognition as king by Rome was the one who Cleopatra claimed to be 
the child of Julius Caesar.13 Most scholars have argued that it was Dolabella who 
gave Cleopatra the right to call Caesarion king of Egypt. This assertion, however, 
cannot find support in the sources.14 In order to understand that, it is necessary to 
give the relevant passage in Dio’s Roman History in full. Having described how 
Cassius penalised the city of Tarsus for their support of Dolabella, Dio expounds 
what benefits were granted to this city by the triumvirs, and subsequently also 
explains how Cleopatra was remunerated for past support to Dolabella:  
 
“The people of Tarsus received praise from the triumvirs (for they were already 
holding sway in Rome), and were inspired with hope of obtaining some return for 
their losses; Cleopatra also, on account of the auxiliary force she had sent to Dolabella, 
obtained the right that her son, whom she named Ptolemy and pretended to be 
engendered by Caesar, and for that reason addressed as Caesarion, was called king of 
Egypt”.15 
 
Dio makes clear that the military support given by Cleopatra to Dolabella played a 
leading role in the decision to give her the right to have her son called king of 
Egypt. The text does not clarify who was responsible for granting this right, but it 
is suggested that the triumvirs and not Dolabella himself were responsible for 
that. The potential threat that Ptolemy XV could pose to Octavian (who as adopted 
divi Iulii filius could be considered his rival) will not have withheld Octavian from 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Cleopatra responsible. For background of the murder, see among others Sullivan (1990) 264-265; 
Hölbl (2001), 239; Huß (2001) 726. 
13 Dio, 47.31.5. The paternity of Caesarion has been an unsolvable issue since antiquity (Suetonius, 
Iul. 52.2; Aug. 17.5; Cicero, Att. 14.20; cf. Plutarch, Caes. 49.5, who seems to be certain about Caesar’s 
paternity of Caesarion). For a modern debate on the paternity of Caesarion, see Heinen (1969) 190-
203; Sullivan (1990) 262; Hölbl (2001) 238. 
14 Sullivan (1990) 265-266; Hölbl (2001) 239. 
15 Dio, 47.31.4-5: “Ταρσεῖς ἐπαίνους τε παρὰ τῶν τριῶν ἀνδρῶν (ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ τὰ πράγματα ἤδη 
τὰ ἐν τῇ Ῥώμῃ εἶχον) καὶ ἐλπίδα ἀντιλήψεσθαί τι ἀντὶ τῶν ἀπολωλότων ἔλαβον· ἥ τε 
Κλεοπάτρα διὰ τὴν συμμαχίαν ἣν τῷ Δολαβέλλᾳ ἔπεμψεν, εὕρετο τὸν υἱόν, ὃν Πτολεμαῖον 
μὲν ὠνόμαζεν, ἐπλάττετο δὲ ἐκ τοῦ Καίσαρος τετοκέναι καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο Καισαρίωνα 
προσηγόρευε, βασιλέα τῆς Αἰγύπτου κληθῆναι”. 
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taking that joint decision. On the contrary, considering the negative connotations 
embedded in the term rex, the elevation to the kingship served as an obstacle to 
the acquisition of a position within the Roman state as strong as or even stronger 
than Caesar’s.  
When Cleopatra was granted the right to call her son king of Egypt is 
unknown, but Dio mentions this event under the year 42. Possibly, it was the 
queen herself who asked for Caesarion to be confirmed as king of Egypt by Rome; 
our source material does not give us any definite answers. That Rome recognised 
Ptolemy XV as king of Egypt does at least demonstrate to what extent Rome 
deemed it justified to intervene into the internal affairs of a nominally 
autonomous realm. By the time that this acknowledgement was given, the 
Ptolemaic Kingdom was thus already considered a part of Rome’s empire. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Cleopatra was the only Near Eastern ruler known to have supported the cause of 
the triumvirs in the two years following Caesar’s assassination. Yet, she is not 
known to have participated in the Battles of Philippi. Overlooking the period of 
civil war between 44 and 42, only two different types of interaction between Rome 
and the Ptolemaic Kingdom can be identified. In the first place, Cleopatra 
supported Dolabella in the war against Cassius by sending him naval vessels and 
money; in the second place, Rome (or possibly more specifically the triumvirs) 
recognised Caesarion as king of Egypt. Although it is not clear whether Cleopatra 
explicitly asked for her son’s recognition, Caesarion’s acknowledgement as king of 
Egypt does at least show how freely Rome intervened into the domestic politics of 
a kingdom or principality. 
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4 JUDAEA 
 
 
For a period of more than seventy years following the end of Seleucid rule in 
Palestine in the late 140s BC, political contacts between Judaea and Rome had been 
limited to a small number of diplomatic transactions, some of which led to the 
conclusion of an alliance. The internal strife between the Hasmonaean brothers 
Aristobulus and Hyrcanus, who both laid claim to the High Priesthood and 
kingship upon the death of their mother Alexandra in 67, made an end to this 
phase of political aloofness. Rome considered the succession crisis a potential 
threat to the peace in Syria and its other provinces in the East; an intervention to 
bring a solution to the conflict became vital. In 63, Pompey overcame the deadlock 
after having been approached with an appeal for support by delegations from 
both brothers. Pompey decided in favour of Hyrcanus, defeated Aristobulus and 
his supporters in battle, and reorganised the internal administration of Judaea. 
Hyrcanus was given back the High Priesthood and leadership (προστασία) over 
the Judaean people (possibly as ἐθνάρχης), but his title of king was rescinded. In 
addition, the geographical extent of Judaea was substantially reduced, and the 
seized territories fell henceforth under the command of the Syrian governor. 
Pompey also imposed the payment of tribute upon the Judaeans, which alongside 
the annexation of the coastal cities, proved to be a drain on the economic resources 
of Judaea. 1  All these measures remained largely unchanged until in 57 the 
proconsul of Syria A. Gabinius divided Judaea into five administrative districts 
and took away from Hyrcanus his political duties, leaving him in all likelihood 
                                                          
1 For details on Pompey’s reorganisation, see chapter 1.7. 
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merely the exercise of his responsibilities as High Priest.2 For how long Gabinius’ 
decision remained in effect cannot be said for certain, but it is clear that the 
partition had at least already come to an end by the time that on Caesar’s initiative 
modifications were implemented in Judaea’s administration, around the mid-40s 
BC. Among the most important arrangements were the return of the coastal city of 
Joppa, the return of the Plain of Esdraelon, the recognition of Hyrcanus as 
ἐθνάρχης of the Judaeans, and the resolution that both this position and the High 
Priesthood were to become hereditary. 3  Caesar also promoted Antipater, the 
strong man behind Hyrcanus, to an official post in the government of Judaea by 
appointing him as ἐπίτροπος over Judaea under Hyrcanus. 4  What duties 
Antipater was expected to accomplish exactly in this capacity remains unknown, 
but he seems at least to have held some supervisory role in the collection of the 
land tax which had been levied ever since Pompey’s reorganisation of Judaea in 
63,5 and which Caesar modified.6 Yet, whatever his precise role was, it is clear that 
                                                          
2 Josephus, AJ 14.90-91; BJ 1.169-170. For more details on Gabinius’ reorganisation of Judaea, see 
among others Kanael (1957); Bammel (1961); Momigliano (1967) 6-7, 20; Smallwood (1967); Schürer 
(1973) 267-269; Smallwood (1976) 31-35; Baumann (1983) 52-64. 
3 See map 3 for clarification. 
4 Josephus, AJ 14.137, 143-144, 192-195, 207-212; BJ 1.194, 199-200. For more details on Caesar’s 
measures with regard to Judaea, see among others Abel (1952) 310-318; Schalit (1969) 36-40; 
Schürer (1973) 270-276; Smallwood (1976) 38-43; Baumann (1983) 69-106. 
5 The exact tasks that Antipater was supposed to undertake as ἐπίτροπος cannot be established 
with certainty. Although the term is often used in Greek documents and literary texts during the 
Roman Imperial period to denote a procurator (Mason (1974) 49 s.v. ἐπίτροπος, 142-143), it is not 
clear whether in this instance ἐπίτροπος is to be understood as a translation of that particular 
Roman position. What is more, even if Antipater had been appointed as procurator, then this 
would by itself not elucidate what his duties were. Procurators exercised a wide variety of duties, 
especially during the imperial period. Some were put in charge of the tax collection in a Roman 
province, whereas others were to rule as governor of an entire province, such as Judaea after the 
death of Agrippa I in AD 44. The title ἐπίτροπος – even if a translation of “procurator” – does by 
itself thus not explain what tasks Antipater was to perform. Smallwood (1976) 39 has nevertheless 
argued with some degree of confidence that “Antipater was to act as resident representative of 
Rome, safeguarding Roman financial interests”. Although it seems indeed likely that Antipater 
was to look after Rome’s financial concerns in Judaea – in particular when taking into account that 
he was the one who coordinated the collection of 700 talents exacted by Cassius in 43 (on which see 
below) – it may go too far to try to identify the duties of Antipater’s position precisely. As Abel 
(1952) 312; Schalit (1969) 40, ibid. n.126 Baumann (1983) 95 and, to a lesser extent, Buchheim (1960) 
62 have argued, the formal boundaries of the post may have been left indefinite, and as such have 
given Antipater the opportunity to act as he saw fit. 
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with the advancement of Hyrcanus and Antipater and with the return of some 
territories, Judaea had succeeded in regaining some of its erstwhile grandeur that 
it had lost in 63. How its political relations with Rome developed in the period up 
to Philippi will be examined at present.  
 
4.1 Judaean support for the Caesareans in Syria 
 
As explored in the preceding two chapters, Cassius left Italy in autumn and made 
his way to the Levant.7 At arrival in Syria around the beginning of 43, the legions 
of Q. Marcius Crispus, proconsul of Bithynia and Pontus, and L. Staius Murcus, 
proconsul of Syria,8 were engaged in a war with a certain Q. Caecilius Bassus, one 
of Pompey’s former equestrian officers, who had settled in Tyre after the Battle at 
Pharsalus.9 The origin of this military conflict dates back to the year 46, when 
Sextus Iulius Caesar, appointed as legate or as quaestor pro praetore over Syria by 
his famous kinsman Gaius Iulius Caesar in 47, was assassinated by some of his 
soldiers who had launched a revolt against him.10 What exactly had prompted 
those troops to rebel against Sextus cannot be determined with certainty because 
of contradicting reports provided by our ancient authors. For the same reason, it is 
unclear what role Caecilius had played in the early stages of the uprising. In the 
accounts of Livy, Dio,11 and to a lesser extent the version that Appian ascribes to a 
certain Libo,12 this former equestrian officer is identified as the initiator of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
6 Josephus, AJ 14.202-203, 206 provides us with the details of the tax. For a modern discussion of 
Caesar’s measures with regard to the taxes imposed on Judaea, see Schalit (1969) 777-781; 
Smallwood (1976) 40-41. 
7 See chapters 2.1. 
8 On the proconsulship of Marcius Crispus and Staius Murcus, see Broughton (1952) 309, 329-330. 
9 Appian, BCiv. 3.77-78; Dio, 47.26.3, 47.28.1. 
10 On Sex. Iulius Caesar’s official position in Syria, see Broughton (1952) 289. 
11 Dio, 47.26.3-27.1; Livy, Per. 114. Cf. Josephus, AJ 14.268; BJ 1.216, who does not mention a revolt. 
He merely refers (in AJ) to Caecilius contriving (συνθείς) a plot against Sextus.  
12 Appian, BCiv 3.77. It has been suggested by Perizonius (1771) 183 that the name Libo (Λίβωνι) is 
to be emended into Livy (Λιβίῳ) – a seemingly plausible suggestion considering the similarity 
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rebellion among the legionaries in Syria, whereas in an alternative account 
transmitted by Appian, some soldiers in Syria are said to have begun the uprising 
and to have made Caecilius their leader only after Sextus’ assassination.13 Yet, 
whoever took the initiative, it is clear that Caecilius emerged as the leader of this 
insurrection, managed to win over almost all the troops in the province, and 
turned the city of Apamea into his base.14 Without doubt, the assassination of 
Sextus and the defection of the Roman troops in Syria to the Pompeian general 
Caecilius alarmed Julius Caesar. The suppression of this renegade and possibly 
also the re-installation of a governor in Syria loyal to Caesar soon became top 
priority. As a means to achieve this aim, Caesar dispatched Q. Cornificius, 
probably quaestor pro praetore in Cilicia at that time, to Syria.15 However, neither 
Cornificius, nor C. Antistius Vetus, whom Caesar had sent off a year later with 
possibly the same rank, could keep Caecilius and his army in check.16 In 44, the 
new proconsul of Syria, Staius Murcus, made attempts with three legions to 
subdue the armies of Caecilius. The proconsul of Bithynia, Marcius Crispus, came 
to assist Staius Murcus, taking with him three more legions as reinforcements.17 
Assistance for the Caesarean cause, however, did not only come from governors 
loyal to Caesar. Josephus informs us that military support was also granted by 
Antipater, who “for the sake of his friends, the deceased and the surviving 
                                                                                                                                                                                
between the two accounts. There is, however, no compelling reason for rectifying the text as it has 
been transmitted to us. Appian can also have meant L. Scribonius Libo, the consul of 34. The 
argument used by Perizonius according to which this Libo is not known to have written on this 
particular period is unconvincing. 
13Appian, BCiv. 3.77, 4.58. Broughton (1952) 297; Schalit (1969) 47; Schürer (1973) 276 and Sherwin-
White (1984) 301-302 ignore this view, and hold Caecilius Bassus responsible for the outbreak of 
the revolt among the troops in Syria. Only Münzer (1899) 1198 and Magnino (1984) 183 appear to 
have noticed the two opposing accounts. Both authors give preference to the version according to 
which Caecilius is held responsible for having stirred up the revolt among the Roman legions in 
Syria, but the arguments used only support their preferred account, and none of them actually 
refute the possibility of the alternative reading which is given by Appian only. 
14 Strabo, 16.2.10; Dio, 47.27.1. For the best overview of Caecilius’ revolt with references to the 
source material, see still Münzer (1899). 
15 Cicero, Fam. 12.19.1; Broughton (1952) 297; Sherwin-White (1984) 301. 
16 Dio, 47.27.2-4; Broughton (1952) 308. 
17 Appian, BCiv. 3.77; 4.58; Dio, 47.27.5. 
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Caesar” sent troops to Syria together with his two sons Phasael and Herod (the 
later king).18 That friendship played a role behind Antipater’s decision to render 
aid – as suggested here by Josephus – is highly conceivable.19 Antipater and his 
offspring had maintained good relations with them, and had profited to varying 
degrees from some of the measures that both Caesars had taken. Above all the 
benefits that they had received from Gaius Caesar in 47 as remuneration for 
Judaea’s armed assistance in the Alexandrian War may have prompted Antipater 
to send auxiliaries to Syria.20 Caesar not only made Antipater ἐπίτροπος of Judaea 
(as we have seen above), he also conferred citizenship upon him and his children, 
and granted him exemption from paying tax.21 Yet, however much these benefits 
and the resultant friendship may have imposed a moral obligation on Antipater to 
dispatch military aid, the rewards that Sextus Caesar was to bestow later during 
the year are not to be ignored, especially not if Josephus is to be believed in his 
Jewish Antiquities: 
 
“Antipater… sent them [Caesar’s generals, ed.] an auxiliary force together with his 
sons, being mindful of the good services they had received from [Sextus, ed.] Caesar, 
and, on that account, thought it just to avenge him and exact satisfaction from his 
murderer [Caecilius Bassus, ed]”.22 
 
                                                          
18  Josephus, BJ 1.217: “διὰ τὸν ἀνῃρημένον καὶ διὰ τὸν περιόντα Καίσαρα, φίλους ὄντας 
ἀμφοτέρους”. The military support granted by Antipater is also mentioned in AJ 14.269. 
19 Friendship between Antipater and Gaius Caesar has not only been testified by Josephus in BJ 
1.217, but also in BJ 1.194 and indirectly in the anonymous B.Alex. 65. The friendship between 
Antipater and Sextus Caesar is mentioned explicitly in BJ 1.217, and is implied in AJ 14.164. 
20 Judaean support for Caesar in the Alexandrian War is attested by Josephus, AJ 14.127-136; BJ 
1.187-192. 
21 Josephus, AJ 14.137, 143-144; BJ 1.194, 199-200. Josephus only refers to the grant of citizenship to 
Antipater, but through this act, Roman citizenship was automatically also awarded to his 
offspring. 
22 Josephus, AJ 14.268-269: “τούτοις δὲ… Ἀντίπατρος συμμαχίαν ἔπεμψε μετὰ τῶν τέκνων, κατὰ 
μνήμην ὧν εὐεργετήθησαν ὑπὸ Καίσαρος, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τιμωρεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ δίκην παρὰ τοῦ 
πεφονευκότος εἰσπράξασθαι δίκαιον ἡγούμενος” (LCL transl. adapted). 
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Although no further details are given with regard to those “good services”, it is 
plausible that Josephus refers here at least in part to the governmental post that 
Sextus Caesar had given to Antipater’s son Herod in the province of Syria.23 The 
conferment of this official position took place at some point towards the end of 47 
or the beginning of 46. At that time, Herod stood trial before the Sanhedrin in 
Jerusalem for his allegedly unauthorised execution of brigands led by a certain 
Ezekias, who were wreaking havoc on the Galilee.24 Herod had been appointed as 
στρατηγός over that latter district by his father Antipater earlier in 47.25 His 
political career would almost certainly have come to an abrupt end had not Sextus 
Caesar compelled Hyrcanus to let him escape Jerusalem and make his way to 
Damascus.26 At arrival there, Herod was made “στρατηγός of Coele Syria” and of 
the city of Samaria.27 Although the exact geographical region to which the term 
Coele Syria refers in this particular context cannot be determined with certainty, it 
                                                          
23 Antipater’s other son, Phasael, who would later be given official positions by Rome (as we will 
see), does not seem to have been given a position by Sextus Caesar at this point. 
24 On the suppression of the bandits in the Galilee and the subsequent trial against Herod, see 
Josephus, AJ 14.159-160, 167-184; BJ 1.204-205, 208-215. For further discussion of the brigands and 
Herod’s trial, see Baumann (1983) 108-113. 
25 Josephus, AJ 14.158; BJ 1.203. Both passages also inform us that Phasael was made στρατηγός of 
Jerusalem and the surrounding area. As στρατηγοί, Herod and Phasael may have functioned as 
the head of their respective districts. Potential explanations for Antipater’s move are given by 
Baumann (1983) 107-108. 
26 Josephus, AJ 14.170, 177-178; BJ 1.211-212. 
27 Josephus, BJ 1.213. Cf. AJ 14.280, which does not mention Samaria. Herod’s control over Samaria 
as στρατηγός seems nevertheless fairly certain in the light of what Josephus relates in AJ 14.284 
and BJ 1.229. In both passages reference is made to Herod terminating a conflict among the people 
of Samaria in 43 – an intervention that can only make sense if Herod held a position of authority 
over that city. The same argument is used by Otto (1913) 18; Schalit (1969) 46 n.154 and Smallwood 
(1976) 45 n.4 to show that Herod had been appointed as στρατηγός over Coele Syria and Samaria. 
Cf. Richardson (1999) 112, who wrongly asserts that the Jewish War refers to Herod being 
appointed στρατηγός over Coele Syria and Samaritis. BJ 1.213 clearly mentions the city of 
Σαμαρεία, not to the entire district which is sometimes called Σαμαρεῖτις. No wonder that 
according to Richardson (p.112 n.68) “the reference to Samaritis seems quite implausible”. The 
exact powers that Herod had as στρατηγός of Coele Syria and Samaria remain unknown. Otto 
(1913) 18 and Schalit (1969) 46 n.154 proposes that he had probably the same responsibilities as the 
previous Ptolemaic and Seleucid στρατηγοί installed in the area of Judaea. 
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is not unlikely that the Decapolis is meant here.28 Just like Samaria, the cities that 
constituted this district had come under Judaean rule for some decades before 
their incorporation into the new Roman province of Syria in 63.29 Now Sextus 
seems to have placed the control over these places into the hands of Herod. That 
this appointment as well as Sextus’ efforts in averting Herod’s prosecution 
encouraged Antipater to avenge Sextus’ assassination by participating in the war 
against the culprits is understandable. The good relations maintained with Gaius 
Caesar are definitely not to be discounted, though (as we saw above). Possibly, 
Antipater anticipated receiving further remuneration from Gaius Caesar for the 
dispatch of the auxiliaries to Syria. Yet, whatever drove him, it is clear that the 
                                                          
28 If so, Herod’s appointment would present us with much earlier evidence for the Decapolis as an 
administrative unit than the career inscription, presented by Isaac (1981), which refers to an 
equestrian officer holding an official position over the Decapolis in the Flavian period. 
29 The toponym “Coele Syria” (Κοίλη Συρία) has been used by ancient authors to designate various 
regions of the Levant.  The term appeared for the first time in Greek language at the beginning of 
the fourth century BC. Schalit (1954) 68-70 and Sartre (1988) 22, 26 among others have convincingly 
argued that at that time “Coele Syria” signified “the whole of Syria” from the Levantine coast in 
the west to the river Euphrates in the east covering the entire area of the old Achaemenid satrapy 
called kul ʿawar nahara (“everything beyond the river”). The word Κοίλη in this context does thus 
not mean “hollow” (κοῖλος), but “whole”, and originates probably as a Greek transliteration from 
the Aramaic word “kul”. As a result of administrative changes in the Levant during the following 
two and a half centuries, the toponym “Coele Syria” acquired additional narrower meanings, 
whereby it was used to refer to different parts of Syria. Throughout antiquity, though, it never 
seems to have lost its original meaning. An examination of the occurrences of the term “Coele 
Syria” in Greek and Latin literature by Sartre (1988) 21-27 has revealed that it was still employed in 
its original meaning by Claudius Ptolemy and Arrian in the second century AD. How the toponym 
“Coele Syria” is to be understood in Josephus’ passages referring to Herod’s appointment as 
στρατηγός over that region in 47 cannot be determined with certainty. It seems most likely, 
though, that in this case it signifies the Decapolis, as argued by Smallwood (1976) 45 n.4 as well. 
The term “Coele Syria” appears about 40 times in Josephus’ corpus. For about 20 instances it is 
possible to grasp the notion of what region is meant – even if in a rather vague way. As Buchheim 
(1960) 100-101 n.28 has already clarified, in most of those occurrences, the term designates regions 
east of the Jordan River (see e.g. Josephus, AJ 13.355-356, 14.40-41; BJ 1.366). The only area east of 
that river known to have formed a part of the province of Syria in 47 was the Decapolis, the Greek 
cities that Pompey had detached in 64 and 63 from Judaean rule and placed under the Roman 
provincial rule. Although the area may not have been physically disconnected from the province of 
Syria, its location was definitely somewhat isolated. To the west, the Decapolis was bordered by 
Judaea and to the north by the Princedom of Chalcis in the Beqāʽ. For Herod, though, it would not 
have been difficult to rule this area, as it was located immediately east of the Galilee, the district 
that he administered as στρατηγός. Sextus probably realised this, and may have taken these 
geographical facts into consideration when he decided to give a governmental post to Herod. 
“Coele Syria” in this instance refers thus in all likelihood to the Decapolis. Other regions east of the 
Jordan are excluded, because they came under the authority of other rulers. 
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Judaean participation did not lead to a victory over Caecilius. By the time that 
Cassius entered Syria around the beginning of 43, the conflicting parties were still 
involved in a war. Whether Judaean troops were present at that time is undecided, 
but the possibility can at any rate not be excluded.  
 
4.2 The imposition of financial contributions 
 
By the beginning of spring 43, Cassius had managed to conciliate all the 
conflicting parties and attained command over the former troops of Caecilius, 
Marcius Crispus and Staius Murcus – twelve legions according to Appian.30 The 
acquisition of all the armies in Syria enabled Cassius within several months to 
secure an absolute position of power in the Roman Near East. The unsuccessful 
invasion of Dolabella proved to be the last hurdle withholding Cassius from 
supreme authority over Syria.31 While the accumulation of his power was still in 
progress, the drawbacks of Cassius’ supremacy became already visible. His newly 
gained position depended largely on the strength and loyalty of a considerable 
military force, for the maintenance of which enormous funds were necessary.32 
Financial resources were mainly extracted from the cities and local communities in 
the eastern Roman provinces.33 However, the two historical accounts of Josephus 
explain that Cassius also ordered the contribution of 700 talents of silver from 
Judaea proper and almost certainly from all the other regions of greater Judaea as 
                                                          
30 Cicero, Fam. 12.11-12; Ad. Brut. 2.3.3; Velleius, 2.69.2; AJ 14.271-272; BJ 1.218-219; Appian, BCiv. 
3.78, 4.59; Dio, 47.28.1. 
31 For more details on Cassius’ war on Dolabella, see chapter 3.1. 
32 Schalit (1969) 47; Schürer (1973) 277; Baumann (1983) 117-118. 
33 After the capture of Laodicea in 43, Cassius imposed the payment of tribute on its citizens as a 
punishment for their support of Dolabella (Appian, BCiv. 4.62; Dio, 47.30.7; Strabo, 16.2.9). Cassius 
also exacted contributions from Tarsus – 1500 talents according to Appian, BCiv. 4.64. At some 
point in the first months of 42, Cassius was entangled in a conflict with Rhodes. Eventually, he 
subjugated this city and demanded money, gold and silver from the citizens (Appian, BCiv. 4.73; 
Plutarch, Brut. 32.2; Dio, 47.33.3-4). Appian, BCiv. 4.74 informs us that Cassius ordered all the 
peoples in Asia to pay the tribute for ten years. On all these exactions, see among others Gowing 
(1992) 166-171. 
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well.34 Whether this tribute was levied in addition to the land tax which Pompey 
had installed and which Caesar modified, is unknown.35 Possibly in his capacity as 
ἐπίτροπος, Antipater assigned the collection of this amount to several persons, 
among whom were his sons and a certain noble called Malichus.36 Although the 
source material does not clarify which sons precisely were involved in the levy of 
this tax, it is at any rate evident that Herod participated. 37 He undertook the 
collection in the Galilee and was allegedly the first to have raised his share of 100 
talents. 38  Cassius was appeased by the promptness with which Herod had 
collected the tribute and would remunerate him soon for his eagerness (see 
below). In contrast, Malichus, and perhaps also the other tax-collectors, incurred 
the resentment of Cassius for the dilatoriness in handing over the contribution.39 
Cassius would even have inflicted capital punishment upon Malichus, had 
Hyrcanus not, through Antipater, averted the execution by the payment of 100 
talents.40 Cassius also reduced the cities of Gophna, Emmaus, Lydda, Thamna and 
                                                          
34 Josephus, AJ 14.272: Josephus claims that the contribution was imposed on Judaea. Since in AJ 
14.274 it is said that Herod had raised his share of the tribute in the Galilee, it is clear that the scope 
of this contribution of 700 talents extended beyond Judaea proper and included probably all the 
other regions of the larger Judaea as well; cf. BJ 1.220, where Josephus says that 700 talents were 
ordered from the Judaeans.  
35 On the taxation imposed by Pompey, see chapter 1.7. Caesar seems to have altered the workings 
of this tax, as we pointed out briefly in the introduction to this chapter. 
36 Josephus, AJ 14.272-273; BJ 1.220-221. 
37 Cf. Smallwood (1976) 46, who presumes that only two sons were involved in the collection of the 
tribute. Which of the sons are meant, is not clarified, but Smallwood probably refers to Herod and 
Phasael.  However, when Josephus says (AJ 14.273; BJ 1.220) that Antipater assigned the collections 
of the tax to his sons (υἱοί), he does not specify which sons are meant exactly. Antipater is known 
to have had four sons who were all adults at the time of the levy of Cassius’ tax and could thus all 
be involved. Besides Herod and Phasael, Antipater fathered Joseph and Pheroras. On Antipater’s 
sons, see Kokkinos (1998) 156-176, and stemma 2 in the appendix of the thesis. 
38 Josephus, AJ 14.274; BJ 1.221. 
39  Josephus, AJ 14.274, 276; BJ 1.221-222. Josephus mentions in BJ 1.221 that “others” (“τοὺς 
λοιπούς”) were abused for their dilatoriness. Although it is not made explicit to whom “others” 
refer, it seems clear that the other tax-collectors are meant. 
40 Josephus, AJ 14.276; cf. BJ 1.222 which fails to mention Hyrcanus, but does, unlike AJ, refer to 
“other cities” (“τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων”) which would have been saved from destruction as a result 
of the gift of 100 talents to Cassius.  An identification of those “other cities” is not possible.  
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perhaps the “officials of other cities” to servitude. 41  Unfortunately, the exact 
reason for this measure cannot be extracted from the source material. Even though 
several scholars hold the delay of those cities in levying their tribute as the main 
cause for their reduction to servitude,42 it is equally possible that Cassius was 
merely after the financial resources of these communities as a means to 
accumulate his wealth.  
 In both historical accounts, Josephus attributes the supervision over the 
collection of the 700 talents to Antipater. No managerial role has been attested for 
Hyrcanus. Only in the Jewish Antiquities (14.276) does the High Priest feature in the 
events, when he is said to have saved Malichus’ life by the gift of 100 talents 
through Antipater. Why is such a prominent role imputed to Antipater in the levy 
of the tribute? Unfortunately, a certain answer cannot be given to this question. 
Possibly, it was Antipater rather than Hyrcanus whom Cassius had approached 
with the demand to assume supervision over the collection. As expounded above, 
Antipater may already in his position as ἐπίτροπος have been responsible for the 
exaction of the tax that Pompey had installed for Judaea in the late 60s BC. In that 
case, it would be logical for Cassius to put Antipater and not Hyrcanus in charge 
of the levy of the tribute of 700 talents.  
 Yet, it is also possible that Hyrcanus’ efforts in the collection of the tribute 
have deliberately been marginalised or distorted by Josephus in his two historical 
works.43 Schwartz has already demonstrated that the tendency to downplay the 
feats for which Hyrcanus was responsible and, simultaneously, to stress 
Antipater’s accomplishments, can be found throughout the relevant sections in 
                                                          
41 Josephus, AJ 14.275: “τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων ἐπιμεληταί”. Cf. BJ 1.222, which only mentions 
Gophna and Emmaus explicitly and seems to refer to Kydda and Thamna implicitly as “two other 
places of lesser importance” (“δύο ἑτέρας τῶν ταπεινοτέρων”). BJ does not refer to the “officials 
of other cities”. 
42 Abel (1952) 320; Schalit (1969) 48; Schürer (1973) 277; Richardson (1999) 115; cf. Smallwood (1976) 
46, who argues that Cassius sold off the inhabitants of these four cities into slavery “to obtain ready 
cash”. 
43 A suggestion implied by Richardson (1999) 114. 
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Josephus’ writings, especially in the earlier Jewish War.44 One of Josephus’ aims for 
this earlier account appears to have been to offer a justification for the demise of 
the Hasmonaean dynasty and for the rise of the Antipatrids as new rulers of 
Judaea. For the realisation of this purpose, it was important to portray the transfer 
of power from Hyrcanus and the Hasmonaeans to Herod’s family as a legitimate 
development. The core strategy employed by Josephus to accomplish this was to 
show the achievements of Antipater and his sons in the best possible light, and to 
ignore or misrepresent Hyrcanus’ successes.45 Although Josephus’ intentions in the 
Jewish Antiquities appear to have been different, here, too, the reader does not 
encounter an accurate and objective view of Hyrcanus’ achievements. One of 
Josephus’ main intentions for his later work was to explain how Hyrcanus’ 
incompetence as a ruler eventually contributed to the downfall of the 
Hasmonaean dynasty and the rise of the Antipatrids.46 For this reason, Josephus 
has in all likelihood also in his Jewish Antiquities distorted some of Hyrcanus’ 
accomplishments. It is thus very well possible that the sections in the Jewish War 
and the Jewish Antiquities dealing with the collection of the 700 talents do not give 
us an accurate rendering of the role played by Hyrcanus in it, all the more so when 
the differences between the two versions are taken into account. Yet, in whatever 
way Hyrcanus participated in the exaction of the contribution, Cassius seems in 
the end to have got for what he asked despite the resistance that he encountered 
from some cities. The cooperation that Antipater, his sons and other Judaean 
                                                          
44 On which see Schwartz (1994) 227-229, who persistently presents Josephus’ view on Hyrcanus 
and the Antipatrids in his Jewish War as the view of the Greek author Nicolaus of Damascus. 
Schwartz even admits (p. 217) to take for granted that the Jewish War reflects Nicolaus’ point of 
view with regard to Herod. Although it is well-known that Josephus relied heavily on Nicolaus’ 
Universal History, of which only fragments of a few books are extant, it would go too far to claim 
that the views on Hyrcanus and the Antipatrids put forward by Josephus in his Jewish War 
constitute a reproduction of Nicolaus’ stance on this issue, taking into account that parts of the 
Universal History dealing with this particular period are unknown to us. On Josephus’ usage of 
Nicolaus’ Universal History, see among others Bloch (1879) 106-116; Schürer (1973) 28, 30-31; Stern 
(1974a) 21-26, 30; Wacholder (1989). 
45 Schwartz (1994) 227. 
46 Schwartz (1994) 217-232. 
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officials rendered in the levy of the contribution, however, does not mean that 
they were enthusiastic about partaking in the financial drainage of Judaea. Rather, 
the assistance that Cassius received shows how difficult it had become for Judaea 
to maintain an independent political course in defiance of Rome. The entire 
Judaean nobility was aware that a disobedient attitude would lead to their 
deposition and possibly even to Judaea being turned into a Roman province. 
There was thus no other choice but to conform to the demand imposed by Cassius. 
 
4.3 Herod’s promotion 
 
Cassius must have been pleased to find Judaea’s ruling elite collaborative when it 
came to the implementation of his unpopular measure. In particular the short time 
needed by Herod to raise his portion of the tax will have engendered satisfaction. 
Perhaps motivated by this achievement, Herod was eventually awarded with an 
administrative post in the province of Syria by Cassius and Staius Murcus. 47 
Despite the fact that our only two relevant sources provide us with contradictory 
details about this official position, we can establish with a substantial degree of 
certainty that the view put forward by Josephus in his Jewish Antiquities according 
to which Herod was appointed as στρατηγός of Coele Syria with a fleet and an 
army consisting of cavalry and infantry under his command is most plausible.48 
The suggestion made in the Jewish War according to which Herod had been made 
ἐπιμελητής (governor) of the whole of Syria (Συρίας ἁπάσης) is rather 
                                                          
47 L. Staius Murcus was the proconsul who had been given a command over Syria in 44 and 
became involved in the war against Caecilius Bassus. After Cassius had ended the conflict and 
incorporated the armies among his own forces, Staius Murcus was retained in his position in Syria, 
on which see Broughton (1952) 349. 
48 Josephus, AJ 14.280. Similar view with similar argumentation by Otto (1913) 19; Schalit (1969) 48 
and 48 n.168; Smallwood (1976) 47; Baumann (1983) 121 and 121 n.24. Cf. Kokkinos (1998) 224 n.64, 
who claims without argumentation that Herod had been made ἐπιμελητής as claimed by BJ 1.225. 
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incredible.49 Ever since Cassius had assumed a supreme position of power in the 
Levant, a Roman governor had been in charge of Syria. Throughout most of 43, 
this role was assumed by Cassius and Murcus,50 but towards the end of the year 
when Cassius made his way to Asia Minor for the forthcoming war against 
Antony and Octavian, a nephew of Cassius is said to have been left in Syria with 
one legion.51 In other words, there is no point of time thinkable on which Herod 
could have been appointed as ἐπιμελητής over Syria. It is much more plausible 
that he was confirmed in his position as στρατηγός of Coele Syria (probably to be 
identified with the Decapolis in this case), as the Jewish Antiquities report. As we 
saw above, Herod had already been made στρατηγός of Coele Syria by Sextus 
Caesar in 47. The appointment by Cassius in 43 was probably nothing but an 
endorsement of that earlier position. However, in 47 Herod was also given control 
over the city of Samaria. Although there is no evidence for Herod actually being 
confirmed in his rule over that place, it is at least evident that sometime in 43 he 
was still in control over Samaria; Josephus mentions him in relation to the 
renovation of that city and the mending of internal disputes there in that year.52 
What duties Herod was asked to fulfil as στρατηγός is not entirely clear. Since 
                                                          
49 Josephus, BJ 1.225. The Greek term ἐπιμελητής has been used in antiquity both in a general, non-
official sense to denote any type of person who was in charge of something (s.v. ἐπιμελητής in 
LSJ), and in a technical way to refer to a wide range of officials in Greece, Asia Minor and Egypt. 
For all these different uses, see Oehler (1909). The term has also been employed as a translation of 
the Latin term curator, which was itself used in a technical and un-official sense to signify a wide 
range of positions, on which see Kornemann (1901) and Mason (1974) 46-47, s.v. ἐπιμελητής. Not 
in all instances of the word in Josephus’ corpus, the exact meaning of the word is clear, but 
ἐπιμελητής has been used in at least two instances to denote in a non-technical sense the governor 
of a province (AJ 17.6; 18.89) as Mason o.c. has demonstrated. Since according to Josephus BJ 1.225 
Cassius put infantry and cavalry at Herod’s disposal, it is very likely that also in this case 
ἐπιμελητής should be understood to mean “governor of a province”. 
50 On Staius Murcus’ proconsulship of Syria in 43, see Broughton (1952) 349. 
51 Appian, BCiv. 4.63: “Cassius left his nephew in Syria with one legion…” (“αὐτος δὲ ὁ Κάσσιος 
τὸν μὲν ἀδελφιδοῦν ἐν Συρίᾳ μεθ' ἑνὸς τέλους ἐπέλιπε…”). The name of this nephew appears to 
be unknown. 
52 Josephus, AJ 14.284; BJ 1.229. Smallwood (1976) 45 n.4 has already pointed to these passages as 
evidence for Herod’s appointment as στρατηγός over Samaria in addition to Coele Syria in 47 by 
Sextus Caesar.  
97 
Herod is said to have had an army, cavalry and a navy under his authority, he 
functioned at least as a military commander in Coele Syria.53  
Yet, whatever was the exact position given to Herod, both in the Jewish War 
and in the Jewish Antiquities, Cassius is also said to have promised the kingship 
over Judaea to Herod.54 Otto has convincingly rejected this suggestion on the basis 
that it would only have been made sometime in the first half of 43 when Antipater 
was still alive.55 
 
 
4.4 Internal conflicts and Cassius 
 
At some point when Cassius was engaged in the war against Dolabella in the 
summer of 43, a conflict erupted between Malichus and Antipater. The dispute 
escalated and Malichus eventually managed to put his enemy to death.56 Not 
surprisingly, Herod wished to take vengeance on Malichus for the cruel act 
inflicted upon his father, but Josephus informs us that he first asked Cassius’ 
consent. It was only after Cassius had given permission to avenge Antipater’s 
death that Herod had Malichus pay the penalty for his deed by executing him.57 
Whether or not Herod was obliged to ask Cassius permission, he did at least feel 
compelled to secure Roman consent. This intervention into an internal affair 
shows how dependent Judaea had become upon Rome and its representatives in 
the East. 
 
                                                          
53 Josephus, AJ 14.280. Cf. BJ 1.225, which does not mention the navy. Mason (1974) 156 clarifies 
that the term στρατηγός has often been used to denote a military commander. Shatzman (1991) 
143 has suggested that this fleet was for the Sea of Galilee – a possibility that is not to be excluded. 
54 Josephus, AJ 14.280; BJ 1.225. 
55 Otto (1913) 19-20.  
56 Josephus, AJ 14.281-283; BJ 1.226. 
57 Josephus, AJ 14.283-293; BJ 1.227-235. 
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Conclusion 
 
On the whole, five examples of political interaction between Rome and Judaea 
have been attested in the source material for the period between 44 and 42 BC: 
firstly, the Judean troops sent by Antipater together with Herod and Phasael to 
fight against Caecilius Bassus; secondly, the imposition of tribute of 700 talents by 
Cassius upon Judaea; thirdly, the enslavement of cities by Cassius; fourthly, the 
rewards for Herod as a result of the collection of the tribute; and fifthly, Herod 
asking permission from Cassius to avenge Antipater’s death. In addition to these 
examples, it seems that during this whole period, Judaea was obliged to pay a 
land tax to Rome, which Pompey installed and Caesar changed. All these 
examples demonstrate on the one hand that the Judaea was involved in Rome’s 
civil war and that efforts were made to show its loyalty to Rome. On the other 
hand, it can be inferred from these examples of interaction that Rome regarded 
Judaea to be an extension of its empire. Not only does the fact that all the leading 
men in Judaea had received their position from Rome shows this, but also Cassius’ 
imposition of a tribute on Judaea resembles the way in which he treated cities in 
the eastern Roman provinces. Herod was aware of its dependent status and 
therefore asked Cassius’ permission to deal with an internal Judaean issue. 
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5 PRINCEDOM OF CHALCIS 
 
 
For the first few decades after the emergence of the Princedom of Chalcis from the 
vestiges of the Seleucid empire in southern Syria towards the end of the second 
century BC, the extant sources do not provide any indication of interstate dealings 
between the sovereigns of this principality and Rome despite the fact that for this 
period diplomatic relations with Rome are attested to have been maintained by 
the neighbouring kingdom Judaea. The earliest political contacts with the 
Princedom of Chalcis that can be identified are to be dated to the year 64 or 63 
when Pompey arrived in the Near East and reorganised the whole region. By that 
time, the ruler of Chalcis, Ptolemy son of Mennaeus, seems to have controlled the 
area of the modern Beqāʽ and the adjoining Lebanon mountain range. Even those 
fortresses on the Phoenician coast between Tripolis and Byblos may have 
constituted a part of Ptolemy’s dominion. However, in 63 Pompey appears to have 
ordered the destruction of those maritime strongholds. Whether other areas of 
Ptolemy’s realm were destroyed as well, remains unclear. The prince was at any 
rate forced to pay one thousand talents as a means to secure his reign, and was 
permitted to use the titles τετράρχης and ἀρχιερεύς.1 Radical as these changes 
may have been for Ptolemy, until the outbreak of the Roman civil war in the year 
44, Rome does not seem to have interfered in Ptolemy’s position, nor to have made 
changes in the internal organisation or geographical extent of his principality. 
How the relationship between the Princedom of Chalcis and Rome developed 
from the assassination of Caesar until the defeat of the tyrannicides Brutus and 
Cassius needs to be examined at present.   
 
                                                          
1 For details on Pompey’s reorganisation, see chapter 1.6. 
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5.1 Chalcidaean support for Caecilius Bassus 
 
In the previous chapter, we saw that in the period between 46 and 44 during 
which Caesarean generals attempted to subdue the Pompeian renegade Caecilius 
Bassus and his armies in Syria, the Caesareans received support from Herod and 
Phasael.2 Yet, the assistance by kings and princes in the region was not merely 
rendered to the Caesarean faction. Caecilius Bassus equally received support from 
Near Eastern rulers. Strabo names Ptolemy, the son of Mennaeus, along with the 
rulers of the Emisenoi (Ἐμισηνοί) and a certain Alchaedamnus, reportedly 
βασιλεύς of a tribe called the Rhambaeans, as allies of Caecilius.3 Unfortunately, 
the extant sources do not provide us with any further details on the way in which 
Ptolemy demonstrated his alliance with Caecilius. Possibly, an offer of armed 
assistance had been made, but it is also conceivable that the ruler of Chalcis had 
supplied Caecilius with military equipment or financial resources. A clear vision 
on the motivation behind Ptolemy’s alleged decision to collaborate with Caecilius 
is equally marred by the lack of explanations afforded by Strabo and other ancient 
authors. Nevertheless, scanty indications in our sources seem to suggest that the 
geopolitical circumstances at this time played a role in Ptolemy’s presumed 
assistance rendered to Caecilius. The period from the mid-50s until the end of the 
30s BC was characterised by mutual distrust and even armed conflict between 
Rome and Parthia. The main battleground of these two powers was the Near East 
and it is for this reason not surprising that both Rome and Parthia tried to gain 
influence and secure loyalty from kings, princes, cities and smaller communities in 
this region. Dio explains that the Parthians had sent an auxiliary force under king 
Orodes’ son Pacorus to assist Caecilius in the year 45, but that these troops had 
already retreated before the beginning of the winter. 4  It is not unlikely that 
                                                          
2 See chapter 4.1. 
3 Strabo, 16.2.10. On the role of the Emisenoi in the revolt, see chapter 6.1. 
4 Dio, 47.27.2-5. 
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Pacorus or another Parthian official had put pressure on the prince of Chalcis, the 
rulers of the Emisenoi and the leader of the Rhambaeans to ally themselves with 
Caecilius. Although the extant sources do not provide us with any direct evidence 
for political pressure on these rulers, indications for the presence of Parthian 
political influence do appear to exist for a well-known place somewhere else in the 
region: Palmyra. The following passage taken from Appian’s Civil Wars illustrates 
how this influence found expression in this city’s conduct: 
 
“When Cleopatra had sailed homewards, Antony sent his horsemen to the polis 
Palmyra, not far from the Euphrates, to plunder, accusing them of something 
insignificant, that they – being on the frontier between the Romans and the Parthians – 
showed tact to both sides (being merchants, they carry Indian and Arabian goods 
from the Persians and dispose of them in the territory of the Romans), but in fact he 
had in his mind to enrich his horsemen. As the Palmyrenes learned about this 
beforehand and carried their essentials to the other side of the riverbank, preparing 
themselves with bows – with which they are by nature excellent – in case anyone 
would attack them, the horsemen, seizing the city empty, turned around, not having 
met anyone, not having taken anything”.5 
 
Appian explains that Palmyra was located on the boundary between the Roman 
and Parthian spheres of influence, and that as a result of this circumstance “it 
showed tact to both sides”. Clearly, the author means that the city had failed to 
take sides between Rome and Parthia, each of them flanking her on one side.6 
                                                          
5 Appian, BCiv. 5.9: “Ἀποπλευσάσης δὲ τῆς Κλεοπάτρας ἐς τὰ οἰκεῖα, ὁ Ἀντώνιος ἔπεμπε τοὺς 
ἱππέας Πάλμυρα πόλιν, οὐ μακρὰν οὖσαν ἀπὸ Εὐφράτου, διαρπάσαι, μικρὰ μὲν ἐπικαλῶν 
αὐτοῖς, ὅτι Ῥωμαίων καὶ Παρθυαίων ὄντες ἐφόριοι ἐς ἑκατέρους ἐπιδεξίως εἶχον (ἔμποροι γὰρ 
ὄντες κομίζουσι μὲν ἐκ Περσῶν τὰ Ἰνδικὰ ἢ Ἀράβια, διατίθενται δ᾽ ἐν τῇ Ῥωμαίων) ἔργῳ δ᾽ 
ἐπινοῶν τοὺς ἱππέας περιουσιάσαι. Παλμυρηνῶν δὲ προμαθόντων καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἐς τὸ 
πέραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ μετενεγκάντων τε καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ὄχθης, εἴ τις ἐπιχειροίη σκευασαμένων 
τόξοις, πρὸς ἃ πεφύκασιν ἐξαιρέτως, οἱ ἱππέες τὴν πόλιν κενὴν καταλαβόντες ὑπέστρεψαν, 
οὔτε ἐς χεῖρας ἐλθόντες οὔτε τι λαβόντες” (transl. Penguin). A critical assessment of this passage 
can be found in Hekster / Kaizer (2004), who show “how contemporary opinions and events 
helped to shape Appian’s description of Antony’s raid on Palmyra in 41 BC” (o.c. p. 80). 
6 That Palmyra was situated on the boundary of the Roman and Parthian spheres of influence is 
also documented by Pliny, HN 5.21.88, who says that Palmyra had “a destiny of its own between 
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Although Appian himself disregards the accusation of Palmyra’s wavering loyalty 
as a triviality and believes instead that Antony’s intention to enrich his horsemen 
had prompted the raid, he does not reject the content of the indictment itself. 
Palmyra may thus indeed have maintained an indecisive political attitude in 41. It 
would probably not have had another choice, “being on the frontier between the 
Romans and the Parthians”. Appian’s account of the intended raid on Palmyra can 
thus serve as an indication that Parthia’s political influence stretched at least as far 
as this city in the year 41. There is no reason to assume that in 46 or 45 this 
situation would have been different. What is more, with the Roman governors 
engaged in an armed conflict against each other in the northern part of Syria 
around this time, it would certainly have been possible for the Parthians to expand 
their political influence by diplomatic means further westwards into territories 
that came under the dominion of Ptolemy, the prince of Chalcis, Sampsigeramus 
the ruler of the Emisenoi and Alchaudonius, the leader of the Rhambaeans. If the 
Parthians did make use of this opportunity, it would not have been difficult for 
them to compel the three rulers to render aid to the same Roman faction. Although 
it cannot be established with certainty whether or not the Parthians undertook 
such actions, it is clear that they had withdrawn their troops from Syria by the 
beginning of the winter in the year 45. Whether Ptolemy was still engaged in the 
conflict when Cassius arrived in the beginning of 43 is uncertain.  
In any event, by spring that year, Cassius had conciliated all the conflicting 
parties and gained control of the former troops of Caecilius, Marcius Crispus and 
Staius Murcus. The acquisition of all the armies in Syria enabled Cassius within 
several months to secure an absolute position of power in the Roman Near East. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
the two mighty empires of the Romans and the Parthians” (“privata sorte inter duo imperia summa 
Romanorum Parthorumque”, LCL transl. adapted). Unfortunately, this passage cannot be used as 
evidence for Palmyra being located in the border zone in the 40s BC. By the time that Pliny 
published his Natural History (in AD 77), Palmyra was already situated firmly within the bounds of 
Rome’s empire. The text, accordingly, does not give a factual description of Palmyra’s geo-political 
position with regard to Rome and Parthia. Rather, as Will (1985) 266 explains, merely provides a 
stereotypical description of an oasis in general. 
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The ineffective invasion of Dolabella proved to be the last obstacle withholding 
Cassius from supreme authority over Syria.7 While the consolidation of his power 
was still in progress, the flaws of Cassius’ superiority became already manifest. In 
order to maintain the loyalty of the troops on which his position largely depended, 
enormous funds were vital. For this purpose, financial resources were not only 
extracted from the cities and local communities in the eastern Roman provinces, 
but also from some of the kings and dynasts in that part of the world. Cassius 
imposed for example the payment of 700 talents on Judaea.8 Whether Cassius also 
exacted money from Ptolemy’s principality is unknown. For the whole period 
from the assassination of Caesar until the Battle of Philippi, our extant sources do 
not give testimony of any further political interaction between Rome and the 
Princedom of Chalcis.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the period from 44 until 42, only one example of political interaction between 
Rome and the Princedom of Chalcis can be identified: support for the renegade Q. 
Caecilius Bassus. Parthian pressure may have played a role in this case. Certainty 
unfortunately cannot be attained. How the relations between Rome and the 
Princedom of Chalcis developed in the period from 42 until 31 will be considered 
in Part II.B. 
                                                          
7 For more details on Cassius’ acquisition of the armies in Syria, see chapter 4.2. 
8 See chapter 4.2. 
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6 THE EMISENOI 
 
Pompey’s administrative reorganisation of the Near East has demonstrated that 
liability to Roman taxation and to intermittent demands for financial contributions 
was not necessarily solely confined to cities and communities within Rome’s 
provinces. As part of Pompey’s restructuring programme, several kingdoms and 
principalities in the Levant, albeit formally located beyond Rome’s provincial 
boundaries, were made subject to Roman taxation and occasional requests for 
pecuniary donations. The best documented example is without doubt the tribute 
that the newly installed ἐθνάρχης of the Judaeans, Hyrcanus, saw imposed on his 
principality.1 More obscure, yet not necessarily less intrusive, were the financial 
contributions which Ptolemy, the prince of Chalcis, was forced to make.2 Further 
to the north, it was the people of the Emisenoi who might not have escaped the 
burden of Roman taxation. 3  Whether a tax was the price that the Emisenian 
φύλαρχος Sampsigeramus had to pay in order to secure Roman recognition of his 
holdings is an issue which our extant source material fails to elucidate.4 It is clear, 
at least, that the possible levy of a Roman tax did not irreparably damage the 
relationship between the Emisenoi and Rome. On the contrary, the Emisenian 
φύλαρχος Iamblichus and his father Sampsigeramus turned out to be key 
supporters of Rome. It appears that the son was among the rulers who in 51 or 50 
informed Cicero as proconsul of Cilicia of the Parthian armies that had crossed the 
Euphrates. When Caesar was engaged in a war against the forces of the Egyptian 
king Ptolemy XIII in the year 47, Iamblichus joined a coalition of Near Eastern 
                                                          
1 See chapter 1.7. 
2 See chapter 1.6. 
3 See chapter 1.6. 
4  Sullivan (1977a) 202 has advanced the idea that the “Romans recognized the holdings of 
Sampsigeramus in return for tribute”.  
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auxiliary troops who came to Caesar’s assistance in Egypt. 5 Thus, within five 
years, Iamblichus had demonstrated at least twice that he was a reliable supporter 
of Rome when it was engaged in a conflict against a foreign power. Whether 
Iamblichus received any benefactions for his efforts is uncertain. It is in any event 
evident that in the following seven years, the Emisenoi did not have any 
opportunity to assist Rome in foreign wars. Following the death of Caesar in 44, 
Rome plunged once more into a period of civil strife, and foreign expeditions in 
the eastern Mediterranean were not undertaken until at least the defeat of Brutus 
and Cassius at Philippi in 42. How did the renewed outbreak of civil war affect the 
relationship between the Emisenoi and Rome? In what way did Emisenian policies 
towards Rome, as well as Rome’s attitude towards the Emisenoi, develop during 
these two and a half years?  
 
6.1 Caecilius Bassus and the Emisenian support 
 
In an earlier chapter, we have already seen that the two years prior to Cassius’ 
arrival in Syria around the beginning of 43 were characterised by a war between 
the Pompeian rebel Caecilius Bassus and troops dispatched by Caesar. One of the 
factors that may have contributed to the inability of the Caesarean generals to 
quell the insurgency in Syria is the military support that Caecilius obtained from 
Parthia and from the dynasts in the region.6 Of these neighbouring chieftains, it 
has already been stated that Ptolemy, the prince of Chalcis, and a certain 
Alchaedamnus, king of the Rhambaeans, seem to have rendered military aid to 
Caecilius in this conflict.7 However, Strabo informs us that besides those two 
dynasts, Sampsigeramus and his son Iamblichus, “φυλάρχων of the tribe of the 
                                                          
5 Cicero, Fam. 15.1.2 says that he received a message from Iamblichus informing him of the crossing 
of the Euphrates by Parthian cavalry. Our evidence for the support that Iamblichus granted to 
Caesar in Egypt consists of Josephus, AJ 14.129 and BJ 1.188. 
6 See Appian, BCiv. 3.78 and 4.59 on the legions of the Caesarean generals. 
7 See chapter 5.1. 
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Emisenoi”, were among the allies whom Caecilius had collected in the Near East.8 
Although further details on the way in which the Emisenian alliance with 
Caecilius manifested itself are not made explicit in our extant sources, it is not 
unthinkable for these two rulers to have sent some military personnel to Syria. 
More obscure remains the motivation behind the alleged decision of the two 
Emisenian φύλαρχοι to collaborate with Caecilius. Yet, it is not unthinkable that 
the Parthians had exerted pressure on Sampsigeramus and Iamblichus to ally 
themselves with Caecilius, in the same way as they may have induced Ptolemy the 
prince of Chalcis to collaborate with Caecilius.9 The period from the mid-50s BC 
until the end of the 30s BC was characterised by mutual distrust and even armed 
conflict between Rome and Parthia. The main battleground of these two powers 
was the Near East and it is for this reason not surprising that both Rome and 
Parthia tried to gain influence and secure loyalty of the kings, princes, cities and 
smaller communities in that region. There are, for example, strong indications that 
the city of Palmyra experienced Parthian pressure in the late 40s BC.10 Around the 
middle of this decade, this thrust may have reached as far as the Princedom of 
Chalcis or the city of Arethusa on the Orontes, which belonged to the rulers of the 
Emisenoi.11 The revolt of Caecilius Bassus and the gathering of Roman legions in 
the north of Syria around Apamea would have given the Parthians the 
opportunity to expand their influence from Palmyra further westwards. It can 
therefore not be excluded that Parthia had put pressure on the Emisenian rulers, 
                                                          
8 Strabo, 16.2.10: “... Σαμψικεράμου καὶ Ἰαμβλίχου... φυλάρχων τοῦ Ἐμισηνῶν ἔθνους”. On 
Sampsigeramus’ and Iamblichus’ alliance with Caecilius Bassus, see also: Chad (1972) 42-43; Seyrig 
(1959) 187; Sullivan (1990) 201. 
9 See chapter 5.1. Sullivan (1977a) 208 has aptly pointed out that “strong persuasion” must have 
been required for the Emisenoi to support the Pompeian Caecilius, since not much earlier (in 47) 
they had supported Caesar in Egypt. Yet, how this “strong persuasion” would have become 
manifest, is not explained by the author. 
10 See chapter 5.1.  
11 All the more so, since an undated boundary marker carrying a Latin inscription – AE (1939) no. 
180 – indicates that at some point during Rome’s rule over the Near East, the Palmyrene territory 
bordered the Emisene sphere of influence, as pointed out by Millar (1993) 34. Nothing withholds 
the possibility that these two administrative entities were already each other’s neighbours in our 
period of civil war.  
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the prince of Chalcis and the leader of the Rhambaeans to make a coalition with 
Caecilius. Dio clarifies that the Parthians themselves had sent an auxiliary force 
under the king’s son Pacorus to support Caecilius in the year 45, but that these 
troops had already retreated before the beginning of the winter. 12  Whether 
Sampsigeramus and Iamblichus were still engaged in the conflict when Cassius 
arrived in the beginning of 43 is uncertain. 
 
At any rate, by the beginning of spring in the year 43, Caecilius and his Caesarean 
opponents Marcius Crispus and Staius Murcus had ceased hostilities and 
surrendered their troops to Cassius, who around the same time seems to have 
gained control over the four legions that a certain legate A. Allienus, who 
previously seemed to have served under Dolabella, had taken from Egypt.13 The 
acquisition of all the armies in Syria enabled Cassius within several months to 
secure an absolute position of power in the Roman Near East. Dolabella’s attempt 
to obtain Syria turned out to be the last barrier withholding Cassius from supreme 
authority over this province. 14  During the following year and a half, Cassius 
extracted enormous financial resources from the cities and local communities in 
the eastern Mediterranean, as well as from Judaea, in order to fortify his 
hegemony and to prepare for the impending war against the triumvirs.15 Whether 
the Emisenoi were also coerced to provide Cassius with funds, armed supplies or 
victuals, is uncertain. Equally opaque is the issue whether the Emisenian rulers 
granted military assistance in any form to Cassius (or Brutus) at Philippi.  
 
 
                                                          
12 Dio, 47.27.2-5. 
13 See chapter 4.2. On the position of A. Allienus and his role in the civil war in 44 and 43, see 
among others Broughton (1952) 352. 
14 See chapter 3.1. 
15 For more details, see chapter 4.2. 
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Conclusion 
 
For the whole period from the assassination of Caesar until Antony’s and 
Octavian’s triumph over Cassius and Brutus, our extant source material, thus, 
only gives testimony of the support which Sampsigeramus and his son Iamblichus 
offered to Caecilius Bassus – possibly under Parthian pressure – at some point 
between the years 46 and 43. 
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7 MEDIA ATROPATENE 
 
The history of the political relations between Media Atropatene and Rome in the 
first century BC prior to the age of civil war is, in contrast to most other bilateral 
connections under discussion here, nearly completely shrouded in mist. The 
participation of Media Atropatene in the wars fought by Lucullus and Pompey 
against Mithridates of Pontus and Tigranes of Armenia is sadly the only interstate 
contact with Rome known to us. Our literary sources refer in this context merely to 
several armed clashes in which the Atropatenean king Mithridates and his 
possible successor Darius were involved by taking up arms against Rome. 1 
Although it is not unlikely that Media Atropatene paid a price for its hostile stance 
towards Rome in the same way as Armenia did, nothing of this sort has been 
attested. What is more, until the year 42, no further political interaction between 
this kingdom and Rome is recorded. Whether the silence of our sources is a matter 
of coincidence or a reflection of the modest role that this kingdom played on the 
political scene of the Near East in the middle of the first century BC is an issue that 
cannot be easily resolved. It is important for our purposes, however, to consider 
what the attitude of Media Atropatene was towards Rome in 42 when the discord 
among Rome’s ruling elite intensified and eventually culminated in the Battle of 
Philippi in the autumn of that year.  
 
7.1 Median mounted bowman at Philippi 
 
In his Civil Wars Appian describes how Brutus and Cassius at the Gulf of Melas in 
Thrace reviewed the troops that constituted their army in the run-up to the Battle 
                                                          
1 For an overview of these sources, see chapter 1.5. 
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of Philippi. The two tyrannicides would have had nineteen Roman legions under 
their command, as well as a wide range of auxiliary troops, of which the military 
function and ethnic origin are specified in the following passage:  
 
 “Brutus had 4,000 Celtic and Lusitanian horse, besides 2,000 Thracian and Illyrian, 
Parthian and Thessalian. Cassius had 2,000 Iberian and Celtic horse and 4,000 
mounted bowmen, Arabs, Medes, and Parthians. The allied kings and tetrarchs of the 
Galatians followed him, leading a large additional force of foot-soldiers and about 
5,000 horse”.2 
 
The precise ethnic background of the Medes who along with Arabs and Parthians 
mentioned in this text comprised the mounted archers cannot be reconstructed. It 
is, however, not unthinkable that these Median bowmen originated from Media 
Atropatene. In that case, the question arises why Atropatenean forces were 
present at Philippi. Since none of our extant sources shed light on this issue, a 
possible explanation remains hypothetical. It is nevertheless not entirely 
groundless to state that Parthian pressure may have accounted for the military 
support offered to Brutus and Cassius. Media Atropatene was located 
immediately north of Parthia and due to this geographical position, Parthia had 
the opportunity to coerce the Atropateneans to provide mounted bowmen to the 
tyrannicides. In what way exactly these horsemen would have supported Brutus 
and Cassius remains unfortunately opaque. It is at any rate clear that the 
                                                          
2 Appian BCiv. 4.88: “ἱππέες δὲ ἦσαν Βρούτῳ μὲν Κελτοὶ καὶ Λυσιτανοὶ τετρακισχίλιοι καὶ 
Θρᾷκες καὶ Ἰλλυριοὶ Παρθηνοὶ καὶ Θεσσαλοὶ δισχίλιοι, Κασσίῳ δὲ Ἴβηρές τε καὶ Κελτοὶ 
δισχίλιοι καὶ ἱπποτοξόται Ἄραβές τε καὶ Μῆδοι καὶ Παρθυαῖοι τετρακισχίλιοι. Σύμμαχοι δὲ 
εἵποντο βασιλέες καὶ τετράρχαι Γαλατῶν τῶν ἐν Ἀσίᾳ, πεζόν τε ἄγοντες πολὺν ἄλλον καὶ 
ἱππέας ὑπὲρ πεντακισχιλίους”. Cf. Brunt (1971) 485-488, who has convincingly demonstrated that 
there were in all likelihood 17 legions fighting on the Republican side at Philippi, and not 19 
legions as reported by Appian in this passage and in BCiv. 4.108. Brunt believes that Appian had 
included in the number the two legions under L. Staius Murcus, proconsul in Syria, and an officer 
called Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus. Although these two commanders were allied to Cassius and 
Brutus, they were engaged in the Adriatic and did accordingly not partake in the Battle of Philippi 
with their troops. 
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Atropatenean assistance did not manage to change the outcome of the Battle of 
Philippi. 
 The text also demonstrates that Cassius had Iberian cavalry at his disposal 
before the final clash with the triumvirs. Why these horsemen from Iberia were 
present is unclear; any potential explanation remains highly speculative. Their 
participation here forms at least the first of two occasions that they are known to 
have been in contact with Rome during our period of civil war.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The political interaction between Rome and Media Atropatene in the period from 
the eruption of civil war in 44 until the fall of Cassius and Brutus in 42 was thus, 
as far as our extant source material is concerned, limited to the supply of 
Atropatenean cavalry to the tyrannicides for the confrontation against Antony and 
Octavian. No other contact is known to have taken place in the period under 
discussion. How the relations between the Romans and Atropateneans developed 
after Philippi, is an issue to be discussed further below. Whether the assistance 
rendered to the defeated faction had any consequences for Media Atropatene, is 
an issue that will also be examined in a later chapter.  
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PART II.B 
42-31 BC 
113 
8 PARTHIA 
 
 
As my analysis in Part II.A has shown, Caesar’s assassination and the subsequent 
outbreak of civil war had an enormous impact on the political dealings between 
Rome and Parthia up till the Battle of Philippi. The murder and ensuing upheaval 
forced a far-advanced plan for a military campaign against Parthia to be put on 
hold.1 Rome’s leading politicians were too much engaged in their own political 
conflicts to see the planned expedition materialise. The relations between the two 
superpowers accordingly advanced in a different direction. With Roman 
governors involved in factional strife and seeking as much support as possible, 
Parthia became just like several other Near Eastern kingdoms and principalities a 
pool from which military resources could be extracted for the internal struggle. 
We have observed, for example, that in 43 Cassius used Parthian servicemen 
(possibly mounted archers) in his war against Dolabella in northern Syria, and a 
year later Parthians also participated in the clash at Philippi against Antony and 
Octavian. Unlike most other authorities in the Near East, though, Parthia could, 
thanks to its status as a global power, not be coerced to render assistance. Parthian 
assistance for the tyrannicides thus reveals that king Orodes was willing to get 
involved in Rome’s domestic struggles. Perhaps, he anticipated that he would be 
remunerated by Brutus and Cassius in the event of a successful outcome of the 
war. Yet, with the downfall of the two tyrannicides on the battlefield, any hope of 
receiving a reward evaporated. What is more, Orodes must have come to the 
realisation that he had made a bet on the wrong horse and that Antony might be 
eager to have him bear the consequences of his conduct, while he made his 
                                                          
1 For details on Caesar’s planned campaign against Parthia, see the introduction of chapter 2. 
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journey through Asia Minor and the Near East in 41.2 Unfortunately, it remains 
unclear whether a penalty was eventually inflicted in view of the absence of 
evidence. It is very likely that Antony let the Parthian king go free. Had sanctions 
been imposed, then traces of it would probably have found their way into the 
extant literary sources which – taken as a whole – provide us with a rather rich 
picture of Antony’s activities in the East in 41. Yet, whatever Antony’s initial 
response to Parthia’s involvement in the Battle at Philippi was, peace could not be 
secured for long. In the year 40, the Parthians launched an invasion and broke the 
feeble peace that existed between them and the Romans. How the relations 
between the two superpowers developed from that moment onwards until 
Actium will be examined in this chapter. 
 
8.1 The Parthian invasion of Syria and Asia Minor 
 
In the winter of 41/40 or the following spring Parthian armies crossed the 
Euphrates and moved into the province of Syria.3 The forces were headed by 
Pacorus, the son of king Orodes, and by the Roman deserter Q. Labienus, who at 
the beginning of 42 had been dispatched to Parthia by Cassius and Brutus to ask 
for reinforcements for the war against Antony and Octavian.4 Upon their arrival in 
Syria, they first took on the struggle against the legate L. Decidius Saxa, whom 
Antony had put in charge of Syria a year earlier with an unknown number of 
troops under his command.5 After the defeat of this officer, Labienus and Pacorus 
                                                          
2 For more details on Antony’s activities in Asia Minor and the Near East in 41, see chapter 9.1 and 
9.2.  
3  For modern narratives and analyses of the Parthian invasion, see: Günther (1922) 39-50; 
Debevoise (1938) 108-120; Magie (1950) 430-432; Sherwin-White (1984) 302-305; Pelling (1988) 193-
194, 197-198; Sullivan (1990) 311-312; Lerouge (2007) 85-86. 
4 Dio, 48.24.3-8; Plutarch, Ant. 28.1; 30.1; Velleius, 2.78.1; Tacitus, Hist. 5.9; Justin, 42.4.7; Livy, Per. 
127; Appian, BCiv. 5.65; Florus, 2.19.4. On Labienus’ embassy to Parthia, see chapter 2.2. 
5 Dio, 48.24.3, 48.25.2-4; Florus, 2.19.4-5; Livy, Per. 127. Cf. Tarn (1932) 77-78; Sherwin-White (1984) 
302; Freyburger / Roddaz (1994) cxii, 82 n.220, who all seem to hold it for certain that Decidius Saxa 
commanded two legions in Syria on the eve of the Parthian invasion. The evidence, however, does 
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split into two forces. The former turned westwards and continued his march 
across Asia Minor via Lydia and Caria to the Ionian west coast, gaining support 
from Roman legions that formerly served under Cassius along the route.6 Pacorus, 
on the other hand, marched to the south from Syria, conquering the Phoenician 
coastal cities, with the exception of Tyre, and invading Judaea, where he deposed 
the Roman backed ἐθνάρχης Hyrcanus and installed Antigonus as king instead.7 
Never before had Parthian armies thrust so far to the west as in the first year of 
their military expedition – an achievement that found expression in the coinage of 
Labienus8 and, possibly, also of Pacorus.9 
                                                                                                                                                                                
not allow for such a precise reconstruction of the number of troops stationed in the Levant at that 
time. Our extant sources can at most inform us about the amount of troops that came into Antony’s 
possession in the aftermath of Philippi. According to Appian, BCiv. 5.3, Antony held the authority 
over six legions and 10,000 horsemen at that moment, and received a further two legions from 
Octavian in exchange of the troops that he had left behind in Italy. Dio, 48.2.3 is less precise, but at 
least mentions Antony’s deal with Octavian. How Antony distributed these troops over the eastern 
Mediterranean towards the end of 42 and throughout 41 prior to the Parthian attack can, 
unfortunately, not be disclosed on the basis of our source material, as Brunt (1971) 497 has already 
demonstrated. That Sherwin-White and Freyburger / Roddaz, thus, do not refer to any ancient 
evidence to support their view is not surprising. Tarn is the only one among them who has made 
an attempt to substantiate his opinion. He has founded his claim on the assumption that L. Marcius 
Censorinus, the proconsul of Macedonia, held six legions under his command in 41 and 40. This    
statement is in itself, however, highly speculative; it is based on the postulation that the army that 
Antony would have recalled in the lead-up to the Treaty of Brundisium (as stated by Appian, BCiv. 
5.58) consisted of six legions – a number inferred from the impossibility to identify the location of 
six of the twenty-two legions that Antony according to Tarn (1932) 76 possessed following the 
agreement reached at Brundisium. For more details on L. Decidius Saxa, see among others Münzer 
(1901); Syme (1937) = (1979). 
6 Dio, 48.25.2; 48.26.3-4; Plutarch, Ant. 30.1; Strabo, 12.8.9; 14.2.24; Appian, Syr. 51. That Labienus 
marched with his troops as far as the Anatolian southwest littoral is proven by two letters 
addressed to the city of Mylasa in Caria (Sherk, RDGE nos. 59-60 = I. Mylasa 601-602) which make 
mention of the hardship that this place endured as a result of the invasion led by Labienus. The 
earliest of these letters was dispatched by an unknown Roman magistrate at some point after 39 
and the later one by Octavian in 31 after the Battle of Actium. 
7 Dio, 48.26.1-2. On the change of rule in Judaea, see chapter 10.4. 
8 Labienus has issued aurei and denarii (Grueber, CRRBM II.500; Crawford (1974) 529 no. 524) which 
depict on the obverse his bust along with the legend “Q LABIENVS PARTHICVS IMP”, and on the 
reverse a horse with bow-case and quiver. The imagery on the reverse clearly functions as a 
metaphor for the military success accomplished by Labienus in Parthian service, as the Parthians 
were known for their cavalry and archers. The title imperator was usually conferred by Roman 
soldiers upon their general after a victory on the battlefield, and its appearance on coinage here 
demonstrates that Labienus liked to pride himself on his military achievements. How the word 
Parthicus is to be understood, remains unfortunately unclear. Strabo, 14.2.24 believes that Labienus 
designated himself as “Parthian imperator” (“Παρθικὸς αὐτοκράτωρ”) – an interpretation that has 
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 The invasion did not escape notice on the Roman side. Antony was 
informed about the Parthian incursion while he was in Egypt with Cleopatra, 
where he had stayed during the winter from 41 to 40. In response to the rapid 
Parthian military advance, Antony hastened to Phoenicia to prepare for the 
counterattack. However, he abandoned this plan when he perceived that Octavian 
had defeated his brother L. Antonius in the battle of Perusia.10  With his forces 
Antony proceeded to Italy, laid siege to Brundisium and seized territory in 
southern Italy. As a result of these actions, Octavian moved southwards with his 
army and a new civil war seemed inevitable. Reluctance among the troops to take 
any sides forced Octavian and Antony, however, to negotiate a compromise; the 
so-called Pact of Brundisium was the outcome.11 After Antony had attended to this 
                                                                                                                                                                                
received the consent of Münzer (1925) 259. Yet, as Timpe (1962) 118 n.90 has already demonstrated 
by drawing attention to Dio, 48.39.3, Labienus does not seem to have commanded any Parthian 
troops directly when he made his march westwards, and it is in this light highly unlikely that he 
called himself “Parthian imperator”. Moreover, Wallmann (1989) 232 has pointed out that Strabo’s 
reference to Labienus as “Parthian imperator” is to be understood in a satirical way in the context of 
the entire passage. He also explains why Plutarch, Ant. 28.1 cannot be used as evidence for 
condoning Strabo’s explanation. A different interpretation of the title Parthicus imperator has been 
provided by Dio, 48.26.5, who believes that Labienus “called himself both imperator and Parthicus” 
(“αὐτοκράτορά τε αὑτὸν καὶ Παρθικόν (...) ὠνόμαζεν”). In this sense, Παρθικὸς is thus not used 
as an adjective, but as a cognomen ex virtute, which was awarded to a victorious commander in the 
field, and referred to the people that he had defeated in battle. Labienus, however, did not crush 
the Parthians; on the contrary, he fought for the Parthians against fellow Romans. Although Dio is 
aware of this, he does not explain why Labienus would have diverted from the traditional usage of 
cognomina ex virtute. Nonetheless, some scholars agree with Dio’s interpretation, most notably 
Crawford (1974) 529. A more plausible explanation for the appearance of the term Parthicus on 
Labienus’ aurei and denarii is provided by Wallmann (1989) 233, who points out that during the 
Late Republic, the term Parthicus (or any other ethnic) could also mean “friend of the Parthians” in 
the same way as the name Atticus, could refer to “friend of Athens”. This view has been subscribed 
to by Freyburger / Roddaz (1994) 84 n.247; Grueber, CRRBM II.500. For further references to the 
modern debate regarding the meaning of the title Parthicus imperator, see Wallmann (1989) 232-234; 
Noé (1997) 423-426 and Curran (2007) 47-51. 
9 Pacorus is generally thought to have been depicted on some drachms and bronze coins from 
Parthia that portray the bust of a beardless prince. On those issues, the depicted ruler is crowned 
by a Nike with a wreath – a representation that may reflect Pacorus’ success on the battlefield in 40. 
For more detailed description of the coins in question, see among others Wroth (1964) xxxvii, 97-98 
and Sellwood (1971) 143-144. 
10 Plutarch, Ant., 30.1-2; Dio, 48.27.3-5. For more details and background on the Perusine War, see 
among others Syme (1939) 208-213; Pelling (1996) 14-17.  
11 Appian, BCiv. 5.65; Dio, 48.28.4; Velleius, 2.76.3; Plutarch, Ant. 30.6. On the Pact of Brundisium, 
see Syme (1939) 216-217; Buchheim (1960) 35-39; Huzar (1978) 136-140. 
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business, he appointed P. Ventidius Bassus as legate with imperium pro consule to 
the command of the war against the Parthian invaders.12 Eventually, Ventidius 
succeeded in this task as Labienus fell on the battlefield in 39,13 followed a year 
later by the death of Pacorus in Syria near Gindarus.14 The loss of these two 
generals marked the end of the Parthian advance. Ventidius and his troops forced 
the Parthian armies to retreat to their own territories beyond the Euphrates – a 
task which was completed in 38.15 
 
With a brief historical outline provided of the Parthian invasion and Roman 
counter-attack, the question ought to be asked why the Parthians decided on an 
invasion of Syria and Asia Minor, and why in 41/40. At first glance, the moment at 
which their assault began seems to be peculiar. In the course of 42, Brutus and 
Cassius had gathered almost all their forces for the clash with Antony and 
Octavian, leaving only one legion behind in Syria.16 With the Near East and Asia 
Minor almost entirely destitute of Roman forces at that time, the Parthians had a 
marvellous opportunity to make an incursion into the Levant and Anatolia. 17 
Further examination reveals, however, that the situation under which the Parthian 
king eventually initiated the attack in 41/40 was not necessarily less advantageous 
than in 42. Certainly, in the aftermath of Philippi Antony had come into 
possession of eight legions (two of which lent to him by Octavian) and 10,000 
horsemen, but it remains opaque where exactly in the eastern Mediterranean these 
forces were stationed.18 Whether Antony had located more troops in Syria in 41 
                                                          
12 Appian, BCiv. 5.65; Dio, 48.39.2; Plutarch, Ant. 33.1. On the title of Ventidius, see Broughton 
(1952) 388. 
13 Dio, 48.39-40; Plutarch, Ant. 33.4; Florus, 2.19.5; Gellius, NA 15.4.3-4; Livy, Per. 127. 
14 Dio, 49.20.1-4; Justin, Epit. 42.4.7-10; Tacitus, Hist. 5.9; Florus, 2.19.6; Velleius, 2.78.1. For more 
details on the battle near Gindarus, see among others Debevoise (1938) 117-118; Günther (1922) 47-
48; Sherwin-White (1984) 304-305; Reinhold (1988) 48-50. 
15 Dio, 48.39-40, 49.20; Velleius, 2.78.1; Plutarch, Ant. 34.1-2; Strabo, 16.2.8. 
16 Appian, BCiv. 4.63. 
17 For this reason, both Günther (1922) 41 and Sherwin-White (1984) 302 maintain that Orodes 
failed to take his best chance of success. 
18 Appian, BCiv. 5.3; Dio, 48.2.3. 
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than Cassius had done prior to his move to Greece in 42 is therefore doubtful. 
Moreover, Appian explains that when Antony went to Egypt towards the end of 
41, he had discharged the troops for the winter. It is very well possible that those 
forces had not yet been entirely mobilised at the moment of the Parthian incursion 
into Syria.19 In addition, some of Antony’s soldiers are said to have been engaged 
in a mutiny.20 The circumstances for an attack in 41/40 seem thus to have been very 
encouraging, not necessarily less so than in 42.  
Favourable as the state of affairs in all likelihood was, it remains uncertain 
to what extent any of those aforementioned conditions played a role in the 
decision of the Parthian ruler to attack in the winter of 41/40 or the following 
spring. Although Dio has us believe that information of the alleged rebellion 
provided by Labienus to the Parthians formed one of the arguments by which 
Orodes was convinced to begin his invasion while Antony still resided in Egypt 
and Octavian was engaged in Italy,21 other considerations may have been taken 
into account as well.22 Appian informs us, for example, that a raid undertaken by 
Antony in 41 on the city of Palmyra, which was allegedly located on the boundary 
                                                          
19 Appian, BCiv. 5.10. 
20 Dio, 48.24.7. Cf. Florus 2.19.3, who is less detailed, but makes mention of discords (discordiae) 
among the Romans prior to the invasion. He implies that these conflicts provided the Parthians 
with a suitable opportunity to launch an attack. 
21 Dio, 48.24.6-48.25.1.  
22 Cf. Debevoise (1938) 104, whose view according to which “a transference of activity to the 
eastern part of the empire” may have prevented the Parthians from embarking on a grand-scale 
invasion into Syria earlier in the 40s BC, is entirely groundless. The author has based his opinion 
on the presumed halt in the production of tetradrachms at the mint of Seleucia on the Tigris 
between 52 and 40/39. The alleged interruption, however, does not necessarily indicate a greater 
military activity in the eastern part of the Parthian kingdom. A more convincing explanation for 
the absence of tetradrachms for those years has been brought forward by McDowell (1935) 184, 
221-222, who in his study to the coinage issued at Seleucia on the Tigris has pointed to the 
existence of so-called ‘autonomous’ coins dated to the years between 42/41 and 39/38. On the 
ground of these coins, he has argued that at least during the late 40s and early 30s BC, Seleucia on 
the Tigris seems to have been under the authority of a local political faction and no longer under 
the control of Orodes. Possibly, the king lost his power over Seleucia on the Tigris already several 
years before the first known ‘autonomous’ coin at this city was struck. The absence of the 
tetradrachms can thus be explained better with relation to developments in the political 
circumstances at Seleucia on the Tigris than with military activities in the eastern end of the 
Parthian kingdom. On Orodes’ coinage, see Wroth (1964) 68-96; Sellwood (1971) 118-142. 
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of Rome’s and Parthia’s spheres of influence, may have triggered the offensive.23 
Futile a reason as the triumvir’s assault on this city at first sight appears to be for 
beginning Parthia’s invasion into Roman territory, it should definitely not be ruled 
out as an important prompt for the incursion. Appian explains that Palmyra was 
located in the border region between Rome’s and Parthia’s domains. The attack on 
this city will thus in all likelihood not have met with much approval on the 
Parthian side. On the contrary, Orodes probably regarded Rome’s intervention as 
a serious act of aggression against a city over which he might have claimed to 
exert control. The assault on Palmyra may thus very well in combination with the 
supposed mutiny among the Roman troops left behind in the eastern 
Mediterranean for the winter of 41/40 have induced the Parthian king to launch 
his invasion. What is more, preparations for a Roman campaign against Parthia 
are said already to have been in progress by 41.24 The prevention of such an attack, 
accordingly, can have served as an important prompt for the battle in 41/40 as 
well.25 
To explain the military offensive against Rome entirely as an act of 
retaliation and as a pre-emptive measure, however, would go too far. Other 
factors must have been in play as well when the decision was made to initiate a 
large-scale incursion. Unfortunately, it proves to be difficult to identify those 
driving forces with certainty. Not only is the lack of indications provided by our 
ancient authors to be blamed for that, but also our ignorance with regard to the 
military aims of the expedition. It so happens that on the basis of the extant source 
material, it cannot be said for how long the Parthians were planning to retain 
control over their territorial gains in the Near East and Asia Minor, nor whether 
Labienus and Pacorus would have continued their military advancement, had the 
Roman commander Ventidius not initiated a counter-attack. Despite those 
                                                          
23 Appian, BCiv. 5.9-10. For further discussion and references on Antony’s raid on Palmyra, see 
chapter 5.1 (with references). 
24 Plutarch, Ant. 25.1. 
25 The same suggestion has been made by Schlude (2012) 23. 
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uncertainties, though, Wolski has argued with apparent confidence that the 
Parthians aimed at the conquest of Syria, Asia Minor, Palestine and possibly also 
Egypt.26 The argument that he uses to substantiate his view is – not surprisingly – 
unconvincing.27 Wolski brings up a passage in Tacitus’ Annals that makes mention 
of king Artabanus (I)/II (c. AD 11-37) referring in the context of his claim on the 
treasure left by the former Parthian king Vonones in Syria and Cilicia to “the old 
boundaries of the Persians and Macedonians, and to his intention of seizing what 
was held first by Cyrus and afterwards by Alexander”.28 Although it is not to be 
denied that the latter two rulers exerted control over Asia Minor during their 
respective reigns (and Alexander even over Egypt), the supposed objective of 
Artabanus to extend his realm with the lands that once belonged to those two 
kings does not prove that Orodes fostered the same intention more than half a 
century earlier. The only region west of the Euphrates on which the king is 
attested to have set his eye was Syria. As we saw above, Orodes tried already in 48 
to get hold of it by stipulating its abandonment by Pompey as condition for 
military assistance in the civil war against Caesar.29 Although this attempt failed, it 
is very likely that the Parthian king still cherished the hope to add Syria to his 
realm in the year 40. The annexation of the northern part of the Levant would give 
the Parthians not only control over the entire trade route from the Far East to the 
                                                          
26 Wolski (1976a) 204-205; Wolski (1993) 136; Debevoise (1938) 108-119; Sullivan (1990) 311-312. The 
author claims that Crassus’ campaign of 53 most likely contributed to the desire of Orodes and his 
successors to incorporate all those territories into their realm. He also argues that the Parthian 
rulers justified this imperialistic policy by harking back to the Achaemenid dynasty and by 
presenting themselves as successors of this great line of kings. Wolski (1966) 73-74; Wolski (1976a) 
202-206; Wolski (1976b) 399-402; Wolski (1982-1984) 166; Wolski (1993) 97-121 all argue that the 
adoption of this Achaemenid programme by the Arsacids was not a sudden event, but a process 
that seems to have begun at the end of the second century BC. Cf. Neusner (1963) 47; Frye (1984) 
228; Shayegan (2011) Ch.3, who are more sceptical about the adoption of an Achaemenid 
programme. See also Shayegan (2011) passim for references to the debate whether the Sasanian or 
Arsacid rulers were the first to represent themselves as descendants of the Achaemenids.  
27 Cf. Dabrowa (1986) 121, who claims that the Parthians had the intention to conquer the Roman 
territories in Anatolia and in Syria, but unlike Wolski fails to provide any evidence for his view. 
28 Tacitus, Ann. 6.31.1: “veteres Persarum ac Macedonum terminos, seque invasurum possessa Cyro et post 
Alexandro… iacebat” (LCL transl. adapted). 
29 See chapter 2.1. 
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Mediterranean Sea,30 it would also leave the Parthians less vulnerable against 
Roman attacks launched from Syria.31 For these purposes, the incorporation of the 
Anatolian coastal regions would not have been necessary. It is thus very unlikely 
that the Parthians actually aimed for the annexation of Asia Minor, the entire 
Levant and Egypt. Other considerations will probably have governed the decision 
to march along the south littoral of Asia Minor as far as the Ionian coast. Possibly 
the sweeping advancement was nothing more than a mere demonstration of 
power to the Romans to warn them for repercussions if they ever again dared to 
launch an attack on Parthia. Yet, whatever had prompted the march into Anatolia, 
it is clear that the Romans were the more successful party in the end, and 
managed to inflict devastating defeats upon the Parthians.  
 
8.2 Antony’s Parthian campaign 
 
Decisive as Rome’s victory over the Parthian troops at Gindarus was, the 
expulsion of the enemy from Syria did not prove to be the beginning of a long-
term concord between the two superpowers. Less than two years after the crucial 
battle, Antony gathered his forces and launched a full-sized military expedition 
against Parthia. How the relations between the two former enemies developed in 
the intermediate period is unfortunately obscure. The historian Florus (living in 
the second century AD) has claimed that following the end of the Parthian 
invasion in 38 “friendship was renewed [between Rome and Parthia, ed.] on the 
basis of mutual respect, and a treaty actually concluded with the king by Antony 
himself”.32 Resolute as Florus is about the realisation of this compact, though, it is 
                                                          
30 Wolski (1976a) 202-203 and Wolski (1976b) 396-402 explain that the Arsacid rulers after the 
conquest of Mesopotamia in the second century BC began to have a desire to annex Syria because 
of its importance  for the trade with Asia. 
31 This argument for the alleged Parthian intention to annex Syria has been mentioned by Schlude 
(2012) 13, 15, 22-23 as well. 
32 Florus, 2.20.1: “pari rursus reverentia integrata amicitia, et quidem ab ipso foedus Antonio cum rege 
percussum”. 
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difficult – if not impossible – to lend credence to his report. The hostilities between 
Rome and Parthia had only just terminated, and Antony was already in the 
process of making arrangements for a military offensive against Parthia. 33 
Furthermore, would the renewal of friendship and the conclusion of a treaty not 
have found their way to other sources, in the same way as previous agreements 
with Parthia, negotiated by Sulla, Lucullus and Pompey respectively have been 
mentioned in a range of historical accounts? 34  Florus’ version of the relations 
between Rome and Parthia in the aftermath of the Parthian invasion can thus 
fairly safely be rejected. If this conclusion is accurate, the question needs to be 
asked how the idea of Antony renewing friendship and concluding a treaty with 
the Parthian king has crept into Florus’ work. Although an unambiguous answer 
cannot be provided, one of our ancient sources provides us with some useful 
indications. Dio explains that in 38, Antony made a treaty (συνθήκη) with the 
Commagenian king Antiochus, in order to stop the hostilities that had erupted 
between them after the Battle of Gindarus.35 This agreement was reached while 
Parthian fugitives from the war against Rome enjoyed asylum in the 
Commagenian capital Samosata.36 Although the treaty does, as far as we know at 
least, not address the issue of the Parthian escapees, it is possible that the source to 
which Florus’ Epitome of Roman History goes back misinterpreted the situation that 
unfolded in the Levant after Parthia’s defeat in 38, and thought that Antony made 
an agreement with the Parthian king concerning these fugitives rather than with 
the ruler from Commagene.37 
                                                          
33 Plutarch, Ant. 25.1 has us believe that Antony was already getting ready for this enterprise in 41 
when he travelled through Asia Minor and the Near East. 
34 On the diplomatic contacts between Sulla, Lucullus and Pompey on the one hand and the 
Parthians on the other hand, see Keaveney (1981). 
35 Dio, 49.22.1. On the treaty that Antony made with Antiochus, see chapter 16.2. 
36 Dio, 49.20.3. 
37 For the realisation of the Epitome of Roman History, Florus depended heavily on Livy’s work. 
Although it remains unclear on what source Florus drew for his account of the friendship and the 
treaty concluded with the Parthian king (2.20.1), provided that this passage is inaccurate, it is 
highly unlikely that he relied in this particular context on Livy, who lived contemporaneous to the 
events. On the sources of Florus’ Epitome of Roman History, see Bessone (1996) 197-221. 
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Yet, whatever source formed the basis of the view according to which 
friendship and a treaty were concluded with Parthia, the relations upheld by 
Rome and Parthia towards one another remained hostile (as we have seen above). 
Even the emergence of Phraates IV, one of Orodes’ sons, as new ruler in the 
aftermath of the invasion in 38 failed to change the relations in a positive way. At 
some point in the spring of 36, Antony set out from Syria and launched his 
military campaign.38 Unlike Crassus in 53, he did not take the direct route to 
Parthia by moving eastwards across the Euphrates at Zeugma into Mesopotamia.39 
Instead, he decided to approach Parthia from the north by way of Armenia and 
Media Atropatene, since the mountainous lands in these kingdoms would provide 
his legions with protection against the Parthian cavalry. 40  For this reason, he 
initially moved to Zeugma assuming that via the bridge over the Euphrates into 
Osrhoene and thence north westwards across the Tigris he would be able to reach 
Armenia using the shortest route. 41  On arrival at Zeugma, though, Antony 
discovered that the crossing was strongly defended by the Parthians. Forced by 
these circumstances to use a detour via Melitene, he eventually arrived in Armenia 
at some point late in the spring of 36, and assembled all the legions and auxiliary 
                                                          
38 See map 2 and 5 for clarification. 
39 Plutarch, Crass. 19.3; Florus, 1.46.3-4; Dio, 40.17.3; Cicero, Div. 2.22; Velleius, 2.46.4; Livy, Per. 106; 
Orosius, 6.13.2. On Crassus’ Parthian campaign of 54-53, see among others Günther (1922) 14-38; 
Debevoise (1938) 78-93; Marshall (1976) 139-161; Keaveney (1982) 417-426; Sherwin-White (1984) 
279-290; Wolski (1993) 128-134; Lerouge (2007) 67-75. 
40 The protection afforded by the mountain chains of Armenia and Media Atropatene formed one 
of the arguments by which the Armenian king Artavasdes II is said to have tried in vain to 
persuade Crassus in 53 to approach Parthia from the north rather than through the plains of 
Mesopotamia (Plutarch, Crass. 19.2-3). Although our literary sources do not explicitly state that 
these considerations played a role behind the decision of Antony to take the way via Armenia and 
Atropatene, Dio (49.25.1) does inform us that it was Artavasdes who had suggested to Antony to 
take this route. In order to convince Antony, it is not unthinkable that the Armenian king used the 
same arguments as he had used earlier in his (failed) attempt to persuade Crassus. 
41 The shortest route from Syria to Armenia has been worked out by Sherwin-White (1984) 309-311, 
who has also convincingly demonstrated the fallibility of the version of events described by Dio, 
49.25.1 according to which Antony only decided to proceed via Armenia into Media Atropatene 
after he had checked the suitability of crossing the Euphrates at Zeugma. See also Kromayer (1896) 
101 with convincing arguments to refute Dio’s version. Cf. Bengtson (1974) 22 and Dabrowa (2006) 
346-347, who still deem it possible for Dio’s report to be accurate.  
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forces for the expedition.42 Plutarch informs us that Antony had 60,000 legionaries, 
10,000 Iberian and Celtic horsemen as well as 30,000 auxiliary forces at his 
disposal. The Armenian king Artavasdes is said to have supplied him with 6,000 
equestrians and 7,000 infantry soldiers.43 Having gathered all these forces, Antony 
marched to the southeast across the River Araxes into Media Atropatene. The 
ruler of this kingdom, Artavasdes, had vacated his realm to render aid to his ally, 
the Parthian king Phraates, who apparently was still in Mesopotamia expecting a 
Roman advance from the west.44 Antony saw his chances and moved further 
southwards to the fortified city of Phraaspa, which at that point accommodated 
the wives and children of the Atropatenean king.45 Yet, in order to speed up his 
advance Antony left behind the siege machinery and some of the supplies along 
                                                          
42 Dio, 49.25.1; Strabo, 11.13.4; Cf. Plutarch, Ant. 37.2-3 who erroneously claims that after Antony 
had sent Cleopatra to Egypt, “he proceeded through Arabia and Armenia to the place where his 
forces were assembled, together with those of the allied kings” (“ἐχώρει δι' Ἀραβίας καὶ 
Ἀρμενίας, ὅπου συνελθούσης αὐτῷ τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τῶν συμμάχων βασιλέων”). Pelling 
(1988) 222 has already correctly pointed out that Antony was in Syria in the winter of 37/36. 
Plutarch’s statement according to which Antony marched through Arabia can thus safely be 
rejected. The exact location of the collection of the troops in Armenia is disputed: Carana (Erzerum) 
in western Armenia and Artaxata in the eastern part of the kingdom have both been mentioned. 
For a brief overview of the arguments in favour of each place, see Kromayer (1896) 82 and 
Sherwin-White (1984) 311.  
43 Plutarch, Ant. 37.3. The number of legions that Antony had at his disposal for the expedition is 
unclear. Velleius, 2.82.1 opts for thirteen legions. The author of De viris illustribus, 85.4 believes that 
Antony used fifteen legions for his expedition. Justin, Epit. 42.5.3 and Florus 2.10.1 both claim 
sixteen. Livy, Per. 130 says that Antony had eighteen legions and 16,000 horsemen. Strabo, 11.14.9 
and Plutarch, Ant. 37.3 both stated that Artavasdes of Armenia provided Antony with 6,000 
horsemen. Cf. Plutarch, Ant. 50.2 who says that the Armenian king had supported Antony with 
16,000 horsemen. 
44 Although Dio, 25.2 does not inform us where the Atropatenean king was when Antony invaded 
his kingdom, it is not unlikely that he was in Mesopotamia near the Euphrates. Dio, 49.25.1 implies 
that the Parthian troops had assembled on the left bank of the Euphrates in anticipation of the 
Roman attack.  
45 Plutarch, Ant. 38.2 (Φραάτα); Dio, 49.25.3 (Πραάσπα). Cf. Strabo, 11.13.3 who mentions the siege 
of a fortress by Antony called Vera (Οὔερα) – a place that has been identified with Phraaspa. On 
this identification and its potential problems, see among others Minorsky (1944) 258-262; Scuderi 
(1984) 83; Sherwin-White (1984) 314 n.42; Syme (1995) 82-83. The exact location of Phraaspa is 
unknown. Most scholars have placed this fortified place at Takht-i-Sulaiman: Kromayer (1896) 78; 
Debevoise (1938) 125-126; Scuderi (1984) 83; Syme (1995) 81. Cf. Sherwin-White (1984) 313-314 who 
rejects the identification of Phraaspa with Takht-i-Sulaiman, because of its “small size”, and thinks 
that the location of the city that Antony besieged needs to be sought in Myanduab or Saqqiz. 
Bengtson (1974) 24-30 believes that Phraaspa is to be identified with Maraga.  
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with two legions under the command of Oppius Statianus.46 This choice proved to 
be fatal for a successful outcome of the campaign. Without proper siege 
equipment and sufficient provisions, Antony was at a disadvantage in his attempt 
to capture the city. What is more, the Parthian and Atropatenean enemy routed 
Statianus along with the two legions under his wings, and Antony saw his prime 
ally, the Armenian king, withdrawing to his kingdom in the heat of the battle.47 All 
these reverses prompted the triumvir to abort the siege of Phraaspa and to return 
to Armenia without having set foot into Parthia.48 Suffering additional losses on 
the way back, Antony is said to have drawn up the balances as soon as he had left 
enemy territory. According to Plutarch, the campaign had ended the lives of 
20,000 infantry soldiers and 4,000 horsemen. 49  Specific as the biographer is, 
though, the exact amount of troops that had perished cannot be established with 
certainty because of disagreement between the various ancient accounts.50  
Obscure as the exact impact of the expedition on Antony’s army thus was, it 
cannot be denied that adverse circumstances had forced the triumvir to end his 
campaign prematurely before having set foot into Parthia. The Roman advance 
halted at Phraaspa, and Plutarch and Dio, who provide us with the two main 
narratives for the siege of this city, discuss in detail how the alleged strategic 
failures made by Antony and the withdrawal of Armenia’s auxiliary forces 
contributed to the disaster that befell the Romans.51 With Antony’s plans thwarted 
before Parthia could be reached, the question immediately comes up, what the 
ultimate military objective of the expedition was. Scholars have come up with a 
                                                          
46 Plutarch, Ant. 38.2; Dio, 49.25.2-3. 
47 Plutarch, Ant. 38.2-39.1; Dio, 49.25.3-49.26.1.  
48 Plutarch, Ant. 39.1-51.2 and Dio, 49.26.1-49.31.4 provide us with a narrative of the war after the 
siege of Phraaspa.  
49 Plutarch, Ant. 50.1. 
50 Velleius, 2.82.2-3 believes that a quarter of the soldiers had succumbed; Florus, 2.20.10 reports 
that hardly a third of sixteen legions had returned from the expedition. Cf. Livy, Per. 130, who 
speaks of the loss of two legions. Possibly, Livy or his epitomiser only had the two legions in mind 
that went down with their general, Oppius Statianus. It has already been made clear, however, that 
Antony also suffered losses when he made his retreat. 
51 Plutarch, Ant. 37.4-38.3, 50.2; Dio, 49.25.2-26.1, 49.31.2. 
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variety of potential options ranging from the complete subjugation of the 
Parthians, to the mere conquest of Mesopotamia, and the capture of Ecbatana, one 
of the capitals of the Parthian kingdom.52 On the basis of our source material, 
however, none of the military aims of the campaign can be identified with 
certainty.  
The picture is not much more promising with regard to the political 
objectives of the enterprise. Certainly, Antony will have been yearning for military 
or political success to bolster his prestige, especially with Ventidius having earned 
a triumph for his accomplishments against the Parthian invaders two years 
earlier.53 Likewise, it cannot be denied, as some of our ancient authors claim, that 
Antony had aspirations to avenge the Parthian invasion of Syria and Asia Minor, 
or even the disaster that befell the Romans in 53 at Carrhae.54 The alleged attempt 
of Antony to seek the restoration of the military standards lost during Crassus’ 
campaign, and of the soldiers taken captive on that occasion needs to be 
understood in that light. 55  It goes too far, though, to regard the campaign 
                                                          
52 Complete subjugation of the Parthians: Kromayer (1896) 90. Mesopotamia: Sherwin-White (1984) 
308; Ecbatana: Bengtson (1974) 21; Reinhold (1988) 56. For none of these suggestions support can be 
found in our extant sources. 
53 Dabrowa (2006) 345, 348 claims that the entire expedition was undertaken by Antony merely for 
propaganda purposes, not with the aim to establish a new political order. 
54 Justin, Epit. 42.5.3; Appian, BCiv. 5.65. Cf. Plut. Ant, 34.2 and Dio, 49.21.2, who claim that 
Ventidius had already avenged the loss of Crassus with his successes in 39 and 38. Obviously, this 
does not mean that Antony regarded it to be his own task as well to take vengeance on the 
Parthians for the defeat that they had inflicted on Crassus. On the role that the desire to take 
revenge of the Parthians played in Antony’s decision to begin a campaign, see Timpe (1962) 119-
126.  
55 On the eve of the expedition, Antony is said by Plutarch, Ant. 37.2 and Dio, 49.24.5 to have 
offered peace, on the condition that the Parthians abandon the standards and release the detained 
servicemen. Both authors, however, cast doubt on the sincerity of this offer, and see the proposed 
deal as part of a strategy to deceive the Parthian king – a view that has found support with 
Günther (1922) 52. Although I agree with Plutarch and Dio that the offer of peace was not meant to 
bring about a peace deal, it goes too far to regard the proposed deal as a means to hold off Parthian 
preparations for war. The enormous preparations for the campaign can hardly have remained 
hidden for Phraates, especially since one of the ambassadors bringing Antony’s plan to the 
Parthian court was a Parthian noble. Moreover, even if Antony’s proposal was sincere – as 
Buchheim (1960) 78; Timpe (1962) 122; Ziegler (1964) 35 hold as a possibility – then Phraates would 
probably never have endorsed it. Bengtson (1974) 21; Pelling (1988) 222; Freyburger / Roddaz 
(1994) cxxxviii and Dabrowa (2006) 345 have already pointed out that the return of the standards 
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primarily as a punitive expedition for the damage inflicted on the Romans in 53 
and during the two-year invasion that had only just come to a halt. Equally 
lopsided is the view accepted by Freyburger / Roddaz and Dabrowa according to 
which Antony undertook the campaign mainly to strengthen his own reputation.56 
For if Antony’s central objective was personal gain, would the enterprise not have 
focused on a fast subjugation of Parthia and the seizure of Parthian cities rather 
than on a protracted siege of a city in Media Atropatene? It has already been 
pointed out that the capture of Phraaspa was not a prerequisite from a strategic 
point of view for a successful campaign against Parthia. Leaving behind a hostile 
fortress would not necessarily have led to a catastrophe, 57  as the successful 
conquest of Pontus by Lucullus in 71 has shown. Lucullus’ decision to abstain 
from an attack on three hostile Pontic cities in that year did not have an adverse 
outcome on the war.58 Antony’s persistent effort to take hold of Phraaspa thus 
illustrates that the campaign of 36 cannot have constituted a sheer quest for 
personal glory. Other considerations must have been in play as well. Although the 
lack of evidence makes it impossible to identify exactly what had prompted the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
and the release of the Roman captives would mean that Phraates lost face with Parthia’s ruling 
elite, and to see his fragile position further weakened. That the Parthian king was ever to give his 
consent to the proposal is thus highly unlikely. Antony must have been aware of this (as much as 
Augustus in the late 20s BC, by the way, who successfully managed to persuade Phraates to 
exchange the standards for his son, who had been abducted by Tiridates II, a rival to the Parthian 
throne, and granted to Augustus, on which see Dio, 53.33.1-2, 54.8.1; Suetonius, Aug. 21.3. Cf. the 
official version in RGDA 29.2). The offer of peace prior to the outbreak of the war was accordingly 
in all likelihood not meant to be sincere. Yet, if this is the case, why then did Antony make such a 
proposal? Wallmann (1989) 262 has convincingly argued that the official proposal of peace was 
made for propaganda purposes, to represent the decision to go to war in Rome as a justified one. 
Obviously, this does not mean that Antony did not desire the restoration of the standards and the 
liberation of the captive soldiers. On the contrary, Plutarch, Ant. 40.4 has us believe that at some 
point during the campaign, Antony made another proposal of peace stipulating the same 
conditions as before (cf. Dio, 49.27.3-5, who does not mention these prerequisites). The return of the 
standards and servicemen thus seems to have been an aim that Antony sought to achieve. It was in 
all likelihood not, though, the main motive for the campaign against Parthia. 
56 Freyburger / Roddaz (1994) cxxxix; Dabrowa (2006) 345, 348. 
57 Sherwin-White (1984) 315. 
58 The three Pontic cities in question are Amisus, Heraclea and Sinope. For more details and 
references on Lucullus’ choice to leave these three Pontic cities behind in 71, and to annex them in 
the following year only, see Sherwin-White (1984) 172-173, 315. 
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campaign and what political aims Antony sought to accomplish, it seems most 
likely that the enterprise was dictated by fear of another Parthian attack on Rome’s 
possessions in Asia Minor and the Near East. The incursions into Syria in the late 
50s and the large-scale invasions of Syria and extensive part of Anatolia in the 
early 30s BC had already exposed the vulnerability of those possessions to 
Parthian aggression. It is not unthinkable that the campaign of 36 was designed to 
address that issue by rendering Parthia innocuous to Roman territory in the 
eastern Mediterranean. In what way Antony envisioned achieving that supposed 
aim is not entirely clear. Possibly, he anticipated advancing on Parthia’s key cities, 
and to force the king to make an act of surrender. Such a deed would enable him 
to reinstall Phraates as a king dependent on Rome in the same way as Pompey had 
done with the subjugated Armenian ruler Tigranes II in 66. Yet, it is also 
conceivable that the triumvir aimed for regime change. In order to understand 
that possibility, it is imperative to have a brief look at some of the events that 
unfolded after Phraates had assumed control at the end of 38. This new king 
initiated a campaign of terror soon after his accession by assassinating his father, 
his brothers and a large number of the leading Parthians. The enormous 
bloodshed induced several members of the elite to flee the kingdom and seek 
refuge with the Romans.59 One of them was a certain Monaeses, who made a 
promise to Antony “to lead his army and bring most of Parthia over to him 
without trouble”.60 Delighted as Antony may have been according to Dio about 
this offer, Monaeses never rendered any support to Antony. Shortly after his 
escape from Parthia, Phraates managed to persuade him to return to his 
kingdom.61 The king seems to have been alarmed by the territorial guarantees 
given to Monaeses by Antony.62 The expatriate was reportedly not only granted 
                                                          
59 Justin, Epit. 42.4.10-42.5.2; Plutarch, Ant. 37.1; Dio, 49.23.3-5. 
60 Dio, 49.24.2: “τῆς... στρατείας ἡγήσεσθαι καὶ τὰ πλείω τῆς Παρθίας ἀκονιτὶ προσποιήσειν...”. 
Cf. Plutarch, Ant. 38, who does not mention this proposal made by Monaeses. 
61 Plutarch, Ant. 38.2; Dio, 49.24.3-5. 
62 Dio, 49.24.3. 
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three Levantine cities, but also the Parthian kingdom (which obviously was still to 
be conquered).63 The plausibility of the suggestion according to which the rule 
over Parthia had been offered to Monaeses is understandable in the light of what 
has been said above.64 Monaeses was a member of Parthia’s nobility, and it is 
conceivable that Antony considered him to be a suitable future ruler for Parthia, 
less likely prone to take up the weapons against Rome. The return of Monaeses, 
however, will have thwarted these plans (if they ever existed), and have forced 
Antony to look for an alternative solution. Yet, whatever he eventually aimed to 
achieve, it seems very likely that the main objective of the campaign was to 
diminish the risk of a Parthian attack on Roman possessions in the eastern 
Mediterranean. Antony must have realised that this was an immense task that 
could not easily be fulfilled. For this reason, he appears not only to have secured 
sufficient legions and auxiliary cohorts, but also to have made attempts to deprive 
Phraates of his main ally, the Atropatenean king Artavasdes. The expedition was 
in the first instance entirely focused on Media Atropatene, and in particular on the 
assault on Phraaspa. It is very plausible that Antony hoped to bring about the 
surrender of the Atropatenean king by taking his wives and children, who resided 
in that city, as prisoners. Fortunately for Artavasdes, Antony never managed to 
seize Phraaspa. Logistic problems and reverses eventually turned the entire 
enterprise into a fiasco. 
 
Conclusion 
 
With Antony forced to acknowledge the superiority of his enemy, the era of 
recurrent military clashes between Rome and Parthia came to an end. An ensuing 
                                                          
63 The cities in question are Larissa, Arethusa and Hierapolis (Plutarch, Ant. 38.1; cf. Dio, 49.24.2, 
who does not mention these cities explicitly). For more details on the potential motives of the grant 
of these three cities, see chapter 12.1. The grant of the Parthian kingdom only appears in Dio. 
64 The probable accuracy of Dio’s words has also been acknowledged by Reinhold (1988) 59; 
Freyburger / Roddaz (1994) cxxxix-cxl. 
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ruler crisis between the incumbent king Phraates and the pretender Tiridates 
ensured that most attention within the Parthian world was devoted to that issue.65 
No political contact is known to have taken place between the two superpowers 
until sometime after the Battle of Actium, when Octavian became entangled in 
Parthia’s domestic problems, and eventually not only managed to solve them, but 
also, as Augustus, succeeded, in 20, in restoring the standards lost in 53 and in 
36.66 This means that for the period of civil war after 42 only two instances of 
interaction between Rome and Parthia can be identified. The first one concerns the 
Parthian invasion of Syria and Asia Minor. The second instance is Antony’s 
Parthian campaign. It is peculiar that further evidence for political or diplomatic 
interaction between both powers after this failed expedition in 36 is lacking. It is 
striking as well, that, contrary to its role between 44 and 42, nothing proves that 
Parthia supported a faction in the Roman state in the period after the defeat of 
Brutus and Cassius. Evidence for the presence of Parthian troops during the battle 
at Actium is for example missing, and it seems most likely that either Phraates was 
over-engaged in the dispute with the pretender Tiridates or that he had learned 
his lesson from previously betting on the wrong horse, and now just waited for the 
outcome of the clash.     
                                                          
65 For more details on the conflict between Phraates and Tiridates, see among other Debevoise 
(1938) 135-141.  
66 On Octavian’s/Augustus’ involvement in the crisis and on his solution, see among other Cooley 
(2009) 241-245. 
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9 PTOLEMAIC KINGDOM 
 
 
 
In Part II.A we saw how Cleopatra as sole Near Eastern ruler supported Dolabella 
and the triumvirs in the period from 44 and 42 despite the fact that Cassius and 
Brutus held supreme power in the eastern Mediterranean. That this stance was 
risky became clear in 42 when Cassius planned to launch a campaign against her – 
an enterprise that was only put off when Brutus summoned him. With the defeat 
of the tyrannicides at Philippi and Antony’s subsequent assumption of power over 
the eastern Mediterranean, Cleopatra had an ally in her vicinity. How the relations 
between Rome and the Ptolemaic Kingdom advanced from that moment onwards 
until Actium, will be explained in what follows.  
 
9.1 Antony and Cleopatra in Cilicia  
 
The earliest testified inter-state relations between Rome and Egypt after the battles 
at Philippi go back to the year 41 when Antony was in Asia Minor engaged in 
dealing with Brutus’ and Cassius’ former allies and with the raising of money 
from cities and communities in order to finance the settlement of veteran soldiers 
in Italy.1 At that time, he called upon Cleopatra to meet him at Tarsus in Cilicia. 
The Ptolemaic queen obeyed the order in any case. She had to give account for the 
charges made against her of having rendered assistance to Cassius in his war 
against Antony and Octavian instead of supporting the triumvirs.2 Although these 
accusations are presented by Plutarch as the reason for Antony to have arranged 
                                                          
1 Velleius, 2.74.1; Josephus, AJ 14.301-323; BJ 1.242; Suetonius, Aug. 13.3; Plutarch, Ant. 23; Appian, 
BCiv. 5.3-7; Dio, 48.1-3. Syme (1939) 206; Magie (1950) 427ff. Broughton (1952) 358, 371; Bengtson 
(1977) 155ff. Christ (1993) 439; Huzar (1978) 129-130. 
2 Plutarch, Ant. 25.1; cf. Appian, BCiv. 5.8; Huß (2001) 729-731; Sullivan (1990) 266-267; Hölbl (2001) 
240. 
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the meeting with Cleopatra, other factors may have played a role as well. Hölbl 
argues for example that the real purpose of the meeting was to “assure... the 
support of the Ptolemaic queen in the impending Parthian war”.3 This view seems 
plausible in the light of another statement made by Plutarch according to whom 
Antony was making preparations for the war against Parthia when he summoned 
the Egyptian queen to Cilicia in 41.4 Although there is no other piece of evidence 
that undermines this account,5 our extant source material indicates that the plans 
for a military campaign against Parthia can never have progressed beyond the 
preliminary stage. Appian illustrates, for example, that Antony only had six 
legions of infantry at his disposal and 10,000 cavalrymen in 41. 6  In the most 
positive estimate this number of legions could have consisted of about 30,000 
soldiers. Crassus embarked on his Parthian expedition with approximately 40 to 
44,000 troops (legions, cavalry and light-armed forces) in total, and Antony 
probably wished to gather more troops in order to prevent a repeat of the 
catastrophe that occurred at Carrhae in 53.7 Eventually he would have assembled 
approximately 70,000 Roman troops and 30,000 auxiliary forces at the start of his 
campaign in 36. It is therefore safe to conclude that if Antony was already making 
preparations to invade Parthia in 41, these plans cannot have been far advanced 
and were probably still in an early stage. Although this consideration does 
obviously not rule out that Antony intended to form an alliance with Cleopatra in 
                                                          
3 Pelling (1988) 185, 193; Sullivan (1990) 267; Hölbl (2001) 240. 
4 Plutarch, Ant. 25.1. Dio, 48.2.3. 
5 Cf. Pelling (1988) 193-194, who seems to suggest that Antony’s siege upon Palmyra in 41 (related 
in Appian, BCiv. 5.9-10) was intended to be the overture of the war against Parthia, had Antony not 
decided to spend the winter from 41 to 40 in Egypt. There is, however, no indication given by 
Appian or by any other author which proves that the siege laid upon Palmyra was supposed to be 
the beginning of a war against Parthia. As we saw, when discussing this passage in chapter 5.1, 
Appian merely informs us that the pretext for the raid was the indecisiveness of this city to choose 
the Parthian or Roman side, and the real reason the desire for booty. The text by Appian can thus 
not be used as evidence for Antony fostering to launch a pre-emptive strike on Parthia in 41 – a 
view also uttered by Hekster / Kaizer (2004) 74-75, who also deal with other problems regarding 
the passage in question. 
6 Appian, BCiv. 5.3; Dio, 48.2.3; Huzar (1978) 129-130. 
7 Marshall (1976) 143-144. 
133 
41 for a future war against Parthia, there is no evidence available which can 
confirm this. It is thus most likely that the main reason for Antony to have 
summoned Cleopatra to Cilicia was to demand clarification regarding the 
accusations made against her of having rendered assistance to Cassius in his war 
against Antony and Octavian. 
Appian’s account illuminates that Cleopatra dismissed the charges made 
against her by asserting that she had given support to Dolabella, who was 
involved in a war against Cassius in Syria, and that she intended to assist the 
triumvirs during the war against the tyrannicides with a fleet, but that a storm had 
destroyed her vessels.8 Although the author does not mention whether Antony 
was convinced by her arguments, it is evident that she was cleared. The love affair 
between the Egyptian queen and Antony, which seems to have begun at this time, 
illustrates that. 9  Following on the meeting, Cleopatra returned to Egypt and 
Antony joined her in Alexandria where he spent the winter of 41/40.10  
 
9.2 The assassination of Arsinoe  
 
Before Antony reached Egypt at the end of 41, however, other events occurred in 
the context of the relationship between Rome and the Ptolemaic Kingdom. At the 
meeting in Cilicia or perhaps slightly later, Cleopatra made Antony a few 
requests. She asked him to eliminate her sister Arsinoe, who had been endowed 
with the rule over Cyprus by Caesar in 48.11 Cleopatra also demanded the removal 
of Serapion, the Egyptian στρατηγός of the island at the time when Brutus and 
Cassius were raising funds and troops in the East in 43 and 42. Antony obeyed her 
instructions and had Arsinoe killed at the Temple of Artemis in Ephesus, and 
                                                          
8 Appian, BCiv. 5.8. 
9 Appian, BCiv. 5.8-9; Dio, 48.24.2; Plutarch, Ant. 25.1-4; Gowing (1992) 113-118. 
10 Appian, BCiv. 5.10-11; Dio, 48.24.3; Plutarch, Ant. 28.1; Sullivan (1990) 267; Broughton (1952) 371. 
11 Dio, 42.35.5; Sullivan (1990) 258; Hölbl (2001) 235. 
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Serapion in Tyre, where he had taken refuge. Both assassinations seem to have 
occurred before Antony made his way for Egypt at the end of 41.12 The motives 
underlying Cleopatra’s request for the elimination of Arsinoe have unfortunately 
escaped notice of the ancient authors. Despite this lacuna, other events which have 
been documented in our sources, may give some insight into the reasons for the 
request. It is likely that the Ptolemaic queen had a desire to eliminate Arsinoe for 
the potential threat that she posed to the throne.13 Not only did she side with 
Ptolemy XIII and his henchmen against Caesar and Cleopatra in the Alexandrian 
War of 48 and 47, she was even acclaimed queen, serving as an opponent of 
Cleopatra.14 Following on Caesar’s victory in this war, Arsinoe was taken to Rome 
where she featured in his triumph celebrated in 46. Afterwards, she was sent into 
exile to Ephesus and resided there as a suppliant in the Temple of Artemis.15 
Although Arsinoe had lost her position of power by then, Cleopatra might still 
have seen her as a potential rival, who had to be eliminated. A different 
explanation should be given for the decision to have Serapion assassinated. 
Appian explains that the στρατηγός of Cyprus sided with Cassius in the war 
against the triumvirs in 42. Cleopatra may have been enraged by the support that 
Serapion rendered to Cassius. She had herself refused to give any assistance to the 
tyrannicide when he asked for it, and she probably expected her subordinate 
στρατηγός to conform with her decision.16 Serapion’s disloyalty probably made 
Cleopatra suspicious, and for that reason she brought about his downfall.  
                                                          
12 Josephus, AJ 15.89; Ap. 2.56-58; cf. Dio, 48.24.2, who refers wrongly to Cleopatra’s brother being 
dragged from the temple of Artemis at Ephesus; cf. Appian, BCiv. 5.9, who mentions wrongly the 
temple at Miletus instead of Ephesus; dating the two eliminations in 41 is based on two consul 
nominations in Dio and on the location of the story in Appian’s work. Sullivan (1990) 267; Hölbl 
(2001) 241. 
13 Similar explanations in: Sullivan (1990) 265 and Huß (2001) 730-731. 
14 Dio, 42.39.1; Sullivan (1990) 259; Hölbl (2001) 236. 
15 Josephus, AJ 15.89; Dio, 43.19.2-3: Arsinoe was in one of Caesar’s celebrated triumphs. Cf. B.Alex. 
33, which only mentions that Arsinoe was removed from her rule; Hölbl (2001) 237. 
16 Appian, BCiv. 5.9: Serapion giving assistance to Cassius; BCiv. 4.61: Cassius asked Cleopatra for 
support; Sullivan (1990) 267; Hölbl (2001) 241; Huß (2001) 731. 
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As has already been said, Cleopatra did not arrange for the elimination of 
Arsinoe and Serapion herself; she made a request to Antony to have them 
removed. The question then arises why she delegated this task to Antony and did 
not take up the removal of her sister and former στρατηγός herself. The only 
logical reason for me can be that Cleopatra felt that she did not have the authority 
to eliminate two of her enemies who had taken refuge to Tyre and Ephesus, both 
located in Roman territory. Although it is unclear whether Antony was himself 
legally allowed to undertake these actions, she must at least have thought that he 
could, and Antony was willing to obey her requests.  Josephus, Appian and Dio all 
appear to regard Antony’s obedience to be a result of his passion for her.17 The 
reliability of this explanation should however be questioned, since all these 
authors might have been influenced by an image of Antony propagated in 
imperial times. In my opinion, more plausible factors for Antony’s conformity can 
be provided. First of all, as it was not in Antony’s interest to have internal strife in 
Egypt, he will probably have agreed with Cleopatra that Arsinoe as a potential 
rival to her throne should be removed. Secondly, Serapion assisted Cassius in the 
war against the triumvirs. For that reason Antony probably obeyed Cleopatra’s 
desire to have the ex-στρατηγός of Cyprus eliminated. The request for the 
elimination of Serapion and Arsinoe may have been made during the meeting of 
Cleopatra and Antony at Tarsos in 41, as we have already seen. Although their 
actual removal has not been recorded in the sources, we may assume that these 
acts were soon afterwards carried out.  
 
9.3 The territorial grants of 37/36 
 
In the winter of 41/40 or the following spring, Parthian armies crossed the 
Euphrates and overran Syria and extensive portions of Asia Minor as far as the 
                                                          
17 Josephus, AJ 15.88-89; Dio, 48.24.2; Appian, BCiv. 5.9.  
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Ionian west coast. The counter-attack followed in 39 and was conducted by the 
proconsul P. Ventidius Bassus. Antony did not intervene in the hostilities at all, as 
he was engaged with Octavian in a conflict against Sextus Pompeius who was 
threatening the grain supply to Italy.18 Only after the Battle of Gindarus in 38 and 
the subsequent expulsion of the Parthian armies from Syria did the triumvir 
return to the Near East and concerned himself with settling the affairs and the re-
establishment of Roman authority in the region. 19  The Commagenian king 
Antiochus who had granted asylum to Parthian soldiers in the aftermath of the 
invasion was the first ruler to toe the line. An expedition against this dynast had 
already begun on the instigation of Ventidius, and Antony succeeded to the 
command of this campaign at his arrival in the Levant. Although the exact 
outcome of the encounter is not known, it is clear that the king retained his royal 
position.20 Less fortunate, however, seems to have been Lysanias, the prince of 
Chalcis, who was accused by Cleopatra of having brought in (ἐπάγειν) the 
Parthian forces in the year 40. 21  Whether or not Antony was moved by this 
argument, he eventually did remove Lysanias from the throne, and had him 
assassinated in the mid-30s BC; his realm was subsequently awarded to 
Cleopatra.22 Bronze coinage from Chalcis that depicts the queen on the obverse 
and is dated both to year 21 of her reign (which began in 52/51) and to year 6 of 
the new era that she instituted in 37/36 (i.e. 32/31) also testifies to the Ptolemaic 
annexation of Lysanias’ former principality.23  
                                                          
18 On the conflict against Sextus Pompeius leading up the Treaty of Misenum in 39 and the 
renewed quarrel in 38, see Broughton (1952) 382-382, 386-388, 390-392 (with references). 
19 For more details on the Parthian invasion, see chapter 8.1. 
20 On the war against Antiochus of Commagene in 38, see chapter 16.2. 
21 Josephus, AJ 15.92. For more details on Lysanias’ involvement in the Parthian invasion, and on 
his exact title (which is disputed), see chapter 11.2.  
22 Josephus, AJ 15.92; BJ 1.440; Dio, 49.32.5. Cf. Porphyry, BNJ 260 F2 (17) who appears to be in error 
with his reference to Lysimachus instead of Lysanias. 
23 Seyrig (1950) 43-46; Schrapel (1996) 187-180. The establishment of a new era has been attested by 
Porphyry, BNJ 260 F2 (17). 
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The grant of the Princedom of Chalcis, however, was not an isolated 
incident. Both Dio and Josephus list Lysanias’ realm among several other domains 
in the eastern Mediterranean that were transferred to Cleopatra. This grant of 
territories to Cleopatra has received ample attention, not only among current 
historians, but also among ancient authors. Discussion centres mainly on the date 
of the grants, which can only be determined with difficulty as a result of 
contradictory indications given by our sources. Nevertheless, most scholars gloss 
over this problem with our evidence and treat the gift of these domains with 
confidence as simultaneous events to be dated sometime between the winter of 
37/36 and 34.24 It is my purpose to take a more critical approach towards the 
evidence and to present a better founded chronology of the donations. The results 
of this examination may contribute to an improved understanding of these gifts in 
the context of the civil war. Yet, before focusing on that undertaking, it is 
worthwhile first to present an outline of the lands which can be securely identified 
as grants to Cleopatra.   
Plutarch and Dio are most informative about the areas that have been 
conferred upon the Egyptian queen by Antony. Although at first review the 
donations mentioned by these two authors seem to be almost entirely divergent, a 
closer scrutiny of the details clarifies that most of the territories mentioned by Dio 
and Plutarch overlap; the deviations in naming are to a large degree merely 
manifestations of the different periods in which both authors wrote their works, 
and of the level of detail that they could or wished to provide. A full quotation of 
the relevant passages in Plutarch’s biography of Antony and Dio’s Roman History 
shows this. Having described how after the Treaty of Tarentum in 37 (which 
arranged for the renewal of the Triumvirate for a period of five years) Antony 
returned to Asia, Plutarch relates the following:25 
                                                          
24 Syme (1939) 260-261; Sullivan (1990) 270-271; Hölbl (2001) 242. 
25 Plutarch, Ant. 36.1-2: “Εὕδουσα δ' ἡ δεινὴ συμφορὰ χρόνον πολύν, ὁ Κλεοπάτρας ἔρως, δοκῶν 
κατευνάσθαι καὶ κατακεκηκλῆσθαι τοῖς βελτίοσι λογισμοῖς, αὖθις ἀνέλαμπε καὶ ἀνεθάρρει 
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“But the dire evil which had been slumbering for a long time, namely, his [Antony’s, 
ed.] passion for Cleopatra, which men thought had been charmed away and lulled to 
a rest by better considerations, blazed up again with renewed power as he drew near 
to Syria. And finally, like the stubborn and unmanageable beast of the soul, of which 
Plato speaks, he spurned away all saving and noble counsels and sent Fonteius Capito 
to bring Cleopatra to Syria. And when she had come, he made her a present of no 
slight or insignificant addition to her dominions, namely, Phoenicia, Coele Syria, 
Cyprus, and a large part of Cilicia; and still further, the balsam-producing part of 
Judaea, and all that part of Arabia Nabataea that slopes toward the outer sea. These 
gifts particularly annoyed the Romans”. 
 
Dio places his account of those territorial awards immediately following the 
mention of Antony acknowledging his paternity over Cleopatra’s children 
Alexander Helios, Cleopatra Selene and Ptolemy Philadephus.26 About the gifts, 
Dio relates the following: 27  
 
“he [Antony, ed.] gave them [Cleopatra and her children, ed.] extensive portions of 
Arabia, in the districts both of Malichus and of the Ituraeans (for he executed 
Lysanias, whom he himself had made king over them, on the charge that he had 
favoured Pacorus), and also extensive portions of Phoenicia and Palestine, parts of 
Crete, and Cyrene and Cyprus as well”. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Συρίᾳ πλησιάζοντος αὐτοῦ. καὶ τέλος, ὥσπερ φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων τὸ δυσπειθὲς καὶ ἀκόλαστον 
τῆς ψυχῆς ὑποζύγιον, ἀπολακτίσας τὰ καλὰ καὶ σωτήρια πάντα Καπίτωνα Φοντήιον ἔπεμψεν 
ἄξοντα Κλεοπάτραν εἰς Συρίαν. ἐλθούσῃ δὲ χαρίζεται καὶ προστίθησι μικρὸν οὐδὲν οὐδ' 
ὀλίγον, ἀλλὰ Φοινίκην, κοίλην Συρίαν, Κύπρον, Κιλικίας πολλήν· ἔτι δὲ τῆς τε Ἰουδαίων τὴν τὸ 
βάλσαμον φέρουσαν καὶ τῆς Ναβαταίων Ἀραβίας ὅση πρὸς τὴν ἐκτὸς ἀποκλίνει θάλασσαν. 
αὗται μάλιστα Ῥωμαίους ἠνίασαν αἱ δωρεαί” (LCL transl. adapted). 
26 Dio, 49.32.4. Cf. Plutarch, Ant. 36.3, who only refers to Antony’s recognition of Alexander Helios 
and Cleopatra Selene as his children, but does not mention Ptolemy Philadelphus.  
27  Dio, 49.32.5: “πολλὰ μὲν τῆς Ἀραβίας τῆς τε Μάλχου καὶ τῆς τῶν Ἰτυραίων (τὸν γὰρ 
Λυσανίαν, ὃν αὐτὸς βασιλέα σφῶν ἐπεποιήκει, ἀπέκτεινεν ὡς τὰ τοῦ Πακόρου πράξαντα) 
πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῆς Φοινίκης τῆς τε Παλαιστίνης, Κρήτης τέ τινα καὶ Κυρήνην τήν τε Κύπρον 
αὐτοῖς ἐχαρίσατο”. 
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If we disregard Dio’s inclusion of Cleopatra’s children in the territorial 
rearrangements for the moment, then agreement between these two authors is 
ascertained for the island of Cyprus, Phoenicia and for parts of Nabataea and 
Judaea.28 Plutarch is the most specific one of the two, and elucidates that the 
portion of Nabataea granted to Cleopatra consisted of the land “that slopes 
towards the outer sea”. As Bowersock has plausibly argued, Plutarch probably 
used the term “outer sea” (τὴν ἐκτὸς θάλασσαν) to refer to the Gulf of Aqaba and 
the Red Sea, since the Mediterranean Sea was known as the “inner sea” and the 
Dead Sea can hardly have been perceived as an “outer sea” because of its 
landlocked nature. Cleopatra was thus in all likelihood granted lands around the 
Gulf of Aqaba and in the northern Ḥejāz. 29  These areas were of economic 
importance for the Nabataeans with the trade route of incense from southern 
Arabia to Petra passing through this zone. Although there is no additional proof 
for the conferral of these coastal regions on the Red Sea to Cleopatra, references in 
Josephus’ Jewish Antiquities and Jewish War do at least confirm that the Ptolemaic 
queen was given parts of Nabataea.30 
Concerning the “balsam-producing parts of Judaea” granted to Cleopatra, 
Plutarch does not provide us with any further detail. Fortunately, Josephus can 
bring some light in this matter by clarifying that the balsam-producing areas in 
                                                          
28 Plutarch, Ant. 36.2; Dio, 49.32.5.  
29 Bowersock (1983) 41. Same view in Sullivan (1990) 212, but without argumentation. Hackl / Jenni 
/ Schneider (2003) 580 claim that the exact areas granted to Cleopatra cannot be determined with 
certainty, but that they were probably located on the Red Sea. Cf. Lindner (1970) 96, who believes 
that the territories granted to Cleopatra were situated east of the Dead Sea; Starcky (1966) 910 
keeps both options open. 
30 Josephus, AJ 15.92-96, BJ 1.360-362 states that Antony granted Cleopatra a portion of the lands of 
the Arabs (Ἄραβες) which she requested. Although the definition of the ethnic “Arabs” is varied in 
our ancient literary sources, in these particular passages, Josephus seems to refer to the Nabataean 
people, all the more since Plutarch clearly indicates the grant of a part of Nabataean territory to 
Cleopatra, and Dio refers to portions of Arabia (Ἀραβία) belonging to Malichus, who at that time 
was king of the Nabataeans. On the use of the terms “Arabs” and “Arabia” to indicate 
“Nabataeans” and “Nabataea”, see among others Macdonald (2009). Cf. Retsö (2003) 364-392, esp. 
371-378, who distinguishes between the Arabs and the Nabataeans, but fails to convince. Young 
(2001) 90-96 gives an overview of the trade routes through the Arabian Peninsula. Bowersock 
(1983) 41 has argued on the basis of the economic importance of the Ḥejāz and the areas around the 
Gulf of Aqaba that Antony bestowed in all likelihood this territory upon her.  
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question were located in the district around Jericho. He also informs us that the 
Ptolemaic queen did not rule this region herself. Josephus says that she gave the 
district around Jericho, as well as the portions of Arabia (i.e. Nabataea) acquired 
by her to Herod under lease for 200 talents annually. She also decided that Herod 
was to stand surety for the payment of 200 talents that the Nabataean king 
Malichus was due to pay her each year.31 
With regard to the possessions that Cleopatra acquired in Phoenicia, Dio 
and Plutarch do not offer any details. Josephus is, again, more precise in this 
respect, and informs us that Antony granted Cleopatra “the cities between the 
Eleutheros River and Egypt with the exception of Tyre and Sidon, which he knew 
to have been free from the time of their ancestors”.32 The donations of some of 
those coastal cities – to be more specific, Tripolis (located just south of Arca), 
Berytus, Ptolemais and Dora – is corroborated by local bronze coinage which 
features Cleopatra’s bust on the obverse or reverse and is dated to various years 
between 37/36 and 31 by the use of both Cleopatra’s original regnal years, and the 
new era that began in 37/36.33  
Plutarch’s and Dio’s reference to the grant of Cyprus to Cleopatra is odd. 
Ever since Caesar had installed Ptolemy XIV and his sister Arsinoe (both siblings 
of Cleopatra) as ruling couple in Cyprus in 47, the island had been in Ptolemaic 
hands.34 This situation would not change until after Actium. That Cyprus was 
given to Cleopatra in the mid-30s BC along with the aforementioned territories is 
thus an error.  
The same is to be said for the grant of portions of Cilicia given to Cleopatra. 
Mitford has convincingly shown on the basis of an inscription found at Salamis, in 
which a certain Diogenes is mentioned as στρατηγός of the joint province Cilicia 
                                                          
31 Josephus, AJ 15.96, 107, 132; BJ 1.362. 
32 Josephus, AJ 15.95: “τὰς ἐντὸς Ἐλευθέρου ποταμοῦ πόλεις ἄχρις Αἰγύπτου χωρὶς Τύρου καὶ 
Σιδῶνος, ἐκ προγόνων εἰδὼς ἐλευθέρας”. Cf. BJ 1.361, which has the same meaning, though 
worded differently. 
33 Schrapel (1996) 175-177, 184-188, 190-197. 
34 Dio, 42.35.5-6. 
141 
and Cyprus, and which can be dated to the time between September 39 and 
August 38, that at least by late summer 38 parts of Cilicia must have been in 
Ptolemaic hands. As Mitford suggests, Antony may have conferred portions of 
Cilicia already in 40 or 39 upon Cleopatra when other lands in Asia Minor were 
granted to native rulers. Plutarch does not provide us with any indication as to 
what part of Cilicia was transferred to Ptolemaic rule.  From Strabo’s Geography, 
though, it can be inferred that at least the localities of Coracesium, Arsinoe and 
Hamaxia, situated on the coast of Cilicia Tracheia, were conferred upon Cleopatra. 
Strabo does not indicate how far the donation stretched into the Cilician lands 
beyond these three towns. Mitford proposes “that a long extension to the east may 
properly be expected...”.35 
In addition to certain lands in Cilicia, Plutarch also informs us along with 
Josephus of the conferral of Coele Syria upon the Ptolemaic queen.36 We have 
already seen in an earlier chapter that the term Coele Syria has been used to 
denote a variety of territories in the Near East.37 With the absence of any other 
sources, it is not possible to determine with certainty what region was meant by 
Coele Syria in the context of the grant of lands to Cleopatra. Yet, as was noted 
earlier, when the Roman governor of Syria, Sextus Caesar, made Herod 
στρατηγός of Coele Syria and Samaria in 47, reference was probably made to the 
cities in Transjordan, known collectively as the Decapolis. Possibly, this region 
was now given to Cleopatra as well.38 The remaining two attested territories given 
to Cleopatra are mentioned by Dio and concern parts of the islands of Crete and 
Cyrene.39  
 
                                                          
35 Plutarch, Ant. 36.2; Strabo, 14.5.3, 14.5.6; Mitford (1980a) 1241-1242. 
36 Plutarch, Ant. 36.2 (quoted above); Josephus, AJ 15.79. 
37 See chapter 4.1. 
38 For similar view, see Schrapel (1996) chapter 6.3. 
39 Dio, 49.32.5. Crete and Cyrene are not located within the Near East. For more details on the exact 
parts of these two areas bestowed upon Cleopatra, see Schrapel (1996) 17-87.  
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Having given the details of the territories placed under Ptolemaic rule, it is now 
time to deal with the date of these gifts, which, as mentioned above, cannot be 
determined with certainty. Dio places the donations in the year 36.40 Plutarch 
confirms Dio’s statement by locating the gift of portions of Nabataea, Judaea, 
Cyprus, Cilicia, Coele Syria and Phoenicia among events that took place at the end 
of 37 or the beginning of 36.41 On the contrary, Josephus appears to locate the 
donation of parts of Judaea, Nabataea, Phoenicia and Coele Syria in his Jewish 
Antiquities and Jewish War among events which took place in 34 – to be more 
precise, just before Antony’s campaign against Armenia in that year.42 Although 
there is no other source available which can reject this later date, the earlier date is 
to be preferred, firstly because it can explain the use of Cleopatra’s new era that 
began in September 37, and secondly because in 34 other territorial grants were 
made that involved mainly Cleopatra’s children, but which are ignored by 
Josephus.43 Exceptions are, as we already pointed out, Cyprus and parts of Cilicia 
Tracheia, which were already in Ptolemaic hands by the late summer of 38. When 
Herod began his lease of the balsam-producing districts around Jericho and the 
portions of Nabataea granted to Cleopatra is not clear, but in all likelihood at some 
point between the beginning of Antony’s Parthian campaign in 36 and his 
expedition war against Armenia in 34.44 
  With regard to the chronology of the conferment of territories upon 
Cleopatra, we can thus conclude that most of the areas were probably donated 
towards the end of 37 or at some point in 36 with the exception of Cyprus and 
parts of Cilicia. We shall see in the following section that in 34 other territories 
were given to the Ptolemaic ruling family – mainly to Cleopatra’s children. That 
her offspring was involved in the donations of 37/36, as Dio suggests, is highly 
                                                          
40 Dio, 49.32.5. 
41 Plutarch, Ant. 36.2. 
42 Josephus, AJ 15.79, 92-96; BJ 1.360-363. 
43 On Josephus’ probable erroneous dating of the donations see: Kromayer (1894) 572-576; Sullivan 
(1990) 270; Pelling (1988) 218. For the donations made in 34, see chapter 9.4. 
44 Josephus, AJ 15.96; BJ 1.362 
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unlikely. It is difficult to determine what had prompted Antony to grant all these 
territories. The ancient authors restrict themselves to sketching the general 
background of the gifts. Josephus clarifies for instance that Cleopatra had a 
general ambition to increase her possessions, and that she dominated Antony to 
such an extent that he appeared to comply with all her demands.45 A similar 
general clarification for all the donations made to her by Antony is recalled in 
Plutarch’s biography of this triumvir. Here it is Antony’s passion for Cleopatra 
which made him grant her all these territories.46 Dominant as the tendency is to 
consider the territorial grants of Antony to Cleopatra to be a result of his 
unrestrained passion for her, other explanations for the gifts might be more 
plausible. The territorial donations to Cleopatra, for example, can be seen as part 
of Antony’s preparations for his intended military campaign against Parthia in 36 
– that is to say, if they were indeed made before the onset of the expedition in the 
summer, which is most likely. Not only did he need alliances with kings or minor 
dynasts for the provision of soldiers and war equipment, he had to make sure as 
well that no native uprisings or Roman revolts against his position as triumvir 
would arise during the course of his expedition. In order to leave behind a secure 
and stable hinterland, he granted several territories in Asia Minor and the Near 
East to Cleopatra. Since she was not a native ruler in those areas and therefore 
completely dependent upon Antony for her position, he was assured of her 
loyalty. That loyalty of the kings and dynasts in the eastern Mediterranean was an 
important issue for Antony while he would be on campaign, can be inferred from 
the execution of Lysanias, the ruler of Chalcis, who, as we have just seen, was 
accused of having favoured the Parthian invaders in 40.  
The grant of territories to Cleopatra was, however, not merely a plan of 
Antony. As we have already seen, Josephus considers the Egyptian queen to be 
the driving force behind the gifts. The image of Cleopatra dictating Antony, 
                                                          
45 Josephus, AJ 15.88, 92-93; BJ 1.359-360. 
46 Plutarch, Ant. 36.1-2. 
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though, is probably a manifestation of Augustus’ successful anti-Antonian 
propaganda that influenced the works of many historians, not in the least 
Nicolaus of Damascus, Herod’s court-historian who had a good relationship with 
Augustus, and whose works form the main source of Josephus’ historical treatises. 
Nevertheless, that Cleopatra cherished the wish to extend her rule over 
considerable parts of the Near East and Asia Minor, in the hope of restoring the 
erstwhile empire ruled by her ancestors Ptolemy II and III in the third century BC, 
which stretched as far as southern Anatolia and Syria, is very likely.47 
 
9.4 The “Donations of Alexandria” in 34 
 
The territories with which Cleopatra was endowed between 40 and 36 remained 
largely unchanged in Egyptian hands until at least the end of Antony’s Armenian 
campaign in 34. Following the Armenian campaign in 34 he modified the 
settlement concluded a few years earlier and redistributed some of the territories 
in the East among Cleopatra and their children.48 Dio and Plutarch are the two 
ancient authors informing us about the new division. Having described Antony’s 
celebration of his victory over the Armenian king Artavasdes in Alexandria in 34, 
Dio relates how in the assembly he announced his territorial reorganisation:49 
 
                                                          
47 On the reigns of these two kings, see Hölbl (2001) 35-76; Huß (2001) 251-380. 
48 See map 1 for clarification. 
49 Dio, 49.41.1-3: “ὁ Ἀντώνιος τούς τε Ἀλεξανδρέας εἱστίασε, καὶ τὴν Κλεοπάτραν τούς τε παι-
δας αὐτῆς ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ παρεκαθίσατο, δημηγορήσας τέ τινα ἐκείνην τε βασιλίδα βασιλέων καὶ 
τὸν Πτολεμαῖον, ὃν Καισαρίωνα ἐπωνόμαζον, βασιλέα βασιλέων καλεῖσθαι ἀκέλευσε. καὶ 
αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν Αἴγυπτον τήν τε Κύπρον, ἄλλην διανομήν τινα ποιησάμενος, ἔδωκε· τοῦ τε γὰρ 
προτέρου Καίσαρος τὴν μὲν γυναῖκα τὸν δὲ υἱὸν ὄντως γεγονέναι ἔλεγε, καὶ ἐς τὴν ἐκείνου δὴ 
χάριν ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐσκήπτετο, ὅπως τὸν Καίσαρα τὸν Ὀκταουιανὸν ἐκ τούτου, ὅτι ποιητὸς 
ἀλλ' οὐ γνήσιος αὐτοῦ παῖς ἦν, διαβάλλοι. ἐκείνοις μὲν δὴ ταῦτ' ἔνειμε, τοῖς δὲ δὴ αὑτοῦ παισὶ 
τοῖς ἐκ τῆς Κλεοπάτρας οἱ γεγονόσι, Πτολεμαίῳ μὲν τήν τε Συρίαν καὶ τὰ ἐντὸς τοῦ Εὐφράτου 
μέχρι τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου πάντα, Κλεοπάτρᾳ δὲ τὴν Λιβύην τὴν περὶ Κυρήνην, τῷ τε ἀδελφῷ 
αὐτῶν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τήν τε Ἀρμενίαν καὶ τἆλλα τὰ πέραν τοῦ Εὐφράτου μέχρις Ἰνδῶν δώσειν 
ὑπέσχετο· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ὡς ἔχων ἥδη ἐχαρίζετο”. 
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“Antony feated the Alexandrians, and in the assembly made Cleopatra and her 
children sit by his side; also in the course of his address to the people he commanded 
that she should be called Queen of Kings, and Ptolemy, whom they named Caesarion, 
King of Kings. And he then made a new distribution of the provinces, giving them 
Egypt and Cyprus in addition; for he declared that in very truth one was the son of 
the former Caesar, and he professed to be taking these measures for Caesar’s sake, 
though his purpose was to cast reproach upon Caesar Octavianus because he was an 
adopted and not a real son of his. Besides making this assignment to them, he 
promised to give to his children by Cleopatra the following districts: to Ptolemy 
[Philadelphus, ed.], Syria and all the region west of the Euphrates as far as the 
Hellespont; to Cleopatra [Selene, ed.], the Cyrenaica in Libya; and and to their brother 
Alexander [Helios, ed.], Armenia and the rest of the countries east of the Euphrates as 
far as India; for he even bestowed the last-named regions as if they were already in his 
possession”. 
 
Dio clarifies that Cleopatra and Caesarion were allotted the rule over Egypt itself 
and over Cyprus. Ptolemy Philadelphus was given Syria and all the regions west 
of the Euphrates as far as the Hellespont, Cleopatra Selene Cyrenaica, and 
Alexander Helios the lands east of the Euphrates as far as India. Cleopatra was 
given the title “Queen of Kings” and Caesarion the title “King of Kings”. Plutarch 
presents us with a similar version of the domains that Antony conferred upon the 
Ptolemaic ruling family in 34 at Alexandria:50 
 
“After filling the gymnasium with a throng and placing on a tribunal of silver two 
thrones of gold, one for himself and the other for Cleopatra, and other lower thrones 
                                                          
50 Plutarch, Ant. 54.3-5: “ἐμπλήσας… ὄχλου τὸ γυμνάσιον καὶ θέμενος ἐπὶ βήματος ἀργυροῦ 
δύο θρόνους χρυσοῦς, τὸν μὲν ἑαυτῷ, τὸν δὲ Κλεοπάτρᾳ, καὶ τοῖς παισὶν ἑτέρους 
ταπεινοτέρους, πρῶτον ηὲν ἀπέφηνε Κλεοπάτραν βασίλισσαν Αἰγύπτου καὶ Κύπρου καὶ 
Λιβύης καὶ κοίλης Συρίας, συμβασιλεύοντος αὐτῇ Καισαρίωνος, ὃς ἐκ Καίσαρος ἐδόκει τοῦ 
προτέρου γεγονέναι Κλεοπάτραν ἔγκυον καταλιπόντος· δεύτερον δὲ τοὺς ἐξ αὑτοῦ καὶ 
Κλεοπάτρας υἱοὺς βασιλεῖς βασιλέων ἀναγορεύσας Ἀλεξανδρῳ μὲν Ἀρμενίαν ἀπένειμε καὶ 
Μηδίαν καὶ τὰ Πάρθων, ὅταν ὑπαγάγηται, Πτολεμαίῳ δὲ Φοινίκην καὶ Συρίαν καὶ Κιλικίαν. 
ἅμα δὲ καὶ προήγαγε τῶν παίδων Ἀλεξανδρον μὲν ἐσθῆτι Μηδικῇ τιάραν καὶ κίταριν ὀρθὴν 
ἐχούσῃ, Πτολεμαῖον δὲ κρηπῖσι καὶ χλανίδι καὶ καυσίᾳ διαδηματοφόρῳ κεκοσμημένον. αὕτη 
γὰρ ἦν σκευὴ τῶν ἀπ' Ἀλεξάνδρου βασιλέων, ἐκείνη δὲ Μήδων καὶ Ἀρμενίων”. 
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for his sons, in the first place he declared Cleopatra Queen of Egypt, Cyprus, Libya, 
and Coele Syria, and she was to share her throne with Caesarion. Caesarion was 
believed to be a son of the former Caesar, by whom Cleopatra was left pregnant. In 
the second place, he proclaimed his own sons by Cleopatra Kings of Kings, and to 
Alexander [Helios, ed.] he allotted Armenia, Media and Parthia (when he should have 
subdued it), to Ptolemy [Philadelphus, ed.] Phoenicia, Syria and Cilicia. At the same 
time he also produced his sons, Alexander arrayed in Median garb, which included a 
tiara and upright head-dress, Ptolemy in boots, short cloak, and broad-brimmed hat 
surmounted by a diadem. For the latter was the dress of the kings who followed 
Alexander [the Great, ed.], the former that of Medes and Armenians”. 
  
Plutarch says that Cleopatra and her co-regent Caesarion were given the rule over 
Egypt, Cyprus, Libya and Coele Syria. Alexander Helios was given Armenia, 
Media (Atropetene) and Parthia, and Ptolemy Phoenicia, Syria and Cilicia. 
Antony’s male offspring by Cleopatra were given the title “King of Kings”. Several 
scholars have dismissed both versions as exaggerated outlines of the territories 
granted to Cleopatra, since most of the domains allegedly awarded to the 
Ptolemies were still ruled by Roman governors, or native kings and princes.51 Be 
that as it may, it would go too far to reject the grant outright. Armenia had been 
annexed by Rome in 34, and was no longer in the hands of king Artavasdes.52 
Moreover, in 33 Antony betrothed Alexander Helios to the daughter of the 
Atropatenian king Artavasdes, thereby securing future Ptolemaic control over that 
kingdom.53 
 The reasons behind the grant of such enormous territories to Cleopatra and 
her children are difficult to determine. Recently, a plausible suggestion has been 
made by Strootman, who argues that the territorial donations were a means by 
which Antony could increase Rome’s control over the Near East through the 
Ptolemies, with whom he was linked as the father of three of Cleopatra’s 
                                                          
51 Pelling (1988) 248; Hölbl (2001) 292. 
52 See chapter 14.2. 
53 See chapter 15.1. 
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children. 54  The Near East was a region characterised by the coexistence of 
numerous kingdoms and principalities which had emerged from the 
disintegrating Seleucid Kingdom in the second half of the second century BC. In 
order to increase the stability in the region, Antony envisioned bringing it under 
indirect Roman control by placing it under the rule of the Ptolemies, who by 
themselves were dependent upon Rome. In this way, Rome could avoid the costs 
of maintaining a province.55 
 
Yet, whatever the exact rationale was behind the so-called “Donations of 
Alexandria”, the territorial reorganisation would never be implemented. Three 
years after Antony celebrated his Armenian victory at Alexandria, Actium 
brought an end to the empire that Antony was building in the East. Cleopatra did 
provide Antony with vital military support at Actium, but the assistance could not 
turn the tide.56  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have seen how Cleopatra asked her paramour Antony to solve 
internal Ptolemaic issues for her. Antony on the other hand implemented a wide-
ranging territorial reorganisation of the Near East, which would make even 
Pompey’s rearrangement in the 60s BC look bleak. It has proven difficult to 
provide an all-encompassing explanation for the grant of territories to Cleopatra 
and the children that she bore with Antony. It seems likely though that he wanted 
to place the entire Near East and Asia Minor under the Ptolemaic rule – possibly 
in order to create stability. This grand Ptolemaic empire would then be standing 
                                                          
54 Strootman (2010). 
55 Strootman (2010) 156-157. 
56 Plutarch, Ant. 65-68; Dio, 50.31-35. 
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under Rome’s hegemony. At Actium, the queen was present with her navy, but 
her aid proved to be in vain. 
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10 JUDAEA 
 
 
Among all the interstate contacts which Rome maintained with kingdoms and 
principalities in the Near East from 44 until 42, the political relationship with 
Judaea stood out for Rome’s strongest interference into the financial and political 
affairs of a principality or kingdom. The intrusion manifested itself primarily in 
the heavy contributions which Cassius imposed on Judaea in 43, possibly in 
addition to the already existing Roman land tax. In need of enormous funds for 
the maintenance of his armies in the Near East, Cassius did not only force cities 
and smaller communities within Rome’s provinces to raise money and supplies. 
He also turned his eye beyond the provincial boundaries, and exploited Judaea as 
a goldmine from which financial resources could be freely extracted as if it 
constituted a part of the Imperium Romanum. Although Cassius seemed to have 
encountered some resistance among the population, Judaean leaders were, 
following the example of Roman governors, for the most part cooperative with 
Rome – in particular Antipater and his son Herod. 1  Cassius left Syria in the 
beginning of 42 and met Brutus in Asia Minor before the war against Antony and 
Octavian took place, which proved to be fatal for the two Republicans. With their 
demise, the balance of power in the Roman Empire shifted towards the triumvirs. 
Antony eventually took over control over the eastern Mediterranean. How the 
relations between Rome and Judaea developed from that moment onwards until 
the Battle of Actium, needs to be considered at present.   
 
 
                                                          
1 See chapter 1.7. 
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10.1 The quest for Antony’s favour 
 
Following the Battle of Philippi, Octavian returned to Italy and took the 
organisation of the land allotments for veteran soldiers in hand, while Antony 
spent the remainder of the year in Greece, and proceeded in the spring of 41 to 
Asia Minor from where he made a tour through Anatolia and the Near East. On 
his journey, Antony began to levy contributions from cities and other communities 
in order to finance the rewards which had been promised to the troops. At the 
same time, embassies from various parts came to meet Antony, and former 
supporters of Brutus and Cassius approached him to give account for their past 
conduct.2 One of the delegations seeking to have a meeting with Antony at some 
point in 41 when he resided in Bithynia consisted of “the powerful among the 
Judaeans” (Ἰουδαίων οἱ δυνατοί) who intended to bring forward accusations 
against Antipater’s sons Herod and Phasael.3 Josephus informs us that the two 
brothers were charged with “seizing the government through force and leaving to 
Hyrcanus merely titular honours”.4 At the time of this deputation, Herod probably 
still held his position as στρατηγός over the Galilee, Samaria and Coele Syria, and 
Phasael his position over Jerusalem and the surrounding area. Recognition of the 
grievances brought forward would almost certainly have ended their political 
career and have left Hyrcanus alone in charge of his principality as ἐθνάρχης. 
Unfortunately for the members of the embassy, Antony seems not to have given 
                                                          
2 Dio, 48.2.2-3; Plutarch, Ant. 23.1; Appian, BCiv. 5.3-8; Suetonius, Aug. 13.3; Josephus, AJ 14.301; BJ 
1.242. On the land allotments, the ensuing war in Italy with L. Antonius, the collection of funds and 
the former supporters of Brutus and Cassius, see among others Rice Holmes (1928) 90-98; Syme 
(1939) 206-212; Buchheim (1960) 9-28; Huzar (1986) 129-130, 148ff; Bengtson (1977) 153ff.  
3 Josephus, BJ 1.242. Cf. AJ 14.302 which refers to this group as “those of the Judaeans in power” 
(Ἰουδαίων οἱ ἐν τέλει). 
4 Josephus, BJ 1.242: “βίᾳ… κρατεῖν τῶν πραγμάτων, ὄνομα δὲ μόνον περιεῖναι Ὑρκανῷ τίμιον” 
(LCL transl. adapted). Cf. AJ 14.301-302, in which Josephus also claims – in different words – that 
accusations were brought forward against Herod and Phasael “to the effect that while Hyrcanus 
had the outward appearance of sovereignty, it was they who had all the power” (“πρόσχημα μὲν 
εἶναι λέγοντες τῆς βασιλείας Ὑρκανόν, τούτους δὲ τὴν πᾶσαν ἔχειν ἐξουσίαν”). 
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them the opportunity to lodge their complaints.5 Josephus reports that Herod, who 
had also travelled to Bithynia, successfully used money to persuade Antony not to 
grant his adversaries an audience.6 Plausible as this version appears to be, other 
considerations may have influenced Antony’s goodwill towards the two brothers 
as well. Several scholars have contended, for example, that the decision to dismiss 
the embassy of influential Judaeans was prompted by Antony’s hospitable 
relations with the late Antipater.7 Both men had already maintained good personal 
relations with each other ever since Antipater entertained Antony with hospitality 
during the latter’s term as praefectus equitum in Syria under Gabinius from 57 until 
55. Yet, conceivable as it is for this friendship to have imposed a moral obligation 
on Antony to support Antipater’s sons by taking them under his protection, it 
would go too far to perceive Antony’s conduct towards the embassy of powerful 
Judaeans entirely as a compensation for Antipater’s past generosity. The choice to 
disregard the deputation may have been dictated by more pragmatic motives, 
such as the realisation that the two brothers had become indispensable for the 
implementation of detested Roman measures. In a previous chapter we have 
already seen that Herod and Phasael participated in the collection of the 700 
talents that Cassius had demanded of Judaea in 43, despite the resistance that this 
action provoked among the local population. This cooperative and loyal attitude 
may have made Antony appreciate that a condemnation of the two brothers 
would have entailed the loss of two reliable supporters, and that he thus had to act 
                                                          
5 Cf. Baumann (1983) 131, who renders Josephus’ statement according to which the members of the 
delegation did not receive a hearing, implausible. There is, however, no reason to doubt Josephus’ 
words.  
6 Josephus, AJ 14.303; BJ 1.242. 
7 Jones (1938) 38; Abel (1952) 324; Buchheim (1960) 64; Schalit (1969) 68; Smallwood (1976) 49; 
Baumann (1983) 131 and Richardson (1999) 123 contend that the hospitable relations maintained by 
Antipater with Antony and Gabinius may have played a role in Antony’s resolution to decline a 
meeting with the Judaean delegation. Josephus suggests that the guest-friendship with Antipater 
influenced Antony’s decision to appoint Herod and Phasael as tetrarchs later during 41 in Antioch 
(AJ 14.326; BJ 1.244). There is no reason to assume that these hospitable relations may not have 
worked in favour of Herod in his attempt to prevent the meeting between Antony and his Judaean 
adversaries in Bithynia.  
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on their behalf against “the powerful among the Judaeans” that constituted the 
embassy.8  
In order to facilitate a full understanding of Antony’s disregard of the 
deputation and his support for the Antipatrid brothers, the issue needs to be 
addressed who or what faction in Judaea the embassy represented and whose 
interests it sought to serve. Unfortunately, none of our extant sources provides us 
with any indications which could illuminate this matter. The nature of the 
accusations laid down by the envoys against Herod and Phasael would suggest 
that the members of this embassy were supporters of Hyrcanus. This is very 
unlikely, though, as Hyrcanus’ relationship with Herod had improved during the 
past few years, in particular since the betrothal of his granddaughter Mariamme to 
Herod in 42.9 It is much more plausible that the envoys represented a party which 
was concerned more generally about the gradual erosion of the High Priest’s 
authority and the concomitant accumulation of power by Herod and Phasael at 
the hands of successive Roman governors in the East. Possibly in the realisation 
that Rome possessed the key to reverse this process, representatives of this 
political group approached Antony on the earliest possible occasion in Bithynia in 
the hope to see the Antipatrid elements in the administration of Judaea eliminated. 
The faction probably expected that the decay of the High Priest’s powers would 
become irreparable if they did not act at that time and tried to convince Antony to 
remove Herod and Phasael from the political stage altogether. Unfortunately for 
the members of the delegation, Antony dismissed their complaints and decided in 
favour of the two brothers.  
 
                                                          
8 Otto (1913) 22; Abel (1952) 324; Schalit (1969) 68; Buchheim (1960) 64 have a similar view. 
9 Although Josephus asserts in AJ 14.300 and BJ 1.241 that Herod and Mariamme became connected 
by an agreement of marriage, it is clear that this connection was nothing more than an engagement 
in 42. The actual marriage only took place several years later in 37 (AJ 14.467; BJ 1.344). 
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10.2 Privileges restored to Judaeans  
 
Later during that year, an embassy sent on behalf of Hyrcanus and the Judaean 
people approached Antony at Ephesus. Josephus explains in his Jewish Antiquities 
that the delegation requested that Antony bring about the liberation of those 
Judeans, who had been captured by Cassius “against the martial law”, and the 
restoration of the territories of which the Judaeans had been stripped in the time of 
Cassius’ hegemony over the Near East.10 Antony deemed these two pleas to be 
justified, and allegedly informed Hyrcanus in a letter, cited by Josephus, about the 
measures he himself had implemented.11 As a means to set the Judaeans free, 
Antony claimed in this letter to have set up notices throughout cities with the 
instruction to release any persons who had been sold by Cassius or his 
subordinates.12 Although it is unclear how many cities were given the order to 
liberate such individuals, Tyre, Sidon, Antioch and Aradus were in all likelihood 
among them. Josephus includes in his account a letter of Antony addressed to the 
magistrates, council and people of Tyre, in which he ordered them to restore to the 
previous owners whatever they had received from his opponents (i.e. Cassius and 
Brutus): 
 
“… it is my [Antony’s, ed.] wish that our allies shall have peace at your hands, and 
that whatever you have received from our opponents shall not be retained by you but 
shall be restored to those from whom it was taken”.13  
 
The same instructions appear in a decree that was allegedly dispatched to Tyre 
and which has been preserved by Josephus as part of another letter:  
                                                          
10 Josephus, AJ 14.304: “οὐ νόμῳ πολέμου”. This episode has no parallel in BJ. 
11 Josephus, AJ 14.305; AJ 14.306-313 contains the letter. 
12 Josephus, AJ 14.313.  
13 Josephus, AJ 14.315: “βούλομαι καὶ τὴν ἀφ' ὑμῶν εἰρήνην τοῖς συμμάχοις ἡμῶν ὑπάρχειν, καὶ 
ὅσα παρὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων ἐλάβετε ἀνταγωνιστῶν μὴ συγχωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς 
ἀφῃρημένοις”. The order forms part of a letter transmitted in AJ 14.314-318. 
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“And whatever was sold belonging to the Judaeans, whether persons or possessions, 
shall be released, the slaves to be free, as they were originally, and the possessions to 
be returned to their former owners”.14  
 
Similar decrees or missives with instructions to return Judaean belongings and to 
liberate Judaean persons sold off by Cassius were allegedly also sent to Sidon, 
Antioch and Aradus.15 The origin of those people is not attested in our extant 
source material. Nevertheless, it does seem plausible that Antony refers in his 
decree to the people of Gophna, Emmaus, Lydda, Thamna and perhaps even the 
inhabitants of other cities whom Cassius is said to have sold as slaves one or two 
years earlier.16   
 In addition to these instructions, though, Antony also ordered Tyre in one 
of the two aforementioned letters to return the territories that had been seized 
from the Judaeans when the tyrannicides held the eastern Mediterranean under 
their control.17 Although the letter in question does not specify the areas that had 
been captured, or the circumstances under which the annexation took place, it is 
very likely that reference is made to those territories occupied after Cassius had 
left the Levant in the beginning of 42 to prepare for the prospective clash with 
Antony and Octavian. Cassius’ departure had left a power vacuum behind and 
was used by Antigonus, the son of Hyrcanus’ late brother Aristobulus, to make an 
attempt for the throne. Antigonus was supported by Ptolemy, son of Mennaeus, 
the prince of Chalcis, and by Marion, the tyrant (τύραννος) of Tyre. Marion 
                                                          
14 Josephus, AJ 14.321: “καὶ ὅσα ἐπράξη Ἰουδαίων ἤτοι σώματα ἢ κτῆσις, ταῦτα ἀφεξήτω, τὰ μὲν 
σώματα ἐλεύξερα εἶναι, ὡς ἦν ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς, ἡ δὲ κτῆσις τοῖς πρότερον κυρίοις” (LCL transl. 
adapted). AJ 14.319-322 contains the letter with the decree (14.320-322). 
15 Josephus, AJ 14.323: “In the same way he also wrote to the people of Sidon, Antioch and Aradus” 
(“Τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ Σιδωνίοις καὶ Ἀντιοχεῦσιν καὶ Ἀραδίοις ἔγραψεν”). The letter containing 
the decree is cited in AJ 14.319-322. 
16 Josephus, AJ 14.275 and BJ 1.222 refer to the selling of inhabitants of Gophna, Emmaus, Lydda 
and Thamna. For more details on this event, see chapter 4.2.  
17  Josephus, AJ 14.314: Antony refers to the territories that had been annexed “when our 
adversaries were in control” (“κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἐναντιουμένων ἡμῖν ἐπικράτειαν”). 
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annexed three strongholds in the Galilee, whose exact identification is uncertain. 
Although Josephus claims that Herod in the end managed to expel the tyrant from 
the Galilee, it is possible that there were other areas that Marion had not returned 
and that Antony in 41 demanded their restoration to Judaean rule.18  
Yet, besides the return of seized territories and persons, Antony is also said 
to have granted the Judaeans the rights (τοῖς... φιλανθρώποις) that he and 
Dolabella had formerly bestowed upon them.19 What the nature of those privileges 
was remains unfortunately obscure in the passage of the Jewish Antiquities (14.313) 
that mentions the renewed bestowal of Antony’s and Dolabella’s awards. 
Josephus may refer to Dolabella’s grant of certain privileges to the Judaeans in the 
beginning of 43 in reply to requests made by envoys of Hyrcanus when the 
proconsul Dolabella held the province of Asia. 20 Those privileges concerned the 
exemption of Judaeans living in that province from military service and the 
permission “to follow the native customs and to come together for sacred and holy 
rites in accordance with the law, and to make offerings for the sacrifices”.21 It is 
possible for these rights to have become obsolete after the defeat of Dolabella in 
the summer of 43 with the quick succession of governors in the East, and that 
Hyrcanus and the Judaeans living in Asia now hoped to see them re-affirmed.22 
                                                          
18 Josephus, AJ 14.298; BJ 1.238-239. Richardson (1999) 123 comes up with a similar argument. For 
more details on the upheaval in Judaea in 42 after Cassius had left Syria, see among others 
Smallwood (1976) 48; Baumann (1983) 127-128. 
19 Josephus, AJ 14.313. 
20 Josephus, AJ 14.223-224. 
21 Josephus, AJ 14.227: “χρῆσθαι τοῖς πατρίοις ἐθισμοῖς, ἱερῶν ἕνεκα καὶ ἁγίων συναγομένοις, 
καθὼς αὐτοῖς νόμιμον, καὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰς θυσίας ἀφαιρεμάτων” (LCL transl. adapted). The 
quotation forms part of a letter that Dolabella is claimed by Josephus to have written to the city of 
Ephesus in January 43 (14.225-227). The letter contains instructions to exempt the Jews from 
military service and to allow them to maintain their native customs. Since Dolabella also ordered 
Ephesus to inform other cities of the necessary actions in accordance with the privileges granted by 
him, it is clear that these rights were to be in force throughout the entire province of Asia. That 
Antony’s letter to Hyrcanus, as it is preserved by Josephus (AJ 14.313), may have referred to these 
privileges is also proposed by Stern (1974b) 218; Smallwood (1976) 50, n.17; Buchheim (1960) 64; 
Schalit (1969) 68. 
22 Judaeans living in the Diaspora regarded Hyrcanus in his capacity as High Priest to be the only 
one with authority to stand up for their religious rights. On the authority of the High Priest among 
the Judaeans in the Diaspora, see among others Rocca (2008) 282. 
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However, as Smallwood has argued, it is equally conceivable that the 
φιλάνθρωπα relate to the grants given by the Senate on Antony’s and Dolabella’s 
initiative to the Judaeans in reply to requests made by a delegation sent to Rome 
on behalf of Hyrcanus in 44.23 Unfortunately, the details of those grants have not 
been mentioned in that part of the Senatorial Decree preserved by Josephus.24 It 
remains thus impossible to establish with certainty which of the rights granted by 
Antony and Dolabella in an earlier stage were now returned. Overall, though, 
Judaea seems to have benefited from the actions that Antony had taken in 
response to the requests made to him in Ephesus. The measures of which we have 
knowledge were aimed at the return of territories, the reinstatement of certain 
rights and the liberation of Judaeans enslaved by Cassius. Further below, though, 
we shall see that this benevolent attitude would not endure. Just like Cassius, 
Antony could not abstain from imposing heavy contributions upon Judaea, and it 
will also be revealed that he did not feel restrained in transferring parts of Judaean 
territories to others.25 
 
10.3 Herod and Phasael made τετράρχαι of Judaea  
 
The delegation consisting of “the powerful among the Judaeans” that came to see 
Antony in Bithynia in 41 was not demoralised by Antony’s refusal to hear their 
grievances. Later during the year, when Antony came to Syria, another embassy 
consisting of “a hundred of the most influential among the Judaeans” approached 
him.26 The deputation went to Daphne, near Antioch, with the intention to bring 
                                                          
23 Josephus, AJ 14.217-222; Smallwood (1976) 50 n.17. 
24 Josephus, AJ 14.219-222. 
25 See chapter 9.3. 
26 Josephus, AJ 14.324: “Ἰουδαίων ἑκατὸν οἱ δυνατώτατοι”. Cf. Josephus, BJ 1.243 which refers to 
the members of this embassy as “the one hundred men among the Judaeans who were in power” 
(“οἱ ἐν τέλει Ἰουδαίων ἑκατὸν ἄνδρες”, own translation). 
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forward accusations against Herod, and possibly also against his brother Phasael.27 
Unlike the mission sent to Antony earlier in Bithynia, this one did obtain an 
audience. Unfortunately, the extant sources do not provide us with any suggestion 
about the nature of the indictments laid down, nor about the motivations of the 
deputation to lodge complaints. Yet, whatever the character of the accusations, 
Herod and Phasael do not seem to have suffered in any way from the measures 
that Antony was about to implement. On the contrary, Josephus explains that after 
Antony had listened to the most eloquent speakers of the delegation, and had 
heard Hyrcanus and the Roman commander Messalla,28 both of whom spoke on 
behalf of Herod and Phasael, he appointed them both as tetrarchs (τετράρχαι).29 
The Jewish War reveals that the two brothers were awarded “the whole of Judaea” 
as their area of responsibility. 30  What that decision meant for the position of 
Hyrcanus, who still held his positions as High Priest and ἐθνάρχης of the 
Judaeans, remains unclear. Nothing in our source material suggests that he lost 
any of these posts at that point. In their new capacity, Herod and Phasael were 
thus in all likelihood at least nominally subordinate to Hyrcanus.31 Whether the 
two brothers applied a geographical division between their areas of authority, is 
unknown. The possibility can at any rate not be excluded. As suggested by several 
authors, it is possible that they retained the same division as that had existed 
                                                          
27 Josephus, BJ 1.243 asserts that the Judaean delegation brought forward accusations against “τῶν 
ἀδελφῶν”, referring in all likelihood to Herod and Phasael. Cf. Josephus, AJ 14.324 who claims 
that charges were made against Herod and “the ones around him” (“τῶν περὶ αὐτόν”). The “τῶν 
περὶ αὐτόν” did probably include Herod’s brother Phasael and other supporters among the ruling 
elite, whose identities remain unknown. 
28 It has been suggested by Schalit (1969) 69 among others that this Messalla is to be identified with 
M. Valerius Messalla Corvinus, the consul of the year 31. Although the official position of Valerius 
Messalla Corvinus in 41 is unknown, it cannot be excluded that he was the Messalla to whom 
Josephus refers, all the more so since he had been active in the East as a commander in support of 
Brutus and Cassius in 43 and 42, and had changed his loyalty to Antony after Philippi. On 
Messalla’s activities in the East, see Broughton (1952) 355, 367.  
29 Josephus, AJ 14.324-326; BJ 1.243-244.  
30 Josephus, BJ 1.244: “πᾶσαν… τὴν Ἰουδαίαν”. Cf. Josephus, AJ 14.326, which is less specific and 
claims that the two brothers as tetrarchs were assigned “the affairs of the Judaeans” (“τὰ τῶν 
Ἰουδαίων… πράγματα”, own translation). This latter statement does not, however, refute the 
version in BJ.  
31 Also suggested by Otto (1913) 22; Schalit (1969) 70; Smallwood (1976) 50; Baumann (1983) 135. 
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between them when they were appointed στρατηγοί in 47: Phasael Jerusalem and 
the surrounding area, and Herod the Galilee.32 There is at any rate no reason to 
assume that they had been awarded a quarter of Judaea as suggested by the name 
of their position, τετράρχης, meaning “ruler of a quarter”. It has already been 
argued convincingly that the name of this position had lost its original meaning by 
the middle of the first century BC.33 
About the driving forces for the decision to appoint Herod and Phasael as 
tetrarchs, we are very badly informed. Josephus implies that the nomination was 
at least in part induced by the hospitable relations that Antony had maintained 
with Antipater, the father of Herod and Phasael, since the mid-50s BC.34 Yet, other 
considerations of a more political nature will probably have played a greater role. 
In particular the loyal attitude of the two brothers towards previous Roman 
generals in the East is likely to have convinced Antony to award them an official 
post in the administration of Judaea. Although the triumvir probably understood 
that Herod and Phasael had thus far shown a tendency to support any Roman 
general holding power over Syria regardless of the political background, the 
internal strife that erupted in the aftermath of Cassius’ departure from the Levant 
in the beginning of 42 revealed how much hostility there still was within Judaea 
against the Antipatrids. By appointing both brothers as τετράρχαι, Antony made 
clear to the enemies of Herod and Phasael that he was willing to retain the 
Antipatrid party. Moreover, the promotion of these two men assured him of vital 
support within Judaea for the implementation of unpopular measures. Already 
later in 41 when Antony visited the Near East on his way to Egypt, he seems to 
                                                          
32 That Herod and Phasael split their responsibilities as tetrarchs in a geographical way whereby 
Herod ruled the Galilee and Phasael Jerusalem with the surrounding region, is also regarded as a 
possibility by Otto (1913) 22; Abel (1952) 325-326; Schalit (1969) 69; Smallwood (1976) 50; Baumann 
(1983) 135. See map 3 for clarification. 
33 That the title τετράρχης lost its original meaning and was used increasingly more from the first 
century BC onwards to denote a ruler who had a title subordinate to the title of king, has been 
shown by Schwahn (1934) 1096-1098; Abel (1952) 326; Schürer (1973) 333-335 n.12; Coşkun 
(forthcoming). 
34 This is what Josephus implies in AJ 14.326 and BJ 1.244. 
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have imposed “heavy contributions” on Judaea, if Appian is to be believed. 
Although details about these tributes are opaque, Antony must have been aware 
that the collection of those enormous funds required loyal and dedicated officials 
who were willing to assist in the collection of the money, even if this provoked 
fierce resistance among the local population and some members of the ruling elite. 
Herod and Phasael had already demonstrated in 43 that they did not shun 
participating in the levy of the unpopular tax imposed by Cassius. Antony was 
probably aware of that, and, even if the promotion of the two Antipatrids was not 
necessary to win their loyalty, Antony had to be assured of their cooperation and 
at least partly for that reason have nominated them as tetrarchs. 
  
Despite Antony’s choice to favour Herod and his brother Phasael, the anti-
Antipatrid faction did not give up. Josephus reveals that when Antony arrived in 
Tyre, another delegation – this time reportedly consisting of one thousand 
members – came to meet Antony. What their grievances were has not been 
attested in the extant source material. Both of Josephus’ accounts inform us that 
Antony did not wish to meet them and allegedly resorted to military force to 
dispel them. Evidently, Antony supported Herod and Phasael and he did not 
consider their removal to be useful.35  
 
10.4 The Parthian invasion and Herod’s promotion to the kingship  
 
The reliability and loyalty which Herod and Phasael had displayed towards Rome 
in previous years thus formed in all likelihood one of Antony’s main driving 
forces for their nomination as tetrarchs over Judaea. Doubtless there was an 
expectation that the allegiance of the two brothers would not falter – in particular 
now they had been granted new positions which bound them to Rome. Valuable 
                                                          
35 Josephus, AJ 14.327-329; BJ 1.245-247. 
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as Antony anticipated Herod and Phasael to be, their appointments did not prove 
to be long-lasting. At some point between the winter of 41 and the spring of 40, 
Parthian troops led by Pacorus, the son of king Orodes II, and the Roman deserter 
Q. Labienus, crossed the Euphrates into Syria. Antigonus, the son of Hyrcanus’ 
late brother Aristobulus, who had returned into exile with the prince of Chalcis 
after he had failed to drive out Hyrcanus two years earlier, seized the invasion as 
an opportunity to make once more an attempt to oust the incumbent ruler and 
obtain the throne for himself.36 On the condition that Hyrcanus and possibly also 
the two Antipatrid brothers would be overthrown and Antigonus assisted in his 
pursuit of control over Judaea, the Parthians were offered rewards. Induced by 
these promises, Pacorus and the Parthian satrap Barzaphranes departed Syria and 
moved southwards – the former along the coast and the latter through the 
interior.37 Pacorus also dispatched a squadron of cavalry in advance to Judaea 
under the command of the Cupbearer (οἰνόχοος) of the Parthian king, who was 
allegedly also called Pacorus. 38 Meanwhile, Antigonus proceeded to Jerusalem 
while he was joined by an increasing number of adherents. His siege of the city 
was met by fierce resistance from troops led by Herod and Phasael, and on a daily 
basis confrontations occurred between both factions.39 None of the two parties 
succeeded to gain the upper hand, even though several of the Jews who had 
gathered in Jerusalem for the celebration of Passover gave support to Antigonus.40 
The deadlock was only overcome when on Antigonus’ initiative Pacorus the 
                                                          
36Antigonus took refuge with Ptolemy, the prince of Chalcis, in 49 after his elder brother Alexander 
and his father Aristobulus, entangled in Rome’s civil war as Caesar’s allies, had been assassinated 
in Syria by Pompey’s partisans (Josephus, AJ 14.123-126; BJ 1.183-186). With the exception of a brief 
absence in 42 when he made a failed attempt to win a position of power in Judaea in 42, Antigonus 
resided with Ptolemy and, later, his son Lysanias in the Princedom of Chalcis until the Parthian 
invasion provided him with the opportunity with support of the new overlords in Syria to win the 
throne for himself. 
37 Josephus, AJ 14.330-332; BJ 1.248-249. In BJ the rewards for the Parthians are offered by Lysanias 
of Chalcis, whereas AJ has Antigonus himself promising the money and women. It is not possible 
to illuminate which one of these two versions is more accurate. 
38 Josephus, AJ 14.333; BJ 1.249. 
39 Josephus, AJ 14.334-339; BJ 1.250-253. 
40 Josephus, AJ 14.338; BJ 1.253. 
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Cupbearer entered the city – ostensibly to bring the conflict to an end, as Josephus 
clarifies, but in reality to assist Antigonus.41 Phasael appears not to have suspected 
the plot, met Pacorus and was persuaded by him to go to Barzaphranes as 
ambassador to discuss a termination of the conflict.42 Despite Herod’s warning not 
to yield to the proposal, Phasael travelled with Hyrcanus to the Galilee, where 
Barzaphranes was encamped. At first cordially welcomed by the Parthian satrap 
with gifts, Phasael and Hyrcanus were at a later point put in chains.43  
For the time being, Herod had evaded arrest by staying behind, but new 
plans had already been devised to lure him into an ambush. As part of this 
scheme, Pacorus the Cupbearer was sent to Jerusalem with the instruction to 
entice Herod outside the city walls and capture him.44 However, as soon as Herod 
learnt of his brother’s and Hyrcanus’ imprisonment, and suspected that a plot was 
being forged against him, he decided that it was no longer safe in the city and 
escaped Jerusalem with members of his family, soldiers and several of his 
associates.45 Herod firstly proceeded southwards into the direction of Idumaea, 
where he dismissed the majority of his followers and accommodated his nearest 
relatives with about eight hundred of his troops in the fortress of Masada.46  
In the meantime, the Parthians had entered Jerusalem, ransacked the city 
and laid waste to other parts of the country. Fate proved to be calamitous for the 
imprisoned Hyrcanus and Phasael.47 Whereas Phasael realised that he was in a 
                                                          
41 Josephus, AJ 14.340-341; BJ 1.254. 
42 Josephus, AJ 14.341; BJ 1.255. 
43 Josephus, AJ 14.341-348; BJ 1.255-260. 
44 Josephus, AJ 14.348; BJ 1.261. 
45 Josephus, AJ 14.349-353; BJ 1.261-263. 
46 Josephus, AJ 14.355-362; BJ 1.263-267. 
47 Josephus asserts in AJ 14.365 and BJ 1.269 that Hyrcanus and Phasael were turned over to 
Antigonus. Yet, these claims are contradicted by AJ 14.366 where Hyrcanus is said to have been 
guarded by the Parthians when Antigonus allegedly went up to him when he was imprisoned. If 
Hyrcanus and Phasael had been transferred into Antigonus’ hands, as Josephus explains earlier in 
his account and in BJ, why would Hyrcanus then still have been held in Parthian detention when 
Antigonus was about to visit him? A possible explanation for this blatant inconsistency may be 
Josephus’ use of two different historical traditions, as Otto (1913) 25 has already proposed. 
According to one version, Hyrcanus and Phasael were handed over to Antigonus, whereas 
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desperate situation and decided to take his own life in order to forestall 
execution,48 Hyrcanus did not escape penalty and saw his ears being disfigured.49 
As a result of the defacement, he was no longer suitable for holding the High 
Priesthood, since Jewish law forbade persons with physical defects holding that 
office.50 This then paved the way for Antigonus to assume the highest sacral 
position in Judaea. Being a son of Hyrcanus’ brother Aristobulus who had held the 
High Priesthood for some years in the 60s BC, Antigonus qualified in particular 
for taking up that post. He combined it with the kingship which the Parthians 
revived for Judaea and conferred upon him soon after the demise of Phasael and 
the incarceration of Hyrcanus.51 
                                                                                                                                                                                
according to the other version the two men were held in Parthian captivity. The latter tradition is 
more plausible, as Otto o.c. has already convincingly argued by pointing to AJ 15.12-13, where 
Josephus briefly recalls Hyrcanus’ and Phasael’s seizure by Barzaphranes and Pacorus, and 
Hyrcanus’ release from Parthian captivity. We can also refer to BJ 1.273 in which Hyrcanus’ 
deportation to Parthia is mentioned. Cf. Schalit (1969) 761-764, who also gives preference to the 
version according to which Hyrcanus and Phasael had been captured by the Parthians, but comes 
up with implausible and somewhat caricatural arguments. Schalit (1969) 762 claims that if 
Hyrcanus had been captured by Antigonus, he would probably have been executed straightaway, 
since the Hasmonaeans were “im Grunde ihres Wesens harte Naturen und unbarmherzige 
Richter” who would not deter from “Greueltaten”, if they were able to use such atrocities to secure 
their power. Yet, as we shall see, this was not the fate awaiting Hyrcanus. 
48 Josephus mentions in both AJ and BJ two readings of Phasael’s death. Whereas in one version (AJ 
14.367; BJ 1.271) he is said to have smashed his head against a rock, according to the other version 
(AJ 14.368; BJ 1.272), this attempt to commit suicide is claimed to have failed, after which on 
Antigonus’ initiative poison was applied to Phasael’s wound by a physician. Which of these two 
interpretations is to be preferred cannot be said on the basis of our extant sources. The vague 
assertion made by Josephus later in his work (AJ 15.13) according to which Phasael died by 
committing suicide, is not helpful in this respect. Yet, either of the readings that Josephus presents 
to us is still to be preferred above the interpretation provided by the third century AD philosopher 
Sextus Iulius Africanus, who claims (in a fragment transmitted by Syncellus, Chron. 371) that 
Phasael had fallen in battle. As it happens, demise on the battlefield would negate the Phasael’s 
initial captivity, which by itself is a well-attested event (Josephus, AJ 14.365, 15.11-13; BJ 1.269) that 
cannot easily be disregarded.  
49 Josephus, AJ 14.366 claims that Antigonus “cut off” (“ἀποτέμνει”) Hyrcanus ears. Cf. Josephus 
BJ 1.270, who says that Antigonus “mutilated the ears with his teeth” (“τὰ ὦτα λωβᾶται τοῖς 
ὀδοῦσιν”). Schalit (1969) 763 points out that cutting or biting off ears was a customary penalty 
inflicted by Parthians (Tacitus, Ann. 12.14). 
50  The evidence for the exclusion of persons with physical defects from the High Priesthood 
consists of Leviticus 21.17-23; Josephus, AJ 3.278, 14.366. 
51 Josephus, AJ 14.379 refers to Antigonus being appointed king (βασιλεύς) by the Parthians. Cf. BJ 
1.273, which only mentions that “the Parthians installed Antigonus as master in Jerusalem” 
(“Πάρθοι καθιστᾶσιν μὲν ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις Ἀντιγόνῳ τὰ πράγματα”). That Antigonus held the 
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Not yet aware of his brother’s fate, Herod pursued his flight from Masada 
to Nabataea in the hope that king Malichus would be willing to offer him a gift or 
a loan in money which could serve as ransom to set Phasael free.52 Herod may 
have expected that his father’s friendship with the king would be in his advantage. 
Malchus had received sums of money in deposit from Antipater, and Herod 
hoped at the moment to be recompensed for these benefits. However, instead of 
offering financial assistance, the Nabataean king ordered Herod not to visit his 
kingdom – according to Josephus under the pretext that the Parthians forbade him 
to do so, but in reality because he did not wish to repay his debts.53 Whatever 
Malchus’ main motivations were, Herod obeyed the king’s instructions and 
continued his journey to Alexandria in Egypt, while on the way he learnt about his 
brother’s death.54  By now, Herod was determined to travel to Rome. Despite 
Cleopatra’s attempts to detain him,55 and the hibernal conditions which made 
                                                                                                                                                                                
High Priesthood is affirmed by his coinage, on which he describes himself on the obverse in 
Aramaic as “High Priest”. The reverse of those coins bears the legend “ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΑΝΤΙΓΟΝΟΥ”, 
and thus attests to Antigonus’ tenure of the kingship (Reifenberg (1963) 42 no.21; Hill (1965) 212-
219; Schürer (1973) 605; Meshorer (2001) 218-220 nos.36-43). Cf. Dio, 48.26.2, who mistakenly claims 
that Antony had set up Hyrcanus’ brother Aristobulus as ruler in Palestine. 
52 For the location of Masada, see map 3. 
53 Josephus, AJ 14.370-373; BJ 1.274-276. Although AJ 14.370 informs us that the Nabataean king had 
received many services from Herod himself, it is more likely that these benefits had been granted 
by Antipater, since BJ proposes that “he was determined not to repay his debts to Antipater” 
(“κατασχεῖν προαιρούμενος τὰ παρ’ Ἀντιπάτρου χρέα...”) and AJ 14.372 claims that the king 
wanted to “withhold from Herod the sums which they had received in deposit from Antipater” 
(“ἀποστερήσωσι τὰς παρακαταθήκας, ἃς παρὰ Ἀντιπάτρου λαβόντες ἔτυχον”). In what 
context Antipater had provided these benefits, is unclear. 
54 Josephus, AJ 14.374; BJ 1.277. 
55 Whereas in AJ 14.375-376 Josephus does not provide us with an explanation why Cleopatra 
wished to detain Herod in Alexandria, in BJ 1.279 the author asserts that Cleopatra hoped to 
entrust Herod with a military command. Unfortunately, as no further details for this alleged 
command are given by Josephus and other sources do not provide us with any useful indications, 
it is not possible to elucidate what expedition the Ptolemaic queen intended to give to Herod. 
Smallwood (1976) 53 n.27 dismisses the idea of a command for Herod on the ground that there is 
no known hotbed to which Cleopatra would have sought to dispatch him. For the same reason, 
Richardson (1999) 127 n.131 has argued that the intended campaign was likely to be one of 
Cleopatra’s own projects of which information has eluded us. However, both Smallwood and 
Richardson have based their views on the presumption that Herod set sail from Egypt sometime 
towards the end of autumn in 40. Although this date is not to be excluded, calculations made by 
Kokkinos (1998) 367-369 have demonstrated that Herod’s journey to Rome can have set off from 
Alexandria as early as February in that year. Accordingly, as the chronology of Herod’s return to 
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seafaring a hazardous enterprise, Herod left Egypt and sailed via Pamphylia and 
Rhodes to the harbour of Brundisium in Italy, whence he hurried to Rome.56 There, 
both Antony and Octavian, who sojourned in the capital at that time, were 
determined to nominate Herod as king (βασιλεύς). Eventually, the Senate 
bestowed the kingly office (βασιλεία) upon Herod in an official meeting towards 
the end of the year 40, while it declared Antigonus an enemy of Rome – not only, 
as Josephus asserts, because of certain earlier offences,57 but mainly “because he 
had received the sovereignty from the Parthians”.58 Following the formal session 
in the Senate, Herod is said to have joined Antony, Octavian, the consuls and 
other magistrates when they went to the Capitol to make a sacrifice and deposit 
the decree.59 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Rome is uncertain, it is not possible to say what campaign Cleopatra intended to entrust to Herod. 
“The disturbances in Italy” (“κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν θορύβους”) which would have left Herod 
undeterred when he was about to leave Egypt according to Josephus, BJ 1.279 (cf. AJ 14.276, where 
Josephus refers to “Italy in disorder” (“κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἐν ταραχῇ”)), can thus refer both to the 
Battle of Perusia at the beginning of 40 and to the upheaval in the summer of 40 between Octavian, 
Antony and Sextus Pompeius which culminated in the Pact of Brundisium in September of October 
of that year. Possibly, Cleopatra planned to send Herod to Italy to deal with either of these two 
conflicts. 
56 Josephus, AJ 14.375-379; BJ 1.278-281. The exact chronology of Herod’s journey to Rome is 
disputed. For critical discussions of this sequence of events, see among others Kokkinos (1998) 367-
369; Eckhardt (2007) 11 n.13. Cf. Kashtan (2002), who completely ignores the chronological 
uncertainties with regard to Herod’s journey to Rome in 40 despite the fact that the publication 
concentrates in part on this trip. 
57 Josephus does not explicate in both AJ 14.384 and BJ 1.284 what these earlier offences were. 
Marcus (1943) 651 n.g argues that Josephus in all likelihood refers to Antigonus’ role in the war led 
by his father Aristobulus in 49 against the Pompeian generals in Syria. Although neither Josephus 
nor any other source elucidates what Antigonus’ part, if any, in this conflict would have been (AJ 
14.123-126, BJ 1.183-186), the lack of evidence does not exclude Antigonus’ participation in the 
hostilities in 49.  
58 Josephus, AJ 14.384: “ὅτι καὶ παρὰ Πάρθων τὴν ἀρχὴν λάβοι” (LCL transl. adapted). Cf. BJ 
1.284, which equally claims that “he received the sovereignty from the Parthians” (“διὰ Πάρθων 
λάβοι τὴν ἀρχήν”, LCL transl. adapted). 
59 Josephus, AJ 14.379-388; BJ 1.281-285; Strabo, 16.2.46; Tacitus, Hist. 5.9; Appian, BC 5.75; Dio, 
49.22.6. Richardson (1999) 127-128 proposes that “Antony initiated the scheme to appoint Herod 
king… and pressed the idea upon Octavian”. Eckhardt (2007) 16-17 argues convincingly that 
Octavian was hardly involved in the nomination of Herod. He refers to a speech (BJ 1.388) which 
Herod allegedly made in front of Octavian in Rhodes following the Battle of Actium, in which he 
purportedly identified Antony as the one who had conferred the kingship upon him. If Octavian 
were equally responsible for conferring the royal title upon Herod, why would Herod not have 
said so in this speech, in which he gave account of his past conduct?  In my opinion, it seems 
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For Herod, the acquisition of the kingship formed, just like his three earlier 
promotions, another step forwards in his career entirely facilitated by Rome. It 
was the ultimate demonstration of trust that Rome had thus far made towards 
him. Whether the conferral of the royal title was what Herod envisioned to be the 
result of his trip, though, cannot be said with certainty because of inconsistencies 
in our source material. Whereas Josephus indicates in AJ 14.382 that Herod aspired 
to the kingship and promised Antony money in exchange for the royal title, in AJ 
14.386-387 he explains that Herod proceeded to Rome, “not to ask [the kingship, 
ed.] for himself, for he did not believe the Romans would offer it to him, since it 
was custom to give it to one of the reigning family, but to claim it for his wife’s 
brother [Aristobulus III, ed.],60 who was a grandson of Aristobulus [II, ed.] on his 
father’s side and of Hyrcanus on his mother’s”.61 Some scholars have dismissed 
the second version (AJ 14.386-387) as an attempt to acquit Herod of the accusation 
that he had removed the Hasmonaean dynasty from its legitimate ruling position 
in Judaea.62 They favour the account transmitted in AJ 14.382 according to which 
Herod requested the royal title for himself and used a bribe to strengthen his case, 
on the ground that Herod did not have an altruistic attitude and was too 
                                                                                                                                                                                
therefore likely that Octavian’s role in the nomination of Herod as king was minimal, all the more 
in the light of our other source material on Herod’s appointment as king. Strabo, Tacitus and 
Appian all ignore Octavian and ascribe the installation of Herod as king to Antony. Besides, in the 
later AJ Octavian plays a less-significant role in the nomination process than in BJ. All in all, it 
seems unlikely (as claimed in BJ) that Octavian was more determined than Antony to grant the 
kingship to Herod. That does, of course, not mean that he did not support or was not enthusiastic 
about Herod’s nomination for the kingship. 
60 Although this brother of Herod’s fiancée Mariamme – the wedding had not yet taken place – is 
not named in the passage, it is very likely that Josephus refers here to Aristobulus, the only brother 
of Mariamme known to us. 
61 Josephus, AJ 14.386-387: “οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν… ταύτην αἰτησόμενος, οὐ γὰρ ἐνόμιζεν αὐτῷ 
τοὺς Ῥωμαίους παρέξειν, τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ γένους ἔθος ἔχοντας αὐτὴν διδόναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ τῆς 
γυναικὸς ἀδελφῷ λαβεῖν ἀξιώσων υἱωνῷ τυγχάνοντι πρὸς μὲν πατρὸς Ἀριστοβούλου πρὸς δὲ 
μητρὸς Ὑρκανοῦ”. Cf. BJ 1.282-285, which does not reveal anything about Herod’s intentions. 
62 Otto (1913) 25-26; Schalit (1969) 689; Smallwood (1976) 54; Kasher (2007) 68-69. Cf. Laqueur 
(1920) 195-199, who oddly claims that the second passage (AJ 14.386-387) is not an attempt to 
acquit Herod, but shows Josephus accusing Herod of trying to justify his acquisition of the 
kingship and the termination of Hasmonaean rule over Judaea by stating that Herod actually 
intended to ask the royal title for Aristobulus. 
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ambitious to function as a mere mentor of the young, approximately thirteen year 
old Aristobulus.63 Some of them use a different argument and maintain that the 
seven days it took for the entire business in Rome to be accomplished would not 
have been sufficient if Herod still had to be persuaded to assume the royal title. 
Under the impression that the entire procedure leading up to the nomination of a 
king by Rome would have taken more time, they have come to the conclusion that 
Herod must already have aimed for the royal title before he arrived at Rome, and 
that in view of the kingship he may already have initiated negotiations during his 
recess in Rhodes.64 Problematic as the second version transmitted by Josephus (AJ 
14.386-387) thus appears to be, none of the pieces of supportive evidence brought 
forward to repudiate the view of Herod demanding the sovereignty over Judaea 
for Aristobulus is actually compelling. Eckhardt has already pointed out that the 
argument according to which Herod’s selfish character would have prevented him 
from asking a favour for Aristobulus is highly speculative in view of it being 
based on presumed knowledge of Herod’s personality.65 In addition, since there is 
no comparative material for the time spent on the official recognition of a king in 
Rome (appellatio), it is not possible to claim that seven days would have been 
inadequate for Antony and Octavian to convince Herod to assume the royal title 
and for the Senate to pass its verdict on the proposed nomination. Besides, there is 
no evidence whatsoever that Herod already conducted consultations during his 
stay in Rhodes.66 The idea that Herod asked the Romans a favour for Aristobulus 
thus cannot categorically be dismissed. What is more, there are reasons thinkable 
                                                          
63 Schalit (1969) 690 and Smallwood (1976) 54 both use the argument based on Herod’s character. 
That Aristobulus was about thirteen years old in 40 is based on Josephus, AJ 15.51 where it is said 
that he was seventeen years old when he assumed the High Priesthood, and on AJ 15.56 where 
reference is made to Aristobulus being no more than eighteen years of age when he died after 
having served for only a year. Aristobulus acceded to the High Priesthood in 35, on which see 
Schürer (1973) 287-288.  
64 Otto (1913) 26; Schalit (1969) 690. 
65 Eckhardt (2007) 14.  
66 For a similar view, see among others Buchheim (1960) 115 n. 159 (without argumentation); 
Eckhardt (2007) 24. On the official recognition of kings by Rome (appellatio) and the rituals on the 
Capitol, see Braund (1984) 23-27. 
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why Herod would actually have put forward Aristobulus for the kingship over 
Judaea.67 The kings that Judaea had known ever since its independence from 
Seleucid rule in the 140s BC – Aristobulus I, Alexander Jannaeus, Hyrcanus II, 
Aristobulus II – had all been recruited from the same Hasmonaean family to 
which Aristobulus III also belonged, and had at the same time all filled the High 
Priesthood. In the recent past, the kingship was thus always combined with the 
highest sacred position in Judaea. As a descendant of a non-clerical family, Herod 
must have been aware that he was not eligible for the High Priesthood.68 That 
Rome was willing to detach the kingship from the High Priesthood in Judaea was 
in all likelihood not anticipated by him. Would it thus not be much for logical for 
Herod to have gone to Rome to ask the kingship for the young and inexperienced 
Aristobulus rather than for himself? Herod could have served as an influential 
mentor for this youthful ruler in the same way as his father Antipater had 
functioned as an adviser for Hyrcanus II. Plausible as this suggestion is,69 we have 
already said above that it is not possible to identify with certainty the requests that 
Herod made in Rome. The view according to which Herod requested the royal 
title in Rome for himself can, in other words, not categorically be relegated to the 
realm of fantasy. 
Yet, whatever Herod’s intentions were when he visited Rome, on Antony’s 
initiative and with the consent of Octavian he was eventually granted the kingship 
during an official meeting of the Senate. What had driven both triumvirs to strive 
for the nomination of Herod is not entirely evident. Fortunately, Josephus 
provides us with several potential explanations for Antony’s and Octavian’s 
support of Herod’s candidature for the Judaean throne. In the Jewish War, it is 
claimed that Antony’s determination to bestow the royal title upon Herod was 
                                                          
67 Eckhardt (2007) 20-24 comes up with similar potential reasons. 
68 Wilker (2007) 30; Rocca (2008) 34. 
69  Other scholars claiming (on the basis of limited or no critical analysis) that Herod in all 
likelihood asked the kingship for Aristobulus are among others Buchheim (1960) 66; Stern (1974b) 
221; Richardson (1999) 128; Wilker (2007) 30. 
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motivated by “the recollection of Antipater’s hospitality” (“μνήμην μὲν τῆς 
Ἀντιπάτρου ξενίας”), and by Herod’s “heroic qualities” (“τὴν… ἀρετήν”). 70 
Although Josephus does not refer to these “heroic qualities” (whatever they were) 
in his Jewish Antiquities, he does mention Antony’s “memory of Antipater’s 
hospitality” (“μνήμην τῆς Ἀντιπάτρου ξενίας”).71 We have already seen that the 
recollection of the ξενία with which Antipater had entertained Antony during his 
term as praefectus equitum under Gabinius, the proconsul of Syria between 57 and 
55, had partly impelled the decision to appoint Herod and his brother Phasael as 
tetrarchs of Judaea in 41. That these considerations would have played a role once 
more a year later with the nomination to the kingship is thus not very odd. 
Obviously, this does not indicate that Antony’s friendly relations with Antipater 
formed the main driving force behind the bestowal of the royal title upon Herod. 
In the Jewish Antiquities, it has already been said that Antony’s eagerness to award 
the royal title was dictated “much more by his hatred towards Antigonus” than by 
the good relations with Antipater.72 For Octavian, the main reason to give at least 
his consent to the nomination of Herod as king was the memory of the 
Alexandrian War in 47 during which Antipater rendered military assistance to 
Julius Caesar, and the hospitality which Antipater had shown towards Octavian’s 
adoptive father.73 Josephus adds to these motives in his Jewish Antiquities that 
Octavian would have been willing to do Antony a favour by giving his consent to 
the grant of kingship to Herod.74  
                                                          
70 Josephus, BJ 1.282. 
71 Josephus, AJ 14.381. 
72 Josephus, AJ 14.382: “πολὺ μέντοι μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ πρὸς Ἀντίγονον μῖσος”. Josephus claims in 
the same section as well that Antony’s support for Herod was partly dictated “by the money which 
Herod promised to give him, if he became king” (“ὑπὸ χρημάτων ὧν αὐτῷ δώσειν Ἡρώδης, εἰ 
γένοιτο βασιλεύς”). Obviously, as we saw in the previous paragraph, it is doubtful whether 
Herod actually came to Rome to ask the royal title for himself. That Antony was prompted by a 
bribe to grant the kingship is thus not certain. Cf. BJ 1.282, which does mention the hatred towards 
Antigonus as well.  
73 Josephus, AJ 14.383; BJ 1.283. 
74 Josephus, AJ 14.383. 
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Eager as Antony and Octavian thus appear to have been, a decision about 
the conferral of the royal title was eventually taken by the Senate, not by the two 
triumvirs.75 Although the factors allegedly prompting Antony and Octavian to 
favour Herod’s elevation to the kingship may definitely have persuaded 
individual senators to support the appointment of Herod, it is much more likely 
that in view of the Parthian invasion of the eastern Mediterranean the ultimate 
choice was dictated by pragmatic motives. Rome was in need of a ruler with the 
necessary skills and military expertise to confront the Parthian-backed king 
Antigonus. Herod had already demonstrated these abilities when he served as a 
στρατηγός in Galilee and dealt with robbers led by a certain Ezekias.76 A suitable 
member of the Hasmonaean dynasty was not available. With at most thirteen 
years of age, Aristobulus III was too young and inexperienced to assume the royal 
title and serve as military leader in the war against Antigonus. Herod was thus the 
only serious candidate for the kingship. Moreover, with the title of king, Rome 
had clearly posed him as the alternative ruler for Judaea. That Herod’s nomination 
marked the termination of Hasmonaean rule over Judaea did probably not bother 
the Senate that much, all the more so since previous dynasts of this family had 
caused internal trouble. Although Josephus’ reports of the Senatorial meeting do 
not point out what the decisive motive was for the grant of kingship to Herod, 
they do refer to Antony elaborating on Herod’s usefulness for the war against the 
Parthian invaders.77  The senators Messalla and Atratinus would even in their 
address to the Senate have made mention of the goodwill (εὔνοια) that Herod had 
shown towards Rome. 78  Pragmatic motives are thus attested in our source 
                                                          
75 The third triumvir, Lepidus, seems to have been in Africa at the time of Herod’s appointment: 
Appian, BCiv. 5.53; Dio, 48.20.4. 
76 Josephus, AJ 14.158-162; BJ 1.201-207. 
77 Josephus, AJ 14.385; BJ 1.284. 
78 Josephus, AJ 14.384. No parallel in BJ. 
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material, and it is very likely that they played a crucial role behind the Senate’s 
decision to award the kingship to Herod.79  
 
10.5 Herod’s return to Judaea, Roman support and the intervention at Samosata 
 
The newly-received kingship had established Herod in a more powerful position 
to confront Antigonus, his Parthian-backed enemy.80 With the intention to expel 
his rival from the throne and to take ultimate control over his kingdom, Herod 
departed from Rome and travelled to Ptolemais in Phoenicia, where he most likely 
arrived towards the end of the winter season in the year 39.81 At that time, the 
Roman general P. Ventidius Bassus was engaged in curbing the disturbances that 
the Parthians had caused to arise in cities of Rome’s eastern provinces, while the 
command over a small contingent of soldiers in Judaea was in the hands of 
Poppaedius Silo, possibly a legate of Antony.82 With a considerable force of native 
and foreign troops, which he had acquired upon arrival in Ptolemais, Herod 
progressed into the Galilee, succeeded to make it almost entirely allegiant to him, 
and set out to rescue his family from the fortress of Masada, which lay under siege 
of Antigonus’ forces. As Herod found on his way the city of Joppa to be hostile 
towards him and allegedly wished to eliminate the threat of a possible attack in 
the rear, he captured it before continuing his march to Masada.83 After Herod had 
successfully liberated his family, and saw his forces being augmented with 
                                                          
79 Similar conclusion and arguments by Otto (1913) 26; Schalit (1969) 85-87; Stern (1974b) 221; 
Smallwood (1976) 55; Bauman (1983) 147-148; Eckhardt (2007) 17-18. 
80 It is not my aim to give a full description of Herod’s conquest of Judaea. For a detailed narrative 
of the war against Antigonus with references to sources, see among others Schalit (1969) 88-97; 
Shatzman (1991) 150-169 (especially with regard to the military aspect); Richardson (1999) 153-162; 
Kasher (2007) 72-86. 
81 Josephus, AJ 14.394; BJ 1.290.  
82  Josephus, AJ 14.395; BJ 1.291: although Josephus does not make it explicit in which cities 
Ventidius undertook the suppression of disturbances, as the latter had already left Judaea (AJ 
14.393; BJ 1.289), it is clear that he either quelled the insurgencies in Syria or in Asia Minor. On the 
official position of Poppaedius Silo, see Broughton (1952) 389. 
83  Josephus, AJ 14.394-397; BJ 1.290-293. The origin of “the considerable force of foreigners” 
(“δύναμιν οὐκ ὀλίγην ξένων”), mentioned in AJ 14.394 and BJ 1.290 is unknown to us. 
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inhabitants of Masada and perhaps even with people from the wider Dead Sea 
region, he advanced to Jerusalem to subdue Antigonus, and was joined by Silo 
and his army.84 Hostilities between both parties were underway when towards the 
beginning of the winter in 39 Silo persuaded some of his soldiers to “cry aloud 
about the lack of provisions, to demand money for food, and to insist that they be 
taken to suitable quarters for wintering, since the region about the city was a 
waste as a result of the ravaging by Antigonus’ soldiers...”.85 Josephus explains 
that Herod collected provisions from other parts of the country as an attempt to 
change the soldiers’ minds so that they would not desert him.86 These supplies, 
however, failed to achieve the desired effect, and Herod was forced to dismiss the 
Roman army in Idumaea, the Galilee and Samaria, districts which were on his 
side.87 As to the reasons behind the retreat into the winter quarters, Josephus 
reveals that Silo was induced by money that Antigonus offered him.88 In the hope 
to win Antony’s favour, Antigonus had allegedly offered another bribe to Silo and 
succeeded in inducing him to station a part of his army in Lydda, a city on the 
west frontier of Judaea proper.89 Whether these allegations of bribery are justified 
                                                          
84 Josephus, AJ 14.398-400; BJ 1.294. 
85 Josephus, AJ 14.406: “(...) σπάνιν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων καταβοᾶν καὶ χρήματα εἰς τροφὰς αἰτεῖν, 
καὶ χειμάσοντας ἀπάγειν εἰς τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τόπους, τῶν περὶ τὴν πόλιν ὄντων ἐπήμων διὰ 
τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀντιγόνου στρατιωτῶν ἀνεκευάσθαι ...”. Josephus, BJ 1.297 mentions the outcry 
(σπάνις) of the soldiers and the two demands as well. 
86 Josephus, AJ 14.408-410; BJ 1.299-301. 
87 Josephus, AJ 14.411; BJ 1.302. Although Josephus does not make it explicit that Herod had no 
other choice than to dismiss his soldiers, that Herod did not have any other choice seems to be 
logical in the light of the efforts that he had made to keep the Roman troops with him. The 
inhabitants of the city of Samaria and the surrounding district had in all likelihood become friendly 
towards Herod at some point after he had returned from Rome, since Josephus informs us that he 
instructed them to provide him with cattle, wine, oil corn and other things with which he hoped to 
appease the demands of Silo and his army (Josephus, AJ 14.408; BJ 1.299). 
88 Josephus, AJ 14.406: “Then it was that Silo showed openly that he had taken a bribe” (“Τότε καὶ 
Σίλων ἀπεκαλύψατο τὴν δωροδοκίαν”); 14.395: “… Silo in Judaea having been corrupted with 
money by Antigonus” (“…Σίλων δ' ἐν Ἰουδαίᾳ χρήμασιν ὑπ' Ἀντιγόνου διεφθαρμένος”, LCL 
transl. adapted); BJ 1.297: “And now Silo’s conduct betrayed his corruption” (“Ἔνθα δὴ Σίλων 
ἀπεκαλύψατο τὴν δωροδοκίαν”); 1.291: “… Silo in Judaea having been corrupted with money by 
Antigonus” (“…Σίλων δ' ἐν Ἰουδαίᾳ χρήμασιν ὑπ' Ἀντιγόνου διεφθαρμένος”, LCL transl. 
adapted). 
89 Josephus, AJ 14.412; BJ 1.302. 
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cannot be clarified.90 What has become clear is that Silo – and also Ventidius 
during his brief visit to Judaea earlier in 39 – did not put all effort in ousting 
Antigonus from the throne.91 Apparently, an official decree of the Senate, which 
was backed by at least two of the three triumvirs (Antony and Octavian), and 
declared a foreign ruler an enemy of Rome, could not be enforced throughout the 
entire empire in a period when the eastern Mediterranean was in great distress as 
a result of an invasion. Commanders and other officials could act in contradiction 
to the decisions made by the key organs of the Roman state realising that they 
would probably not face any serious repercussions for their behaviour.92 
 Abandoned by the Roman troops who had retreated into their winter 
quarters, Herod dispatched his brother Joseph to Idumaea, lodged his own family 
in Samaria, and advanced into the Galilee, where he succeeded to expel the 
remaining garrisons of Antigonus and managed to defeat the brigands who 
operated from caves.93 Josephus informs us that Ventidius asked Silo and Herod to 
join him in Syria in the war against the Parthians, after they would have 
completed the conflicts in the Galilee. However, Herod is said to have dismissed 
Silo and conducted the war against the bandits himself.94 The reason behind the 
decision is difficult to gauge, but it is probably related to the fact that Silo had 
earlier on deserted Herod and was no longer regarded as a trustworthy ally. 
 Following the final defeat of the Parthians in 38, on Antony’s instructions 
Ventidius dispatched a certain Machaeras with two legions and two thousand 
                                                          
90 Cf. Schalit (1969) 89, 691, who argues that the allegations of bribery are probably accurate.  
91 Josephus claims that Ventidius extorted money from Antigonus when he was in Judaea (AJ 
14.392-393; BJ 1.288-289). If we can trust this allegation, then it is very understandable why 
Ventidius did not make any effort to expel Antigonus. 
92 Cf. Schalit (1969) 691, who argues that Ventidius and Silo did not assist Herod in removing 
Antigonus because Antony was far away in Athens, and because the envoy Q. Dellius dispatched 
by Antony to Ventidius and Silo with instructions to support Herod had apparently not informed 
them of the orders. Although the first explanation given by Schalit is plausible, the second one 
seems to contradict AJ 14.394 and BJ 1.290, where Josephus explicitly says that Dellius convinced 
Ventidius and Silo to render assistance to Herod. The difficulty of enforcing all decisions made in 
Rome throughout the empire is discussed in more detail in chapter 17.2. 
93 Josephus, AJ 14.413-433; BJ 1.303-316. 
94 Josephus, AJ 14.420-421; BJ 1.309. 
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horsemen to Herod to support him.95 Unfortunately for Herod, though, the new 
commander did not prove to be of much help. Having supposedly been offered 
bribes, Machaeras went to see Antigonus and was unexpectedly repulsed by him 
with armed force. Allegedly enraged about the hostile reception, “[Machaeras, ed.] 
withdrew to the city of Emmaus and slaughtered all the Judaeans whom he met 
on the way, whether friends or foes”.96 Details about this killing spree are not 
preserved in our sources, but Josephus clarifies that Herod was “irritated” 
(“παροξυνθείς”) by Machaeras’ armed aggression and accordingly decided to 
inform Antony in person about the lack of support he had received.97 The triumvir 
was at that time involved in a war against king Antiochus of Commagene who 
had granted shelter to Parthian refugees unable to return to their own land after 
defeat of the Parthians near Gindarus. 98 The king was besieged in his capital 
Samosata and still managed to resist the Romans when Herod arrived. 99 
Eventually, though, the hostilities were brought to an end. Josephus claims in his 
Jewish War that it was Herod who actually managed to terminate the siege – a 
claim that seems to be exaggerated in the light of our other two sources, Dio and 
Plutarch, who both reveal that the hostilities had stopped by some sort of 
negotiation between Antiochus and Antony.100 Moreover, in the Jewish Antiquities, 
nothing is said of Herod participating in the attack on Samosata. Whatever 
Herod’s involvement was in the conflict against Antiochus, following the end of 
the aggression, Rome finally had military power available that could be employed 
in Judaea. Antony appointed C. Sosius, the future consul of 32, to the province of 
Syria and gave him the task to support Herod in gaining control over his 
                                                          
95 Josephus, AJ 14.434; BJ 1.317. 
96 Josephus, AJ 14.435-436: “ἀνεχώρει μὲν εἰς Ἀμμαοῦν πόλιν, οἷς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν Ἰουδαίοις 
περιετύγχανε τούτους ἀπέσφαττεν ἐχθρούς τε καὶ φίλους” (LCL transl. adapted). BJ 1.318-319 
also mentions the assassination of the Judaeans.  
97 Josephus, AJ 14.437; BJ 1.320. 
98 On the war against Antiochus of Commagene in 38, see chapter 16.2. 
99 Josephus, AJ 14.445-447; BJ 1.322. 
100 Josephus, AJ 14.322; Dio, 49.22.1-2; Plutarch, Ant. 34.4. 
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kingdom. 101  Eventually, thanks to renewed Roman military assistance, Herod 
managed in the course of 37 to defeat his enemy at Jerusalem and to get hold of his 
realm.102  
 
10.6 Antony between Cleopatra and Herod  
 
With the defeat of Antigonus in the summer of 37, Herod finally came into the 
possession of the kingdom which had been conferred upon him three years earlier. 
Although the exact extent of his realm at this stage is unknown to us, it 
encompassed in all likelihood the districts Judaea, the Galilee, Peraea, the eastern 
part of Idumaea, and Samaria (though not including the homonymous city).103 It is 
not clear whether the payment of tribute or any other regular tax was imposed on 
Herod’s newly conquered kingdom, as had been the case with Judaea following 
the reorganisation by Pompey in 63. Although Appian mentions Herod in a list 
along with three other kings who were to pay a contribution to Rome as exchange 
for the kingship, his statement may refer to a one-time fee rather than to a regular 
land or capital tax.104  
                                                          
101 Josephus, AJ 14.447; BJ 1.322. 
102 Josephus, AJ 14.448-491; BJ 1.323-357; Tacitus, Hist. 5.9; Dio, 49.22.3-6. 
103 Although the precise geographical extent of Herod’s realm at the end of the war in 37 is not 
attested anywhere, it is possible on the basis of our knowledge of the conquests made during the 
conflict with Antigonus in the first place, and of the territories that Octavian awarded Herod in the 
year 30 in the second place, to establish roughly over what district Herod’s rule stretched. 
Josephus, AJ 15.217 and BJ 1.396 informs us that when Octavian came to Egypt after the death of 
Cleopatra and Antony, he granted Gaza, Anthedon (both in western Idumaea), Joppa, Strato’s 
Tower, Gadara, Hippos and Samaria to Herod. Samaria (Σαμάρεια) in this context refers in all 
likelihood to the city and not to the district, because all the other places enumerated by Josephus 
are cities. Moreover, the region Samaria had already been under control when Herod dismissed 
Silo and his armies to their winter quarters towards the end of 39 (In AJ 14.411 and BJ 1.302). Cf. 
Richardson (1999) 131 who fails to provide arguments for his claim according to which the district 
of Samaria was only given to Herod in 30. 
104 Appian, BCiv. 5.75 informs us that Herod had to pay a tribute (φόρος) for being set up as king 
“over the Idumaeans and Samaritans” (“Ἰδουμαίων δὲ καὶ Σαμαρέων). It is unclear, though, 
whether the reference is here to a recurrent tax or to a one-off levy. Moreover, Appian only 
mentions the Idumaeans and Samaritans, suggesting that the payment due to Antony was only in 
exchange for the rule over Idumaea and the district of Samaria. Cf. Schalit (1969) 161-162, who 
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 A year after Herod had defeated Antigonus and taken control over his 
kingdom, he had to face a misfortune when Antony awarded Cleopatra the coastal 
cities from the Eleutherus River in the north to Egypt in the south, with the 
exception of Tyre and Sidon.105 As we have seen in a previous chapter, Cleopatra 
seems to have had the ambition to expand her kingdom with those territories in 
the Near East which formerly constituted a part of the Ptolemaic Kingdom. She 
probably considered her relationship with Antony to be a suitable instrument for 
the fulfilment of this plan. As a result of the grant of this request, though, Herod 
was deprived of vital access to the sea – a loss that will have had serious 
consequences for the economic situation in Judaea. Yet, despite the territorial 
rearrangement in favour of Cleopatra, Antony’s relationship with Herod does not 
seem to have deteriorated too severely. Even the further loss of lands two years 
later did not affect the bond beyond repair. In 37/36, Antony granted the balsam- 
groves around Jericho to Cleopatra as part of a grand-scale reorganisation of the 
Near East and Asia Minor, known as the Donations of Alexandria. For a high rent 
of 200 talents a year, Herod leased it in addition to portions of Nabataea from the 
Ptolemaic queen. Furthermore, the Judaean king stood surety for the payment that 
the Nabataean king Malichus was due to Cleopatra.106 Whether or not the decision 
to have Herod standing surety for the charges that Malichus owed Cleopatra was 
designed to engender conflict between the two kings, the relations between the 
two kings did deteriorate, as we shall see further below. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
believes that Appian’s passage is corrupt, and that we ought to read Ἰουδαίων instead of 
Ἰδουμαίων. Schalit cannot believe that Antony would only demand money for a part of the 
kingdom and has therefore argued for the change in the text. Pastor (1997) 106 believes that Roman 
taxes were probably still levied from 37 onwards. Schalit (1969) 161-162 argues on the basis of 
Appian, BCiv. 5.75 that Herod had to pay tax for the districts Judaea and Samaria.  
105 For a detailed discussion with references of the grant of Judaean territories to Cleopatra, see 
chapter 9.3.  
106 On the loss of Nabataean territories to Cleopatra and the contribution that Malichus had to pay, 
see chapter 9.3 and chapter 13.2.  
176 
With regard to Ptolemaic territorial ambitions, Antony thus showed willingness to 
meet Cleopatra’s demands. This goodwill did not, however, manifest itself in all 
cases of conflicting interest between Cleopatra and Herod. The strife between the 
Ptolemaic queen and the Judaean king in the aftermath of the death of Aristobulus 
III in 35 or 34, for example, was settled by Antony in favour of Herod. The origin 
of this friction dates back to 37 when Herod appointed Hananel, a Babylonian Jew 
of sacerdotal lineage, as High Priest.107 Although Hyrcanus had been released from 
Parthian captivity, he was no longer suitable for this position as a result of the 
physical defect that he had incurred in the wake of the Parthian invasion of Judaea 
in 40. Herod himself lacked the necessary qualifications to assume this office in the 
light of his descent from a non-priestly family.108 Alexandra, Herod’s mother-in-
law, and Mariamme, Herod’s wife, criticised the choice of a High Priest from 
Babylonia while a legitimate candidate for the highest sacred position in Judaea 
from their own Hasmonaean line was available in the person of their son and 
brother Aristobulus III. They therefore urged Herod to depose Hananel and 
nominate this Aristobulus as High Priest instead. Alexandra is even said by 
Josephus to have asked Cleopatra to enquire whether Antony would be willing to 
persuade Herod to appoint Aristobulus. Although it is unclear how much 
pressure Antony put on Herod, probably in 35 the Judaean king ultimately 
complied with the request and removed Hananel and nominated Aristobulus as 
his replacement.109 Yet, however much the promotion of a Hasmonaean to the 
High Priesthood had appeased Alexandra and Mariamme, the amity did not last 
for long. About a year after his instalment, Aristobulus is said to have drowned in 
a swimming pool while attending a banquet in Jericho. Alexandra accused Herod 
                                                          
107 Josephus, AJ 15.22. 
108 Herod was the son of the Idumaean Antipater and of Cypros “a woman of a distinguished 
family from Arabia [i.e. Nabataea, ed]” (Josephus, BJ 1.181: “γυναῖκα τῶν ἐπισήμων ἐξ Ἀραβίας”; 
AJ 14.121). On the appointment of the High Priest by Herod, see Rocca (2008) 282-283, who 
explains that Herod’s selection of a candidate from the Diaspora was dictated by the potential 
threat that a High Priest from Judaea (especially from the Hasmonaean family) could pose to the 
position of the new king. 
109 Josephus, AJ 15.21-38. 
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and managed through her connection with Cleopatra to have Herod summoned to 
Antony in Laodicea to give account of his role in Aristobulus’ demise. Josephus 
informs us that by means of a bribe he succeeded in being acquitted.110 Whether or 
not money was in play here, it is much more likely that Antony’s decision to 
exonerate Herod was dictated by pragmatic motives. No suitable alternative ruler 
was available to replace Herod; moreover the new king had demonstrated his 
loyalty in the past to many different Roman representatives in the East.111 Yet, 
whatever prompted Antony to free Herod, the episode shows at least how 
dependent Herod’s position had become on Antony as Rome’s representative in 
the East. Even for an internal Judaean affair, he had to give account to Rome.  
 
10.7 Actium and Herod in war with Malichus of Nabataea 
 
The political relations between Rome and Judaea as they unfolded following 
Herod’s absolution in 35 or 34 remain largely shrouded in mist until Antony the 
advent of the war against Octavian in 31. Probably as a result of the good 
relationship between both rulers and the benefits which Herod had received from 
Antony, Herod intended to sent troops to Antony’s support for the conflict against 
Antony. On Cleopatra’s advice, however, Antony decided to decline the offer of 
assistance and ordered Herod to begin a war against the Nabataean king. Josephus 
explains that the Ptolemaic queen hoped in this way to extend her hegemony over 
either Judaea or Arabia depending on the outcome of the war.112 Plausible as this 
explanation is, the ambition of the Ptolemaic queen to extend her control was in all 
likelihood not the only motive behind the order given to Herod. Josephus informs 
us in his Jewish Antiquities that Malichus had overdue payments to Cleopatra and 
that Herod had himself already planned to undertake an expedition into 
                                                          
110 Josephus, AJ 15.62-87. 
111 Similar views by Schalit (1969) 113-114 and Smallwood (1976) 66 among others. 
112 Josephus, AJ 15.110; BJ 1.364-365. 
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Nabataea, but refrained from doing so only when he heard about a looming 
confrontation between Octavian and Antony in Greece.113 As explained above, 
Herod stood surety for Malichus’ debts and was thus desperate to ensure that the 
terms of the agreement with the Ptolemaic queen would be fulfilled. One of 
Cleopatra’s main concerns must have been the retrieval of those outstanding 
debts. From that perspective, it is not odd that she prompted Antony to instruct 
Herod to launch a punitive expedition against Malichus, all the more since the 
queen and her paramour were in the process of gathering troops and resources for 
the war against Octavian and would thus not have had the opportunity to recover 
the debt themselves. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The war against Malichus was protracted and for a long time none of the two sides 
managed to inflict a decisive defeat upon the other until in the course of 31 the 
tables turned in favour of Herod and the conflict ended in Judaean victory.114 In 
the meantime, the Battle of Actium had already taken place and Herod was 
concerned that he would face penalties by Octavian for his friendly relations with 
Antony. Fortunately for Herod, Octavian confirmed him in his position when he 
went to see him in Rhodes in 30, and later in Egypt returned him the territories 
that had been given to Cleopatra and even added several other cities in addition.115 
Despite his support for Octavian’s enemy, Herod was apparently still regarded to 
be a suitable ruler of Judaea, especially as he had shown himself to have been a 
loyal supporter of any Roman that held supremacy in the Near East. During the 
ten years that Antony held the supreme power over the eastern Mediterranean, 
                                                          
113 Josephus, AJ 15.107-110. 
114 For more details on the course of the war between Herod and Malichus, see among others 
Smallwood (1976) 67. 
115 Josephus, AJ 15.187-195, 217; BJ 1.387-393, 396-397. 
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the triumvir must have been aware that Herod was an asset for Rome. In those 
circumstances where Herod was in conflict with Alexandra, his wife Mariamme or 
other members of Judaea’s ruling elite, Antony manifested himself as a staunch 
supporter of Herod. Yet, the loss of territories to Cleopatra also demonstrates that 
Antony did not refrain from taking away territories from Herod’s realm. Clearly, 
Judaea was regarded as an extension of the Roman Empire. The new king, on the 
other hand, realised that his position depended entirely on his faithfulness 
towards Rome and that his freedom to act was restricted. This moral obligation to 
support Antony is demonstrated most clearly in Herod’s intention to support 
Antony at Actium.  
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11 PRINCEDOM OF CHALCIS 
 
In Part II.A we saw how the Princedom of Chalcis, possibly pressurised by the 
Parthians, supported the renegade Q. Caecilius Bassus in his revolt in Syria. No 
other political contact is known to have taken place. How the relations with Rome 
developed after Philippi up till the Battle of Actium needs to be considered at 
present. Of particular interest in this respect is Parthia’s influence on these 
bilateral relations. 
 
11.1 Antony in the East 
 
Following the Battle of Philippi, Octavian returned to Italy and took on the 
distribution of land among the veteran soldiers, while Antony stayed in Greece for 
the remainder of the year, and advanced in the spring of 41 into Asia Minor, from 
where he made a journey through Anatolia and the Near East. On his tour, 
Antony dealt, among other things, with diplomatic matters, engaged in judicial 
affairs, and levied contributions with which the rewards promised to the troops 
were to be financed.1 In order to secure sufficient funds, the triumvir did not, 
however, merely target the subjects in Rome’s provinces. Even some of the 
kingdoms and principalities in the eastern Mediterranean appear to have been 
used as a source of wealth. Of all the ancient authors, Appian is most elaborate in 
this respect and provides us with an, albeit inexhaustive, list of geographical 
regions affected by Antony’s measures. Some of those regions, such as Galatia and 
Cappadocia, stood under royal domination during the time of the events 
described, whereas others came either partially or entirely under Roman 
                                                          
1 Dio, 48.2.2-4; Plutarch, Ant. 23.1; Appian, BCiv. 5.3-8; Suetonius, Aug. 13.3; Josephus, AJ 14.301; BJ 
1.242. On the land allotments, the collection of funds and the former supporters of Brutus and 
Cassius, see chapter 10.1. 
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provincial rule.2 Of particular interest to us is the reference to Ituraea (Ἰτουραία), 
by which toponym the author may have denoted territories that in the year 41 
were governed by Ptolemy, son of Mennaeus. Although there is no trace of 
Ptolemy having represented himself publicly as ruler of the Ituraeans, it is clear, as 
illustrated above, that his realm comprised, besides the city of Chalcis and the 
Beqāʽ valley, portions of the Lebanon mountain ranges which were inhabited by 
Ituraeans among others.3 It is, however, important to point out that not all the 
Ituraeans inhabited lands at this time that came under the control of the prince of 
Chalcis. Ituraean presence has also been attested in the northern part of Mount 
Lebanon, where another Ptolemy appears to have ruled over a different 
principality, possibly centred at the settlement of Acra.4 This sovereign is said to 
have been the son of a certain Sohaemus and to have supplied Caesar with aid 
during his involvement in the Ptolemaic succession crisis at Alexandria in 47.5 
Nothing more is heard about this prince. Yet, it is not impossible for him still to 
have been on the throne in 41. When Appian thus mentions Antony’s imposition 
of contributions on Ἰτουραία, it cannot be excluded that the principalities of both 
Ptolemies were forced to make financial transfers. Certainty can, however, not be 
attained, all the more since the toponym Ἰτουραία and its Latin equivalent Ituraea 
seem to signify, despite its infrequent use, different territories to different classical 
authors.6 Thus, as Aliquot has adequately stated, “l’identification d’une Iturée 
strictement ou vaguement circonscrite ne semble pas possible”.7 The fact that some 
of the territories where the Ituraeans had settled were simultaneously occupied by 
other peoples, may have contributed to this divergence. Equally vital in this 
respect were the multiple territorial changes implemented in the Lebanon 
                                                          
2 Appian, BCiv. 5.7. 
3 See chapter 1.6. 
4 Aliquot (1999-2003) 237-241. On the locations of Ituraean settlement, see among others: ibid. 198-
205; Schottroff (1982) 130-137. 
5 Josephus, AJ 14.129; cf. BJ 1.188, which mentions Ptolemy, but does not specify that he was the 
son of a Sohaemus. 
6 Aliquot (1999-2003) 191-198 provides an overview and critical discussion of the relevant evidence. 
7 Aliquot (1999-2003) 191. 
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Mountain ranges and the Hauran.8 Yet, despite these uncertainties, there is a 
possibility that Appian in the aforementioned passage denoted those districts 
inhabited by the Ituraeans when he used the toponym Ἰτουραία. In that case, the 
two Ptolemies do not seem to have been able to evade the contributions that 
Antony had imposed on several Anatolian and Near Eastern kingdoms and 
principalities. 
 Whether or not the Princedom of Chalcis in the end was obliged to share 
the financial burden that had been imposed on a large part of the eastern 
Mediterranean, it is evident that Antony did not merely engage in the exaction of 
money, the confiscation of goods and supplies. In response to embassies that came 
to him from various parts of Anatolia and the Near East, he also dealt with judicial 
affairs. 9  In a previous chapter, we saw, for example, that during his visit in 
Ephesus, Antony was approached by an embassy requesting the restoration of 
certain annexed territories and Judaean people who had been taken captive when 
Cassius dominated the Near East.10 Antony granted the demand, and informed the 
Judaean ἐθνάρχης Hyrcanus about it in a letter that had been transmitted by 
Josephus.11 In this letter, the names of the envoys appear who participated as a 
member in the deputation sent to Antony. Apart from Lysimachus, son of 
Pausanias, and Alexander, son of Theodorus, a certain Josephus, son of Mennaeus, 
is named. Sullivan has made the incredible suggestion on the basis of the 
appearance of the same patronymic that this Josephus might have been the 
brother of Ptolemy, the ruler of Chalcis.12 The implausibility of this idea is patent 
in the light of the good relations which Ptolemy had maintained since the year 49 
with the Hasmonaean prince Antigonus, who in 42, following Cassius’ departure 
from the Near East to prepare for the war against the triumvirs, had made an 
                                                          
8 For these explanations, see Aliquot (1999-2003) 197-198. 
9 See chapter 10.1. 
10 For more details, see chapter 10.2  
11 Josephus, AJ 14.306-313 contains the letter. 
12 Sullivan (1990) 207. 
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attempt to deprive Hyrcanus of the throne with the assistance of Ptolemy 
himself.13 Although the challenge to obtain control over Judaea eventually failed, 
Ptolemy’s involvement in the unsuccessful coup is indicative of his enmity 
towards Hyrcanus. It is therefore highly unlikely that Ptolemy allowed a relative 
of his to function as an envoy on an embassy sent by Hyrcanus with the aim to 
obtain certain benefits from Antony. The Josephus, son of Mennaeus, mentioned 
in the letter allegedly sent by Antony to Hyrcanus, is probably a highly placed 
figure in the Judaean state, or, less likely, a rebellious brother of Ptolemy. 
 
11.2 The Parthian invasion, the death of Ptolemy and the ascension of Lysanias 
 
As we saw above, at some point between the winter of 41 and the spring of 40, 
Parthian troops led by Pacorus, the son of king Orodes II, and the Roman deserter 
Q. Labienus crossed the Euphrates into the province of Syria, where they split 
their forces. Labienus took on the war against the legate L. Decidius Saxa, and 
continued his march westwards across Asia Minor. Pacorus, on the other hand, 
moved to the south from Syria, conquering the Phoenician coastal cities with the 
exception of Tyre and invading Judaea along with the Parthian satrap 
Barzaphranes.14 Josephus explains that around this time Ptolemy died – probably 
of natural causes – and was succeeded as ruler of Chalcis by his son Lysanias.15 
Soon after the succession, the new monarch appears to have concluded friendship 
with the Hasmonaean prince Antigonus, who already since 49 upon the 
assassination of his brother Alexander had lived along with his sister Alexandra in 
                                                          
13 Josephus, AJ 14.297-300. 
14 On the Parthian invasion, see chapter 8.1. 
15 Josephus, AJ 14.330. Neither Josephus nor any other sources provide us with any indication 
concerning the cause of Ptolemy’s death. Yet, it seems likely that Ptolemy died as a result of old 
age, all the more since the beginning of his reign can at least be dated back as far as the year 85. 
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exile with the rulers of Chalcis.16 As a possible token of the newly concluded 
friendship, Lysanias may have persuaded Barzaphranes “by the promise of a 
thousand talents and five hundred women, to bring back Antigonus and raise him 
to the throne, after deposing Hyrcanus”.17 Certainty cannot, however, be attained 
concerning this version of the events as described by Josephus in the Jewish War, 
all the more since the author explains in the later Jewish Antiquities that it was 
Antigonus himself who had held out the prospect of the women and financial 
resources to the Parthians.18  
Yet, whoever made the promises in the end, it is clear that Lysanias was a 
supporter of the Hasmonaean cause and as such stood opposite the Romans who 
in the same year had decided to raise Herod to the kingship. From that perspective 
it is difficult to lend credence to a statement made by Dio, according to which 
Antony made Lysanias king (βασιλεύς).19 The author refers to this occasion when 
he recounts Lysanias’ execution and other events that occurred in 36. Lysanias’ 
alleged elevation to the kingship would thus have taken place prior to this year. 
Possibly, the prince of Chalcis had abrogated his support for Antigonus 
specifically, and the Hasmonaean cause in general at some point after the Roman 
proconsul P. Ventidius Bassus had ousted the Parthians from Syria in 38.20 Such a 
change of loyalty could indeed have prompted the triumvir to recognise Lysanias 
as king over Chalcis and the possessions that his father held in the Beqāʽ and 
Lebanon Mountains. However, would we, in that case, not have expected Lysanias 
                                                          
16 Josephus, AJ 14.124-126 and BJ 1.184-186 relates that Antigonus and his sisters were escorted to 
Chalcis at some point following the assassination of his father Aristobulus and his brother 
Alexander at the hand of Pompey’s partisans in 49. The author also informs us in the same 
passages that one of Ptolemy’s sons, Philippion, married Alexandra, a sister of Antigonus. After 
Philippion had been put to death by his father, it was Ptolemy himself who married Alexandra. For 
a plausible political interpretation of the assassination, see Aliquot (1999-2003) 259. 
17 Josephus, BJ 1.248: “... ὑποσχέσει χιλίων ταλάντων καὶ πεντακοσίων γυναικῶν καταγαγεῖν 
ἐπὶ τὰ βασίλεια τὸν Ἀντίγονον, καταλῦσαι δὲ τὸν Ὑρκανόν”.  
18 Josephus, AJ 14.331. 
19 Dio, 49.32.5. 
20 Similar argument in Sullivan (1990) 207. Cf. Aliquot (1999-2003) 259, who believes that Lysanias 
remained faithful to Antigonus until his death in 37, despite the fact that our extant documentation 
leaves open a potential earlier desertion of the Hasmonaean king.  
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to display his new position publicly on his coinage – by far the most useful and 
powerful medium to disseminate a public image on a wide scale? None of the 
limited types of coin issues that can be allocated to his reign do enclose any 
indications of a kingship conferred upon Lysanias. On the contrary, the two types 
that explicitly mention the prince’s name refer to him by the same titles as the ones 
carried by his father: τετράρχης and ἀρχιερεύς.21  Obviously, since these two 
issues are undated, it cannot be denied that they were struck before Antony is 
alleged to have elevated Lysanias to the kingship. The two other coin types that 
belong to the reign of Lysanias have been dated to the year 40 and it is indeed 
possible that the issues mentioning the two titles that the prince carried were 
struck in the same year. Dio’s statement according to which Antony granted the 
kingship to Lysanias can thus not be refuted, all the more since Porphyry refers – 
albeit in a different context – to Lysanias as king.22 
 
11.3 The Princedom of Chalcis annexed by Cleopatra 
 
Whether Lysanias had been granted the royal title by Antony or not, it is certain 
that he could not enjoy his position of power for a long period of time. Probably at 
some point in the year following the defeat and execution of Antigonus in 37, the 
triumvir had Lysanias put to death, and his former principality awarded to 
Cleopatra.23 The acquisition of the region around Chalcis constituted merely a part 
of much vaster territories that were granted to her by Antony. Cleopatra seems to 
have had the ambition to expand her kingdom with those territories in the Near 
                                                          
21 Kindler (1993) 287, nos. 12 (abbreviated title) and 13 (full title).  
22 Porphyry, BNJ 260 F2 (17). Cf. Schmitt (1982) 112, who finds it odd that Dio and Porphyry style 
Lysanias as king, “denn er hatte es mit den Parthern gehalten oder doch eine zweideutige Rolle 
gespielt…”. Schürer (1973) 565, however, claims that “later writers often apply the title βασιλεύς to 
tetrarchs as well”. This would be another reason to doubt the elevation of Lysanias to the kingship 
as claimed by Dio. 
23 See chapter 9.3. 
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East which formerly constituted a part of the Ptolemaic Kingdom.24 According to 
Josephus, she “accused Lysanias, the son of Ptolemy, of bringing in the Parthians 
against the interests of the (Roman) government...”.25 It remains opaque whether 
Antony was eventually convinced by this argument to remove Lysanias from his 
position of power. While there are sufficient indications that Lysanias had been at 
good terms with Antigonus, there is no firm evidence available to support the 
view that Lysanias had brought in the Parthians. As far as our source material is 
concerned, the prince of Chalcis may, at the most, have induced the Parthians to 
support Antigonus in his attempt to gain the kingship over Judaea. Moreover, if 
Lysanias had been confirmed in his position of power by Antony at some point 
after he had made an alliance with Antigonus in the year 40, then any remorse that 
the triumvir may have felt towards Lysanias for his support of the Parthian 
invaders and the Hasmonaean prince must already have subsided. The aid 
reputedly given to the Parthians can from this perspective at the most have served 
as a mere pretext for the deposition and assassination of the prince of Chalcis, as 
well as for the subsequent conferral of the former principality to Cleopatra.26 
Nonetheless, the possibility cannot be excluded that Lysanias was actively 
involved in an alliance with the Parthians, and that Antony for these reasons may 
have consented to Cleopatra’s wish to have Lysanias removed.  
 The Egyptian queen would retain control over the territories with which 
she had been endowed by Antony until the Battle of Actium in 31. A certain 
Zenodoros is attested to have ruled the Princedom of Chalcis subsequently.27 The 
earliest of his three known coin types can be dated to the year 31/30 and carries 
                                                          
24 See chapter 9.3. 
25  Josephus, AJ 15.92: “Λυσανίαν μὲν οὖν τὸν Πτολεμαίου Πάρθους αἰτιασαμένη τοῖς 
πράγμασιν ἐπάγειν ἀποκτίννυσιν...” (LCL transl. adapted).  
26 So also Sullivan (1990) 207 and Aliquot (1999-2003) 261. 
27 Schürer and Seyrig have identified our Zenodorus with a certain “Zenodorus, son of the tetrarch 
Lysanias mentioned in an inscription found at Baalbek. Criticism on this identification has been 
uttered by Myers (2010) 165-166. 
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besides a representation of the new ruler also a portrait of Octavian.28 Of this 
Zenodorus, Josephus tells us the following in the context of a territorial grant that 
Augustus made to Herod in the mid-20s BC:29 
 
“There was a certain Zenodorus who had leased the domain of Lysanias, but not 
being satisfied with the revenues, he increased his income by using robber bands in 
Trachonitis. For the inhabitants of that region led desperate lives and pillaged the 
property of the Damascenes, and Zenodorus did not stop them but himself shared in 
their gains. The neighbouring peoples, feeling these serious losses, protested to Varro, 
who was then their governor, and asked him to write to Caesar [i.e. Augustus, ed.] 
about the misdeeds of Zenodorus. When these reports were brought to Caesar, he 
wrote back that he should drive out the robber bands and assign that territory to 
Herod in order that through his supervision Trachonitis might cease to be an 
annoyance to its neighbours”. 
 
The domain leased by Zenodorus clearly corresponds to the Princedom of Chalcis 
which had come under the rule of Lysanias in the 30s BC. From whom Zenodorus 
had leased the territories in question is not said explicitly by Josephus. Sullivan 
has argued on the basis of this passage and its earlier parallel in Jewish War that 
Zenodorus had rented his principality from the Egyptian queen Cleopatra, in the 
same way as Herod would have leased back the balsam groves around Jericho 
from her. 30  The relevant texts in Josephus’ Jewish War and Jewish Antiquities, 
                                                          
28 Seyrig (1950) 46-48; Kindler (1993) 285, 287 no.14. Octavian’s portrait appears on the other two 
coin types as well (nos. 15-16). 
29 Josephus, AJ 15.344-345: “Ζηνόδωρός τις ἐμεμίσθωτο τὸν οἶκον τοῦ Λυσανίου. τούτῳ τὰ μὲν 
κατὰ τὰς προσόδους οὐκ ἤρκει, τὰ λῃστήρια δὲ ἔχων ἐν τῷ Τράχωνι πλείω τὴν πρόσοδον 
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Ζηνόδωρος οὔτ' εἶργεν αὐτός τε τῶν ὠφελειῶν ἐκοινώνει. κακῶς δὲ πάσχοντες οἱ πλησιόχωροι 
Οὐάρρωνος κατεβόων τοῦ τότε ἡγεμονεύοντος, καὶ γράφειν ἠξίουν Καίσαρι τοῦ Ζηνοδώρου 
τὴν ἀδικίαν. Καῖσαρ δὲ ἀνενεχθέντων τούτων ἀντέγραφεν ἐξελεῖν τὰ λῃστήρια τήν τε χώραν 
Ἡρώδῃ προσνέμειν, ὡς διὰ τῆς ἐπιμελείας τῆς ἐκείνου μηκέτ' ὀχληρῶν τῶν περὶ τὸν Τράχωνα 
γενησομένων τοῖς πλησίον”. A similar text is given by BJ 1.398. On the looting sponsored by 
Zenodorus and on the transferral of Zenodorus’ realm to Herod’s kingdom, see Aliquot (1999-
2003) 232-233. On the location of Trachonitis, see map 4. 
30 Sullivan (1990) 207-208 and n.52. Earlier argues by Schmitt (1982) 112 without argumentation. On 
Herod’s lease of balsam groves, see chapter 9.3. 
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however, do not support such an interpretation. It is much more likely that the 
new prince, who according to his own coinage also carried the titles of τετράρχης 
and ἀρχιερεύς, had leased his new principality from Octavian, who, as we saw, 
features on Zenodorus’ coinage. What is more, Josephus clarifies in the passage 
quoted above that it was the pillaging activities which Zenodorus organised to 
make up for the lack of profits generated by his lease that had prompted the 
affected peoples to lodge a complaint with the governor Varro,31 who himself 
referred the issue to Augustus. Accordingly, Josephus seems to make clear that 
Zenodorus was leasing domains formerly belonging to Lysanias during Augustus’ 
reign. After the defeat of Antony and Cleopatra at Actium, Octavian was given the 
task to decide on the future of the territories in the Levant and Asia Minor that 
had been granted to the Ptolemaic queen in 37/36, and it is not unthinkable that at 
that point he singled out Zenodorus as ruler and gave him the Princedom of 
Chalcis under lease. Although it cannot be excluded that this prince had played 
some role in the administration of this principality when it came under Ptolemaic 
rule, it is much more likely that Lysanias’ former realm was directly run by the 
Egyptian queen until 31 and her subordinates.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The political interaction between Rome and the Princedom of Chalcis is not well 
documented in our extant source material and, partly for this reason and partly 
due to its small geographical extent not many forms of interaction are known. In 
the conflict between the Pompeian Caecilius and the Caesarian generals, the 
Princedom of Chalcis chose the side of Caecilius, possibly under Parthian 
pressure. Several years later, Lysanias saw his position confirmed by Antony, 
despite his possible allegiance to Parthia during the invasion between 40 and 38. 
                                                          
31 Varro’s exact identity and term of office remain unknown, on which see Schürer (1973) 256. 
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Eventually accusations of alleged assistance rendered to the Parthians may have 
proven fatal to him. Being interlocked between Rome and Parthia in the period 
between 44 and 31 BC, the Princedom of Chalcis seems to have chosen the wrong 
party to support.   
190 
12 THE EMISENOI 
 
The ways in which the political relationship between Rome and the Emisenoi 
developed in the period from 44 until 42 is largely shrouded in mist. The only 
possible political contact in these years attested in our extant sources is the 
military aid which Sampsigeramus and his son Iamblichus, φύλαρχοι of the 
Emisenoi, would have offered to Caecilius Bassus, one of Pompey’s former 
equestrian officers at some point between 46 and 43. The possibility of Parthian 
influence having reached the Emisenian domains, as well as Parthia’s active 
support for Caecilius, make the suggestion plausible that the Emisenian rulers 
were pressurised by the Parthians to ally themselves to Caecilius in his war 
against the Caesareans in Syria. Yet, whatever the exact driving force was behind 
the assistance which Sampsigeramus and Iamblichus would have granted to 
Caecilius, the influence that Parthia exerted over large areas of the Near East in the 
40s BC eventually culminated in the grand-scale invasion of the year 40.1 Although 
the exact role of the Emisenoi in this conflict is obscure, their attitude “could 
hardly have been openly pro-Roman” with the Parthian-backed Antigonus 
established as king in Judaea. 2  Following the final defeat inflicted upon the 
Parthians, Antony’s generals began to reassert Roman authority in Asia Minor and 
the Near East. How the relationship between Rome and the Emesenoi developed 
from the end of the Parthian invasion until the defeat of Antony at Actium, is an 
issue that will be examined shortly. 
 
 
                                                          
1 On the Parthian invasion, see chapter 8.1. 
2 Sullivan (1990) 201 (quotation). See also Sullivan (1977a) 209 for a similar view.  
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12.1 Arethusa and Antony 
 
The death of the Parthian prince Pacorus on the battlefield in the year 38 is 
momentous for having marked the end of a two-year invasion during which the 
Parthians made their furthest advancement ever westwards into Asia Minor. 
Rome’s triumph did not denote a return to the status quo for Parthia. Pacorus’ 
downfall and the expulsion of the Parthian armies from Syria launched a period of 
political instability within Parthia, and the beginning of a purge among Parthia’s 
ruling elite.3 Soon after the Roman general P. Ventidius Bassus had struck the final 
blow upon his opponents, the aged Parthian king Orodes installed his son 
Phraates as successor to the throne – a choice which turned out to be disastrous for 
members of the royal family and the aristocracy.4 Not only is the new monarch 
said to have eliminated all of his brothers and numerous persons from Parthia’s 
upper echelons, but according to Justin and Plutarch, Phraates IV also would have 
been responsible for the death of his father.5 Nevertheless, several members of the 
ruling elite managed to escape the horrors of the royal court and fled to other 
places. A certain Monaeses, belonging to Parthia’s nobility, took refuge with 
Antony in the year 37, and was allegedly presented by him with the cities of 
Larissa, Arethusa and Hierapolis.6 Despite a lack of clarity in the extant source 
material concerning the exact constitutional relation of these three places with 
Rome in the year following the ejection of the Parthian armies from Syria, we seem 
at least to be able to gather that Arethusa did not come under Roman provincial 
government. We have already seen that Strabo reckons this city to have belonged 
                                                          
3 See chapter 8.2. 
4 Justin, Epit. 42.4.10-42.5.2; Dio, 49.23.3-5. On the death of Pacorus, Phraates’ accession to the 
throne and the consequences of the succession for members of the royal family and for Parthia’s 
aristocracy, see: Debevoise (1938) 120-123; Wolski (1993) 140-142. 
5 Justin, Epit. 42.5.1; Plutarch, Ant. 37.1. 
6  Plutarch, Ant. 37.1, 46.2; Dio, 49.23.5; cf. 49.24.2 only asserts that three Roman cities were 
presented to Monaeses. Although Dio does not specify the names of these cities, it is not very likely 
to assume that he refers to other places than Larissa, Arethusa and Hierapolis.  
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to Sampsigeramus and Iamblichus, φύλαρχοι of the Emisenoi.7 Although Strabo 
makes his claim in the context of the alliance which these two rulers would have 
had with the Pompeian equestrian officer Q. Caecilius Bassus at some point 
between 46 and 43, there is no reason to assume that in the year 37, Arethusa 
could not have fallen under the authority of the Emisenian rulers. In that case, the 
annexation of this city and the donation of it to a Parthian nobleman would 
demonstrate the extent to which the Emisenoi – albeit not officially under Roman 
provincial rule – were regarded as a part of Rome’s empire.  
 Dio seems to imply that the donation of the three cities was made, along 
with other presents, as reward for Monaeses’ promise to Antony “to lead his army 
and bring most of Parthia over to him without trouble”. 8  Plausible as this 
explanation appears to be, the selection of Arethusa as present for Monaeses may 
have been initiated by Antony as a means to penalise the Emisenian rulers – or 
ruler if Sampsigeramus had already died – for their attitude during the Parthian 
invasion.9 Although the exact position of the Emisenoi in the conflict between 
Rome and Parthia remains opaque, we have already established that it is highly 
unlikely for Iamblichus and possibly also Sampsigeramus to have taken on openly 
an anti-Parthian attitude.10 
 Whatever the exact motivations were behind the alleged grant of three 
cities to Monaeses, these three places would not have been in Monaeses’ 
                                                          
7 Strabo, 16.2.10. 
8 Dio, 49.24.2: “τῆς... στρατείας ἡγήσεσθαι καὶ τὰ πλείω τῆς Παρθίας ἀκονιτὶ προσποιήσειν ...”. 
Cf. Plutarch, Ant. 37.1, who connects the grant of the three cities with the ways in which for 
Antony Monaeses’ fortunes as a fugitive would be comparable with those of the Athenian 
statesman Themistocles in the fifth century BC. Pelling (1988) 222 argues convincingly that 
“Plutarch effectively applies this favourite story to his characterisation of Antony as boastful and 
open-handed, but there may be some fiction here...”. It is unlikely that the similarities between the 
experiences of these two fugitives would have prompted Antony to give three cities to Monaeses. 
The motivation brought forward by Dio is much more convincing. Cf. Reinhold (1988) 59-60, who 
claims that the three cities which Antony would have granted to Monaeses “had been the realm of 
Alchaudonius”. As is clarified below, the city of Arethusa would in 37 most likely have belonged 
to the Emisenian ruler(s).  
9 So also Sullivan (1977a) 209. 
10 Sullivan (1990) 201 proposes that “the appearance of Antony in the East may have caught 
Iamblichus in a posture of less than complete loyalty to Rome”. 
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possession for a long time. Both Dio and Plutarch inform us that the Parthian king 
Phraates managed to persuade Monaeses to return.11 Whether as a result of this 
move, Arethusa was restored to the Emisenoi, remains unclear. Equally opaque is 
the issue whether the Emesenoi supported Antony in his Parthian campaign. The 
possibility can at any rate not be excluded.  
 
12.2 Actium and the death of Iamblichus 
 
The relations between Octavian and Antony deteriorated rapidly in the course of 
the year 32, and both commanders began to mobilise forces, gather provisions and 
exact funds in the lead up towards the military confrontation which eventually 
took place at Actium a year later. The army that Antony managed to assemble 
consisted both of Roman legions and of auxiliary troops recruited from kingdoms 
and principalities in Asia Minor and the Near East. The loyalty of these forces 
towards Antony did not, however, prove to be entirely flawless. Dio informs us, 
for example, of Philadelphus, king of Paphlagonia, and the Roman commander 
Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, who already during the preparatory stage of the 
battle abandoned Antony’s cause and changed their allegiance to Octavian.12 The 
loss of these allies would have made Antony suspicious of everybody. For this 
reason, he “tortured and put to death, among others, Iamblichus, king of the tribe 
of the Arabians...”.13 It is not entirely certain that this Iamblichus can be identified 
with the φύλαρχος of the Emesenoi mentioned by Strabo in relation to the 
support which this ruler and his father Sampsigeramus granted to Caecilius 
Bassus. The possibility can at any rate not be ruled out, all the more since the 
ethnic Arab/Arabian has been used by the ancient authors to denote a variety of 
                                                          
11 Dio, 49.24.3; Plutarch, Ant. 37.2. 
12 Dio, 50.13.5-6. 
13  Dio, 50.13.7: “ἀπέκτεινεν ἐκ τούτου ἄλλους τε καὶ Ἰάμβλιχον Ἀραβίων τινῶν βασιλέα 
βασανίσας...”.  
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ethnic, social and political groups all over the Near East.14 For the motivation 
behind Iamblichus’ alleged execution, our preserved sources do not provide us 
with any indication. Perhaps, Iamblichus’ loyalty towards Antony had faltered in 
recent years. It is evident, at least, that the executed ruler was succeeded by 
Alexander, allegedly a brother of Iamblichus. Following Actium this ruler was 
captured by Octavian, staged in his triumph and put to death.15  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Our knowledge of the political relationship between Rome and the Emisenoi in 
the period from the demise of Brutus and Cassius in 42 until the Battle of Actium 
in 31 is severely limited. In the year 37, the Emisenoi seem to have lost control 
over Arethusa. Antony would have annexed this city and given it to the Parthian 
nobleman Monaeses. Although this arrangement would not have been long-
lasting, the possible annexation of a place that did not officially come under 
Rome’s provincial authority, would demonstrate to what extent the dominions 
belonging to the Emisenoi formed a part of Rome’s empire. Whether the 
annexation of Arethusa ought to be regarded as penalty for some unknown 
misconduct of the Emisenian leader(s) towards Antony, is unclear. Equally 
opaque remains the matter of whether the Iamblichus, whom Antony is said to 
have executed in the lead up to the Battle of Actium, can be identified with 
Iamblichus, φύλαρχος of the Emisenoi. If such an identification is possible, then 
the question arises how the relationship between Iamblichus and Antony could 
have deteriorated. Unfortunately, none of our extant sources can shed light on this 
issue. 
                                                          
14 On the use of the ethnic Arab/Arabian in the ancient sources to denote various social, political 
and ethnic groups, see among others Retsö (2003) 364-392 and Macdonald (2009) 280-285. 
15 Dio, 51.2.2. 
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13 NABATAEA 
 
 
Pompey’s administrative reorganisation of the Near East in the second half of the 
60s BC touched upon the internal government, territorial extent and financial 
autonomy of most kingdoms and principalities in that region. Armenia, Judaea 
and the Princedom of Chalcis were, for example, all subject to measures taken by 
Pompey within the framework of this restructuring programme.1 The Nabataean 
kingdom seems to have been unaffected by these reforms. An inspection of it in 
the year 63 was prematurely aborted when a sudden deterioration in the 
succession crisis between the two Hasmonaean brothers, Hyrcanus and 
Aristobulus, prompted Pompey to make his return to Judaea. 2  The alleged 
termination of this undertaking meant that, for the time being, the Nabataean king 
Aretas III was spared Roman interference into the domestic affairs of his kingdom. 
Future intrusion could not, however, be averted, and already in the following 
year, Pompey’s successor as governor in Syria, M. Aemilius Scaurus, allegedly 
serving proquaestore propraetore, embarked on a military campaign against 
Nabataea, laying waste to the areas surrounding Petra.3 In spite of a claim made 
by Scaurus on a denarius that he issued in 58 as aedile along with his colleague P. 
Plautius Hypsaeus, the expedition does not seem to have ended in a Roman 
victory and the submission of Aretas. On the contrary, with the Nabataean capital 
still standing up to the Romans, Scaurus turned to diplomacy and successfully 
persuaded the king to pay a sum of money in exchange for the cessation of 
hostilities.4 Scaurus was apparently more interested in Aretas’ wealth than in a 
                                                          
1 See chapters 1.1, 1.6, 1.7.  
2 See chapter 1.7. 
3 For Scaurus’ official position, see the conclusion of chapter 1. 
4 Josephus, AJ 14.80. The denarius issued by Scaurus and Plautius Hypsaeus depicts on the obverse 
a kneeling king Aretas holding a branch in his hand next to a dromedary (Crawford (1974) 446-447 
196 
protraction of the war with the possibility of exhausting his troops and resources – 
an observation that has led to the suggestion that the purpose of this whole 
campaign was nothing more than the extortion of financial means and supplies 
from the rich city of Petra.5 Yet, whatever Scaurus’ exact motivations were for 
launching an attack on Nabataea, neither his expedition nor a campaign initiated 
by the proconsul of Syria, A. Gabinius, in the year 55 proved to be permanently 
ruinous for the political relations between Rome and the Nabataean kingdom.6 In 
the year 47, Herod’s father Antipater, who was married to a Nabataean princess 
named Cypros, managed to tempt the Nabataean king Malichus I to send military 
assistance to Caesar for the war in Egypt.7 Whether Malichus eventually received 
any remuneration for his help similar to the honours bestowed upon Antipater 
and Hyrcanus is unknown.8 Our extant source material does not document any 
political conduct undertaken by Rome and Nabataea towards one another from 
the year 47 until the beginning of the 30s BC. For this reason, it remains also 
                                                                                                                                                                                
no. 422). The scene clearly features an act of submission made by the Nabataean king. As argued 
by Bowersock (1983) 34-35 and Funke (1989) 9 n.37, Scaurus tried to disseminate the message that 
the Nabataean king had offered his surrender to him at the end of the expedition in the year 62. 
The representation of this campaign as a triumph over Aretas does not, however, correspond with 
the accounts by Josephus which clearly illustrate that the hostilities came to an end by diplomatic 
means. Cf. Hackl / Jenni / Schneider (2003) 111-114, who believe that the scene on the coin does not 
signify an act of submission, but an offer of peace by Aretas to Scaurus. 
5 Josephus, AJ 14.80-81 and BJ 1.159 comprise the source material for the campaign undertaken by 
M. Aemilius Scaurus. Sartre (1979) 44-45 argues that Scaurus’ cupidity could have been one of the 
driving forces behind the expedition. The author bases his view on some of the activities 
undertaken by Scaurus earlier and later during his career which would illustrate that avarice was 
not foreign to him. Bowersock (1983) 33 similarly claims that “although Pompey’s planned 
inspection of Nabataea was probably part of some larger scheme for administering the Near East 
after the annexation of Syria, there is every reason to suspect that Scaurus moved into the kingdom 
of the Nabataeans principally to avail himself of the wealth of its rulers…”. Sullivan (1990) 210 
equally argues that financial motives played a role in the decision to attack Nabataea.  
6 Josephus, AJ 14.103 and BJ 1.178 inform us of the expedition that Gabinius undertook against the 
Nabataeans. The Roman proconsul was victorious. For possible explanations of this campaign, see 
among others Sartre (1979) 46; Bowersock (1983) 35-36; Sullivan (1990) 210; Hackl / Jenni / 
Schneider (2003) 484-485. For the evidence of Gabinius’ provincia and imperium, see Broughton 
(1952) 203. 
7 Josephus, AJ 14.128; BJ 1.187. The anonymous B.Alex. 1.1 clarifies that the aid consisted of cavalry. 
Cf. Bowersock (1983) 38, who claims in error that the Nabataeans supported Caesar against 
Pompey. The horsemen had been sent to Egypt to assist Caesar in the war against Ptolemy XIII, 
brother of Cleopatra VII.  
8 Josephus, AJ 14.137; BJ 1.194. 
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obscure whether any diplomatic and political exchanges occurred between 
Cassius and Malichus in the two years during which the Republicans ruled the 
Near East. The earliest attested political contact between Rome and Nabataea after 
the support given to Caesar occurred in the year 39 during the Parthian invasion 
of the Near East and Asia Minor. How the political relationship between these two 
powers developed thenceforth until the defeat of Antony and Cleopatra at Actium 
needs to be examined in this chapter. 
 
13.1 Ventidius Bassus and Nabataea 
 
At some point towards the end of 41 or the beginning of 40, Parthian forces 
crossed the River Euphrates and overran the province of Syria. The units led by 
the king’s son Pacorus proceeded subsequently southwards along the Phoenician 
coast and through the interior lands to Judaea, while the Roman deserter in 
Parthian service, Q. Labienus, won over to his side a part of the Roman troops 
present in the East, and advanced along the south littoral of Anatolia possibly as 
far as Lydia and Ionia. The strength and reliability of the troops loyal to Rome or 
its representative in the region had proved to be insufficient to obviate the furthest 
Parthian penetration westwards. In order to restore Roman rule in the eastern 
Mediterranean, Antony assigned the war against the Parthians to his legate P. 
Ventidius Bassus. This Roman general managed to turn the tide and repel the 
invading armies from Asia Minor and Syria in the course of the year 39. 9 
Important as the successes in the war against the Parthians were for Rome, 
Ventidius’ attention was not exclusively focused on the expulsion of the invaders. 
Demands for financial resources seem to have been made to several kings and 
princes in the East, and the Nabataean king Malichus is reckoned as one of them 
                                                          
9 See chapter 8.1. 
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by Dio.10 As explanation for the exaction of money by Ventidius, Dio refers to the 
assistance that Malichus granted to Pacorus.11 Unfortunately, the author himself 
does not illuminate in what way the alliance with Pacorus manifested itself. 
Further details about the king’s alleged collaboration with the Parthians are only 
provided by Josephus in his account of Herod’s attempt to take refuge with the 
Nabataean king in the year 40 after the Parthian invasion of Judaea.12  
As part of this episode described by Josephus, Herod is said to have 
proceeded to Nabataea following his escape from Jerusalem, in the hope of 
receiving money from Malichus which he was to use as ransom to set his brother 
Phasael free from imprisonment. An encounter between Herod and Malichus 
seems, however, not to have taken place on this occasion. On the contrary, 
Josephus relates that Herod received a message from Malichus with orders to 
retire, “for the Parthians had given him instructions not to receive Herod”.13 That 
it would have been in Parthia’s interest to obstruct all possible channels through 
which Herod could have received help is understandable if one bears in mind 
Herod’s armed resistance against Antigonus, the Parthian-backed candidate for 
the Judaean throne, earlier in the same year.14 Yet, the Parthians would only have 
been able to prevent Herod from obtaining assistance if they managed to secure 
the cooperation of the rulers and civic authorities in the region. Fortunately for the 
Parthians, many cities and kings in Asia Minor and the Near East did forge an 
                                                          
10 Dio, 48.41.5: “Besides accomplishing all this he exacted large sums of money from the rest 
individually, and large sums also from Antigonus and Antiochus and Malichus the Nabataean, 
because they had given help to Pacorus” (“Καὶ ὁ μὲν ταῦτά τε διῆγε, καὶ χρήματα πολλὰ μὲν 
παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ἑκάστων, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοῦ Ἀντιγόνου τοῦ Μάλχου τοῦ Ναβαταίου, 
ὅτι τῷ Πακόρῳ συνήραντο, ἐσέπραξε”). 
11 It has generally been accepted that Ventidius’ demand for financial resources was a retaliation 
measure for Malichus’ alleged allegiance to the Parthians: Riddle (1961) 57; Starcky (1966) 910; 
Lindner (1970) 95; Schürer (1973) 580; Sartre (1979) 47-48; Bowersock (1983) 39-40; Sullivan (1990) 
212. 
12 On Herod’s flight from Judaea to Egypt, see chapter 10.4. 
13 Josephus, AJ 14.372: “παρηγγελκέναι γὰρ αὐτῷ Πάρθους Ἡρώδην μὴ δέχεσθαι...” (LCL transl. 
adapted). 
14 On the clash between Herod’s and Antigonus’ forces, see: Josephus, AJ 14.334-339; BJ 1.250-253. 
For more details, see chapter 10.4. 
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alliance with them. King Malichus also appears to have chosen this cause, despite 
the good relations that he had maintained with Herod’s late father Antipater. As 
Sartre has pointed out suitably, “lorsque toute l’Asie abandonne le parti de Rome, 
on voit mal comment Malichos aurait pu rester seul, isolé, au risque d’en subir les 
fâcheuses conséquences”.15 The threat of a Parthian punitive expedition in the case 
of collaboration with Herod, an enemy of Parthia, prevailed apparently for 
Malichus above good relations with Herod’s family.  
Plausible as it thus is for Malichus to have collaborated with the Parthians, 
Josephus himself dismisses the Parthian prohibition of receiving Herod as a mere 
pretext, believing that the actual reason for Herod’s expulsion from Nabataea was 
Malichus’ unwillingness to repay his outstanding debts to Herod’s late father 
Antipater.16 Sullivan casts doubt on the accuracy of this explanation by pointing to 
the affluence of the Nabataean kingdom as a result of its involvement in long-
distance trade.17 Yet, to reject Josephus’ version entirely, as Sullivan does, would 
go too far, all the more since the precise size and nature of Malichus’ debt to 
Antipater remains unknown. Both Parthian pressure as well as a reluctance to 
reimburse Herod may accordingly have played a role in Malichus’ decision to ban 
Herod from his kingdom. 
Yet, whatever the exact motives were prompting Malichus not to receive 
Herod, the extant sources provide us at least with some indication of Malichus’ 
allegiance to the Parthians. The exaction of money in the year 39 by Ventidius can 
thus indeed have served as a punitive measure to show Malichus that 
collaboration with an enemy of Rome was not tolerated. Financial motives, 
however, are not to be ruled out either. Sartre and Bowersock have already 
                                                          
15 Sartre (1979) 48. 
16 Josephus, AJ 14.372; BJ 1.276. Cf. Bowersock (1983) 39, who asserts that Herod did not only 
demand protection from Malichus, but also “the restoration of the territories that had been 
conceded to the Arabs by Antipater”. Yet, this latter statement is completely unfounded: in the 
whole episode of Herod’s attempt to take refuge with the Nabataean king, no demand seems to 
have been made for the return of territories. Herod’s requests seem to have been of a financial 
nature. 
17 Sullivan (1990) 212. 
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touched upon the fact that the war against the Parthians had left the Roman 
treasury depleted and that the resources extracted from Nabataea would have 
come at a convenient moment.18  
 
13.2 The grant of territory to Cleopatra 
 
Following the conclusion of the Treaty of Tarentum in the summer or autumn of 
37, Octavian remained in the western Mediterranean and began preparations for a 
new campaign against Sextus Pompeius, while Antony travelled via Asia Minor to 
Syria and implemented a far-reaching territorial reorganisation of the Near East 
and southern Anatolia during the winter of 37/36.19 Antony had decided to confer 
upon Cleopatra large tracts of land that until that point came under the rule of 
various cities, kings and dynasts.20 Unlike some of those rulers, such as Lysanias, 
the prince of Chalcis, who was deposed and saw his domains entirely transferred 
to Ptolemaic rule, the Nabataean ruler Malichus was fortunate to retain his 
position of power and to experience just like Herod a mere partial territorial loss.  
Plutarch informs us that Malichus saw “that part of Arabia Nabataea which slopes 
toward the outer sea” removed from his realm and assigned to Cleopatra.21 Where 
this region was exactly located can unfortunately not be determined with 
certainty. In our section on the territorial grants to Cleopatra, I have argued, 
though, in line with Bowersock that the Nabataean domains given to the 
Ptolemaic queen probably consisted of the regions around the Gulf of Aqaba and 
in the northern Ḥejāz.22 
                                                          
18 Sartre (1979) 48; Bowersock (1983) 39-40. 
19 On the agreement reached at Tarentum between Octavian and Antony, see Bleicken (1990) 14-15 
and ibid. n.28 with references; Pelling (1996) 25-27, q.v. 25 and ibid. n.112 believes that a compact at 
Tarentum may have been reached late July or August 37. On Octavian’s war against Sextus 
Pompey, see: Pelling (1996) 34-36.  
20 For the details of the territorial grant to Cleopatra, including the date of the gifts, see chapter 9.3.  
21 Plutarch, Ant. 36.2: “...τῆς Ναβαταίων Ἀραβίας ὅση πρὸς τὴν ἐκτὸς ἀποκλίνει θάλασσαν”.  
22 Chapter 9.3. 
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Economically vital as the regions probably assigned to Cleopatra thus were, 
the Ptolemaic queen does not seem to have ruled the newly received portions of 
the Nabataean kingdom herself. The account by Josephus explains that Herod 
leased the newly awarded district from her at some point before the Armenian 
campaign in 34, and even stood surety for the payment of tribute which Malichus 
allegedly owed her.23 Bowersock claims that the arrangement was contrived by 
Cleopatra to generate discord between the Nabataean and Judaean kings. 24 
Although there is no proof to corroborate this view, a conflict did eventually arise 
before the Battle of Actium between the two rulers over outstanding payments to 
the Ptolemaic queen. On Cleopatra’s instigation, Antony instructed Herod to 
launch an attack on Nabataea.25 Josephus explains that Cleopatra hoped in this 
way to extend her hegemony over either Judaea or Arabia depending on the 
outcome of the war.26 The hostilities ultimately ended in a victory for Herod after 
Actium. The kingdom of Malichus was by that time no longer under the threat of a 
Ptolemaic annexation. 
 
13.3 Nabataean support at Actium  
 
In the course of the year 32, relations between Antony and Octavian degenerated 
rapidly. Both commanders began to mobilise forces, gather provisions and exact 
funds in the prelude to a military confrontation that eventually took place at 
Actium a year later.27 The armies that Antony had managed to muster did not, 
however, merely consist of Roman legions. Auxiliary troops sent by kings and 
                                                          
23 Josephus, AJ 15.96, 107, 132; BJ 1.362. For more details on the lease and the tribute for which 
Herod served as guarantor, see chapter 10.7. 
24 Bowersock (1983) 41. Also implied by Lindner (1970) 97. 
25 For more details on the war between Herod and Malichus as well as on the role of Antony and 
Cleopatra in the conflict see chapter 10.7.  
26 Josephus, AJ 15.110; BJ 1.364-365. For more details on the role of Antony and Cleopatra in the war 
between Herod and Malichus,  
27 On the deterioration of the relations between Antony and Octavian, and the mobilisation of 
forces, see among others Syme (1939) 276-293; Lange (2009) 60-70. 
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dynasts from the eastern Mediterranean were present at Actium as well. Plutarch 
provides us with a list of rulers who had sent an army to Greece, and recounts a 
certain Malichus from Arabia (Μάλχος ἐξ Ἀραβίας) among them.28 Most likely, 
this Malichus is to be identified with the Nabataean king. No other Near Eastern 
ruler is known to have carried the same name around this time. Besides, in the 
context of the territorial grants to Cleopatra, Plutarch refers to a certain “Arabia of 
the Nabataeans” – a phrase suggesting that according to the author the 
Nabataeans inhabited an area called Arabia.29 The Malichus who is said to have 
supplied Antony with an army is thus in all likelihood the ruler from Nabataea. 
The presence of Nabataean soldiers at Actium is nonetheless difficult to believe. 
Malichus was at the time of the battle engaged in a war against Herod and would 
probably have needed all his resources to fight the Judaeans. Implausible as 
Nabataean participation at Actium thus may seem in the light of the war against 
Herod, Plutarch’s report cannot be dismissed as fiction because of its 
idiosyncrasy. 30  It is possible that Malichus did not know that Antony and 
Cleopatra were behind the order to initiate an attack upon his kingdom. 
Moreover, he may have felt obliged to come to Antony’s assistance in order to 
demonstrate his loyalty in the hope not to face a loss of territory again.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The relationship between Rome and the Nabataean kingdom in the period from 
the death of Caesar until the defeat of Actium went through several different 
stages. During the Parthian invasion of the Near East and Asia Minor in 40, king 
                                                          
28 Plutarch, Ant. 61.2. 
29 Plutarch, Ant. 36.2: “τῆς Ναβαταίων Ἀραβίας”. On the use of the ethnic “Arabs” to denote 
Nabataeans, see among others Retsö (2003) 364-392 and Macdonald (2009) 280-285. 
30 Cf. Pelling (1988) 268, who does not explain how it would have been possible for Malichus to 
send an army when he was engaged in a war against Herod. Graf (1986) 272 ignores the possible 
presence of a Nabataean army at Actium entirely. Josephus, AJ 15.111-160 and BJ 1.366-385 
comprise the source material for the war between Herod and Malichus. 
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Malichus seems to have been allied to the Parthians. The money that Ventidius 
would have exacted from the Nabataeans a year later was in all likelihood meant 
as a punitive measure. In 37/36, the Nabataeans lost part of their territory to 
Cleopatra and were also forced to pay her contributions. At Actium, Nabataean 
forces are said by Plutarch to have fought on Antony’s side. How long Malichus 
would have remained loyal to Antony remains unfortunately opaque. In the 
aftermath of the confrontation at Actium, Malichus appears to have incinerated 
the ships with which Cleopatra had fled the battle scene and reached Egypt.31 
Bowersock argues that by this act, the Nabataean king would have secured 
Octavian’s good will.32 In that case, Malichus would not have had the opportunity 
to enjoy it for a long time. Later in the year 30, he seems to have been succeeded 
by a certain Obodas.33 
                                                          
31 Plutarch, Ant. 69.3; Dio, 51.7.1. 
32 Bowersock (1983) 43. 
33 On the succession of Malichus I and the Nabataean kings in general, see among others Wenning 
(1993). 
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14 ARMENIA 
 
For Armenia, Pompey’s administrative reorganisation of the Near East marked the 
end of an age of expansionism. All the territories upon which king Tigranes II had 
laid claim following his accession to the throne around the middle of the 90s BC 
had to be abandoned under pressure of Pompey in the year 66. With the payment 
of 6,000 talents, Tigranes merely succeeded in retaining control over the kingdom 
that he had inherited from his predecessor Artavasdes I.1 Disadvantageous as 
Pompey’s measures initially seem to have been, soon after these political 
rearrangements had been implemented, Tigranes was rewarded for his 
submission with being enrolled among the friends and allies of Rome. 2 
Thenceforth, the relations between the two powers appear to have remained 
peaceful. The death of Tigranes and the accession of his son Artavasdes II to the 
throne in probably 56 or 55 do not seem to have changed this situation.3 What is 
more, at some point after the beginning of his reign, Artavasdes was recognised as 
a friend of the Romans,4 and when Crassus embarked on his Parthian campaign in 
53, Artavasdes not only advised him to launch an attack on Parthia through 
Armenia, but also offered 16,000 horsemen and 30,000 infantry soldiers to the 
                                                          
1 On Pompey’s reorganisation of Armenia, see chapter 1.1. 
2 On the enrolment of Tigranes among the friend and allies of Rome, see chapter 1.1. On the 
potential political implications of the establishment of friendship and alliance by Rome with kings, 
princes and other rulers in the Near East, see chapter 1.4. 
3 For the sources on the date of Artavasdes’ accession to the throne, see Sullivan (1990) 285, 447 
n.19. Cf. Baumgartner (1896) 1308 who believes that Artavasdes had been made a co-regent with 
his father after the Battle of Tigranocerta in 69. He bases his view on a passage in Memnon, BNJ 
434, F2 38.5 which reveals that in the aftermath of this battle Tigranes conferred “the diadem and 
the insignia of office on his son” (“τὸ διάδημα καὶ τὰ παράσημα τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπιθεὶς τῶν παιδί”). 
The text does not specify which son exactly was given the diadem. Memnon could accordingly 
have had one of Tigranes’ other sons in mind instead of Artavasdes. 
4 Strabo, 11.14.15 does not inform us of the date of Artavasdes’ recognition as a friend of the 
Romans. 
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Romans.5 Although Crassus decided against advancing through Armenia, he still 
seems to have counted on the military supplies offered by Artavasdes earlier on 
when he moved through Mesopotamia to the heart of Parthia. Unfortunately for 
him, however, the invasion of Armenia by the Parthian king Orodes made it 
impossible for Artavasdes to supply Crassus with Armenian contingents.6 Despite 
these circumstances, the ultimate disaster that befell the Romans at Carrhae was 
still blamed on the Armenian king.7 Whether or not this accusation was legitimate, 
it is evident that the Romans became wary of Artavasdes. This mistrust found 
expression in some of the letters that Cicero had sent in 51 during his term as 
proconsul of Cilicia. 8  The Parthians had already crossed the Euphrates and 
overrun parts of Syria.9 Cicero feared that the Armenians would ally with the 
Parthians and launch an attack on the Roman possessions in Anatolia through 
Cappadocia. An Armenian invasion did not take place in the end, however. 
Artavasdes held aloof. Whether this stance eventually brought about a 
normalisation of the bilateral relations between Rome and Armenia remains 
unfortunately opaque. The possibility cannot be excluded, all the more since 
Armenian troops are said to have served as Pompey’s allies at Pharsalus in 48.10 
How the relations between Rome and the Armenian kingdom developed during 
the following thirteen years are regrettably obscure. The earliest known contact 
between Rome and Armenia after Pharsalus can be dated to the period following 
the expulsion of the Parthian invaders from Syria in 38. How the political relations 
                                                          
5 Plutarch, Crass. 19.1-2. For a detailed overview with sources of Crassus’ Parthian campaign, see 
among others Debevoise (1938) 78-95.  
6 Plutarch, Crass. 21.5; cf. Dio, 40.16.2, who refers to Orodes’ intention to launch an attack upon 
Armenia. For a critical assessment of Artavasdes’ role in Crassus’ Parthian campaign, see Sherwin-
White (1984) 286-290; Prantl (2008) 93-97. 
7 Plutarch, Crass. 22.3. 
8 Cicero, Fam. 15.2.2 (addressed to the magistrates and Senate at Rome on 21/22 September 51); 
15.3.1 (addressed to M. Cato on 3 September 51); 15.4.4 (addressed to Cato towards the end of 51 or 
the beginning of 50); Att. 5.20.2. 
9 For more details on the Parthian incursions across the Euphrates into Syria, see Debevoise (1938) 
96-104; Sherwin-White (1984) 292-297. 
10 Appian, BCiv. 2.71.  
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maintained by Rome and Armenia developed from this time onwards until the 
Battle of Actium, and to what extent Armenia kept its political independence from 
Rome needs to be considered here.  
 
14.1 Armenia, the Caucasus and Antony’s Parthian campaign 
  
The defeat of the Parthian forces in the battle near Gindarus at some point in the 
course of 38 marked the end of a two-year invasion during which Parthian troops 
overran Syria and made their furthest advancement ever westwards into Asia 
Minor. Memorable as this decisive victory of the Roman proconsul P. Ventidius 
Bassus over his Parthian opponents was, the expulsion of the invading armies did 
not usher in a period of peace for the Near East as a whole. In the aftermath of the 
Parthian invasion, Rome endeavoured to reassert its authority in the eastern 
Mediterranean, and as part of this aspiration, it seems to have undertaken 
punitive expeditions against those rulers who had either given support to the 
Parthians, or had taken up arms against Rome and her allies. Best known of these 
retaliatory campaigns is, without doubt, the attack that Ventidius launched upon 
king Antiochus of Commagene, allegedly because of the latter’s refusal to hand 
over the Parthian refugees who had taken shelter with him after their defeat in the 
war against Rome.11 Not necessarily less vindictive was Rome’s triumph in 37 over 
the Parthian-backed pretender Antigonus for his armed resistance against Herod, 
the Roman candidate for the Judaean throne.12 Whether besides Antigonus and 
Antiochus, other rulers – such as king Artavasdes of Armenia – were confronted 
with a Roman military punitive expedition in the wake of the Parthian invasion 
remains unclear. The possibility can a any rate not be excluded, all the more since 
Plutarch refers to a victory won by a certain P. Canidius Crassus over the 
                                                          
11 See chapter 16.2. 
12 See chapter 10.5. 
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Armenian people as well as over the kings of the Caucasian Iberians and 
Albanians.13 Canidius Crassus had been one of the two consules suffecti of 40 and 
was left behind in the Near East by Antony following the settlement of peace with 
Antiochus of Commagene towards the end of 38.14 Moreover, Strabo elucidates 
that some of the passes connecting Armenia with Albania and Iberia were used by 
Canidius. Although the conquest of the Armenians is not explicitly mentioned, 
Strabo does at any rate support the idea that Canidius Crassus had been in 
Armenia.15  
Details concerning the date of the alleged expedition as well as the possible 
motives for the supposed attack on these three peoples are unfortunately not 
given by Plutarch. Nevertheless, it is possible to gain some insight into these 
matters on the basis of Dio’s account of Canidius Crassus’ military adventures: 
 
“During the remainder of the winter, when Gellius and Nerva were now holding 
office, Publius Canidius Crassus made a campaign against the Iberians in Asia, 
conquered in battle their king Pharnabazus and brought them to make an alliance; 
with this king he invaded Albania, the adjoining country, and, after overcoming the 
inhabitants and their king Zober, conciliated them likewise”.16 
 
On the grounds that L. Gellius Publicola and M. Cocceius Nerva held their 
consulships in 36, we can conclude that Dio dates the Caucasian campaign to the 
                                                          
13 Plutarch, Ant. 34.6. On Ἀλβανία and Ἰβηρία, see among others Andreas (1894); Tomaschek 
(1894) 1305-1306; Treidler (1962); Sullivan (1990) 291-293. Canidius Crassus’ official position for this 
year is unknown. 
14 Plutarch, Ant. 34.4, 34.6. On the chronology of the war against Antiochus of Commagene, see 
chapter 16.2. On the consulship of Canidius Crassus, see Broughton (1952) 378-379. 
15 Strabo, Geogr. 11.3.5. 
16 Dio, 49.24.1: “ἐν δὲ δὴ τῷ λοιπῷ χειμῶνι τοῦ τε Γελλίου καὶ τοῦ Νέρουα ἀρχόντων, Πούπλιος 
Κανίδιος Κράσσος ἐπὶ Ἴβηρας τοὺς ταύτῃ στρατεύσας μάχῃ τε τὸν βασιλέα αὐτῶν 
Φαρνάβαζον ἐνίκησε καὶ ἐς συμμαχίαν προσηγάγετο, καὶ μετ’ αὐτοῦ ἐς τὴν Ἀλβανίδα τὴν 
ὅμορον ἐμβαλών, καὶ ἐκείνους τόν τε βασιλέα αὐτῶν Ζόβηρα κρατήσας, ὁμοίως αὐτοὺς 
ᾠκειώσατο”. 
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beginning of that year before the onset of spring.17 Details concerning the time of 
the alleged victory over the Armenians have, however, not been disclosed by Dio; 
this episode has even not found its way into his Roman History. From the lack of 
any reference in this work to an expedition conducted against the Armenians in 36 
we cannot, however, infer that the conquest of the Armenians had not taken place. 
On the contrary, additional evidence can be brought forward to support Plutarch’s 
version of Canidius Crassus’ expeditions. In the first place, Strabo reports that 
some of the passes connecting Armenia with Albania and Iberia were used by 
Canidius. Although the conquest of the Armenians is not explicitly mentioned, 
Strabo does at any rate support the idea that Canidius Crassus had been in 
Armenia.18 In the second place, situated along with several other kingdoms and 
principalities between Parthia in the southeast, and those Roman provinces in 
Anatolia which had been overran by the Parthians in the year 40 in the west and 
southwest, it is highly unlikely that Armenia could have maintained a pro-Roman 
stance. With the Armenian king Artavasdes thus having kept up almost certainly a 
hostile attitude towards Rome, the use of armed power by Canidius Crassus 
against king Artavasdes of Armenia would be understandable. The same driving 
force may also have been behind the decision to undertake a military expedition 
against the kings of the Iberians and Albanians.  
Yet, plausible as these explanations for the apparent Caucasian and 
Armenian campaigns are, other considerations did possibly play a role in the 
decision-making process preceding these expeditions as well. In the passage 
quoted above, Dio informs us of alliances which Canidius Crassus is said to have 
made with the Iberian and Albanian tribes following their defeat in war against 
Rome. Although Dio does not reveal the implications of these alliances, it is not 
                                                          
17 Treidler (1962) 1907; Pelling (1988) 212; Sullivan (1990) 292 all place the Caucasian campaign in 
36. Cf. Sherwin-White (1984) 307, n.26 who purports that “a winter offensive... is improbable”. An 
alternative date is, however, not provided. On the consulship of Gellius Publicola and Cocceius 
Nerva, see Broughton (1952) 399. 
18 Strabo, 11.3.5. 
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inconceivable that with the formation of these compacts, Canidius Crassus had 
secured armed support from the Iberian and Albanian kings for Antony’s military 
expedition against Parthia in the summer of 36. 19  Plutarch explicitly reckons 
Iberians (possibly from the Caucasus) among the cavalry gathered by Antony for 
his campaign. Albanian contingents could potentially have been among the 30,000 
soldiers who are mentioned by Plutarch without any ethnic specification.20 Yet, in 
whatever way the Iberian and Albanian kings participated in the war against 
Parthia, if we have to believe Plutarch, then their contribution could not have been 
more substantial than the assistance granted by the Armenian king Artavasdes, 
who is said to have “furnished 6,000 horse and 7,000 foot”, and was supposedly 
the greatest of all the allied kings.21 Details concerning the formation of an alliance 
with Artavasdes, eventually bringing about Armenian assistance for Antony’s 
military adventure into Parthia, have unfortunately been documented neither by 
                                                          
19 Günther (1922) 51, n.1; Huzar (1978) 175 and Pelling (1988) 212 all argue that Canidius Crassus’ 
achievements in the Caucasus were intended to diminish the chance of Antony suffering an attack 
from the north on his march to Parthia. Cf. Sherwin-White (1984) 308, who disagrees with this 
generally accepted explanation for Caucasian campaigns and points out that “the Iberians and 
Albanians, freed from the Armenian yoke by Pompeius, had no known interest in the lands south 
of the mountain barrier that separated them from Armenia, apart from the recovery of certain 
borderlands from the Armenians...”. The same observation has been made by Freyburger / Roddaz 
(1994) cxxvi. Yet, from the absence of proof for Iberian and Albanian ambitions to expand the 
kingdom to the south, it is, however, not possible to draw the conclusion – as Sherwin-White does 
– that the Caucasian campaign conducted by Canidius Crassus “was no more than an operation of 
prestige...”. Reinhold (1988) 59 does not exclude either of the two explanations for Canidius 
Crassus’ military adventures in the Caucasus. 
20 Plutarch, Ant. 37.3: “There were, of the Romans themselves, 60,000 foot-soldiers, together with 
the cavalry classed as Roman, namely, 10,000 Iberians and Celts; of the other nations there were 
30,000, counting alike horsemen and light-armed troops” (“ἦσαν δὲ Ῥωμαίων μὲν αὐτῶν 
ἑξακισμύριοι πεζοὶ καὶ τὸ Ῥωμαίοις συντεταγμένον ἱππικὸν, Ἰβήρων καὶ Κελτῶν μύριοι, τῶν 
δὲ ἄλλων ἐθνῶν ἐγένοντο τρεῖς μυριάδες σὺν ἱππεῦσιν ὁμοῦ καὶ ψιλοῖς”); Pelling (1988)  223 
asserts correctly that the Ἴβηρες referred to by Plutarch could have been Spaniards, but also 
Caucasian Iberians.  
21 Plutarch, Ant. 37.3: “... ἑξακισχιλίους ἱππεῖς καὶ πεζοὺς ἑπτακισχιλίους παρέχων”. Cf. Strabo, 
11.14.9, who also reports that Artavasdes provided Antony with 6000 horsemen. Cf. Plutarch, Ant. 
50.2, who refers to the number of horsemen led by Artavasdes of Armenia as 16,000 not 6,000. It 
seems highly plausible that one of these numbers is erroneous. Pelling (1988) 223 argues, however, 
that “possibly both figures are correct. If the muster was in West Armenia, the greater part of the 
Armenian contingent may not have joined him until later, as he made his way towards Media”. 
However plausible this interpretation is, the assumption that the muster of all the troops occurred 
in west Armenia is not in the least certain. See on Antony’s route Sherwin-White (1984) 307-312.  
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Plutarch, nor by Dio. Nonetheless, it is plausible that it was the military invasion 
of Armenia by Canidius Crassus that procured an alliance between Rome and 
king Artavasdes, in the same way as compacts were formed with the Iberian and 
Albanian rulers following Canidius Crassus’ attacks on their kingdoms.22    
Armenian involvement in the military expedition against Parthia did go 
beyond the provision of infantry and cavalry. Strabo asserts, for example, that 
Artavasdes served as a guide, “a counsellor and master of decisions respecting the 
war”.23 Specific manifestations of this role that Artavasdes would have played in 
Antony’s campaign are, however, not unveiled by Strabo. Fortunately, Dio can 
provide us with a useful indication: 
 
“And he [Antony, ed.] went as far as the Euphrates, thinking it was destitute of a 
garrison; when, however, he found that whole region carefully guarded, he turned 
aside from it, but undertook to make a campaign against Artavasdes, the king of 
the Medes, being persuaded thereto by the king of Greater Armenia, who had the 
same name and was an enemy of the other”.24 
 
                                                          
22 Cf. Prantl (2008) 100, who believes that Antony had assigned Canidius Crassus with the task to 
renew “die Klientelherrschaft über Armenien”. Prantl’s usage of the term “Klientelherrschaft” in 
this context is regrettable. Evidence for a renewal of client rule over Armenia is non-existent. 
Moreover, ancient sources do not describe the socio-political relations between Rome and kings or 
princes in terms of clientela, apart from a few instances (see Introduction section 5). It remains 
therefore opaque what Prantl means by a renewal of the “Klientelherrschaft”. In my opinion, it is 
most likely that the aim of Canidius Crassus’ campaign against Armenia was the renewal of an 
alliance with the Armenian king. The formation of this alliance may be the event that was 
commemorated on a denarius of Antony, which features on the reverse an Armenian tiara. For the 
date of this coin and the interpretation of the tiara, see Bedoukian (1978) 27-28; Crawford (1974) 537 
no.539, 743. Cf. Sullivan (1990) 289, who argues that the tiara depicted on the reverse of this coin 
“copied the version of the king of Atropatene, Artavasdes I...”. It remains debatable how much 
military force was actually used to bring about a compact between Armenia and Rome. Sherwin-
White (1984) 307 argues that “king Artavasdes... doubtless submitted as quickly as his father had 
done to Pompeius”. This view has been adopted by Pelling (1988) 213. According to Prantl (2008) 
100, it remains unclear whether Roman troops had to use armed force. Nonetheless, Prantl 
proposes that actual armed hostilities had probably not taken place.  
23 Strabo, 11.13.4: “... σύμβουλον ἐποιεῖτο καὶ κύριον τῆς περὶ τοῦ πολέμου γνώμης”; 16.1.28. 
24  Dio, 49.25.1: “ἦλθε μέχρι τοῦ Εὐφράτου, νομίζων ἔρημον αὐτὸν φρουρᾶς εἶναι· ἐπεὶ μέντοι 
πάντα τὰ ταύτῃ διὰ φυλακῆς ἀκριβοῦς ὄντα εὗρεν, ἐκεῖθεν μὲν ἀπετράπετο, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν τῶν 
Μήδων βασιλέα Ἀρταουάσδην τῷ τῆς Ἀρμενίας τῆς μείζονος βασιλεῖ, ὁμωνύμῳ τέ οἱ καὶ 
ἐχθρῷ ὄντι, πεισθεὶς...”. 
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Dio clearly states that the Armenian king persuaded Antony to undertake a 
campaign against Artavasdes of Media Atropatene when Antony found out that 
the Euphrates was guarded by Parthians. The Armenian ruler is said to have 
maintained hostile relations with the Atropatenean ruler. Artavasdes possibly 
nursed hopes that Antony would grant him a part of, or perhaps even the whole 
territory of Media Atropatene after a triumph. Media Atropatene had been part of 
the kingdom of Armenia for some years during the reign of Tigranes the Great. 
Artavasdes represented himself as King of Kings on his coinage, emulating his 
predecessor Tigranes the Great (r. c. 96/95-56/55 BC), who expanded his kingdom 
to include all adjacent kingdoms and principalities, Syria and portions of Parthia 
and Cilicia.25 
 In the passage quoted above, Dio seems to imply that the decision to attack 
king Artavasdes of Media Atropatene was only made after Antony’s discovery 
that the Euphrates was heavily guarded by Parthian troops, making a crossing (at 
Zeugma)26 too hazardous. However, such an interpretation is rather implausible; 
Antony probably did not suddenly change his entire strategy. The attack on Media 
Atropatene had probably already been planned. Canidius Crassus and Artavasdes 
of Armenia may already have decided on the attack earlier during the year. The 
logical question then crops up why Antony would have marched to Zeugma, a 
place at which the Euphrates could be crossed and whence Roman troops could 
advance through Mesopotamia to the centre of the Parthian kingdom. It is most 
likely, as Sherwin-White has proposed, that Antony intended to cross the 
Euphrates at Zeugma and to push from there to Armenia and further across the 
Araxes River into Media Atropatene – possibly in order to avoid the Parthian 
cavalry in the Mesopotamian plains which had caused disaster to Crassus’ 
campaign in 53. However, with the Euphrates safeguarded, Antony was forced to 
                                                          
25 Bedoukian (1978) 69-70, nos. 130-135 refers to drachms and copper coins have been found that 
carry the legend “ΒΑCΙΛΕΩC ΒΑCΙΛΕΩΝ ΑΡΤΑΥΑΖΔΟΥ”. See also the catalogue in 
Mousheghian / Depeyrot (1999) 166-167, nos. 113-118. 
26 Strabo, 11.13.5 refers to one of Antony’s guides who travelled from Zeugma to Atropatene. 
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make an enormous detour through Commagene. From Armenia, Antony 
advanced to Phraaspa, the capital of Media Atropatene. The expedition against 
Media Atropatene did not lead to the results for which Antony had hoped. On the 
contrary, the siege engines that Antony had left behind under the command of 
Statianus while he advanced towards the city of Phraaspa were destroyed by the 
troops of the Parthian king Phraates IV. The Armenian king Artavasdes had by 
that time retreated from the expedition and returned to his homeland.27 Although 
in the ancient literary sources Artavasdes received a negative judgement for his 
decision to retreat to his own kingdom, Prantl argues convincingly that 
Artavasdes probably retreated from the war because he did not wish to jeopardise 
the Parthians too much. 28  Artavasdes had experienced in 53 what the 
consequences could be of siding with Rome: while the Parthian commanders 
Suren and Silaces attacked the Roman legions, king Orodes himself occupied 
Armenia – in all likelihood to prevent the Armenian king from granting assistance 
to Crassus. Such an invasion Artavasdes did not wish to experience again in 36.  
  
14.2 The Armenian campaigns of 34 and the late 30s BC 
 
The withdrawal of king Artavasdes of Armenia in 36 from the battlefield in Media 
Atropatene proved to be catastrophic for the political relations between Antony 
and Artavasdes. Soon after the disaster had overcome the Romans, the triumvir is 
said to have entertained thoughts to take vengeance on the Armenian king.29 In 35, 
preparations for an invasion with the objective to seize Artavasdes were already in 
an advanced phase, and an attack may possibly have taken place, had news of 
Octavia’s forthcoming arrival in the eastern Mediterranean not prompted Antony 
                                                          
27 Plutarch, Ant. 38.2-39.1; Dio, 49.25.2-5; Strabo, 11.13.4. 
28 Prantl (2008) 103.  
29 Dio, 49.31.2; Plutarch, Ant. 50.3. 
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to abort the mission.30 In the following year, Antony renewed his attempts to 
capture the Armenian king. He did not, however, immediately set out on a 
military campaign. Dio informs us what strategies Antony employed instead to 
take revenge on Artavasdes: 31 
 
“In his endeavour to take vengeance on the Armenian king with the least trouble to 
himself, he [Antony, ed.] asked for the hand of the king’s daughter, as if to marry her 
to his son Alexander; he sent on this errand one Quintus Dellius, who had once been a 
favourite of his, and promised to give the king many gifts. Finally, at the beginning of 
spring, he came suddenly into Nicopolis (the place founded by Pompey), and while 
there sent for the king, stating that he wished to have his aid in planning and 
executing some measures against the Parthians. And when the king, suspecting the 
plot, did not come, he sent Dellius to confer with him again, and meanwhile, for his 
own part, marched with undiminished haste towards Artaxata”. 
 
Dio claims that Antony initially tried to use the promise of a marriage of the king’s 
daughter with Alexander, the son whom he produced with Cleopatra, as a means 
to trap Artavasdes. Dynastic intermarriage was a widespread phenomenon in the 
Hellenistic world particularly designed to create alliances of a political nature 
between the kingdoms and principalities whose royal families were involved.32 
Antony may have hoped that the offer of a marriage bond with the prestigious 
Ptolemies would entice Artavasdes to give his daughter to Alexander in wedlock. 
The new connection would give the triumvir ample opportunity to eliminate the 
Armenian king in whatever possible way. Evidence for an actual marriage 
                                                          
30 Dio, 49.33. On Octavia’s visit to the East in 35, see among others Buchheim (1960) 84-88; Reinhold 
(1988) 65-66; Pelling (1988) 243-248.  
31  Dio, 49.39.2-3: “πράττων δ' ὅπως ὡς ὅτι ἀπονώτατα τὸν Ἀρμένιον τιμωρήσηται, τήν τε 
θυγατέρα αὐτοῦ ὡς καὶ τῷ υἱεῖ συνοικίσων ᾔτησε, Κύιντόν τινα Δέλλιον παιδικά ποτε ἑαυτοῦ 
ηενόμενον πέμψας, καὶ πολλά τινα αὐτῷ δώσειν ὑπέσχετο. καὶ τέλος ἔς τε τὴν Νικόπολιν τὴν 
τοῦ Πομπηίου αἰφνίδιον ἅμα τῷ ἦρι ἦλθε, κἀνταῦθα αὐτὸν ὡς καὶ συμβουλεύσοντα καὶ 
συμπράξοντά τινα κατὰ τῶν Πάρθων μετεπέμψατο. ἐπειδή τε οὐκ ἀφίκετο τὴν ἐπιβουλὴν 
ὑποπτεύσας, τόν τε Δέλλιον αὖθις ἐς λόγους οἱ προσέπεμψε, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐδὲν ἧττον σπουδῇ 
πρὸς τὰ Ἀρτάξατα ἤλασε” (LCL transl. adapted). 
32 Seibert (1967); Sullivan (1990) 14-15. 
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between Alexander and a daughter of Artavasdes does, however, not appear to 
exist. The proposal was, thus, most likely rejected by Artavasdes. An alternative 
scheme to take the Armenian king into custody equally failed to procure the 
desired results. Antony decided accordingly to advance into Armenia. He moved 
towards the capital Artaxata, and managed by means of a ruse to put the king 
under arrest and carry him off to feature in a procession in Alexandria.33 The 
victory over Armenia was subsequently commemorated on some of Antony’s 
coinage.34  
Revenge for Artavasdes’ behaviour during the Parthian campaign of 36 was 
in all likelihood one of the main driving forces behind Antony’s decision to 
capture the Armenian king. Yet, despite the prominence of the theme of retaliation 
in some of the ancient texts,35 other factors seem to have been in play as well. 
Antony did not limit his activities in Armenia to the capture of Artavasdes. Before 
the prisoner was carried off to Alexandria, the triumvir is said to have taken him 
to visit those fortresses in Armenia where his assets were stored.36  
Apparently, Antony was in need of financial resources, and his decision to 
arrest Artavasdes may have been dictated by the assumption that it would be 
easier to lay claim on Armenia’s treasuries by using the release of the king as bait. 
Unfortunately for Antony, the scheme failed to achieve its objective. The 
Armenians abandoned Artavasdes and selected the eldest son Artaxias as king 
instead. Thereupon Antony resorted to his arms and occupied the whole kingdom, 
forcing Artaxias to seek refuge with the Parthians.37 The occupation of Armenia 
                                                          
33 Dio, 49.39.2-49.40.4; Plutarch, Ant. 50.4; Livy, Per. 131; Strabo, 11.14.15; Josephus, AJ 15.96, 104; 
Velleius, 2.82.3; Tacitus, Ann. 2.3; Orosius, 6.19.3. Cf. Josephus, BJ 1.362-363, who is clearly 
mistaken to believe that Antony made a campaign into Parthia at this stage and that the son of 
Tigranes, Artabazes, whom he took with him as prisoner, was a Parthian (Πάρθος). 
34 Grueber, BMCRR II, 525, nos. 179-182 with brief discussion; Crawford (1974) 539, no. 543: on the 
obverse of the denarius is the head of Antony and an Armenian tiara depicted, with the legend 
“ANTONI ARMENIA DEVICTA”; the reverse has a bust of Cleopatra, draped and wearing a 
diadem. We can see the legend “CLEOPATRAE REGINAE REGUM FILIORUM REGUM”. 
35 Plutarch, Ant. 50.3; Dio, 49.31.2; 49.33.1; 49.39.2; Strabo, 11.13.4; 11.14.15. 
36 Dio, 49.39.5. 
37 Dio, 49.39.6-49.40.1; Josephus, AJ 15.105. 
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gave Antony finally the opportunity to get hold of the material wealth stored in 
the various forts throughout the kingdom. Financial motives may thus have been 
vital behind the decision to invade Armenia and put its king under arrest. This 
does not, however, exclude that other factors were in play as well. An additional 
motive for the removal of the Armenian king is possibly the secret negotiations 
which Artavasdes, according to Dio, maintained with Octavian “for the purpose of 
injuring Antony”.38   
Yet, whatever drove Antony to eliminate Artavasdes, it is at least clear that 
he did not allow the newly installed king Artaxias (r. 34-20), son of Artavasdes, to 
succeed to the Armenian throne. Antony gave in the year 33 a part of the newly 
acquired Armenian territory to Artavasdes of Media Atropatene, who was at 
variance with his Armenian opponent and whose daughter Iotape had been 
betrothed to Alexander, the son of Antony and Cleopatra.39 However, as soon as 
Antony was forced to withdraw his forces on which Artavasdes of Media 
Atropatene depended later during the year as part of preparations for the 
impending armed clash against Octavian, Artaxias left Parthia (where he had 
taken refuge), successfully defeated the Atropatenean king and appropriated the 
kingdom that he had been given in 34 following the capture of his father.40  
 
Conclusion 
 
In the years between the onset of Roman civil war following the assassination of 
Caesar and the Battle of Actium, the political relations between Rome and 
Armenia underwent significant changes. From an ally in the Parthian campaign, 
Armenia became an enemy of Rome after the Armenian king had withdrawn from 
the battlefield. Artavasdes’ disloyalty to Rome should, however, not be 
                                                          
38 Dio, 49.41.5: “... ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀντωνίῳ κεκοινολογημένος...”. Confirmed by Buchheim (1960) 90. 
39 Dio, 49.44.2. 
40 Dio, 49.44.4. 
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understood as a expression of an a priori detestation of Rome, but rather as a 
reflection of Armenia’s precarious position on the world stage between Rome and 
Parthia. In order to maintain some degree of independence, the Armenian king 
was forced not to ally himself completely to either of the two parties. On the other 
hand, Rome and Parthia had an interest in preventing each other from gaining too 
much political influence over Armenia, as this kingdom formed the link between 
both empires. 
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15 MEDIA ATROPATENE 
 
The relations between Rome and Media Atropatene in the period of civil war from 
44 until 42 remained largely unknown, as we saw in Part II.A. Median troops 
participated at Philippi, fighting on the side of Brutus and Cassius. With the loss 
of the tyrannicides and the arrival of Antony in the East, it would be vital to see 
how the relations developed in the period up till Actium. Unfortunately, as we 
shall realise, our sources do not reveal anything about the relations with Media 
Atropatene until Antony’s Parthian campaign in 36. Whether the support for the 
the tyrannicides at Philippi had any negative consequences for Media Atropatene 
in the subsequent years can thus not be determined. 
 
15.1 The Parthian and Armenian invasions 
 
In the spring of the year 36, Antony launched his military expedition against 
Parthia. In order to avoid any encounter with the Parthian cavalry which had 
brought ruin upon the legions of Crassus in 53, Antony decided not to advance 
through the plains of Mesopotamia – the natural habitat of those horsemen. His 
march led him instead via the mountainous regions of Armenia across the Araxes 
River into Media Atropatene, which at that time was ruled by a certain 
Artavasdes, and thenceforth further to the city of Phraaspa.1 Although the strategy 
initially seemed to be successful, the long-term siege of this place allowed the 
Parthian and Median forces, who had gathered on the Euphrates near Zeugma, to 
move to Media Atropatene and fight the Romans. Several armed confrontations 
ended in triumphs for the Parthians, and Antony was as a result of the losses 
                                                          
1 On Antony’s marching route and the location of Phraaspa, see chapter 8.2. 
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ultimately forced to make his retreat from the battlefield and to return into 
Armenia.2  
The campaign resulted in the loss of about a third of Rome’s forces, and left 
Antony’s prestige damaged. To what extent Atropatenean forces had contributed 
to this military success over Rome is not entirely clear. It is at least evident that 
soon after the victory a rift occurred in the relations between the Parthian king 
Phraates and the Atropatenean Artavasdes, eventually leading to a 
rapprochement between the latter ruler and Antony: 
 
“he [Antony, ed.] attempted to conduct a campaign against the Armenian. For this he 
placed no small hope in the Mede, who in his anger against Phraates because he had 
not received from him many of the spoils or any other honour and in his eagerness to 
punish the Armenian for bringing in the Romans had sent Polemon to him [Antony, 
ed.] requesting his friendship and alliance”.3 
 
Artavasdes’ overtures found a sympathetic ear with Antony, and are said to have 
brought about the conclusion of a treaty (σπείσασθαι) between the two parties 
through the agency of the Pontic king Polemon.4 What the terms of this compact 
between the two parties were, is unfortunately not revealed to us. That the 
agreement arranged for Atropatenean support to Rome in the impending 
                                                          
2 On the course and outcome of Antony’s Parthian campaign, see chapter 8.2. See also maps 2 and 
5. 
3 Dio 49.33.1: “στρατεῠσαι ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀρμένιον ἐπεχείρησεν, ἐλπίδα τοῦ Μήδου οὐκ ἐλαχίστην 
ἔχων, ὅτι πρός τε τὸν Φραάτην ἀγανακτήσας ἐπὶ τῷ μήτε τῶν λαφύρων πολλὰ παρ’ αὐτοῦ 
μήτ’ ἄλλην τινὰ τιμὴν λαβεῖν, καὶ τὸν Ἀρμένιον τιμωρήσασθαι τῆς τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐπαγωγῆς, 
τὸν Πολέμωνα αὐτῷ προσέπεμψε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ συμμαχίαν αἰτῶν” (LCL transl. adapted). It is 
clear that “the Mede” in this context refers to the Atropatenean and not to the Parthian king, since 
the latter is mentioned separately in the same passage and is singled out as the object of the Mede’s 
anger. Cf. Plutarch Ant. 52.1-2, who equally refers to the dispute between the Parthian ruler 
Phraates and the king of “the Medes” (τῶν Μήδων) concerning the partition of the Roman spoils, 
but keeps silent about any conflict between Media Atropatene and Armenia.  
4 Dio 49.33.1: “He [Antony, ed.] was apparently so exceedingly delighted over the affair that he 
both made a treaty with him [the Mede, ed.] and later gave Polemon Lesser Armenia as a reward 
for his mission” (“oὕτω γάρ που ὑπερήσθη τῷ πράγματι ὥστε καὶ ἐκείνῳ σπείσασθαι καὶ τῷ 
Πολέμωνι μισθὸν τῆς κηρυκείας τὴν μικροτέραν Ἀρμενίαν μετὰ ταῦτα δοῦναι”). (LCL transl. 
adapted). 
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campaign against the Armenian king is at any rate very likely. It can, however, not 
be excluded that the two parties had also made plans for an attack on Parthia to be 
staged at some point after the expedition into Armenia. The Atropatenean 
Artavasdes was at odds with his Parthian counterpart Phraates over the division 
of the booty seized during the Roman invasion of 36, and would according to 
Plutarch have made promises to Antony to fight alongside him against the 
Parthians.5 Plutarch places these assurances to Antony and the preparations for a 
new Parthian campaign in the period before Octavia’s visit to the East in 35.6 
Although the expedition into Parthia appears not to have been scheduled for this 
year,7 it is very well possible that a military alliance for a future war against 
Parthia had already been made in 35 and formed a component of the treaty 
concluded at that time.8    
Yet, whatever may have been agreed upon by Antony and Artavasdes of 
Media Atropatene, it is clear that Octavia’s visit to the eastern Mediterranean 
prompted the triumvir to postpone his expedition against Armenia until the year 
34. In what way the Atropatenean king participated in this campaign cannot be 
established with certainty. The enterprise was, at any rate, not detrimental to the 
good relations between the two men.9 On the contrary, after the capture of the 
                                                          
5 Plutarch, Ant. 52.1. 
6 On Octavia’s visit to the eastern Mediterranean, see among others Buchheim (1960) 84-88. 
7 Dio, 49.33.3 makes clear that Antony had the intention to advance on Armenia, but pretended to 
undertake a campaign against Parthia “in order that he might find him [the Armenian king, ed.] 
unprepared” (“ἵνα ἀπαράσκευον αὐτὸν εὕρῃ”). Cf. Plutarch, Ant. 52 who genuinely seems to 
believe that Antony was about to set out on a campaign against Parthia in the year 35, only for it to 
be aborted after he had received news of Octavia’s coming to the East. That an attack on Parthia 
was planned to be launched in 35 is, however, highly unlikely. After Antony had dismissed 
Octavia, he first dealt with Armenia, not with Parthia. Moreover, as Pelling (1998) 242-243 has 
argued, Plutarch may have used elements of the preparatory stages prior to the planned Parthian 
campaign of 33 for his description of the preliminaries that preceded the alleged intended 
expedition of 35. Plutarch says that “he [Antony, ed.] prepared to go up again through Armenia, 
effect a junction with the Mede at the river Araxes, and then prosecute the war” (“παρεσκευάζετο 
δι' Ἀρμενίας αὖθις ἀναβαίνειν καὶ συγγενόμενος τῷ Μήδῳ περὶ ποταμὸν Ἀράξην οὕτω κινεῖν 
τὸν πόλεμον”). A similar report can be found in Dio, 49.44.1, but then for the year 33. 
8 Similar view uttered by Pelling (1988) 242-243. 
9 For more details on the course of Antony’s Armenian expedition see chapter 14.2. 
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Armenian Artavasdes and the invasion of Armenia, 10  Antony is said to have 
renewed the friendly relations with Artavasdes of Media Atropatene by 
betrothing his son Alexander Helios, whom he procured with Cleopatra, to Iotape, 
the daughter of the Atropatenean ruler.11 As explained in a previous chapter, the 
creation of this dynastic connection was politically motivated. Antony hoped that 
Media Atropatene as well as other portions of the eastern Mediterranean would 
eventually end up in Ptolemaic hands. Since the districts promised to Alexander 
Helios later in the year 34 at Alexandria were located east of the Euphrates and as 
such not under direct Roman control, Antony decided to arrange a marriage for 
his son with the daughter of the Atropatenean ruler in the hope that in this way 
Ptolemaic presence would be established in Media Atropatene and the other 
neighbouring kingdoms.12   
Important as the arranged dynastic link between Alexander Helios and 
Iotape was to be able to fulfill Antony’s grand-scale administrative reorganisation 
of the Near East, for the time being, the status quo remained unchanged: 
Artavasdes kept his position.  In 33, Antony returned to Media Atropatene and 
engaged in diplomatic exchanges with the king. Dio reveals that  
 
“they made a covenant to serve each other as allies, the one [Antony, ed.] against the 
Parthians and the other [Artavasdes, ed.] against Caesar, and to cement the compact 
they exchanged some soldiers, the Mede received a portion of the newly-acquired 
Armenia, and Antony received the king’s daughter, to be united in marriage with 
Alexander, and the military standards taken in the battle with Statianus”.13 
                                                          
10 On the capture of Artavasdes and the invasion of Armenia, see chapter 14.2. 
11 Dio 49.40.2; Plutarch Ant. 53.6. The betrothal of Alexander Helios to Iotape occurred after the 
attempt to betroth his son to the daughter of the Armenian Artavasdes. 
12 On the territorial grants to Alexander Helios in 34, see chapter 9.4. 
13 Dio 49.44.1-2: “συμμαχήσειν τε γὰρ ἀλλήλοις, ὁ μὲν ἐπὶ τοὺς Πάρθους ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν Καίσαρα, 
συνέθεντο, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ στρατιώτας τέ τινας ἀντέδοσάν σφισι, καὶ ὁ μὲν τῆς Ἀρμενίας τῆς 
νεοκτήτου τινὰ ἔλαβεν, ὁ δὲ τὴν θυγατέρα αὐτοῦ Ἰωτάπην ὡς καὶ τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ 
συνοικήσουσαν, καὶ τὰ σημεῖα τὰ στρατιωτικὰ τὰ ἐν τῇ τοῦ Στατιανοῦ μάχῃ ἁλόντα”. Upon 
arrival in Media Atropatene, Oppius Statianus was left behind with the siege engins while Antony 
advanced ahead to Phraaspa with a portion of the troops. Statianus was subsequently defeated by 
the enemy, on which see Plutarch, Ant. 38.3. 
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Although a campaign into Parthia did in the end not take place, the alliance was 
still of use to both parties. Soon after the Atropatenean Artavasdes had been 
granted a part of Armenia – probably the region around Symbace – the Parthian 
king Phraates made an attack on him with the help of Artaxes, who had emerged 
as new king of Armenia after the arrest of his father and had been forced to seek 
refuge with the Parthians.14 The Atropatenean king did, however, manage to beat 
off the invaders with the assistance of the Roman allies. Only after Antony had 
withdrawn his Roman troops from this kingdom in the run-up to the war against 
Octavian did they manage to defeat Artavasdes. The Atropatenean possessions in 
Armenia were subsequently restored to Artaxes, and Media Atropatene remained 
under either Armenian or Parthian control until the year 20.15 Dio also says that 
the Atropatenean Artavasdes was taken captive. Although this statement cannot 
be excluded, it is at least evident that if he were captured, he was soon released, 
since he featured later on at Actium.16 
 
15.2 Medes at Actium  
 
For the war against Octavian, Antony had not merely Roman legions at his 
disposal, but could also count on the military support provided by various kings 
and princes in the eastern Mediterranean. Plutarch informs us of the rulers that 
had placed auxiliary troops at Antony’s disposal, and reckons the king of the 
Medes (Μήδων) among them. 17  Just as in an earlier passage of Antony’s 
biography, Plutarch may also here be referring to the ruler of Media Atropatene. 
                                                          
14 Our only source for the grant of Symbace to Media Atropatene is Strabo, 11.13.2. For a debate on 
the exact location of Symbace, see Syme (1995) 81. For the capture of the Armenian Artavasdes, the 
emergence of Araxes as king and his subsequent escape to Parthia, see chapter 14.2. 
15 For more details on the annexation and occupation of Media Atropatene by Parthia or Armenia, 
see Sullivan (1990) 298-299. 
16 Dio 49.44.4.  
17 Plutarch, Ant. 61.2. 
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At first glance, the participation of auxiliary forces provided by the Atropatenean 
king appears to be odd, taking into account a passage in Dio’s Roman History that 
refers to the capture of this ruler in 33.18 However, it is not impossible to presume 
that the Atropatenean Artavasdes was released and succeeded in returning to his 
kingdom.19 In that case, it would have been possible for the Atropatenean ruler to 
provide Antony with auxiliary forces for his war against Octavian. Clear 
explanations for the presence of Median forces at Actium are not provided by any 
of our sources. Nonetheless, it is not unthinkable that Antony lured the 
Atropatenean king with further grants of territories. Whatever the exact reason 
was for Artavasdes of Media Atropatene to dispatch troops to the assistance of 
Antony, after Actium he sought refuge with Octavian and may have been granted 
the rule over Armenia Minor instead of his own kingdom.20 
 
Conclusion 
 
The political relations between Rome and Media Atropatene were diverse in the 
age of civil war. During the Parthian campaign of 36, the Atropateneans 
functioned as allies of the Parthian king Phraates, while in the period afterwards 
they showed their loyalty to Antony. The friendship and alliance with Antony 
appear to have been confirmed with the betrothal of Antony’s son to a daughter of 
Artavasdes of Media Atropatene. Antony was apparently aware of the Hellenistic 
practice of intermarriage, which had proven to be an effective instrument to create 
and maintain alliances. 
                                                          
18 Dio, 49.44.4. 
19 Cf. Wilcken (1896) 1310, who argues that Artavasdes of Media Atropatene was only captured by 
the Parthians in the year 30. Dio, however, places these events in the year 33. 
20 RGDA 32 says that Artavasdes, king of the Medes came as suppliant to him. Cooley (2009) 253 
explains that Artavasdes of Media Atropatene had been an ally of Antony. After Actium, Artaxes II 
of Armenia began to resume control of greater Armenia and expelled Artavasdes who took refuge 
with Octavian; Dio 51.16.2. Cf. Sullivan (1990) 198-299. 
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16 COMMAGENE 
 
The territorial rearrangement of Near Eastern kingdoms and principalities formed 
one of the most tangible facets of Pompey’s administrative reorganisation of the 
Levant and Upper Euphrates basin in the 60s BC. Best documented of the 
geographical alterations implemented by Rome in this period are without doubt 
the enormous territorial deprivations that befell the Armenian king Tigranes and 
the Judaean ἐθνάρχης Hyrcanus. Yet, several other rulers also experienced an 
adjustment to the size of their realm. Changes were, for example, made in 64 to the 
extent of the dominions under the control of Antiochus I, king of Commagene.1 
This monarch had only been free from the Armenian yoke for approximately five 
years, and Pompey now allocated to him the town of Seleucia on the Euphrates 
(also known as Zeugma), and possibly parts of Mesopotamia as well. As Zeugma 
was located near an important crossing point of the Euphrates, marking the 
boundary of the spheres of influence between Rome and Parthia in eastern 
Anatolia, Pompey must have had confidence in Antiochus’ loyalty to Rome. 
Pompey furthermore concluded friendship and possibly also an alliance with the 
Commagenian king, a benign relationship. That these good relations were not 
ephemeral became apparent during the consulship of Caesar in 59 when 
Antiochus was granted the honour of wearing the toga praetexta.2 The upkeep of 
friendship with Rome did not, however, prevent Antiochus from maintaining 
good connections with Parthia. At some point in the second half of this decade or 
in the next one, the Commagenian king even established a dynastic link with the 
Arsacid rulers of Parthia by giving his daughter Laodice in marriage to the 
                                                          
1 On Pompey’s reorganisation of Armenia, Judaea and Commagene, see chapter 1.1, 1.7, 1.3. 
2 Cicero, Q.fr. 2.10(11).2. On the right bestowed upon Antiochus specifically and on kings in general 
to wear the toga praetexta, see Facella (2010) 194-195; Braund (1984) 27-29. 
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Parthian king Orodes II.3 Rome was probably not amused by this move, and may 
for this reason, on the urging of Cicero, have arranged for the removal of Zeugma 
or a district close to this city from Antiochus’ possessions.4 Yet, whatever had 
prompted the annexation of territories, it is clear that the loss did not infuriate the 
Commagenian ruler to such an extent that he would neglect his friendship with 
Rome. In 51, for example, Antiochus was the first to inform Cicero as proconsul of 
Cilicia through legates of the fact that Parthian troops had crossed the Euphrates, 
and in 48 he came to the support of Pompey in the civil war. 5  Despite his 
allegiance to the Pompeian cause, Caesar showed his clemency after Pharsalus and 
confirmed him along with other kings and princes whose realms bordered the 
province of Syria in their position as friends of the Roman people.6 What the 
influence of this renewal of friendly relations was on subsequent dealings between 
Commagene and Rome remains unfortunately opaque. Until the Parthian invasion 
of 40, nothing is known of their interstate contacts. How the bilateral relations 
developed in the period afterwards will be examined at present.  
 
                                                          
3 The evidence for the existence of a marriage between Laodice and Orodes consists of Dio, 49.23.4 
and an inscription (Kb) found on the abacus of a column at Karakuş. The inscription informs us of 
the name of Orodes’ consort. For a commentary on this inscription, see Wagner (1983) 208-212.  
4 Cicero, Q. fr. 2.11(10).2 writes in February 54 in a letter to his brother that he had taken away from 
Antiochus the little town (oppidulum) that was (erat) located in Euphrati Zeugmate. On the basis of 
this letter, several scholars have argued that the town of Zeugma which Pompey had granted to 
Antiochus, was now removed from Antiochus and integrated into the province of Syria: Dobiáš 
(1925) 256-257, 261; Watts (1981) 93; Syme (1995) 101. Cf. Wagner (1976) 62-64 and Shackleton 
Bailey (1980) 192, who claim with different argumentations that Cicero’s letter cannot be used as 
evidence for the removal of the town of Zeugma from Antiochus in 55 or 54. Kennedy / Burgess 
(1998) 141 believes that the oppidulum is to be identified with a small town in the territory of 
Zeugma. Facella (2006) 241-242 slightly favours the view according to which the oppidulum taken 
away from Antiochus was not the town of Zeugma. She believes that the phrase “extorsi oppidulum 
quod erat positum in Euphrati Zeugmate” does not mean that the town taken away from Antiochus is 
to be located in the territory of Zeugma on the Euphrates, but that the town was formerly located in 
the territory of Zeugma, but belongs now to a different district. 
5 Cicero, Fam. 15.1.2 (dated to 18 September 51). For more discussion and analysis of the exchanges 
between Antiochus and Cicero in 51, see Shackleton Bailey (1977) 437-438; Facella (2005a) 94-98. 
The evidence for the participation of the Commagenians at Pharsalus on the Pompeian side 
consists of Appian, BCiv. 2.49; Caesar, BCiv. 3.4.6. Cf. Florus, 2.13.5 does not mention 
Commagenians among Pompey’s allies.  
6 B.Alex. 65.  
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16.1 The Parthian invasion 
 
At some point in the winter of 41/40, Parthian armies crossed the River Euphrates 
and invaded the province of Syria. The forces under the command of the king’s 
son Pacorus moved thence southward into Judaea and Phoenicia, whereas the 
units under the command of the Roman deserter Q. Labienus advanced through 
Asia Minor possibly as far as the Ionian coast.7 Never before had the Parthians 
penetrated into the remote south-western areas of Anatolia, while at the same time 
holding Syria and most Phoenician cities under occupation. Yet, to ascribe this 
success solely to the strength of the Parthian armies would probably go too far. 
Dio informs us that Labienus easily won the allegiance of almost all the Roman 
armies in Syria when he overran that province, and it is very likely that the 
advancement into Asia Minor was accomplished with these newly acquired troops 
in addition to several Parthian detachments.8 Moreover, Dio specifically refers to 
the Commagenian king Antiochus as well as to two other Near Eastern rulers 
from whom the Roman proconsul P. Ventidius Bassus of Syria, who served as 
Antony’s legate, is said to have extorted a large amount of money in the year 39 in 
retaliation for the support that they would have granted to Pacorus. 9  Details 
concerning the exact nature of the alleged aid rendered by Antiochus are 
unfortunately not disclosed by the author. The assistance would, however, not 
necessarily have manifested itself in the provision of military personnel or 
equipment. Assuming that the city of Zeugma came under Commagenian rule at 
this time, it is equally imaginable for the king only to have lent the Parthians the 
opportunity of an unhindered passage of the Euphrates near this place. Although 
                                                          
7 On the Parthian invasion of Asia Minor, Syria and Judaea see chapter 8.1 and 10.4.  
8 Dio, 48.25.1-4; 48.26.3-4. For more discussion of Labienus’ advancement, see chapter 8.1. 
9 Dio, 48.41.5: “Besides accomplishing all this he exacted large sums of money from the rest 
individually, and large sums also from Antigonus and Antiochus and Malchus the Nabataean, 
because they had given help to Pacorus” (“Καὶ ὁ μὲν ταῦτά τε διῆγε, καὶ χρήματα πολλὰ μὲν 
παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὡς ἑκάστων, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοῦ Ἀντιγόνου τοῦ Μάλχου τοῦ Ναβαταίου, 
ὅτι τῷ Πακόρῳ συνήραντο, ἐσέπραξε”). On the extortion of money from Nabataea, see chapter 
13.2.  
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such a crossing during the first two years of the war is not specifically attested in 
our extant source material, Dio does inform us that the Parthians habitually 
traversed the waterway at that point.10 Besides, the bridge over the Euphrates near 
Zeugma would have afforded them with the easiest possible route for an attack on 
the Romans in Syria.11 Provided that the Parthians thus had the intention to cross 
the Euphrates at this place, it is not unthinkable for Antiochus to have granted 
them a free passage of the river and even a safe journey through his realm. 
Certainty concerning the ways in which the king may have furnished support can 
regrettably not be attained. It is merely evident that he abstained from any 
opposition against the intruding armies.12 The prospect of severe sanctions for 
upholding a hostile stance towards them did without doubt play a role in this 
decision.13 Nonetheless, the fact that his daughter Laodice was united in marriage 
with the Parthian king Orodes must have constituted a factor of importance as 
well. The existence of this nuptial bond between the dynasties of Commagene and 
Parthia may even explain why Antiochus did not revoke his fidelity to the 
Parthians immediately after the war in 38.  
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Dio, 49.19.3.  
11 Frontinus, Strat. 1.1.6, referring to the Parthian deliberations concerning the route that was to be 
taken for the invasion of Syria in 38, says that the journey via Zeugma would be the shortest 
(brevissimum) one. Kennedy / Burgess (1998) 144 commenting on this passage purports that 
“describing the route through Zeugma as shorter may have more to do with ease than distance”. 
On the Euphrates-crossing at Zeugma, see also Wagner (1976) 33-34; Syme (1995) 97-102; Comfort / 
Abadie-Reynal / Ergeç (2000) 
12 So also Facella (2006) 244, who claims in addition that an attitude of compliance towards the 
Parthian invaders would have been a sufficient reason for Rome to wrest money from its former 
ally.  
13  That the Parthian invaders were liable to inflict penalties upon revolting communities, is 
demonstrated by Dio, 48.26.3-4, who refers to the cities of Mylasa and Alabanda in Ionia which 
would have been punished in retaliation for their respective revolts against Labienus. Strabo, 
14.2.24 also refers to the abuse of cities by Labienus, and mentions Mylasa explicitly. On the 
treatment of Mylasa and Alabanda by Labienus, see: Debevoise (1938) 109-110; Magie (1950) 431 
and 1280-1281 n.10. 
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16.2 The defeat of the Parthians and the siege of Samosata 
 
The demise of Pacorus on the battlefield near the stronghold of Gindarus in 38 is 
momentous for having marked the end of the Parthian invasion of Asia Minor and 
the Levant.14 With the downfall of the prince, the Parthian forces no longer stood 
any chance against the superior Roman legions and were forced to surrender. The 
capitulation did not, however, immediately bring the hostilities to a halt. Dio 
illustrates that some of the Parthian soldiers in the aftermath of the final mêlée on 
their return homewards were cut off and slain by the Romans before they could 
reach the bridge (γέφυρα) over the Euphrates.15 Although the author has not 
specified what bridge these vanquished troops planned to use, it is plausible to 
presume that it was their intention to traverse the river at the same spot as they 
had done earlier in the year when Pacorus had embarked with them on another 
incursion into Syria. On that occasion, the Parthian prince is said to have built a 
bridge over the Euphrates in a place presently unknown to us downstream from 
Zeugma, and to have led his army across it into the region of Cyrrhestica where 
they were eventually overcome near Gindarus.16 An escape via that bridge would 
out of familiarity with the route leading to it have been highly appealing to the 
Parthian survivors of the war. Moreover, around this time, a certain Pharnaeus (or 
Channaeus according to Dio) seems to have functioned as a dynast of some sort in 
the district of Cyrrhestica, and he is said to have been well-disposed to the 
Parthians.17 Assuming that the route to the newly constructed bridge over the 
Euphrates fell under his authority, a passage of the river at that point would have 
been even more attractive to the soldiers eager to return home.  
                                                          
14 On the battle near Gindarus and the downfall of Pacorus in 38, see chapter 8.1. 
15 Dio, 49.20.3. 
16 Frontinus, Strat. 1.1.6; Dio, 49.19.1-4. Sherwin-White (1984) 304 n.19 holds it possible that the 
Parthians crossed at Nicephorium. 
17  Frontinus, Strat. 1.1.6; Dio, 49.19.2. Debevoise (1938) 117 n.94 argues that regarding the 
discrepancy in the names of the dynast transmitted in these two sources, “Frontinus is equally 
reliable and at least a full century closer to the events recorded. The form Pharnaeus is more 
probable, since it contains the Iranian element Phar”. 
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 Not all the Parthian forces, however, are said to have headed for the newly 
constructed bridge in Cyrrhestica. Dio informs us that some of them “fled for 
refuge to Antiochus in Commagene”. 18  Although no explanations for this 
manoeuvre are mentioned, it is not unthinkable that these refugees suspected that 
the Romans were aware of the route leading to the recently built overpass. 
Anxious of falling victim to an ambush, they sought an alternative and decided to 
proceed to Antiochus. Under the impression that Antiochus favoured the Parthian 
cause, they may have pinned their hopes on the Commagenian king offering 
protection against the Romans and allowing them a free crossing of the Euphrates 
at Zeugma or Samosata.19 Whether Antiochus in the end permitted them to pass 
the river unhindered remains unfortunately unclear. He appears in any case not to 
have defied the Parthian fugitives, not even when shortly afterwards his realm 
came under Roman attack.  
 The military expedition against Antiochus began at some moment in the 
year 38 under the leadership of Ventidius. 20  Dio claims that Antony’s legate 
initiated the campaign on the pretext that the king had not handed over the 
refugees, “but in reality because of the vast wealth that he possessed”.21 That the 
riches of the Commagenian king held a great attraction for the Roman general is 
without doubt conceivable.22 The presence of two palaces for the royal family and 
countless elaborately designed sanctuaries constructed during the reign of our 
Antiochus attest to Commagene’s wealth.23 Yet, it would go too far to reduce the 
explanation for the launch of this campaign to sheer financial motives. Strategic 
                                                          
18 Dio, 49.20.4: “... πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίοχον ἐς τὴν Κομμαγηνὴν κατέφυγον”. 
19 Facella (2006) 248 argues that the existence of a ford in the Euphrates at Samosata would have 
given the Parthians a good reason to take refuge with Antiochus. On crossing the Euphrates at 
Samosata, see Ammianus, 18.8.1; Wagner (1976) 44. Comfort / Abadie-Reynal / Ergeç (2000) 107 
purport that there seems to have been a pontoon bridge at this city. 
20 The sources for Ventidius’ campaign against Commagene are: Plutarch, Ant. 34.2-3; Dio, 49.20.5-
21.1. 
21 Dio, 49.20.5: “... τῇ δ’ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὰ χρήματα ἃ πάμπολλα εἶχεν...”. (LCL transl. adapted).  
22 Magie (1950) 432 seems to adopt Dio’s interpretation uncritically, claiming that in all likelihood 
“the real reason for attacking him was a desire to obtain some of his great wealth”. So also Sullivan 
(1977c) 768-769; Sullivan (1990) 196. 
23 For more details on Commagene’s wealth, including references, see Facella (2005b) 225-228. 
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considerations are likely to have played a prominent role in the decision to 
commence a war against Antiochus as well.24 The kingdom of Commagene was 
situated on the right bank of the Euphrates and via the bridge over the river near 
Zeugma as well as the ford at Samosata, the Parthians had easy access to Syria and 
Rome’s provinces in Anatolia.25 In order to guarantee the safety of these territories 
it was thus important for Rome to secure the loyalty of the Commagenian kings. 
The expedition against Antiochus may accordingly have been undertaken in an 
attempt to win over Antiochus for the Roman cause. Alternatively, the plan may 
have been to replace Antiochus with a different ruler more loyal to Rome or 
perhaps to liquidate the kingdom entirely and turn it into a province.26 Ventidius 
himself did not, however, get the chance to end the conflict in Rome’s advantage. 
Sometime after the beginning of the offensive, Antony removed him from his 
command and continued the campaign under his own control, beleaguering the 
Commagenian king in Samosata. Dio and Plutarch attribute the change of 
command to Antony’s jealousy of Ventidius’ successes – an allegation that can be 
traced back to a source influenced by Augustan propaganda.27 What the outcome 
of the siege was remains regrettably unclear. Dio and Plutarch both claim that the 
long duration of the attack and the lack of success prompted Antony to reach an 
agreement with Antiochus. 28  In contrast, Josephus says that Antiochus was 
                                                          
24 So also Facella (2006) 245. 
25 Facella (2006) 248 equally regards the ford in the Euphrates at Samosata to have been “una porta 
di ingresso per i Parti alle province romane orientali”. 
26 Buchheim (1960) 80 and Freyburger / Roddaz (1994) cxx-cxxi argue on the basis of Dio, 49.22.2 
(cited below) that the purpose of the campaign was to replace Antiochus by a certain Alexander, 
who had deserted from the Commagenian to the Roman side. After the siege, this Alexander is 
said to have been assassinated by the Romans on the instigation of Antiochus. Although Dio does 
not state that Alexander had been singled out to replace Antiochus, the possibility of such a plan 
cannot be ruled out. 
27 Dio, 49.21.1-4; Plutarch, Ant. 34.3 is less explicit than Dio, although he refers to Antony’s jealousy 
(φθόνος) in the context of Ventidius’ decision not to pursue the Parthians beyond the Euphrates 
after Gindarus (34.2). Facella (2006) 246 argues, on the basis of the similarities between the two 
accounts that Dio and Plutarch have in all likelihood made use of a common source influenced by 
Augustan propaganda and hostile towards Antony. Similar view by Reinhold (1988) 50 and 
Freyburger / Roddaz (1994) cxx regarding Dio.  
28 Dio, 49.22.1-2 says that Antony “secretly opened negotiations with the foe and made a pretended 
compact with him so that he might have a plausible reason for withdrawing. At any rate, Antony 
got neither hostages (except two and these of little importance) nor the money which he had 
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eventually compelled to surrender the city.29 In the Jewish War he even states that 
the military aid provided by king Herod brought the siege to a conclusion. 30 
Although the role of Herod in the war against the Commagenian king may have 
been exaggerated by Josephus in his Jewish War, on no grounds can the view be 
rejected that military coercion forced Antiochus to capitulate. Nor is it impossible 
for the two parties to have come to an arrangement.31 Yet, in whatever way the 
conflict was eventually brought to an end, clear is that Antiochus retained his 
kingship. 
 
For how much longer Antiochus would have held sway over his realm is 
unfortunately unclear. He may have been executed in 37 by king Phraates of 
Parthia. Yet, the passage in Dio, on which this hypothesis is based, does not 
unambiguously identify Antiochus as the one who fell victim to the purges of the 
new Arsacid king.32 The Commagenian king may thus have outlived the wave of 
violence that involved Phraates’ family members. The question of the date of 
Antiochus’ death remains unfortunately unresolved. Yet, the discovery of a bronze 
coin showing on the obverse the head of Antiochus with his name and on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
demanded, but he granted Antiochus the death of a certain Alexander, who had earlier deserted 
from him to the Roman side” (“διεκηρυκεύσατο αὐτῷ κρύφα, καὶ πλαστὰς πρὸς αὐτὸν 
συνθήκας, ὅπως εὐπρεπῶς ἀπαναστῇ, ἐποιήσατο. ἀμέλει αὐτὸς μὲν οὔτε ὁμήρους, πλὴν δύο 
καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἐπιφανῶν, οὔτε τὰ χρήματα ἃ ᾔτησεν ἔλαβε τῷ δ' Ἀντιόχῳ θάνατον 
Ἀλεξάνδρου τινὸς αὐτομολήσαντος παρ' αὐτοῦ πρότερον πρὸς τοὺς Ρωμαίους ἐχαρίσατο”). 
Plutarch, Ant. 34.4 reports that “he [Antony, ed.] was glad to make peace with Antiochus on his 
payment of three hundred talents” (“ἀγαπητῶς ἐπὶ τριακοσίοις σπένδεται ταλάντοις πρὸς τὸν 
Ἀντίοχον”). Orosius, 6.18.23 says that “Antony made peace with Antiochus, after he had subdued 
with difficulty a single fort…” (“Antonius, uno vix castello expugnato, pacem cum Antiocho fecit”, own 
translation). Sherwin-White (1984) 306 n.24 thinks that the castellum to which Orosius refers cannot 
have been Samosata, which was a large city. He maintains that the castellum can possibly be 
identified with the palace site at Yeni Kale. Cf. Facella (2006) 247 who argues, however, that 
Orosius can only have meant the city of Samosata.  
29 Josephus, AJ 14.447; BJ 1.322. 
30 Josephus, BJ 1.322. 
31  Facella (2006) also argues that “non si possa stabilire se Antioco fu realmente costretto a 
consegnare Samosata o se si accordò con Antonio per porre fine all’assedio…”. Cf. Sherwin-White 
(1984) 306 n.24, who believes that the versions of the siege related by Josephus on the one hand and 
Dio and Plutarch on the other hand are not contradictory. See also Magie (1950) 432; Sullivan 
(1977c) 769; Pelling (1988) 211; Sullivan (1990) 196. 
32 Dio, 49.23.3-4. Doubt that Antiochus had succumbed to Phraates’ purgatories has also been 
raised by Sullivan (1977c) 775-776; Facella (2006) 249. Cf. Wagner (1983) 213. 
231 
reverse a bull with the name of his son and successor Mithradates, has led scholars 
to believe in the existence of a joint-reign of both kings.33 When this supposed co-
regency would have begun and for how long it would have lasted is unclear.34 
 
16.3 Commagenian presence at Actium 
 
Nothing is known of the relations between Rome and Commagene from the end of 
the siege of Samosata in 38 until the Battle of Actium in 31. In this latter encounter, 
king Mithradates of Commagene is said by Plutarch to have participated on the 
side of Antony along with several other Near Eastern rulers.35 In what way the 
king would have supported Antony remains unfortunately diffuse. It is evident 
only that Octavian did not remove Mithradates from his kingship after the war as 
a result of his favour for Antony. 36  Whether the king took on the title of 
φιλορώμαιος only after his confirmation as ruler of Commagene by Octavian is 
uncertain.37 Yet, like his father, he seemed to have been keen to exhibit his friendly 
relations to the Romans. 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 Sullivan (1990) 197; This coin type has been described by Taşyürek (1975) 42 in the following 
way: Obv. “ΒΑ ΜΕΓ ΑΝΤΙΟΧΟΥ” with head of Antiochus I with Armenian tiara facing the right. 
Rev. “ΒΑ ΜΕΓ ΜΙΘΡΑΔ ΦΜ ΦΙΛ” depicting a bull facing to the right. Taşyürek reconstructs the 
text as follows: “ΒΑ(ΣΙΛΕΩΣ) ΜΕΓ(ΑΛΟΥ) ΑΝΤΙΟΧΟΥ; ΒΑ(ΣΙΛΕΩΣ) ΜΕΓ(ΑΛΟΥ) 
ΜΙΘΡΑΔ(ΑΤΟΥ) Φ(ΙΛΟΡΩ)Μ(ΑΙΟΥ) ΦΙΛ(ΕΛΛΗΝΟΣ)”. 
34  Wagner (1983) 206 believes that the joint-regency began shortly after the confirmation of 
Antiochus as king by Pompey in 64. 
35 Plutarch, Ant. 61.1. 
36 Dio, 52.43.1; Facella (2006) 299. 
37 Epigraphic attestations of the epithet φιλορώμαιος: Şahin (1991) 101-105; Facella (2006) 307-309. 
The letters “ΦΜ” on the reverse of the coin mentioning both Antiochus and Mithradates may be an 
abbreviation for the title φιλορώμαιος. This reconstruction is, however, uncertain. The coins of the 
two Cappadocian kings who present themselves with this title, Ariobarzanes I (r.95-62) and 
Ariobarzanes III (r.52-42) do not use an abbreviation to refer to the epithet φιλορώμαιος. On these 
coins, see Wroth (1899) xxxii-xxxiii, 39-40, 42. 
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Conclusion 
 
The political relations between Rome and Commagene in the period of civil war 
remain to a large extent unknown. It is, however, clear that despite the fact that 
Antiochus carried the title philoromaios and displayed it in all public inscriptions, 
his actions within this time frame were not always friendly towards the Romans. 
During the Parthian invasion of Syria and the Near East, he seemed to have stood 
firmly on Parthian side. As his kingdom was easily accessible for the Parthian via 
crossings at Zeugma and Samosata, he did not have much choice but to show 
allegiance to the Parthians in the two and a half years that the invasion lasted.  
How the interstate affairs developed after the end of the war remains 
unfortunately unclear. It is only evident that Antiochus’ successor supported 
Antony at Actium, but was eventually left in power by Octavian. 
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PART III 
 
TYPES OF CONDUCT 
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The period of civil war between Caesar’s assassination in 44 and the defeat of 
Antony and Cleopatra in the Battle of Actium in 31 did not merely see armed 
clashes between Roman armies, but also a proliferation in new administrative 
practices, especially following the enactment of the Triumvirate in November 43 
by the lex Titia. It is well-known that during the period of the Triumvirate, many 
measures were taken against traditional custom. Not only were the proconsuls 
appointed by the triumvirs themselves, they even controlled the selection of other 
magistrates to a large extent. 1  Nevertheless, in spite of all the unlawful and 
despotic measures taken by the triumvirs, Fergus Millar has argued convincingly 
in a classic article from 1973 that “the Triumvirate was an institution which was 
created by a form of law, and which was superimposed on, but did not replace, 
the institutions of the res publica”.2 Numerous indications in our extant source 
material indicate, for example, that the people’s assemblies were still summoned 
for the passage of laws, or that the magistrates were not all directly appointed by 
the triumvirs.3 The administrative institutions of the res publica did thus not cease 
to function in the age of Roman civil war that lasted from 44 until 31. Whether a 
similar continuity can be detected in the conduct of Rome and Near Eastern kings 
and princes towards one another, is an issue that needs to be examined at present. 
In order to determine the extent to which this behaviour altered during the period 
of civil strife, I shall compare the political interaction between Rome and Near 
Eastern rulers in the period from 44 until 31 with the bilateral relations between 
these two parties in the period before this civil war. Such a comparative analysis, 
on the one hand from the perspective of the Near Eastern kingdoms and 
principalities (chapter 17) and on the other hand from the perspective of Rome 
(chapter 18), will shed light on the extent to which the conduct of each of the 
                                                          
1 Evidence for the nomination of magistracies made by the triumvirs has been brought forward by 
Frei-Stolba (1967) 80-83 and Millar (1973) 51-52 = (2002) 244-245.  
2 Millar (1973) 61 = (2002) 260. 
3 Millar (1973) 52-54 = (2002) 246-248. 
235 
parties towards one another between 44 and 31 was typical of our period of civil 
war. 
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17 CONDUCT OF NEAR EASTERN RULERS 
TOWARDS ROME 
 
The conduct of Near Eastern rulers towards Rome in the period of civil war from 
44 until 31 was highly diverse, as can be gathered from the discussion in part II. At 
least six different types of behaviour have been identified, all of which will be 
under examination in this chapter. While the first four sections focus on requests 
of various sorts, the last two deal with the involvement of Near Eastern kingdoms 
and principalities in Rome’s foreign wars and civil conflicts respectively. The 
analysis includes both conduct initiated by Near Eastern monarchs and notables, 
as well as activities undertaken in response to Rome, although it is important to 
appreciate that in several instances it remains unclear which of the two parties 
involved took the initiative. For each type of conduct under discussion, a 
comparison with the period before 44 will be made in order to establish to what 
extent the behaviour of Near Eastern monarchs and other potentates between the 
years 44 until 31 was typical of our period of civil war.  
 
17.1 Requests for intervention in internal affairs 
 
The practice of kings and princes of approaching Rome with requests to intervene 
into the internal affairs of their own realm is one of the most frequently attested 
types of conduct undertaken by Near Eastern monarchs, potentates and other 
members of the ruling elite towards Rome from 44 until 31. The relatively high 
quantity of these entreaties among all the known behaviour may not engender 
surprise, given the prevalence of those appeals prior to the period of civil war.1 
Yet, it is important to stress that the sizable share of this sort of conduct in the 
                                                          
1 On the requests made to Rome by Near Eastern rulers for intervention into the internal affairs of 
their realm prior to the period of civil war, see below. 
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sources does not necessarily reflect the actual extent of such pleas in proportion to 
other interstate actions. The evidence for the political behaviour of Near Eastern 
rulers towards Rome is almost entirely drawn from a small selection of Greek and 
Latin literary sources, whose primary focus of attention was anything but the 
foreign affairs of kingdoms and principalities on the fringe of Rome’s empire. Brief 
references to cases of interstate contact between Near Eastern rulers and Rome 
seem only to have been made if relevant for the topic under discussion. 
Accordingly, it is highly doubtful that the literary sources provide us with more 
than a mere glimpse of the behaviour undertaken by Near Eastern monarchs and 
other aristocrats towards Rome. A remarkable exception in this respect is the 
conduct of Judaean rulers, officials and notables, of which we are better informed 
than the behaviour of other rulers as a result of the preservation of Josephus’ 
Jewish Antiquities and Jewish War, the only two extant works concentrating solely 
on the political history of one specific kingdom.2 Valuable as the insights produced 
by Josephus are, however, the Jewish Antiquities and Jewish War are unlikely to 
have rendered a full report of all the bilateral relations between Judaea and Rome.3 
Hence, it is safe to conclude that the behaviour of Near Eastern rulers towards 
Rome as gleaned from the sources is not by definition characteristic of the actual 
conduct undertaken by these monarchs and potentates towards Rome. The 
proportion of the total number of requests made by Near Eastern monarchs and 
                                                          
2 Particularly relevant in this context are the documents relating to Judaea’s affairs gathered in 
Josephus, AJ 14.190-264. The compilation includes senatus consulta, letters and several decrees 
issued both by Roman magistrates and by communities in the Near East, on which see among 
others Schürer (1973) 272-274. 
3 Following his collection of official records, Josephus, AJ 14.265 informs his readership that “there 
are many other such decrees passed by the Senate and the αὐτοκράτορες of the Romans, relating 
to Hyrcanus and our nation, as well as resolutions of cities and rescripts of provincial governors in 
reply to letters on the subject of our rights, all of which those who will read our work without 
malice will find it possible to take on faith from the documents we have cited” (“πολλὰ μὲν οὖν 
ἐστιν καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα τῇ συγκλήτῳ καὶ τοῖς αὐτοκράτορσι τοῖς Ῥωμαίων δόγματα πρὸς 
Ὑρκανὸν καὶ τὸ ἔθνος ἡμῶν γεγενημένα, καὶ πόλεσιν ψηφίσματα, καὶ γράμματα πρὸς τὰς 
περὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων δικαίων ἐπιστολὰς ἀντοπεφωνημένα τοῖς ἡγεμόσιν, περὶ ὧν ἁπάντων ἐξ 
ὧν παρατεθείμεθα πιστεύειν τοῖς ἀναγνωσομένοις οὐ βασκάνως ἡμῶν τὴν συγγραφὴν 
πάρεστιν”). 
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aristocrats to Rome for intervention into the internal affairs of their own 
dominions in relation to the amount of other types of conduct may thus have been 
higher or lower than the picture that emerges from our sources. Yet, essential as it 
is to be aware of these limitations, the significance of our material is not to be 
underestimated, in particular not with regard to the diversity it reveals in the sort 
of appeals made to Rome as well as the kind of actors and institutions involved in 
such pleas. The kind of entreaties and the type of actors and governing bodies that 
were embroiled form crucial elements to be taken into account when analysing the 
degree to which the political conduct of Near Eastern monarchs, other potentates 
and administrative institutions towards Rome between 44 and 31 was typical for 
the period of civil war.  
 
Requests made to Rome by Near Eastern dynasts that Rome become engaged in 
the internal dealings of their own realm are attested as early as 41, in the aftermath 
of Philippi. Following the downfall of Brutus and Cassius, Antony moved 
eastwards into Asia Minor and made a tour through Anatolia and the Near East to 
settle affairs in that corner of the Roman world and to raise money for the soldiers 
that had fought in the war against the tyrannicides.4 On several stages of his 
journey he was approached by embassies consisting of so-called “influential 
Judaeans”, who had come to bring forward accusations against Herod and his 
associates.5 The delegation that met Antony in Bithynia reportedly charged Herod 
and his brother Phasael with holding de facto power within Judaea at the expense 
of Hyrcanus, who as ἐθνάρχης and High Priest was the official leader of the 
Judaeans.6 Although details concerning the aims of this deputation have not been 
disclosed by our extant sources, it is highly probable that included among the 
                                                          
4 Appian, BCiv. 5.1; 5.3; 5.22; Plutarch, Ant. 23.1; Suetonius, Aug. 13.3; Dio, 48.2.1; 48.24.1. On 
Antony’s tour through the eastern provinces in 41, see Bengtson (1977) 153-167; Huzar (1978) 129-
130; 149-155; Lange (2009) 26-27. 
5 Josephus, AJ 14.302: “Ἰουδαίων οἱ ἐν τέλει”; BJ 1.242: “Ἰουδαίων οἱ δυνατοί”. On these embassies 
and the socio-political group which these delegations may have represented, see chapter 10.1. 
6 Josephus, AJ 14.301-303; BJ 1.242. 
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objectives of the ambassadors was the removal of Herod and Phasael from the 
political scene altogether, whatever their official positions within Judaea were at 
that moment. This same ambition may have underlain the decision of the 
“influential Judaeans” to send two more delegations to Antony – one to meet him 
at Daphne near Antioch, and another at Tyre – after the first legation in Bithynia 
had been declined adjudication by the triumvir.7 The dispatch of these embassies 
proved, however, not to be detrimental to the position of Herod and Phasael. On 
the contrary, at Daphne Antony nominated the two brothers as τετράρχαι of 
Judaea.  
 The requests for intervention into the internal affairs of a principality did 
thus, in this case, not lead to the results aspired to by the litigants. A variety of 
plausible explanations can be given for Antony’s decision not to let the 
complainants have their way, all of which have been extensively discussed in part 
II.8 Yet, whatever the motives were for declining the appeals of Herod’s foes, the 
ways in which Antony dealt with this conflict among the Judaean ruling elite 
illustrates that the triumvir was willing on request to mediate in an internal power 
struggle and even to side with one of the parties at variance. 9  Monarchs, 
potentates and other dignitaries within the Near Eastern kingdoms and 
principalities who faced political opposition or were engaged in a conflict must 
have realised that Antony did not categorically dismiss pleas to settle domestic 
rivalries and disputes. Appeals for intervention in an internal power conflict were 
accordingly presented to the triumvir by some of those sovereigns and notables in 
the hope of receiving a favourable response. The Egyptian queen Cleopatra was 
one of them when she successfully convinced the triumvir in a meeting at Tarsus 
                                                          
7 Josephus, AJ 14.324-329 and BJ 1.243-247 reveals neither the exact nature of the accusations nor 
the objectives of the delegations sent to Antony at Daphne and Tyre respectively.  
8 See chapter 10.1. 
9 As Gruen (1984) 111 n.75 has noted, “it is not... always easy to draw a sharp line between 
applications for support and requests for arbitration”. Nonetheless, it is still useful to differentiate 
between the two kinds of appeal, because in the case of arbitration, the mediator is expected to be 
impartial. This is not the case when two parties in conflict try to win the support of another power. 
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in the year 41 to have her sister Arsinoe and the former στρατηγός of Cyprus, 
Serapion, eliminated. Arsinoe had been raised as queen by the faction of king 
Ptolemy XIII during the Alexandrian War to serve as a rival to Cleopatra.10 With 
the emergence of Caesar as victor in the war, Arsinoe was, however, taken captive, 
transferred to Rome to be staged in Caesar’s triumph, and subsequently relegated 
to Ephesus where she lived in the Temple of Artemis. Despite the fact that after 
these events Arsinoe no longer held an official post within the Ptolemaic kingdom, 
Cleopatra may still have regarded her as a potential threat to her reign, and have 
desired to pay off the old grudge that she cherished against her. Since Ephesus 
was situated within the bounds of the Roman province of Asia, over which 
Antony held control, she asked her future paramour to have Arsinoe eradicated – 
a request with which he was prepared to comply.11 Serapion is not known to have 
played a role in this episode, and he was definitely not viewed as a menace to 
Cleopatra’s position. Instead, without permission from the Egyptian queen, he 
had provided Cassius with a fleet in the year 43 to fight Dolabella. Following the 
downfall of the two tyrannicides at Philippi, Serapion fled to Tyre and managed 
initially to escape punishment. However, when Cleopatra petitioned Antony to do 
away with her former στρατηγός, he ultimately suffered the death penalty for his 
treasonous activity.  
 In contrast with the outcome of the meetings that the “influential Judaeans” 
had with Antony, Cleopatra’s efforts to have the triumvir settling old scores on 
her behalf did thus repay her trouble. Our evidence does not, however, reveal in 
all instances Rome’s responses to pleas for interference in an internal conflict or 
rivalry. The obscure role of Antony in the quarrel between Herod and his mother-
in-law Alexandra concerning the appointment of her son Aristobulus to the High 
                                                          
10 On the assassination of Arsinoe and Serapion, see chapter 9.2. 
11 Following the Battle of Philippi, Octavian and Antony had agreed that the latter would make his 
way to the East to raise money for the troops and to settle affairs in that corner of the Roman world 
(Appian, BCiv. 5.1; 5.3; 5.22; Plutarch, Ant. 23.1; Suetonius, Aug. 13.3; Dio, 48.2.1; 48.24.1). 
241 
Priesthood can demonstrate that.12 At some point after the Parthian invasion and 
following the defeat of the Parthian-backed Judaean king Antigonus in 37, the new 
king Herod had installed a certain Hananel as High Priest in Jerusalem, since the 
previous incumbent of this post, Hyrcanus, could no longer resume his sacerdotal 
function because of the physical deformity that he had got during the Parthian 
incursion of Judaea. Alexandra, not only mother of Herod’s wife Mariamme, but 
at the same time daughter of this Hyrcanus, disagreed with the appointment of 
this new nominee to the High Priesthood, as she had hoped for the elevation of 
her own son, Aristobulus, to that office. In order to get her own way, Alexandra 
resorted to aid abroad. Through her friendship with Cleopatra, she expected that 
Antony would force Herod to replace Hananel with Aristobulus. Eventually, 
Herod did yield to the pressure that was exerted on him, and he deposed the new 
appointee, assigning the High Priestly functions to his brother-in-law. But whether 
an explicit command made by Antony was necessary for Herod to do as 
Alexandra wished, or whether the possible threat of a reprimand from the side of 
the triumvir prompted Herod to change his mind, remains unclear.13 
  
The pleas for Roman intervention in the internal affairs of Near Eastern kingdoms 
and principalities that have so far been revealed all pertained to requests for 
arbitration in a domestic power conflict and to calls for active support to a 
particular faction involved in a political feud. In the hope that Rome would deal 
with internal disputes or would settle an old grudge, the so-called influential 
Judaeans and the Egyptian queen Cleopatra made overtures to this foreign power. 
Yet, kings, princes and other notables from the Near East made appeals of a 
different nature to Rome in the period of civil war as well. According to Josephus, 
Herod would, for example, have asked the kingship for his future brother-in-law 
                                                          
12 On this quarrel, see chapter 1.7. 
13 On the conflict between Herod, Alexandra and Cleopatra concerning the appointment of a High 
Priest, see chapter 10.6. 
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Aristobulus when he came to Rome in the year 40 following his narrow escape 
from the Parthian invaders in Judaea.14 Although several scholars have dismissed 
the idea that Herod planned to solicit the kingship for the brother of his fiancée, 
Josephus’ version of Herod’s intentions cannot be discarded on the ground of his 
selfishness. 15  For the present discussion, it is merely important to realise that 
evidence exists – albeit not indisputable – for requests made to Rome to nominate 
a prince as king over one of the Near Eastern principalities.   
 
The practice of Near Eastern kings, princes and other notables of approaching 
Rome with pleas for intervention into the internal affairs of their realm was thus 
not merely limited to appeals for adjudication in a dispute or to calls for assistance 
to one of the contending parties. Recourse to Rome was also sought in cases where 
a Near Eastern prince strove for the kingship. The entreaties for interference into 
the internal dealings of a kingdom or principality made in the period of civil war 
from 44 until 31 were thus not all of the same nature. The question that remains to 
be addressed, however, is to what extent such requests were typical of our age of 
civil strife. A glance at the period prior to the eruption of political discord 
illustrates that the sheer act of Near Eastern rulers and potentates of approaching 
Rome with appeals for intervention into the domestic affairs of their own 
dominions was in itself not emblematic for our era of civil war. Already in the first 
half of the second century BC, Near Eastern rulers and dignitaries turned to Rome 
with such pleas.16 Well-recorded are, for example, the requests for Roman support 
that the Egyptian ruler Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II made in the 160s and 150s BC in 
                                                          
14 Josephus, AJ 14.386-387. 
15 See chapter 10.4. As we have seen, several convincing arguments can indeed be brought forward 
that would lend credence to Josephus’ report. 
16 This conduct was not limited to Near Eastern rulers, but was also shown by dynasts from Asia 
Minor, such as the Cappadocian princes Orophernes and his half-brother Ariarathes who both in 
the 150s BC appealed to Rome to mediate in the conflict that had erupted between them following 
the death of their father Ariarathes IV in 163. For more details on this conflict and Rome’s role in it, 
see among others Will (1967) 312-314; Gruen (1984) 582-583; Canali de Rossi (1997) 532-534; 
Ballesteros Pastor (2008) 46-48; Van Wijlick (forthcoming). 
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his attempt to secure control over the island of Cyprus, which at that time came 
under the authority of his elder brother and co-regent Ptolemy VI Philometor with 
whom he was at variance.17 Equally renowned is the case of Alexander Balas who 
claimed to be a son of Antiochus IV Epiphanes and asked for Roman aid in 
153/152 with which he planned to win the Seleucid throne at the cost of Demetrius 
I.18 Yet, illustrative as these examples are for the prevalence of requests for Roman 
interference into the internal affairs of Near Eastern kingdoms and principalities 
from the second century BC onwards, they do as it is not prove that there were no 
features of such appeals whatsoever characteristic of our period of civil war. On 
the contrary, a striking difference emerges from our comparative analysis of the 
entreaties for Roman intervention made by Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II and 
Alexander Balas on the one hand, and the pleas put forward by Near Eastern 
rulers and notables in the age of civil war on the other hand – a distinction which 
may to some degree be explained by the friction among Rome’s ruling aristocracy 
and the administrative changes that occurred in the era of civil strife. The 
difference in question pertains to the Roman institutions to which the suppliants 
reported themselves. Whereas requests for intervention made by Near Eastern 
rulers and potentates between 44 and 31 were directed to the most powerful 
Roman governor in the East, the pleas of Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II, Alexander 
Balas, and several others in the second century BC, were put forward to the Senate 
in Rome, either by the petitioner in person or through an embassy.19 To be more 
precise, all the other known requests for interference into the internal affairs of a 
                                                          
17 On the conflict between Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II and Ptolemy VI Philometor with reference to 
the rule over Cyprus specifically, and the division of the rule over the Ptolemaic kingdom in 
general, as well as the requests to the Senate, see among others Bouché-Leclercq (1904/1963) 27-45; 
Will (1967) 303-306; Gruen (1984) 692-708; Huß (2001) 544-589; Hölbl (2001) 183-189, all with 
references. 
18 On the request for aid that Alexander Balas made, see among others: Polybius, 33.18.6-14; Will 
(1967) 315-316; Gruen (1976) 91-93; Walbank (1979) 557; 561; Gruen (1984) 666-667; Sherwin-White 
(1984) 48-49; Habicht (1989) 362; Habicht (2006) 214-215.  
19 The pretender to the Seleucid throne Tryphon would have sent gifts to the Senate in order to 
secure Rome’s support in the conflict against Demetrius II (Diodorus 33.28a). On the alleged 
request for aid, see Gruen (1984) 668-669; Habicht (1989) 368; Habicht (2006) 222. 
244 
Near Eastern kingdom or principality in our era of civil war were made either to 
Antony or to a legate under his command. Obviously, it cannot be excluded that 
other proconsuls and even the Senate functioned as addressees of such pleas as 
well. If that was the case, their involvement in these interstate dealings has eluded 
our extant sources. It is at any rate not inconceivable that the predominance of 
Antony and his subordinates among the recipients of requests for intervention – 
the image that thus emanates from our existing sources – is an accurate reflection 
of reality. Antony held sway over the eastern Mediterranean as triumvir in all the 
documented cases of such pleas made to him. He would even have specifically 
received the task to set the East in order following the defeat of Cassius and 
Brutus at Philippi. The various rulers and notables from the Near East must have 
been aware of Antony’s extraordinary position of power within the Roman state. 
From that perspective, it is understandable that these Near Eastern petitioners 
turned to Antony with appeals for settling their internal affairs. Yet, it is also 
possible that those dynasts went to see Antony because he was the nearest 
representative of Roman power. 
Yet, explicable as the move of Near Eastern rulers to approach Antony and 
his inferiors is, the practice of asking governors in the region to deal with the 
internal affairs of a kingdom or principality was in itself not typical of the period 
of civil war. Before the eruption of political strife in 44, some of the demands for 
support were also made to Roman officials in the Near East, such as the plea that 
Antiochus XIII Asiaticus appears have put forward to Pompey in 64 to restore him 
to the Seleucid throne,20 or the appeal that was made about eight years later (in 56) 
by the deposed king of Parthia, Mithradates, to the proconsul of Syria, A. 
                                                          
20 Appian, Mith. 106; Justin, Epit. 40.2.2-5 and Malalas 212 inform us of the plea put forward by 
Antiochus XIII Asiaticus. Pompey refused to comply with the request and had the former kingdom 
transformed into the new Roman province of Syria. For the appeal submitted by Antiochus XIII 
Asiaticus to Pompey as well as the latter’s response, see among others Appian, Syr. 49; 70; 
Plutarch, Pomp. 39.2; Velleius, 2.37.5; Bevan (1902) 267; Will (1967) 423-424; 426-429; Sartre (2001) 
442. See chapter 1.5. 
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Gabinius, asking for aid in his attempt to recover the kingship.21 Addressing a 
Roman governor in the periphery to deal with the internal issues of a kingdom 
and principality was, accordingly, a phenomenon not unique to our age of civil 
war. 
 
17.2 Divided Rome: The mobilisation of Rome’s representatives in the East 
 
The analysis above has revealed that during the period of civil war, requests put 
forward by Near Eastern rulers and notables for Roman intervention into the 
internal conflicts of their realm were, as far as the evidence reveals, all directed to 
Roman governors and minor officials in the eastern Mediterranean. The Senate is 
not recorded to have been encountered with such petitions. By the time Rome 
plunged into a civil war in 44, the pre-eminent role that this body had played in 
the preceding century as recipient of pleas for settling domestic feuds within Near 
Eastern kingdoms and principalities seems already to have come to an end. As we 
have seen, several explanations can be offered for the fact that not the Senate but a 
handful of Roman governors were approached with requests to deal with internal 
disputes. Yet, whatever motivated the Near Eastern sovereigns and dignitaries 
during the era of civil dissension to approach Roman commanders in the 
provinces, it is clear that they were willing in the first place, just as their 
predecessors earlier on, to have a foreign power embroiled in their own domestic 
political quarrels. That the outcome of requests for mediation in a conflict, or calls 
for active help in a struggle, could be unfavourable, was a potential risk which the 
petitioners had to be prepared to put up with. Even during the period of civil war 
when such pleas were directed to governors instead of the Senate, the possibility 
of an appeal not producing the desired effect was present. A mere look at the 
dismissal of the Judaean embassy that came to see Antony in Bithynia in 41 with 
                                                          
21 On Mithradates’ request to Gabinius for assistance in regaining the throne of Parthia, see Dio, 
39.56.1-2. 
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complaints about Herod and his brother suffices to endorse that view. However, it 
is important to realise that those who suffered a rejection from Rome were not in 
all cases dissuaded from making another attempt to have their request granted. 
Antony’s refusal to give the delegation of the supposedly leading Judaeans a 
hearing did not, for example, keep them from sending deputations on two more 
occasions – one to meet Antony at Daphne and one at Tyre.22 The initiators of 
these two embassies were evidently determined to obtain the triumvir’s support, 
and probably had the genuine expectation that they could win Antony for their 
cause. Why would they else have put the time and effort into it? Yet, as will 
become apparent, during the age of civil strife, not all Near Eastern rulers and 
notables who saw their initial plea for support in a domestic quarrel rejected by 
Rome decided to put forward another request to the same administrative 
institution, apparently fearing that their supplication would be rejected again. In a 
similar way, rulers who were engaged in a struggle for power and saw their rival 
or opponent receiving aid from Rome did not all approach the same Roman 
institution that had promised the support in the hope to have the initial decision 
repealed. A glance at some of the events that occurred in relation to the power 
conflict in Judaea in the early 30s BC involving Antigonus, a scion from the 
Hasmonaean family, and Herod illustrates how certain rulers could act under 
such circumstances, how they tried to muster support for their own cause.  
The struggle for power in Judaea was set in motion with the Parthian 
invasion of Syria in the winter of 41/40.23 At some point after the launch of that 
incursion, Antigonus managed to persuade the invaders to assist him in his effort 
to oust Hyrcanus from his position as ἐθνάρχης and to win the Judaean throne for 
himself.24 With Hyrcanus ultimately deposed and imprisoned, the venture proved 
to be successful, even though the Parthians failed to capture Herod, one of the 
                                                          
22 For more details on the dispatch of embassies to Antony by the Judaeans in 41, see chapter 10.1 
and 10.2. 
23 On the Parthian invasion, see chapter 8.1. 
24 Josephus, AJ 14.330-332; BJ 1.248-249.  
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main opponents of the new regime who, following his escape from Jerusalem, 
made his way via Alexandria, Rhodes and Brundisium to Rome, where he was 
eventually granted the kingship in a meeting of the Senate.25 For Antigonus, who 
had been nominated as king by the Parthians in the meantime, Rome’s recognition 
of a rival to the throne did not at first constitute a serious threat to his position. As 
long as the Parthians retained their control over the Levant, his authority would 
not be in danger. Yet, with the expulsion of the Parthian aggressor from Asia 
Minor and Syria by the proconsul P. Ventidius Bassus in the course of 39, 
Antigonus could no longer rely on Parthian aid and was all on his own in his 
struggle against Herod. The future of his rule depended henceforth entirely on 
Rome’s willingness to assist Herod in his attempt to obtain full sovereignty over 
his new realm. Any compassion from the Senate or the two triumvirs Antony and 
Octavian would not be realistic to envisage. Now that he had been declared an 
enemy of Rome for his cooperation with the Parthians, he could not expect the 
decree regulating the bestowal of kingship upon Herod to be repealed. In order to 
ward off his own downfall, Antigonus seems, therefore, to have placed his bet on 
the feeble loyalty of the Roman commanders who had been dispatched into 
Judaea to hold up the Herodian cause. With financial allurements, Antigonus 
hoped to keep them from rendering effective support to his opponent. Of the 
Romans active in Judaea to stand by Herod, the aforementioned Ventidius, a 
legate called Pompaedius Silo and a certain Machaeras (possibly a prefect) all 
appear to have been approached by Antigonus with promises of money in return 
for their favour.26 That this strategy was successful at the outset is suggested by 
our literary sources. Josephus not only implies that Ventidius’ premature 
departure from Judaea’s battlefield in 39 is to be ascribed to bribes offered by 
Antigonus, he also claims that the withdrawal of Silo and his army into the winter 
quarters later in the same year was motivated by the financial benefits of which 
                                                          
25 See chapter 10.4. 
26 On bribes supposedly offered to Ventidius, Silo and Machaeras, see chapter 10.5. 
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Antigonus would have held out the prospect. 27  The retreat of these two 
commanders forced Herod to give up his achievements in Judaea proper, and 
made him focus on the conquest of the Galilee and Idumaea instead.28 Rewarding 
as the practice of offering bribes to individual Roman governors and their 
subordinates thus initially was, these tactics failed to provide Antigonus with 
lasting Roman support necessary to maintain his position in the long term. The 
personal appeal for military aid that Herod made in 38 to Antony at Samosata in 
Commagene can be considered to be the point at which the tables turned. The 
triumvir was willing to meet the demands of Rome’s candidate for the kingship 
over Judaea, and with the troops that Antony had placed under the command of 
Gaius Sosius, Herod eventually managed to inflict a final defeat upon his 
Hasmonaean rival and to obtain control over his kingdom.29 
 Successful as the ending of Judaea’s power struggle thus was for Herod, a 
more interventionist approach of Ventidius and Silo would presumably have 
hastened the events that resulted in Antigonus’ downfall. Whether the financial 
allurements to which Josephus refers contributed in the end to Ventidius’ and 
Silo’s retreat, remains unfortunately unclear.30  The possibility cannot be ruled out, 
at any rate. At the time of their withdrawal from Judaea (in 39), Rome was still 
engaged in the war against the Parthian invaders. In those conditions, it would 
have been difficult for the Senate in Rome and for Antony to ensure that all the 
governors dispatched to the Near East would adhere to the official senatorial line 
and triumviral ordinances.31 The remoteness between Senate and promagistrates 
on the fringe of Rome’s empire as well as the long distance between Antony and 
his legates gave Rome’s representatives in the Near East the opportunity to follow 
                                                          
27 Josephus, AJ 14.392-193, 395, 406-412, 435-438; BJ 1.288-289, 291, 297-302, 317-319. 
28 Josephus, AJ 14.413-433; BJ 1.303-316. 
29 On the appeal made by Herod to Antony and the subsequent hostilities leading to the capture of 
Jerusalem and the fall of Antigonus, see chapter 10.5. 
30 It has to be borne in mind that other explanations for Rome’s initial passivity can be put forward 
as well, all of which have been discussed in chapter 10.5. 
31 Cf. Schalit (1969) 691. 
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a more independent course. In defiance of the decree conferring the kingship upon 
Herod, Ventidius and Silo most likely anticipated that they could get away with 
withholding vital support from the new appointee. Antigonus was probably 
aware of the relative autonomy that Rome’s governors and minor officials in the 
Levant enjoyed. With financial rewards put into prospect, he hoped to capitalise 
on it. 
 
In order to counteract the Senate’s decision to present Herod with the kingship 
over Judaea, Antigonus thus tried – apparently with some success – to secure the 
goodwill of Rome’s governors in the Near East. The Hasmonaean king was, 
however, not the first and only ruler who was engaged in an internal conflict and 
endeavoured to obtain the support of a Roman functionary in reaction to the 
backing that an internal opponent had received from a different Roman official or 
from the Senate. In 63, a claimant to the Judaean throne called Hyrcanus followed 
a similar course. Ever since the demise of queen Alexandra Salome in 67, he had 
been engrossed in a struggle for the High Priesthood and the kingship with his 
brother Aristobulus.32 With the aim of ending the succession crisis, both brothers 
dispatched embassies to M. Aemilius Scaurus, who as Pompey’s subordinate had 
entered Damascus in the year 65. Having heard the statements made by the two 
opposing parties, Scaurus eventually decided in favour of Aristobulus. Hyrcanus 
was, evidently, displeased with the outcome, and when Pompey finally made his 
appearance in Judaea in the spring of 63, the case of the succession to the Judaean 
throne was reconsidered. At first, Pompey refrained from rendering a verdict, but 
after Aristobulus had initiated a military offensive against Hyrcanus, Pompey 
repealed Scaurus’ earlier judgement and chose the latter’s side. 
The manner in which Hyrcanus tried to secure Roman acknowledgment 
thus bears a strong resemblance to Antigonus’ effort to win Roman assistance. In 
                                                          
32 On the conflict between Aristobulus and Hyrcanus that erupted after the death of their mother 
Alexandra in 67, see chapter 1.7. 
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reaction to the support that a political rival had received from the Senate or from a 
specific Roman governor, both rulers endeavoured to muster the support of 
different Roman governors or officials in the Near East. Antigonus’ behaviour in 
the early 30s was thus not only typical of our period of civil strife. Both during and 
before this period, it proved to be possible for dynasts in the eastern 
Mediterranean to exploit the freedom that individual Roman officials enjoyed due 
to the remoteness between the periphery and the centre of the empire.  
 
17.3 Requests for the enlargement of territories 
 
In our discussion of the political conduct of Near Eastern kings, princes and other 
dignitaries towards Rome in the period of civil war only the requests that these 
rulers and notables made for intervention into the domestic affairs of their own 
realm have so far been reviewed. As illustrated above, the internal matters in 
which Rome was asked to interfere related to political conflicts, succession crises 
and the promotion of princes and other notables to the position of king. Yet, 
profuse as the requests to deal with any of these issues were, it is important to 
realise that Near Eastern rulers did not merely approach Rome with pleas to set 
the domestic affairs in order. The petitions put forward to Rome could take on an 
entirely different character as well. Our extent sources bear, for example, witness 
to several calls for the enlargement of a kingdom or principality. The Judaean 
ἐθνάρχης Hyrcanus is one of the Near Eastern rulers attested to have made 
requests for the territorial extension of his realm. He sent an embassy to meet 
Antony at Ephesus in 41 to ask him for the restoration of those locations that had 
been conquered by the Tyrians while Cassius was in the Near East. 33  The 
ambassadors found a sympathetic ear and the triumvir ordered Tyre by edict to 
return the lands that had been seized from the Judaeans ever since Cassius had 
                                                          
33 On the request for the restoration of the territories seized by the Tyrians with bibliography and 
references, see chapter 10.2. 
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entered Syria, early in 43. Several years later in the winter of 37/36, it was 
Cleopatra who reputedly beseeched Antony to have certain territories in the Near 
East added to her realm. In particular, she seems to have set her eye on the 
Princedom of Chalcis, Judaea and Nabataea – domains which came (albeit partly) 
under Ptolemaic influence during the heyday of the Ptolemaic Kingdom in the 
third century BC. 34  Eventually, Antony would give in to the demands of his 
mistress and conferred upon her the cities on the Phoenician coast south of the 
Eleutherus River (with the exception of Sidon and Tyre), the Princedom of Chalcis, 
the balsam and palm plantations around Jericho that were a part of Herod’s realm, 
as well as some portions of Nabataea. Two years later, additional regions were 
assigned to the Ptolemies and divided among Cleopatra and her children – a 
territorial reorganisation better known as the so-called Donations of Alexandria.35 
Although any specific evidence is absent, it is very likely that also this time 
Cleopatra had a say in the arrangement. 
 
It may not come as a surprise that the practice of Near Eastern rulers to put 
forward pleas to Rome for the enlargement of the territories under their control 
was not typical of our period of civil war. Nonetheless, the evidence for requests 
for territorial expansion seems with regard to the Near East to be limited to a plea 
that Hyrcanus as High Priest and ἐθνάρχης submitted at some point in the 40s BC 
to the Senate in Rome for the restoration of the townships in the Great Plain of 
Esdraelon to Judaea – an area that probably Pompey had taken away from Judaea 
in 63.36  
                                                          
34 For details of these demands, including bibliography and sources, see chapter 9.4. 
35 On the so-called ‘Donations of Alexandria’, see chapter 9.4. 
36 The request for the restoration of the Great Plain of Esdraelon to Judaea is itself not attested in 
our sources. Josephus has, however, preserved a fragment of an otherwise unknown senatus 
consultum (AJ 14.211-212), which is dated to January or February of the year 44 and makes mention 
of an embassy that had spoken on behalf of Hyrcanus in the Senate in Rome. Although the 
transmitted portion of the decree does not refer in any way to requests that Hyrcanus’ envoys 
submitted to the Senate, it is possible that the fragment of a senatus consultum which is excerpted in 
AJ 14.207-210 and refers to the transfer of the villages in the Great Plain of Esdraelon to Judaea (AJ 
252 
17.4 The conclusion of an alliance with Rome against a third party 
 
In 33, king Artavasdes of Media Atropatene seems to have made a compact with 
Antony to serve each other as allies against the Parthians and Octavian 
respectively.37 In the previous year, Antony had undertaken a military expedition 
against Armenia, captured the king and granted a part of his kingdom to 
Artavasdes of Media Atropatene. The possessions of the Atropatenian king were 
threatened by Artaxias, the son of the captured Armenian king who lived in exile 
at the Parthian court. In all likelihood to assure himself of support in the case of a 
combined Parthian-Armenian offensive, Artavasdes appears to have concluded an 
alliance with Antony. Although the details of the agreement between both parties 
remain obscure, it is unlikely that the two participants had concluded their pact 
with the intention to launch a war against Parthia; it was probably merely a 
defensive agreement against potential Parthian and Armenian hostilities. 
 
The practice of a Near Eastern king or prince of concluding an alliance with Rome 
against a third party cannot be regarded as conduct typical of our period of civil 
war. In 161 or 160, an alliance between the Judaean people and Rome was created, 
allegedly stipulating to serve each other as allies if one of them would come under 
attack of a third party.38 Although the Judaeans did not receive any active military 
aid from Rome when it came subsequently under Seleucid attack, the leaders of 
Judaea must have considered the pact with Rome to be beneficial to such an extent 
                                                                                                                                                                                
14.207-208) as well as to ambassadors dispatched by Hyrcanus to the Senate in Rome (AJ 14.209), 
constitutes a part of the decree given at AJ 14.211-212. Provided that this connection is valid, then it 
is very plausible to assume that the delegates sent to Rome at some point before February 44 had 
asked the Senate to see the Great Plain of Esdraelon, restored to the territory of Judaea. That parts 
of the text at AJ 14.200-210 belong to the senatus consultum preserved at AJ 14.211-212 has been 
argued by Schürer (1973) 272-275, n.23. 
37 See chapter 15.1. 
38 I Macc. 8.17-32. The alliance was concluded after an embassy had been sent to Rome in which the 
famous Eupolemus participated. 
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that they asked twice for a renewal of the compact – a bid with which Rome 
eventually complied.39 
 
17.5 Involvement in a foreign war 
 
The behaviour of Near Eastern kings, princes and other members of the ruling 
elite towards Rome in the period of civil war was not merely limited to requests 
for intervention in the internal political affairs of their own dominions, to pleas for 
territorial expansion and to the conclusion of an alliance. Interference in the 
political affairs of Rome occurred as well. Some evidence attests, for example, to 
Near Eastern rulers being involved in Rome’s foreign wars. Their involvement 
could manifest itself in support for either side. During the Parthian invasion of 
Syria and Asia Minor in the period from 40 until 38, the Commagenian king 
Antiochus, for instance, fought for the cause of the aggressor.40 Why he chose to 
render active military backing to the invaders is not entirely clear. Several 
different plausible explanations can be put forward. Yet whatever impelled 
Antiochus to give aid to the Parthians, it clear that he paid dearly for his alliance 
with the aggressor. He came under Roman attack in 38 and was eventually 
besieged by Antony at Samosata. 
 For his raid against Antiochus, Antony seems not only to have relied on his 
own Roman troops. The newly installed king of Judaea, Herod, came to Antony’s 
support and even have contributed, if Josephus is to be believed, to the 
subjugation of the Commagenian ruler.41 Herod had come to Samosata to ask 
Antony for more aid in his attempt to quell all opposition in his homeland and to 
become the undisputed leader of Judaea. Possibly, Herod anticipated that the 
                                                          
39 I Macc. 14.24; 15.15-24: renewal of the alliance in 139; Josephus, AJ 13.259-265: renewal of the 
alliance around 132 or in 105. 
40 See chapter 16.2. Cicero did not trust the Commagenian king when he was proconsul in Cilicia in 
51. On his untrustworthiness see Facella (2005). 
41 So Josephus, BJ 1.322. Cf. AJ 14.445-447 which does not state that Herod’s arrival at Samosata 
contributed to the end of the siege. 
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demonstration of his own military capacities would convince Antony of his 
usefulness as a ruler.42 
 Two years after the expulsion of the Parthians, Antony launched his own 
military expedition against Parthia. In the initial stages of the campaign, he 
received aid from the Armenian king Artavasdes, who not only placed horsemen 
at his disposal, but also led him through his own kingdom into Media Atropatene. 
The support granted to Antony proved in the end, however, not to be of much 
help. Not long after the invasion of Media Atropatene, Artavasdes of Armenia 
gathered his troops and withdrew from the battlefield into his own kingdom. 
Having suffered severe losses, Antony was eventually forced to make his own 
retreat. To what extent the flight of the Armenian king contributed to this 
outcome, remains, however, arguable.43 
 
It is clear that Near Eastern rulers were not merely involved in Rome’s foreign 
wars during our age of civil war. The Emisene ruler Iamblichus cooperated, for 
example, with Rome when the Parthians invaded in 51, while Antipater and 
Hyrcanus sent help to Caesar’s ally Mithradates of Pergamum during the 
Alexandrian War of 48.44 
 
17.6 Involvement in a civil war 
 
Of all the types of conduct undertaken by Near Eastern kings, potentates and 
other dignitaries towards Rome that have been discussed so far, none can be 
regarded as conduct typical for our period of civil war. The only kind of behaviour 
that occurred between 44 and 31 and is characteristic of our age of civil strife is 
thus the support granted by Near Eastern rulers and notables to Roman factions 
                                                          
42 See chapter 10.5. 
43 See chapter 14.2. 
44 Cicero, Fam. 15.1.2. 
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engaged in a domestic power conflict. Support for a Roman faction at variance 
with another political group is not only attested in our age of civil turmoil. Also 
during the Year of the Four Emperors (AD 69), we see a Near Eastern ruler 
participating on the side of one of the factions. It was the Judaean king Agrippa II 
who supported the cause of Vespasian when he travelled to Rome in that year.45 
Several instances of aid allotted to one of Rome’s contending parties have emerged 
from the extant sources for our period of civil war. The prince of Chalcis, Ptolemy, 
son of Mennaeus, seems, for example, along with Sampsigeramus and Iamblichus, 
φύλαρχοι of the Emisenoi, to have assisted Q. Caecilius Bassus, a former 
Pompeian equestrian officer, in his rebellion against the governor of Syria, Sextus 
Iulius Caesar, in 46, and subsequently against other Roman generals who had 
been dispatched to quell the insurgence.46 The Ptolemaic queen, for example, made 
preparations in 43 for the dispatch of a fleet to Octavian and Antony. Although 
unfavourable winds are said to have prevented her from executing her plan, 
Cassius would still have undertaken a punitive expedition against her – were it 
not for the fact that the campaign was ultimately aborted on Brutus’ orders.47  
With the absence of any direct military confrontation between Rome’s 
opposing political factions in the eastern Mediterranean for the next decade, none 
of the Near Eastern rulers were involved in rendering support to any of the 
conflicting parties. It was only in the run-up to the Battle of Actium that Near 
Eastern kings and princes are attested again to be entangled in Rome’s internal 
political conflict. Several of those rulers provided military assistance to Antony in 
the war against Octavian. The Nabataean king Malichus, the king of Media 
Atropatene and Mithradates of Commagene all appear to have allied themselves 
with Antony. The latter may even have attended in person.48 
                                                          
45 Wellesley (2000) 43. 
46 See chapters 5.1, 6.1, 4.1. 
47 On the four legions sent off to Dolabella and on the plan dispatch of a fleet to Antony and 
Octavian, see chapter 3.2. 
48 See chapters 13.3, 15.2, 16.3. 
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 The reasons behind the decision of the aforementioned rulers to assist a 
faction in Rome’s domestic political conflict are highly diverse and cannot be 
reduced to one particular motive.49 Some appear to have hoped to receive benefits 
as a reward for their support, whereas others were pressurised by a particular 
Roman faction or by other Near Eastern rulers. In this respect, the proximity of the 
leader of a faction to the Near Eastern kings – Cassius and Antony both had their 
power base in the eastern Mediterranean – played a vital role as well. 
Nevertheless, whatever prompted these rulers to support one particular Roman 
party in an internal conflict, it is clear that not all of them favoured the ultimately 
victorious faction. Backing the wrong horse did, however, not necessarily bring 
about adverse consequences. Although Cleopatra was threatened by Cassius with 
a punitive expedition, Herod was famously forgiven by Octavian in 30 for his 
conduct in the civil wars and confirmed in his kingship.50 
 
Conclusion 
 
The behaviour of Near Eastern rulers towards Rome in the period of civil war 
from 44 until 31 has thus for the most part not been typical of an era of internal 
strife. Only the grant of support to a Roman faction that was engaged in a 
domestic political conflict can be regarded as behaviour characteristic for a period 
of civil war. Unfortunately, the evidence for this type of behaviour predominantly 
comes from our era of civil strife. Only one example of support granted to a 
faction in an internal conflict has been identified outside our own period: in AD 69 
the Judaean king Agrippa II supported the cause of Vespasian in Rome. The lack 
of evidence does not reflect a reluctance of Near Eastern rulers to get involved in 
Rome’s civil wars. Rather, it mirrors the gradual disappearance of nominally 
independent kingdoms and principalities on the fringe of Rome’s empire.  
                                                          
49 See the different chapters for possible explanations.  
50 Josephus, AJ 15.183-198; BJ 1.386-393. 
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18 ROME’S CONDUCT TOWARDS NEAR EASTERN 
KINGDOMS AND PRINCIPALITIES 
 
The behaviour of Rome towards Near Eastern kingdoms and principalities proved 
to be highly diverse. The study in part II has already shown that this conduct was 
partly undertaken in response to various requests put forward by Near Eastern 
rulers and other dignitaries, and partly on Rome’s own initiative. This chapter will 
focus on the different type of actions taken on by Rome towards these kingdoms 
and principalities, whether in response to a specific plea or not. The various kinds 
of conduct that have been identified are as follows: the conduct of war against a 
Near Eastern kingdom; the conclusion of an alliance with a Near Eastern king or 
prince against a third party; the arrangement of dynastic intermarriage; demands 
for financial or military contributions; the judgement over past conduct of Near 
Eastern rulers; the nomination or removal of kings or princes; and the grant or 
seizure of territories. All of these will be discussed in what follows. 
 
18.1 At war with a Near Eastern kingdom 
 
One of Rome’s most intrusive and devastating types of behaviour towards a Near 
Eastern kingdom was without doubt the launch of a military campaign. In our 
period of civil war, three of these wars were conducted. The first of those 
expeditions commenced in 38 in the aftermath of the Parthian invasion and was 
directed towards king Antiochus I of Commagene. This ruler had granted shelter 
to some Parthian refugees following Parthia’s final defeat in the battle near 
Gindarus. It was possibly the provision of this safe haven that prompted the 
Roman commander Ventidius to initiate his assault on Commagene, although 
financial and strategic considerations may have played a role as well. Yet, 
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whatever impelled the Romans to begin the campaign, it is evident that in the 
same year, hostilities came to an end.1 
 Two years later, Antony began his Parthian expedition that ended in 
disaster. Moving in the first instance towards the north and subsequently through 
Armenia across the Araxes into the kingdom of Media Atropatene, the advance 
came to a halt at the city of Phraaspa before having reached Parthia. Substantial 
losses and the defection of the Armenian auxiliary troops forced Antony 
eventually to make his retreat.2 In order to penalise king Artavasdes of Armenia 
for his premature withdrawal from the battlefield, Antony undertook a campaign 
against his kingdom in the year 34 and managed to capture him. The triumvir 
advertised his success in Armenia widely on coinage, in the hope that it would not 
merely compensate for his failure in Media Atropatene, but also counterbalance 
Octavian’s earlier success against Sextus Pompeius.3 
Twenty years before the capture of king Artavasdes of Armenia, Crassus 
launched his military campaign into Parthia and was eventually defeated at 
Carrhae in 53. It does not need any further elaboration to show that military 
expeditions against foreign kingdoms and principalities were not typical of our 
period of civil war, even though the rationale behind the expeditions may possibly 
have been related to the competition among Rome’s ruling elite, in particular 
between Antony and Octavian – a rivalry which eventually culminated in the 
Battle of Actium, Antony’s defeat and the rise of sole rule in Rome. 
 
18.2 The conclusion of alliances for the conduct of a war against a third party 
 
In at least two of the three offensive wars fought in our period of civil war, Rome 
received support from Near Eastern kings, princes and other notables. Antony 
                                                          
1 See chapter 16.2. 
2 See chapter 8.2. 
3 See chapter 14.2 with references to the relevant coinage. 
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was, for example, assisted by Herod in his expedition against Antiochus I of 
Commagene,4 and for the Parthian campaign he received armed assistance from 
king Artavasdes of Armenia. Iberian and Celtic cavalry would have served as his 
auxiliaries in this expedition as well.5 Vital as these pacts with Near Eastern kings 
and princes were, it is evident that Rome did not only conclude alliances with the 
aim of securing sufficient support for an offensive military campaign against a 
kingdom or principality. Compacts whereby Rome promised aid to a Near Eastern 
king or prince who was entangled in a conflict with another ruler were made as 
well. Antony, for example, in 33 came to an agreement with king Artavasdes of 
Media Atropatene to serve each other as allies against the Parthians and Octavian 
respectively. A year earlier, Antony had captured the Armenian ruler Artavasdes 
and occupied his kingdom, granting a part of it to the Atropatenean Artavasdes. 
The new Armenian king, Artaxias, had in the meantime escaped his realm and 
fled to Parthia. With the probable intention of forestalling a joint Parthian-
Armenian attack on the Armenian possessions of the Atropatenean ruler, 
Artavasdes appears to have made an alliance with Rome, which initially proved to 
be beneficial for him. However, when Antony removed the Roman soldiers from 
Armenia not much later as part of the preparations for the war against Octavian, 
the Parthian ruler Phraates and the Armenian ruler Artaxias succeeded in 
expelling Artavasdes from Armenian territories. 6 
 
Rome’s practice of concluding alliances with a Near Eastern king or prince 
engaged in a conflict with another ruler cannot be regarded as conduct typical of 
our period of civil war. In 161 or 160, Rome entered, for example, into a treaty 
                                                          
4 See chapter 10.5. 
5 See chapter 8.2. 
6 See chapter 15.1. 
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with the Judaean people, which reputedly stipulated that both parties were to 
serve each other as allies if one of them would come under attack of a third party.7 
 
18.3 The arrangement of dynastic intermarriage 
 
At the time of Rome’s entrance on the political stage of the Near East in the 
beginning of the second century BC, dynastic intermarriage was a phenomenon 
that had already proliferated in that region for several millennia, and would 
continue to be a widespread occurrence for the remainder of the Roman Republic 
and even beyond our age of civil war well into the Imperial period. 8  Each 
generation of rulers was apparently aware of the potential benefits that the 
creation of family ties through marriage could yield. Not only did a marriage 
between members of different royal families in the Near East give the monarchs 
and potentates who were involved the opportunity to establish friendly relations 
with each other, it also enabled them to involve themselves in the internal affairs 
of each other’s kingdom or principality. In order to avoid any disputes with the 
Ptolemaic rulers, the Seleucid king Antiochus III is, for example, said to have first 
betrothed and later married off his daughter Cleopatra to Ptolemy V Epiphanes in 
the 190s BC. 9  About half a century later, the marriages that were concluded 
between Cleopatra Thea, a daughter of the Egyptian ruler Ptolemy VI Philometor, 
and three different Seleucid kings (Alexander Balas, Demetrius II and Antiochus 
VII Sidetes) seem to have contributed to influence and patronage that the 
Ptolemies exerted over the final Seleucid pretenders to the throne.10 Rome neither 
                                                          
7 See chapter 17.4. 
8 Sullivan (1990) 14-15. 
9 Diodorus, 28.12; cf. Porphyry, BNJ 260 F47, who reports that Antiochus arranged the marriage 
between his daughter and Ptolemy as part of his plan to add Egypt to his dominions. See also 
Polybius, 18.51.10; Livy, 33.40.2; 35.13.4; Walbank (1967) 623 lists the evidence for the year in which 
the betrothal would have taken place and concludes that 196 is clearly the correct date; Will (1967) 
161-162; Ogden (1999) 82-83; Huß (2001) 499-500; Hölbl (2001) 140. 
10 On the marriages, see I Macc. 10.51-58. Ogden (1999) 147-149. 
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interfered in the arrangement of dynastic intermarriages, nor was it itself involved 
as one of the participating members. Only in the 30s BC do the benefits of this 
system appear to have been understood by at least one Roman official. It was 
Antony who in 33 married off Alexander Helios, one of the sons he bore with 
Cleopatra, to Iotape, the daughter of king Artavasdes of Media Atropatene. As we 
have seen in part II, the marriage was in all likelihood connected with the so-
called Donations of Alexandria from 34. Alexander was granted the lands east of 
the Euphrates if we are to believe Dio – a claim often dismissed as Augustan 
propaganda by modern scholars, but which can be explained as part of a policy to 
establish secure rule throughout the Near East. Since Media Atropetene was not 
ruled by the Ptolemies, marrying a Ptolemaic prince to an Atropatenean princess 
was an exquisite way to gain influence into one of the areas given to Alexander.11 
 
Although there are no other examples known of Rome arranging marriages 
between different Hellenistic dynasties, it would go too far to regard this kind of 
conduct typical of our period of civil war. It would be better to see it as a novel 
attempt to reorganise the eastern Mediterranean by employing established 
Hellenistic methods in the expectation that such would increase the chances of 
success. 
 
18.4 Demands for financial and military contributions 
 
One of the most frequently attested types of behaviour conducted by Rome 
towards Near Eastern kings, princes and other notables in the period of civil war 
was the demand for financial and military contributions. Several of such 
requirements have been testified in our extant sources and extensively reviewed in 
part II. In 43, it was Cassius who asked Cleopatra and her governor of Cyprus, 
                                                          
11 On the marriage, see chapter 9.4. 
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Serapion, for vessels – an order with which the latter, unlike the Egyptian queen, 
complied.12 In the same year, Cassius also imposed a tax of seven hundred talents 
upon the Judaeans. As has been demonstrated earlier, Cassius was in need of 
funds and military equipment to extend and solidify his power base in the eastern 
Mediterranean. It is from this perspective that the heavy taxes on Judaea are in all 
likelihood to be understood.13 
 Following the defeat of Cassius and Brutus at Philippi, Antony made a tour 
through Asia Minor and the Near East, and imposed heavy contributions on 
Judaea, possibly the Princedom of Chalcis and several other kingdoms and 
principalities in Anatolia.14 It is very plausible that the financial contributions were 
inflicted on these different lands as a means to raise funds for the soldiers who 
had fought under his and Octavian’s command. Antony would have agreed with 
Octavian in the aftermath of Philippi to levy money in the East for the payment of 
their troops.15 
 
It thus appears to be evident that our known cases of demands for financial and 
military contributions were specifically linked to the circumstances that came with 
the civil war – such as the need for funds and military equipment as well as the 
settlement of veterans from the internal political conflict. That does not mean that 
the exaction of money was unique to our period of civil war. A regular tribute 
appears, for example, to have been imposed on Judaea as part of Pompey’s 
reorganisation of that state in the late 60s.16 
 
 
                                                          
12 See chapter 3.2. 
13 See chapter 4.2. 
14 See chapter 10.4, 11.1. 
15 See previous note. 
16 See chapter 1.7. 
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18.5 Rome calling Near Eastern kings and princes to account  
 
Two instances of Rome calling Near Eastern kings and princes to account for their 
behaviour are known to have occurred in our period of civil war. In the year 41, 
while Antony made his tour through the eastern provinces, he summoned the 
Egyptian queen Cleopatra to meet him at Tarsus to account for her involvement in 
the conflict with Brutus and Cassius. She was reputedly accused of having failed 
to render support to the Caesareans in the war against the tyrannicides, and of 
having given aid to Cassius. Cleopatra came to see her future paramour and 
managed to have the indictment dropped.17 
 Several years later, in 34, Antony bade Herod to come to see him at 
Laodicea to defend himself against the accusation that he was responsible for the 
death of the High Priest Aristobulus in 35. Antony had been urged by Cleopatra 
on behalf of Aristobulus’ mother, Alexandra, to take on the case. In the end, the 
allegations were dropped and Herod was acquitted.18 
 
It is clear that the summoning of Cleopatra was related to the events that had 
occurred while the triumvirs on the one hand and Cassius and Brutus on the other 
hand were engaged in a political and armed conflict. As such, this kind of 
behaviour was unique to our age of civil war. Yet, the bidding of Herod in 34 to 
account for his behaviour stood in relation to an event that had no connection 
whatsoever with Rome’s civil war. It is, therefore, questionable whether 
summoning a Near Eastern ruler to give account for certain behaviour in a context 
not related to the civil war was typical of our era of civil strife.  
 
 
                                                          
17 Appian, BCiv. 5.8; Plutarch, Ant. 25.1; see chapter 9.1. 
18 See chapter 10.6. 
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18.6 Nomination and removal of Near Eastern rulers 
 
The nomination or removal of a Near Eastern ruler is a practice that belongs 
without doubt to one of the most frequently attested types of behaviour. In 43, 
Dolabella, the illegal Roman proconsul who had been declared an enemy by the 
Senate and whose command over the province of Syria had been rescinded and 
transferred to Cassius, granted Cleopatra the right to have her son Ptolemy Caesar 
called king of Egypt.19 In the same year, Cassius rewarded Herod for his speed in 
collecting the required tribute by appointing him as στρατηγός of Coele Syria.20 In 
41, Antony nominated Herod and Phasael as tetrarchs over Galilee and Jerusalem 
and surroundings.21 In 40, Herod was officially given the kingship in a meeting of 
the Senate in Rome.22 Four years later, Antony put to death a certain Lysanias, 
ruler of the Princedom of Chalcis.23 In 31, he may also have executed the ruler of 
the Emisenoi, Iamblichus.24 
 
It is clear that the nomination and removal of rulers in the Near East as well as the 
decision of Antony and of the Senate to confirm certain rulers were types of 
behaviour not specifically characteristic of our age of civil war. For almost each of 
these cases it is evident that circumstances related to a civil war did not play a role 
in the decision to nominate certain rulers. It is more likely that most of the 
aforementioned nominations constituted a part of Antony’s plan to reorganise the 
Near East in such a way that it would be politically stable. An earlier 
administrative rearrangement of the Levant and other parts of the eastern 
Mediterranean had been undertaken by Pompey in the 60s BC. As part of the 
reorganisation of the Near East, Pompey removed and installed several rulers. In 
                                                          
19 Dio 47.31.5; see also chapter 3.2.  
20 See chapter 4.3. 
21 See chapter 10.3. 
22 See chapter 10.4. 
23 See chapter 11.3. 
24 See chapter 12.2.  
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63, after the Judaean brothers Hyrcanus and Aristobulus had come to see him, 
each asking for the confirmation of the kingship, Pompey eventually sided with 
Hyrcanus, and confirmed him in his position as High Priest and ἐθνάρχης of the 
Judaeans.25  
 
18.7 Territorial rearrangements 
 
Territorial rearrangements are quite frequently testified in the extant sources to 
have occurred in the period of civil war. It is obvious that this type of conduct 
from the side of Rome was not typical of an era of internal political strife. Even 
before the onset of domestic conflict following the assassination of Caesar, Rome 
implemented changes to dominions over which the Near Eastern rulers had 
control. Well-known are the territorial reductions that Pompey imposed on Judaea 
and on Armenia.26 Within our period of civil war, perhaps most evocative are the 
extensive modifications that Antony carried through involving Cleopatra and the 
three children he bore with her. In 37/6 he would have granted the Egyptian queen 
substantial parts of the Near East, and in 34, the territorial rearrangement 
comprised theoretically almost the entire Near East. We have already seen that 
this radical reform was not the work of an unrestrained lover under the spell of 
the Egyptian queen. The rationale behind these grand reforms seems to have been 
the political and administrative stabilisation of the Near East, by placing it under 
the rule of one kingdom which had already existed for over two and a half 
centuries. Instead of incorporating the Near East in its entirety into the Roman 
empire by imposing provincial rule, Antony placed it under the hegemony of the 
Ptolemies and indirectly under the aegis of Rome.27 
 
                                                          
25 See chapter 1.7. 
26 See chapter 1.1, 1.7. 
27 On the territorial donations and the so-called ‘Donations of Alexandria’, see chapter 9.4.  
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Conclusion 
 
My analysis of the behaviour of Rome towards Near Eastern kings, princes and 
other dignitaries in the period from 44 until 31 has demonstrated that most types 
of conduct undertaken within this time frame were not characteristic of an age of 
civil war. The only kind of behaviour that is typical of a period of civil war to a 
certain extent is the demand of financial and military contributions, although it 
has to be borne in mind that money was also exacted from some of the Near 
Eastern kingdoms and principalities in periods during which Rome’s internal 
politics was peaceful. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
This thesis has looked at the interstate contacts between Rome and Near Eastern 
dynasts in the period of Roman civil war from 44 until 31 from different 
perspectives; I set out to provide an analysis of the political relations between 
Rome on the one hand and Near Eastern kingdoms and principalities on the other 
hand in this period. The inquiry consisted mainly of the identification and 
explanation of individual instances of bilateral interaction (Part II). On the basis of 
these findings, an attempt has been made to examine to what degree the conduct 
of each of the parties was typical of our age of civil strife (Part III). Since the thesis 
has almost entirely focused on specific cases of political contact, it may appear 
difficult to move away from the particular and to recognise trends in the 
behaviour of the participants on both sides. What this thesis reveals is the wide 
variety in political dealings between representatives of Roman power on the one 
hand and Near Eastern rulers on the other hand. These differences can be seen, for 
example, in the attitude of the dynasts towards Cassius and Brutus. Whereas 
almost all the rulers in the Levant supported the tyrannicides while they held 
sway over the eastern Mediterranean, Cleopatra remained faithful to Dolabella 
and the triumvirs. On the other hand, Rome’s representative in the East equally 
did not treat all the kingdoms and principalities in the same way. Some realms, 
such as Judaea, saw heavy taxes imposed on them and territories taken away, 
whereas others – most notably the Ptolemaic Kingdom – experienced a territorial 
expansion at the hands of Antony. Yet, despite all these varieties, it is possible 
when observing our discoveries at a greater distance to draw further conclusions.  
 
In the Introduction, I argued against the application of the patron-client 
terminology to Rome’s foreign relations. The main arguments for this point of 
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view were the lack of any evidence for the existence of formal interstate clientela, 
and the actual nature of the relations that Rome had with kings, queens, other 
rulers and communities. My study of Rome’s bilateral dealings with kingdoms 
and principalities in the Near East during the period of civil war has confirmed 
this judgement. Indeed, rulers in the Near East were all, with the exception of the 
Parthian kings, to a large degree dependent upon Rome. None of them enjoyed 
full freedom to act as they liked or thought fit. Antony’s unilateral grant of 
territories to Cleopatra in 37/36 and to her children in 34 at the cost of the domains 
of other dynasts in the eastern Mediterranean aptly demonstrates this. Also 
illustrative of the inferiority is the ease with which Rome’s governors in the East – 
most notably Cassius and Antony – interfered in the internal administration of 
kingdoms and principalities by implementing personal changes. Subordinate as 
Near Eastern rulers in relation to Rome were, the factual existence of an unequal 
interstate relationship does not allow us to conclude that Rome viewed kings and 
princes in the East as her clients. An association of clientela was based on specific 
mutual obligations, whereby the client rendered support to the patron in exchange 
for protection.  Rome’s bilateral connections with rulers in the Near East during 
our age of civil war, however, in no way resemble these characteristics. Applying 
the patron-client terminology to those relations would thus be a distortion of the 
past.  
  The same conclusion can be drawn with the regard to the existence of 
official treaties regulating the behaviour of Rome and Near Eastern rulers 
involved. There is no evidence for such formal compacts in our period of civil war 
arranged by Rome and kingdoms and principalities in the Near East. Although it 
cannot be excluded that treaties were made, it seems that Rome refrained from 
entering into official accords altogether, bearing in mind the reluctance with which 
such treaties were concluded with Hellenistic kingdoms in the second century BC, 
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as demonstrated by Gruen.1 Rome apparently disliked the idea of committing 
herself to the obligations that formed an integral part of such formal 
arrangements. Rome preferred the informal connection of amicitia, which did not 
impose certain duties upon the parties involved. Some of the rulers during our age 
of civil strife had been recognised as friends or as friends and allies of Rome – 
most notably the Judaean ἐθνάρχης Hyrcanus at Caesar’s intercession in 47. My 
study has revealed that these associations could influence the conduct of Rome 
and of its friends in the Near East. 
 
As demonstrated in Part I, interstate amicitia was a phenomenon which Rome 
encountered in the third century BC. It was an informal institution that originated 
in the eastern Mediterranean and which Rome gradually embraced. That certain 
rulers during our period had a relationship based on amicitia with Rome is thus 
not peculiar and testifies to continuity in the framework within which the 
interstate relations took place. My examination of the interaction between Rome 
and Near Eastern kingdoms and principalities during our era of civil war in Part 
III has also shown continuity in conduct with earlier periods. Striking in this 
respect is the freedom which Rome’s personnel in the Near East thought to enjoy 
to a certain degree from decisions from above. The attempts of the Judaean 
pretender Antigonus to forestall Roman support for Herod in the early 30s BC by 
successfully bribing the Roman legate Silo to abstain from assistance to Herod 
demonstrates this best. It also illustrates that Near Eastern dynasts were aware of 
this possibility and tried to benefit from it. Equally remarkable is the continuity in 
the practice of embassies from Near Eastern rulers or other groups from this 
region to Rome’s most powerful representative in the region. In our case, this was 
predominantly Antony, who as triumvir was the supreme leader over the eastern 
Mediterranean from 41 onwards (a position formalised in 40 in the Pact of 
                                                          
1 Gruen (1984) 13-53. 
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Brundisium). The practice of Near Eastern dynasts of dispatching embassies to 
Rome with requests to mediate in a dispute or to grant support in a conflict goes 
back to the third century BC. It was common for those embassies to be addressed 
to the Senate. However, with the rise of powerful politicians, such as Marius, Sulla 
and Pompey, and strife within the Senate during the Late Republic, those 
deputations were increasingly often sent to governors in the region. In that sense, 
the practice of delegates to approach Antony in the 40s and 30s BC was in 
agreement with established practice.  
 
The analysis of the political relations between Rome and Near Eastern kingdoms 
and principalities during the period of civil war from 44 until 31 has thus revealed 
that not only the framework within which these dealings took place but also the 
individual instances of interaction were characterised by continuity with previous 
periods. Whether similar conclusions can be drawn with regard to later periods of 
civil strife remains the subject for a different study.  
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Map 1 The eastern Mediterranean 
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Map 2 Armenia and North Mesopotamia 
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Map 3 Judaea 
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Map 4 The Levant 
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Map 5 Antony’s march, 36 BC 
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Stemma 1 The Hasmonaean Family 
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Stemma 2 The Herodian Family 
 
Source: Smallwood (1976) xx. 
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